Since then they had been greatly strengthened.
[20] THROUGH OLD PATHS. The Indians had passed this way centuries before
the fortress was thought of.
[21] ST. CLAIR seems to have waited just long enough for the defence to
become difficult, to admit its impossibility. He chose the part of
safety rather than that of glory.
IV.
HUBBARDTON.
(_July 7, 1777._)
Not doubting he would find Skenesborough still in our possession, St.
Clair was pushing for that place with all possible speed. He expected to
get there by land, before the enemy could do so by water; then, after
gathering up the men and stores saved from Ticonderoga, St. Clair meant
to fall back toward Fort Edward, where General Schuyler,[22] his
superior officer, lay with two thousand men.
This was plainly St Clair's true course. Indeed, there was nothing else
for him to do, unless he decided to abandon the direct route to Albany
altogether. So St. Clair did what a good general should. He resolved to
throw himself between Burgoyne and Schuyler, whose force, joined to his
own, would thus be able, even if not strong enough to risk a battle, at
least to keep up a bold front toward the enemy.
Though Burgoyne really knew nothing about Schuyler's force, he was
keenly alive to the importance of cutting off the garrison of
Ticonderoga from its line of retreat, and, if possible, of striking it a
disabling blow before it could take up a new position. St. Clair counted
on stealing a march before his retreat could be interfered with. He
also depended on the strength of the obstructions at the bridge[23] of
Ticonderoga to delay the enemy's fleet until his own could get safely to
Skenesborough. In both expectations, St. Clair was disappointed.
[Sidenote: July 6.]
In the first place, Burgoyne had sent Frazer out in pursuit of him, as
soon as the evacuation was discovered; in the second, Burgoyne's
gunboats had hewed their way through the obstructions by nine in the
morning, and were presently crowding all sail after the American
flotilla, under command of Burgoyne himself.
Riedesel's camp, we remember, lay on the Vermont side, and so nearest to
Mount Independence, and St. Clair's line of retreat. Burgoyne,
therefore, ordered Riedesel to fall in behind Frazer, who had just
marched, and give that officer any support he might be in want of.
Thus, most of the hostile forces were in active movement, either by land
or water, at an early hour of the sixth. Let us first follow Frazer, in
his effort to strike the American rear.
Frazer had with him eight hundred and fifty men of his own corps. He
pushed on so eagerly that the slow-moving Germans were far in the rear
when the British halted for the night, near Hubbardton. The day had been
sultry, the march fatiguing. Frazer's men threw themselves on the
ground, and slept on their arms.
St. Clair had reached Hubbardton the same afternoon, in great disorder.
He halted only long enough for the rearguard to come up, and then
hastened on, six miles farther, to Castleton, leaving Warner,[24] with
three regiments, to cover his retreat. Instead of keeping within
supporting distance of the main body, Warner foolishly decided to halt
for the night where he was, because his men were tired, thus putting a
gap of six miles between his commander and himself.
Warner did not neglect, however, to fell some trees in front of his
camp, and this simple precaution, perhaps, proved the salvation of his
command the next day.
[Sidenote: July 7.]
At five in the morning, Frazer's scouts fell upon Warner's pickets while
they were cooking their breakfasts, unsuspicious of danger. The surprise
was complete. With their usual dash, Frazer's men rushed on to the
assault, but soon found themselves entangled among the felled trees and
brushwood, behind which the Americans were hurriedly endeavoring to
form. At the moment of attack, one regiment made a shameful retreat. The
rest were rallied by Warner and Francis,[25] behind trees, in copses, or
wherever a vantage-ground could be had. As the combat took place in the
woods, the British were forced to adopt the same tactics. Musket and
rifle were soon doing deadly work in their ranks, every foot of ground
was obstinately disputed, and when they thought the battle already won
they found the Americans had only just begun to fight.
For three hours, eight hundred men maintained a gallant and stubborn
fight against the picked soldiers of Burgoyne's army, each side being
repeatedly driven from its ground without gaining decided advantage over
the other. Nor would Frazer have gained the day, as he at length did,
but for the timely arrival of the Germans. Indeed, at the moment when
the British were really beaten and ready to give way, the sound of many
voices, singing aloud, rose above the din of battle, and near at hand.
At first neither of the combatants knew what such strange sounds could
mean. It was Riedesel's Germans advancing to the attack, chanting battle
hymns to the fierce refrain of the musketry and the loud shouts of the
combatants. Fifty fresh men would have turned the scale to either side.
This reenforcement, therefore, decided the day. Being now greatly
outnumbered, the Americans scattered in the woods around them.
Although a defeat, this spirited little battle was every way honorable
to the Americans, who fought on until all hope of relief had vanished. A
single company would have turned defeat into victory, when to the
British, defeat in the woods, thirty miles from help, meant destruction.
Even as it was, they did not know what to do with the victory they had
just won, with the loss of two hundred men, killed and wounded,
seventeen of whom were officers. They had neither shelter nor medicines
for the wounded, nor provisions for themselves. The battle had exhausted
their ammunition, and every moment was expected to bring another swarm
of foes about their ears.
The Americans had three hundred men killed and wounded, and many
taken. The brave Colonel Francis, who had so admirably conducted the
retreat from Ticonderoga, was killed while rallying his men. Seldom has
a battle shown more determined obstinacy in the combatants, seldom has
one been more bloody for the numbers engaged.
[Illustration: ST. CLAIR'S RETREAT--BURGOYNE'S ADVANCE ON FORT EDWARD.]
While Frazer was thus driving St. Clair's rearguard before him on the
left, the British were giving chase to the American flotilla on the
lake. This had hardly reached Skenesborough, encumbered with the sick,
the baggage, and the stores, when the British gunboats came up with, and
furiously attacked, it. Our vessels could not be cleared for action or
make effective resistance. After making what defence they could, they
were abandoned, and blown up by their crews. Skenesborough was then set
on fire, the Americans making good their retreat to Fort Anne,[26] with
the loss of all their stores.
St. Clair heard of Warner's defeat and of the taking of Skenesborough
almost at the same hour. His first plan had wholly miscarried. His
soldiers were angry and insubordinate, half his available force had been
scattered at Hubbardton, his supplies were gone, his line of retreat in
the enemy's hands. Finding himself thus cut off from the direct route to
Fort Edward, he now marched to join Schuyler by way of Rutland,
Manchester, and Bennington. This he succeeded in doing on the twelfth,
with about half the men he had led from Ticonderoga. Warner, too,
brought off the shattered remnant of his command to Bennington.
On his part, Schuyler had promptly sent a reenforcement to Fort Anne, to
protect St. Clair's retreat, as soon as he knew of it. These troops soon
found other work on their hands than that cut out for them.
[Sidenote: July 7.]
Burgoyne was determined to give the Americans no time either to rally,
or again unite their scattered bands in his front. Without delay, one
regiment was pushed forward to Fort Anne, on the heels of the fugitives
who had just left Skenesborough in flames. When this battalion reached
the fort, instead of waiting to be attacked, the Americans sallied out
upon it with spirit, and were driving it before them in full retreat,
when the yells of some Indians, who were lurking in the neighboring
woods, spread such a panic among the victors that they gave up the
fight, set fire to Fort Anne, and retreated to Fort Edward with no enemy
pursuing them. The defeated British then fell back to Skenesborough, so
that each detachment may be said to have run away from the other.
General Burgoyne had much reason to be elated with his success thus far.
In one short week he had taken Ticonderoga, with more than one hundred
cannon; had scattered the garrison right and left; had captured or
destroyed a prodigious quantity of warlike stores, the loss of which
distressed the Americans long after; had annihilated their naval
armament on the lake, and had sown dismay among the neighboring colonies
broadcast. It was even a question whether there was any longer a force
in his front capable of offering the least resistance to his march.
[Illustration: BLOCK HOUSE, FORT ANNE.]
With these exploits, the first stage of the invasion may be said to have
ended. If ever a man had been favored by fortune, Burgoyne was that man.
The next stage must show him in a very different light, as the fool of
fortune, whose favors he neither knew how to deserve when offered him,
nor how to compel when withheld.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] GENERAL PHILIP SCHUYLER, one of the four major-generals first
created by Congress, June, 1775. Had seen some service in the French
War; was given command of the Northern Department, including
Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Fort Stanwix, etc., February, 1777, as the one
man who could unite the people of New York against the enemy. Gates
declined to serve under him.
[23] OBSTRUCTIONS AT THE BRIDGE. The Americans had stretched a boom of
logs, strongly chained together, across the strait.
[24] SETH WARNER was on the way to Ticonderoga when he met St. Clair
retreating. The rearguard, which Colonel Francis had previously
commanded, was then increased, and put under Warner's orders.
[25] COLONEL EBENEZER FRANCIS of Newton, Mass., colonel, 11th
Massachusetts Regiment. His bravery was so conspicuous that the British
thought he was in chief command of the Americans.
[26] FORT ANNE, one of the minor posts built during the French War to
protect the route from Albany to Lake Champlain. It consisted of a log
blockhouse surrounded by a palisade. Boat navigation of Lake Champlain
began here, fourteen miles from Skenesborough, by Wood Creek flowing
into it.
V.
FACING DISASTER.
One of Washington's most trusted generals said, and said truly, that it
was only through misfortune that the Americans would rise to the
character of a great people. Perhaps no event of the Revolution more
signally verified the truth of this saying, than the fall of
Ticonderoga.
Let us see how this disaster was affecting the Northern States. In that
section, stragglers and deserters were spreading exaggerated accounts of
it on every side. In Vermont, the settlers living west of the mountains
were now practically defenceless. Burgoyne's agents were undermining
their loyalty; the fall of Ticonderoga had shaken it still more. Rather
than abandon their farms, many no longer hesitated to put themselves
under British protection. Hundreds, who were too patriotic to do this,
fled over the mountains, spreading consternation as they went. From Lake
Champlain to the New England coast, there was not a village which did
not believe itself to be the especial object of Burgoyne's vengeance.
Indeed, his name became a bugbear, to frighten unruly children with.
Of those who had been with the army, many believed it their first duty
to protect their families, and so went home. Numbers, who were on the
way to Ticonderoga, turned back, on hearing that it was taken. To
Burgoyne, these results were equal to a battle gained, since he was
weakening the Americans, just as surely, in this way, with entire safety
to himself.
In despair, those settlers who stood faithful among the faithless,
turned to their New Hampshire brethren. "If we are driven back, the
invader will soon be at your doors," they said. "We are your buckler and
shield. Our humble cabins are the bulwark of your happy firesides. But
our hearts fail us. Help us or we perish!"
Could Schuyler do nothing for these suffering people? To let them be
ruined and driven out was not only bad policy, but worse strategy. He
knew that Burgoyne must regard these settlements with foreboding, as the
home of a hostile and brave yeomanry, whose presence was a constant
threat to him. To maintain them, then, was an act of simplest wisdom.
Schuyler could ill spare a single soldier, yet it was necessary to do
something, and that quickly, for all New England was in a tumult, and
Burgoyne said to be marching all ways at once. What wonder, since
Washington himself believed New England to be the threatened point![27]
Warner's regiment had been recruited among the Green Mountain Boys of
this very section. Schuyler posted what was left of it at Manchester, to
be at once a rallying-point for the settlers, a menace to the loyalists,
and a defence against Burgoyne's predatory bands, who were already
spreading themselves out over the surrounding region. It was not much,
but it was something.
From New Hampshire, the panic quickly spread into Massachusetts, and
throughout all New England. As usually happens, the loss of Ticonderoga
was laid at the door of the generals in chief command. Many accused St.
Clair of treacherous dealing. Everywhere, people were filled with wrath
and astonishment. "The fortress has been sold!" they cried. Some of the
officers, who had been present, wrote home that the place could have
held out against Burgoyne for weeks, or until help could have arrived.
This was sure to find ready believers, and so added to the volume of
denunciation cast upon the head of the unlucky St. Clair.
But these passionate outbursts of feeling were soon quenched by the
necessity all saw for prompt action. Once passion and prejudice had
burned out, our people nobly rose to the demands of the situation. But
confidence in the generals of the Northern army was gone forever. The
men of New England would not sit long in the shadow of defeat, but they
said they would no more be sacrificed to the incompetency of leaders who
had been tried and found wanting. Congress had to pay heed to this
feeling. Washington had to admit the force of it, because he knew that
New England must be chiefly looked to in this crisis, to make head
against Burgoyne. If she failed, all else would fail.
[Sidenote: P. Van Cortlandt's letters.]
If we turn now to New York, what do we see? Five counties in the enemy's
hands. Three more, so divided against themselves as to be without order
or government. Of the remaining six, the resources of Orange, Ulster,
and Dutchess were already heavily taxed with the duty of defending the
passes of the Hudson; Westchester was being overrun by the enemy, at
will; only Tryon and Albany remained, and in Tryon, every able-bodied
citizen, not a loyalist, was arming to repel the invasion of St. Leger,
now imminent.
We have thus briefly glanced at the dangers resulting from the fall of
Ticonderoga, at the resources of the sections which Burgoyne was now
threatening to lay waste with fire and sword, and at the attitude of the
people toward those generals who had so grievously disappointed them in
the conduct of the campaign, up to this time.
[Sidenote: John Marshall.]
In the words of one distinguished writer, "The evacuation of Ticonderoga
was a shock for which no part of the United States was prepared." In the
language of another, "No event throughout the whole war produced such
consternation, nothing could have been more unexpected."
It was not so much the loss of the fortress itself,--as costly as it was
to the impoverished colonies, that could have been borne,--but the
people had been led to believe, and did believe, it was next to
impregnable; nor could they understand why those who had been intrusted
with its defence should have fled without striking a blow, or calling
for assistance until too late.
Congress immediately ordered all the generals of the Northern army[28]
to Philadelphia, in order that their conduct might be looked into. John
Adams hotly declared that they would never be able to defend a post
until they shot a general. But Washington, always greatest in defeat,
hastened to show how such a step was doubly dangerous to an army when
fronting its enemy, and wisely procured its suspension for the present.
He first set himself to work to soothe Schuyler's wounded pride, while
stimulating him to greater activity. "We should never despair," he nobly
said. And again: "If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth new
exertions. I yet look forward to a happy change." It was indeed
fortunate that one so stout of heart, with so steady a hand, so firm in
the belief of final triumph, so calm in the hour of greatest danger,
should have guided the destinies of the infant nation at this trying
hour.
FOOTNOTES:
[27] THE THREATENED POINT. Baffled in his purpose of taking Philadelphia
by Washington's success at Trenton, Sir William Howe had decided on
making another attempt; but his manoeuvres led Washington to believe
Howe was going to Newport, R.I., with the view of overrunning
Massachusetts. See Note 3, "Plan of Campaign" (p. 32).
[28] GENERALS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY. Schuyler and St. Clair were chiefly
inculpated. Brigadiers Poor, Patterson, and De Fermoy, who were with St.
Clair at Ticonderoga, were included in the order. All had agreed in the
necessity for the evacuation, and all came in for a share of the public
censure. Poor and Patterson nobly redeemed themselves in the later
operations against Burgoyne.
VI.
THE MARCH TO FORT EDWARD.[29]
It is a well-known maxim of war, that the general who makes the fewest
mistakes will come off conqueror.
In his haste to crush the Americans before they could combine against
him, Burgoyne had overshot his mark. His troops were now so widely
scattered that he could not stir until they were again collected. By the
combats of Hubbardton and Fort Anne, nothing material had been gained,
since St. Clair was at Fort Edward by the time Frazer got to
Skenesborough, and the Americans had returned to Fort Anne as soon as
the British left the neighborhood.
After the battle of Hubbardton, Riedesel was posted at Castleton, in
order to create the impression that the British army was moving into New
England. By this bit of strategy, Burgoyne expected to keep back
reenforcements from Schuyler. Riedesel's presence also gave much
encouragement to the loyalists, who now joined Burgoyne in such numbers
as to persuade him that a majority of the inhabitants were for the king.
The information they gave, proved of vital consequence in determining
Burgoyne's operations in the near future.
Two routes were now open to Burgoyne. Contrary to sound judgment, he
decided on marching to Fort Edward, by way of Fort Anne, instead of
going back to Ticonderoga, making that his _depot_, and proceeding
thence up Lake George to Fort Edward and the Hudson. Unquestionably, the
latter route would have taken him to Albany, by the time he actually
reached Fort Edward, and in much better condition to fight.
Burgoyne had said he was afraid that going back to Ticonderoga would
dispirit his soldiers. It could have been done in half the time required
for bringing the supplies up to it at Skenesborough, to say nothing of
the long and fatiguing marches saved by water carriage across Lake
George.
Be that as it may, from the moment Burgoyne decided in favor of the Fort
Anne route, that moment the possession of Fort Anne became a necessity
to him. Had he first attacked it with fifteen hundred men, instead of
five hundred, he would have taken it; but even if he had occupied it
after the fight of the eighth, the Americans would have been prevented
from blocking his way, as they subsequently did with so much effect. In
Burgoyne's case, delays were most dangerous. It seems only too plain,
that he was the sort of general who would rather commit two errors than
retract one.
Let us see what Burgoyne's chosen route offered of advantage or
disadvantage. The distance by it to Fort Edward is only twenty-six
miles. By a good road, in easy marches, an army should be there in two
days; in an exigency, in one. It was mostly a wilderness country,
and, though generally level, much of it was a bog, which could only be
made passable by laying down a corduroy road. There were miles of such
road to be repaired or built before wagons or artillery could be dragged
over it. Indeed, a worse country to march through can hardly be
imagined. On the other hand, of this twenty-six miles, Wood Creek, a
tributary of Lake Champlain, afforded boat navigation for nine or ten,
or as far as Fort Anne, for the artillery, stores, and baggage.
[Illustration: OLD FORT EDWARD.
A, Magazine. B, Barracks. C, Storehouse. D, Hospital.]
But while Burgoyne was getting his scattered forces again in hand, and
was bringing everything up the lake to Skenesborough, the garrison of
Fort Edward had been spreading themselves out over the road he meant to
take, and were putting every obstacle in his way that ingenuity could
devise or experience suggest. Hundreds of trees were felled across the
road. The navigation of Wood Creek was similarly interrupted. Those
trees growing on its banks were dexterously dropped so as to interlock
their branches in mid-stream. Farms were deserted. All the live-stock
was driven out of reach, to the end that the country itself might offer
the most effectual resistance to Burgoyne's march.
Burgoyne could not move until his working parties had cleared the way,
in whole or in part. From this cause alone, he was detained more than a
week at Skenesborough. This delay was as precious to the Americans as it
was vexatious to Burgoyne, since it gave them time to bring up
reenforcements, form magazines, and prepare for the approaching
struggle, while the enemy's difficulties multiplied with every mile he
advanced.
[Sidenote: July 25.]
At length the British army left Skenesborough. It took two days to reach
Fort Anne, and five to arrive at Fort Edward, where it halted to allow
the heavy artillery, sent by way of Lake George, to join it; give time
to bring up its supplies of food and ammunition, without which the army
was helpless to move farther on; and, meanwhile, permit the general to
put in execution a scheme by which he expected to get a supply of
cattle, horses, carts, and forage, of all of which he was in pressing
want.
Still another body of savages joined Burgoyne at Fort Edward. Better for
him had they staid in their native wilds, for he presently found himself
equally powerless to control their thirst for blood, or greed for
plunder.
[Sidenote: July 21.]
Not yet feeling himself strong enough to risk a battle, Schuyler decided
to evacuate Fort Edward on the enemy's approach. He first called in to
him the garrison at Fort George. Nixon's brigade, which had just been
obstructing the road from Fort Anne, was also called back. All told,
Schuyler now had only about four thousand men. With these he fell back;
first, to Moses's Creek, then to Saratoga, then to Stillwater.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] FORT EDWARD, a link in the chain of forts extending between Canada
and the Hudson,--first called Fort Lyman, for Colonel Phineas Lyman, who
built it in 1755,--stood at the elbow of the Hudson, where the river
turns west, after approaching within sixteen miles of Lake George, to
which point there was a good military road. The fort itself was only a
redoubt of timber and earth, surrounded by a stockade, and having a
casern, or barrack, inside, capable of accommodating two hundred
soldiers. It was an important military position, because this was the
old portage, or carrying-place, from the Hudson to Lake George, though
the fort was no great matter.
VII.
BEFORE BENNINGTON.
[Sidenote: Frazer advances.]