Produced by Barbara Kosker and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
WORKS BY SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE
OLD LANDMARKS AND HISTORIC PERSONAGES
OF BOSTON. Illustrated $2.00
OLD LANDMARKS AND HISTORIC FIELDS OF
MIDDLESEX. Illustrated 2.00
NOOKS AND CORNERS OF THE NEW ENGLAND
COAST. Illustrated 3.50
CAPTAIN NELSON. A Romance of Colonial Days .75
THE HEART OF THE WHITE MOUNTAINS. Illustrated
(Illuminated Cloth) 7.50
Tourist's Edition 3.00
AROUND THE HUB. A Boy's Book about Boston.
Illustrated 1.50
NEW ENGLAND LEGENDS AND FOLK LORE.
Illustrated 2.00
THE MAKING OF NEW ENGLAND. Illustrated 1.50
THE MAKING OF THE GREAT WEST 1.75
OLD BOSTON TAVERNS. Paper .50
BURGOYNE'S INVASION OF 1777. Net .50
_Any book on the above list sent by mail, postpaid, on receipt
of price, by_
LEE AND SHEPARD, BOSTON
[Illustration: GENL. BURGOYNE.]
Decisive Events in American History
BURGOYNE'S INVASION OF 1777
WITH AN
OUTLINE SKETCH OF THE AMERICAN INVASION
OF CANADA, 1775-76
BY
SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE
BOSTON 1889
LEE AND SHEPARD PUBLISHERS
10 MILK STREET NEXT "OLD SOUTH MEETING HOUSE"
NEW YORK CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM
718 AND 720 BROADWAY
BOSTON
S. J. PARKHILL & CO., PRINTERS
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
INTRODUCTION 9
PRELUDE.
I. THE INVASION OF CANADA 15
II. THE INVASION OF CANADA 19
BURGOYNE'S INVASION.
I. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 27
II. BURGOYNE'S ARMY 33
III. THE FALL OF TICONDEROGA 37
IV. HUBBARDTON 45
V. FACING DISASTER 56
VI. THE MARCH TO FORT EDWARD 61
VII. BEFORE BENNINGTON 68
VIII. BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 77
IX. AFTER BENNINGTON 87
X. ST. LEGER'S EXPEDITION 90
XI. OUR ARMY ADVANCES 95
XII. BATTLE OF BEMIS' HEIGHTS 101
XIII. LINCOLN'S RAID IN BURGOYNE'S REAR 113
XIV. SECOND BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM 116
XV. RETREAT AND SURRENDER 126
XVI. SEVENTEENTH OF OCTOBER, 1777 137
XVII. CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT 143
[Illustration: MILITARY MAP, LAKE CHAMPLAIN.]
INTRODUCTION
Among the decisive events of the Revolutionary struggle, Burgoyne's
campaign deservedly holds the foremost place, as well for what it led
to, as for what it was in inception and execution--at once the most
daring, most quixotic, and most disastrous effort of the whole war.
Burgoyne was himself, in some respects, so remarkable a man that any
picture of his exploits must needs be more or less tinted with his
personality. And this was unusually picturesque and imposing. He
acquired prestige, at a time when other generals were losing it, through
his participation in Carleton's successful campaign. But Burgoyne was
something more than the professional soldier. His nature was poetic; his
temperament imaginative. He did nothing in a commonplace way. Even his
orders are far more scholarly than soldier-like. At one time he tells
his soldiers that "occasions may occur, when nor difficulty, nor labor,
nor life are to be regarded"--as if soldiers, in general, expected
anything else than to be shot at!--at another, we find him preaching
humanity to Indians, repentance to rebels, or better manners to his
adversary, with all the superb self-consciousness that was Burgoyne's
most prominent characteristic.
To the military critic, Burgoyne's campaign is instructive, because it
embodies, in itself, about all the operations known to active warfare.
It was destined to great things, but collapsed, like a bubble, with the
first shock of an adverse fortune.
This campaign is remarkable in yet another way. It has given us the most
voluminous literature extant, that treats of any single episode of the
Revolutionary War. In general, it takes many more words to explain a
defeat than to describe a victory. Hence this fulness is much more
conspicuous upon the British than upon the American side of the history
of this campaign. Not only the general, who had his reputation to
defend, but high officials, whose guiding hand was seen behind the
curtain, were called to the bar of public opinion. The ministers
endeavored to make a scapegoat of the general; the general, to fix the
responsibility for defeat upon the ministers. His demand for a
court-martial was denied. His sovereign refused to hear him. It was thus
meanly attempted to turn the torrent of popular indignation, arising
from the ill success of the expedition, wholly upon the unlucky
general's head. Burgoyne's heroic persistency at length brought the
British nation face to face with the unwelcome fact, which the ministers
were so desirous of concealing,--that somebody besides the general had
blundered; and if the inquiry that Burgoyne obtained from Parliament
failed to vindicate him as a captain, it nevertheless did good service
by exposing both the shortcomings of his accusers, and the motives which
had guided their conduct with respect to himself.
Besides the official examination by the House of Commons, we have
several excellent narratives, written by officers who served with
Burgoyne, all of which materially contribute to an intelligent study of
the campaign, from a purely military point of view. These narratives are
really histories of the several corps to which the writers belonged,
rather than capable surveys of the whole situation; but they give us the
current gossip of the camp-fire and mess-table, spiced with anecdote,
and enlivened with the daily experiences through which the writers were
passing. And this is much.
In his defence, General Burgoyne vigorously addresses himself to the
four principal charges brought forward by his accusers: namely, first,
of encumbering himself with a needless amount of artillery; secondly, of
taking the Fort Anne route, rather than the one by way of Lake George;
thirdly, of sending off an expedition to Bennington, under conditions
inviting defeat; and, lastly, of crossing the Hudson after the disasters
of Bennington and Fort Stanwix had taken place.
The real criticism upon Burgoyne's conduct, so far as it relates to the
movement of his forces only, seems to be that from the moment when the
march was actually to begin, he found himself in want of everything
necessary to a rapid advance. Thus, we find him scarcely arrived at
Skenesborough before he is asking Sir Guy Carleton for reenforcements to
garrison Ticonderoga and Fort George with, to the end that his own force
might not be weakened by the detachments required to hold those
fortresses against the Americans, when he should move on. It would seem
that this contingency, at least, might have been foreseen before it
forced itself upon Burgoyne's attention. Yet it was of so serious a
nature, in this general's eyes, that he expresses a doubt whether his
army would be found equal to the task before it, unless Carleton would
assume the defence of the forts referred to above.
At this time, too, the inadequacy of his transportation service became
so painfully evident, that the expedition to Bennington offered the only
practicable solution to Burgoyne's mind.
These circumstances stamp the purposed invasion with a certain haphazard
character at the outset, which boded no good to it in the future.
Carleton having declined to use his troops in the manner suggested,
Burgoyne was compelled to leave a thousand men behind him when he
marched for Albany. Carleton, the saviour of Canada, was justly
chagrined at finding himself superseded in the conduct of this campaign,
by an officer who had served under his orders in the preceding one; and,
though he seems to have acted with loyalty toward Burgoyne, this is by
no means the only instance known in which one general has refused to go
beyond the strict letter of his instructions for the purpose of rescuing
a rival from a dilemma into which he had plunged with his eyes wide
open.
The Prelude with which our narrative opens, undertakes first, to briefly
outline the history of the Northern Army, which finally brought victory
out of defeat; and next, to render familiar the names, location, and
strategic value of the frontier fortresses, before beginning the story
of the campaign itself.
Few armies have ever suffered more, or more nobly redeemed an apparently
lost cause, than the one which was defeated at Quebec and victorious at
Saratoga. The train of misfortunes which brought Burgoyne's erratic
course to so untimely an end was nothing by comparison. And the
quickness with which raw yeomanry were formed into armies capable of
fighting veteran troops, affords the strongest proof that the Americans
are a nation of soldiers.
So many specific causes have been assigned for Burgoyne's failure, that
it is hardly practicable to discuss all of them within reasonable
limits. The simplest statement of the whole case is that he allowed
himself to be beaten in detail. It seems plain enough that any plan,
which exposed his forces to this result, was necessarily vicious in
itself. Moreover, Burgoyne wofully misestimated the resources, spirit,
and fighting capacity of his adversary. With our forces strongly posted
on the Mohawk, St. Leger's advance down the valley was clearly
impracticable. Yet such a combination of movements as would bring about
a junction of the two invading columns, at this point, was all essential
to the success of Burgoyne's campaign. To have effected this in season,
Burgoyne should have made a rapid march to the Mohawk, intrenched
himself there, and operated in conjunction with St. Leger. His delays,
attributable first, to his unwise choice of the Fort Anne route, next,
to Schuyler's activity in obstructing it, and lastly, to his defeat at
Bennington, gave time to render our army so greatly superior to his own,
that the conditions were wholly altered when the final trial of strength
came to be made.
What might have happened if Sir W. Howe had moved his large army and
fleet up the Hudson, in due season, is quite another matter. The writer
does not care to discuss futilities. In the first place, he thinks that
Burgoyne's campaign should stand or fall on its own merits. In the next,
such a movement by Howe would have left Washington free to act in the
enemy's rear, or upon his flanks, with a fair prospect of cutting him
off from his base at New York. Of the two commanders-in-chief,
Washington acted most effectively in reenforcing Gates's army from his
own. Howe could not and Carleton would not do this. From the moment that
Burgoyne crossed the Hudson, he seems to have pinned his faith to
chance; but if chance has sometimes saved poor generalship, the general
who commits himself to its guidance, does so with full knowledge that he
is casting his reputation on the hazard of a die. As Burgoyne did just
this, he must be set down, we think, notwithstanding his chivalrous
defence of himself, as the conspicuous failure of the war. And we assume
that the importance which his campaign implied to Europe and America,
more than any high order of ability in the general himself, has lifted
Burgoyne into undeserved prominence.
PRELUDE
I.
THE INVASION OF CANADA, 1775.
[Sidenote: Canada's attitude.]
England took Canada from France in 1759, and soon after annexed it to
her own dominions. Twelve years later, her despotic acts drove her
American colonies into open rebellion. England feared, and the colonies
hoped, Canada would join in the revolt against her. But, though they did
not love their new masters, prudence counselled the Canadians to stand
aloof, at least till the Americans had proved their ability to make head
against the might of England.
That England would be much distressed by Canada's taking sides with the
Americans was plain enough to all men, for the whole continent would
then be one in purpose, and the conflict more equal; but the Americans
also greatly wished it because all New England and New York lay open to
invasion from Canada.
Nature had created a great highway, stretching southward from the St.
Lawrence to the Hudson, over which rival armies had often passed to
victory or defeat in the old wars. Open water offered an easy transit
for nearly the whole way. A chain of forts extended throughout its
whole length. Chambly and St. John's defended the passage of the
Richelieu, through which the waters of Lake Champlain flow to the St.
Lawrence. Crown Point[1] and Ticonderoga[2] blocked the passage of this
lake in its narrowest part. Ticonderoga, indeed, is placed just where
the outlet of Lake George falls down a mountain gorge into Lake
Champlain. Its cannon, therefore, commanded that outlet also. Fort
George stood at the head of Lake George, within sixteen miles of Fort
Edward, on the Hudson. These were the gates through which a hostile army
might sally forth upon our naked frontier. Much, therefore, depended on
whether they were to be kept by friend or foe.
[Sidenote: Ticonderoga.]
In natural and artificial strength, Ticonderoga was by far the most
important of these fortresses. At this place the opposite shores of New
York and Vermont are pushed out into the lake toward each other, thus
forming two peninsulas, with the lake contracted to a width of half a
mile, or point-blank cannon range, between them: one is Ticonderoga; the
other, Mount Independence. Thus, together, they command the passage of
the two lakes.
Ticonderoga itself is a tongue-shaped projection of quite uneven land,
broad and high at the base, or where it joins the hills behind it, but
growing narrower as it descends over intervening hollows or swells to
its farthest point in the lake. That part next the mainland is a wooded
height, having a broad plateau on the brow--large enough to encamp an
army corps upon--but cut down abruptly on the sides washed by the lake.
This height, therefore, commanded the whole peninsula lying before it,
and underneath it, as well as the approach from Lake George, opening
behind it in a rugged mountain pass, since it must be either crossed or
turned before access to the peninsula could be gained. Except for the
higher hills surrounding it, this one is, in every respect, an admirable
military position.
The French, who built the first fortress here, had covered all the low
ground next the lake with batteries and intrenchments, but had left the
heights rising behind it unguarded, until Abercromby attacked on that
side in 1758. They then hastily threw up a rude intrenchment of logs,
extending quite across the crest in its broadest part. Yet, in spite of
the victory he then obtained, Montcalm was so fully convinced that
Ticonderoga could not stand a siege, that he made no secret of calling
it a trap, for some honest man to disgrace himself in.[3]
Ticonderoga, however, was henceforth looked upon as a sort of Gibraltar.
People, therefore, were filled with wonder when they heard how Ethan
Allen had surprised and taken it on the 9th of May, 1775, with only a
handful of men; how Seth Warner had also taken Crown Point; and how
Skenesborough[4] and Fort George, being thus cut off from Canada, had
also fallen into our hands without firing a shot.[5]
Thus, in the very beginning of the war for independence, and at one bold
stroke, we regained possession of this gateway of the north; or in
military phrase, we now held all the strategic points by which an
advance from Lower Canada upon the United Colonies was possible.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] CROWN POINT, built by the French in 1731, greatly strengthened by
the British, who took it in 1759.
[2] TICONDEROGA, familiarly called "Ty" because the early spelling of
the name was Tyconderoga. Built 1755-56 by the French, taken 1759 by the
British, under Amherst. Three weeks before the battle of Lexington, an
agent of Massachusetts was sent to ascertain the feelings of the people
of Canada. His first advice was that "Ty" should be seized as quickly as
possible.
[3] MONTCALM'S PROPHECY came true in St. Clair's case in 1777.
[4] SKENESBOROUGH, now Whitehall, named for Philip Skene, a retired
British officer, who settled on lands granted him after the French War.
He had about fifty tenants, and a few negro slaves.
[5] THE CAPTURED ARTILLERY was taken to Cambridge on sleds in midwinter,
by Colonel Knox. It enabled Washington to bring the siege of Boston to a
favorable conclusion.
II.
THE INVASION OF CANADA.
[Sidenote: Invasion of Canada.]
The prompt seizure of the lake fortresses had a marked effect upon the
wavering Canadians.[6] Many joined us. More stood ready to do so
whenever the signal for revolt should be given. Success begets
confidence. The Americans were now led to believe that by throwing an
army into Canada at once, the people would no longer hesitate to free
themselves from the British yoke. The time seemed the riper for it,
because it was known that the strong places of Canada were but weakly
guarded. Could Quebec and Montreal be taken, British power in Canada
would be at an end.
[Sidenote: Our army retreats.]
[Sidenote: 1776.]
With such promise held out before it, Congress resolved to make the
attempt. Forces were ordered to both places. One body, under General
Montgomery,[7] mustered at Ticonderoga. Ethan Allen went before it to
rouse the Canadians, who were expected to receive the Americans with
open arms. This army moved down the lake in October, taking St. John's
and Chambly in its way, and Montreal a little later. The other, led by
Colonel Arnold,[8] ascended the Kennebec to its head, crossed over to
the Chaudiere, which was followed to the St. Lawrence, and came before
Quebec at about the same time Montgomery entered Montreal. Montgomery
hastened to Arnold with a handful of men. Together they assaulted Quebec
on the morning of December 31. The attack failed, and Montgomery fell.
The Americans lay before Quebec till spring, when the arrival of fresh
troops, for the enemy, forced ours to retreat to Montreal. This, too,
was abandoned. Our army then fell back toward Lake Champlain, setting
fire to Chambly, and St. John's behind it. The enemy followed close,
recapturing these places as our troops left them. Very little fighting
took place, but the Americans were greatly disheartened by having
constantly to retreat, and by the loss of many brave officers and men,
who fell sick and died of the smallpox. July 1 the army finally reached
Crown Point, ragged, sickly, and destitute of everything. Weakened by
the loss of five thousand men and three commanders, it was no longer
able to keep the field. Instead of conquering Canada, it had been driven
out at the point of the bayonet. The great question now was, whether
this army could hold its own against a victorious and advancing enemy.
General Gates[9] took command of the army at this critical time.
Convinced that he could never hope to hold both Crown Point and
Ticonderoga, and knowing Ticonderoga to be much the stronger, in a
military view, he decided to remove the army to that place at once. This
was promptly done.[10] The soldiers were set to work strengthening the
old, or building new, works, under the direction of skilful engineers.
Of these new works the strongest, as well as most important, because
they commanded Ticonderoga itself, were those raised on the peninsula
opposite the fortress on the Vermont side, which was christened Mount
Independence on the day the army heard that the colonies had declared
themselves free and independent.
Having thrown a bridge across the strait, between Ticonderoga and Mount
Independence, the Americans waited for the enemy to come and attack
them, for with such leaders as Gates and Stark they felt confident of
gaining the victory.
The British were equally active on their side. After driving the
Americans from Canada, they next determined to make themselves masters
of Lake Champlain, recover the forts they had lost, and so gain a
foothold for striking a blow at our northern colonies.
For this purpose they set about building a fleet at St. John's. Vessels
were sent out from England, for the purpose, which were taken to pieces
below the Chambly rapids, brought across the portage, and put together
again at St. John's. By working diligently, the British got their fleet
ready to sail early in October.
Well knowing the importance of keeping possession of the lake, the
Americans turned Skenesborough into a dockyard, and were straining every
nerve to get ready a fleet strong enough to cope with the British. As
everything needed for equipping it had to be brought from the sea-coast,
the British had much the advantage in this respect, yet all labored with
so much zeal, that our fleet was first ready for action. Gates gave the
command of it to Arnold, who had once been a sailor, and whose courage
had been tried so signally under the walls of Quebec.
By the middle of August, Ticonderoga was in fighting trim. The enemy's
delays had given time to make the defences so strong that an attack was
rather hoped for than feared. Ignorant of the great preparations making
at St. John's, the Americans also believed themselves strongest on the
lake. Our fleet, therefore, went forward with confidence to the battle.
[Sidenote: Naval battle, October 11.]
On the 11th of October the British flotilla was seen coming up the lake.
The rival forces met at Valcour Island, and the battle began. From noon
till night the combatants hurled broadsides at each other without
ceasing. The British then drew off to repair damages, meaning to renew
the fight in the morning. This gave Arnold a chance to slip through them
unperceived, for his vessels were so badly shattered that all hope of
gaining the victory was given over. He was pursued and overtaken. Near
Crown Point the battle began again, but the enemy's superior forces soon
decided it in his favor. Rather than surrender, Arnold ran his disabled
vessels on shore, set fire to them, and with his men escaped to the
woods.
Having thus cleared the lake, the British commander, Guy Carleton,[11]
sailed back to St. John's, leaving Ticonderoga unmolested behind him, to
the great astonishment of our soldiers, who said Carleton deserved to be
hanged for not following up his victory over Arnold.
[Illustration: NAVAL BATTLE, LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
A, American flotilla. B-C, British. D, Line of Retreat, when the British
were forced back to E.]
FOOTNOTES:
[6] THE WAVERING CANADIANS. The Massachusetts revolutionary authority
had been at work upon the wavering Canadians since 1774, with only
partial success. (See note 2, preceding chapter.) The Americans thought
the Canadians would seize the opportunity of freeing themselves, but
events proved this opinion ill-grounded. A political connection between
the Protestants of New England and the Catholics of Canada, except for
mutual defence, could hardly be lasting, nor did the priests favor it.
The military advantages were equally questionable, though great stress
was laid upon them by Washington and Schuyler, even after the allegiance
of the Canadians had been confirmed to the British side by the reverses
our arms sustained. If we had conquered Canada, it would doubtless have
been handed over to France again at the close of the war.
[7] GENERAL RICHARD MONTGOMERY, of Irish birth, had served under Amherst
at the taking of Crown Point and Ticonderoga in 1759, settled in New
York, been one of eight brigadiers created by Congress in June, 1775;
General Schuyler's illness threw the chief command, for which he proved
himself eminently fitted, on Montgomery. His having served on this line
was much in his favor.
[8] COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD had once been a soldier at Ticonderoga. He
went there again with a commission from Massachusetts, when the fortress
was taken by Allen. He had also spent some time in Quebec. These facts
had influence in procuring for him a command in the invading expedition.
[9] GENERAL HORATIO GATES, a retired British major, settled in Virginia,
was made adjutant-general of the army, June, 1775.
[10] THE REMOVAL OF THE ARMY from Crown Point to Ticonderoga was
strongly opposed by Stark and others, and disapproved by Washington.
[11] GUY CARLETON, British governor of Canada, though driven from
Montreal by Montgomery, had successfully defended Quebec against him. He
reconnoitred Ticonderoga, but seems to have thought it too strong to be
attacked with his force.
BURGOYNE'S INVASION
I.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
After the British had gone back to Canada, it was thought they would
return as soon as the lake should be frozen hard enough to bear
artillery. But when it was found that they had gone into winter
quarters, and the danger was past, part of the garrison of Ticonderoga
was hurried off to Washington, who was then fighting against great odds
in the Jerseys. This winter was the dark hour of the Revolution, upon
which the victory at Trenton[12] shed the first ray of light. So low had
the American cause fallen at this time, that, but for this unlooked-for
success, it is doubtful if another army could have been brought into the
field.
The British were really planning to invade New York as soon as the lakes
should be open again, in the spring. For this campaign great
preparations were making, both in Canada and England. Quiet, therefore,
reigned at Ticonderoga throughout the winter of 1776 and 1777.
General Burgoyne sailed for England in November, to lay before the king
a plan for subduing the colonies in a single campaign. Burgoyne was a
good soldier, popular with the army and government, brave to rashness,
but vain and headstrong. He knew the Americans were not to be despised,
for he had seen them fight at Bunker Hill, as well as in the campaign
just closed, in which he himself had taken part; yet an easy confidence
in his own abilities led Burgoyne into committing many grave errors, not
the least of which was underestimating this very enemy.[13]
[Sidenote: George III. wants the war pushed.]
Any plan that promised to put down the Americans, was sure of gaining
the king's ear. Justice was never tempered with mercy in this monarch's
treatment of his rebellious subjects. His heart was hardened, his hand
ever ready to strike them the fatal blow. Moreover, the Americans had
just now declared themselves independent of Great Britain. They had
crossed their Rubicon. To crush them with iron hand was now the king's
one thought and purpose. No half measures would do for him. He told his
ministers, in so many words, that every means of distressing the
Americans would meet with his approval. Mercenaries, savages,
refugees--all who could fire a shot, or burn a dwelling, were to be
enrolled under the proud old banner of the isles. No more effectual
means could have been devised to arouse the spirit of resistance to the
highest pitch.
Burgoyne's ambition was kindled by the hope of making himself the hero
of the war. He combined the qualities of general and statesman without
being great as either. He wrote and talked well, was eloquent and
persuasive, had friends at court, and knew how to make the most of his
opportunity. On his part, the king wanted a general badly. He had been
grievously disappointed in Sir William Howe, whose victories seemed
never bringing the war any nearer to an end. Burgoyne brought forward
his plan at the right moment, shrewdly touched the keynote of the king's
discontent by declaring for aggressive war, smoothed every obstacle away
with easy assurance, and so impressed the ministers with his capacity,
that they believed they had found the very man the king wanted for the
work in hand.
The plan proposed for making short work of the war was briefly this: The
American colonies were to be divided in two parts, by seizing the line
of the Hudson River; just as in later times, the Union armies aimed to
split the Southern Confederacy in two by getting possession of the
Mississippi. To effect this, two armies were to act together. With one,
Burgoyne was to come down the lakes from Canada, and force his way to
Albany, while the other was coming up the Hudson to join him. Once these
armies were united, with full control of the Hudson in their hands, New
England would be cut off from the other colonies by forts and fleets,
and the way laid open to crush out rebellion in what was admitted to be
its cradle and stronghold.
Ever since Sir William Howe had been driven from Boston, in the spring
of 1776, the opinion prevailed among American generals that, sooner or
later, New England would become the battle-ground.[14] This view was
sustained by the enemy's seizure of Newport, in December of the same
year, so that the Americans were perplexed at finding themselves
threatened from this quarter, until the enemy's plans were fully
developed.
[Sidenote: St. Leger's part.]
There was yet another part to the plan concerted between Burgoyne and
the British cabinet. It was seen that in proportion as Burgoyne moved
down toward Albany, he would have the fertile Mohawk valley on his
right. This valley was the great thoroughfare between the Hudson and
Lake Ontario, Niagara, and Detroit. In it were many prosperous
settlements, inhabited by a vigorous yeomanry, who were the mainstay of
the patriot cause in this quarter. The passage to and fro was guarded by
Fort Stanwix, which stood where Rome now is, and Fort Oswego, which was
situated at the lake. Fort Stanwix was held by the Americans, and
Oswego, by the British. Perceiving its value to the Americans not only
as a granary, but as a recruiting station, and in view of the danger of
leaving it on his flank, Burgoyne decided to march a force through this
valley, clear it of enemies, and so effectively bring about a timely
cooeperation between the two branches of the expedition. Freed of fear
for himself, he could materially aid in the work intrusted to his
auxiliary. It followed that the Americans, with whom Burgoyne himself
might be contending, would, of necessity, be greatly distressed by their
inability to draw either men or supplies from the Mohawk Valley, no less
than by the appearance of this force upon their own flank. The command
of it was given to Colonel St. Leger, who was ordered to proceed up the
St. Lawrence to Oswego, and from thence to Fort Stanwix and Albany.
It must be allowed that this plan was well conceived; yet its success
depended so much upon all the parts working in harmony together, that to
have set it in motion, without consultation or clear understanding
between the generals who were to execute it, is inconceivable. At a
distance of three thousand miles from the scene of war, the British
cabinet undertook to direct complicated military operations, in which
widely separated armies were to take part. General Burgoyne received his
orders on the spot. General Howe did not receive his until the 16th of
August; his army was then entering Chesapeake Bay. Burgoyne was being
defeated at Bennington, at the time Howe was reading his despatch, and
learning from it what he had not known before; namely, that he was
expected to cooeperate with the army of Burgoyne. These facts will so
sufficiently illustrate the course that events were taking, as to
foreshadow their conclusion to the feeblest understanding.
In order to make the war more terrible to the Americans, the British
cabinet decided to use the Indians of Canada, and the Great Lakes,
against them. Not even the plea of military necessity could reconcile
some Englishmen to letting loose these barbarians upon the colonists.
Though enemies, they were men. Lord Chatham, the noblest Englishman of
them all, cried out against it in Parliament. "Who is the man," he
indignantly asked, "who has dared to associate to our arms the tomahawk
and scalping-knife of the savage?" All knew he meant the prime minister,
and, behind him, the king himself. Had not King George just said that
any means of distressing the Americans must meet with his approval?
FOOTNOTES:
[12] VICTORY AT TRENTON. After being driven from the Jerseys, Washington
suddenly turned on his pursuers, and by the two fine combats of Trenton
and Princeton, compelled much superior forces everywhere to retreat
before him, thus breaking up all the enemy's plans for the ensuing
campaign, saving Philadelphia, and putting new life into the American
cause.
[13] UNDERESTIMATING HIS ENEMY. Burgoyne candidly admits as much in his
letter to Lord G. Germaine. _State of the Expedition_, Appendix, xcii.
[14] NEW ENGLAND THE BATTLE-GROUND. Sir William Howe did propose, at
first, operating against Boston from Rhode Island, with ten thousand
men, while an equal force should effect a junction with the army of
Canada, by way of the Hudson. This purpose he subsequently deferred for
an advance into Pennsylvania, but Burgoyne asserts that he was not
informed of the change of plan when he sailed for Canada in April; and,
though Sir William Howe afterward wrote him to the same effect (July
17th) a letter which was received early in August, Burgoyne,
nevertheless, persisted in his intention of passing the Hudson,
notwithstanding he knew, and says (August 20th), that no operation had
yet been undertaken in his favor. _State of the Expedition_, 188, 189;
Appendix, xlvii.
II.
BURGOYNE'S ARMY.
Having thus outlined the plan of invasion, let us now look at the means
allotted for its execution. There were in Canada ten thousand British
soldiers; in New York, thirty thousand. Burgoyne was to take with him
seven thousand, of whom three thousand were Germans in the pay of
England.[15] In discipline, spirit, and equipment, this was by far the
best little army that had yet taken the field in America.
Good judges said that England might be searched through and through
before such battalions could be raised. Forty cannon, splendidly served
and equipped, formed its artillery train. All the generals, and most of
the soldiers, were veterans. In short, nothing that experience could
suggest, or unlimited means provide, was omitted to make this army
invincible. It was one with which Burgoyne felt he could do anything,
and dare everything.
Besides these regular troops, we have said the government had authorized
and even attempted to justify to the world, the employment of Indians.
Four hundred warriors joined the army when it marched, and as many more
when it reached Lake Champlain. They were to scour the woods, hang like
a storm cloud about the enemy's camps, and discover his every movement.
For this service they had no equals. In the woods they could steal upon
an enemy unawares, or lie in wait for his approach. In the field they
were of little use. Much of the terror they inspired came from the
suddenness of their onset, their hideous looks and unearthly war-cries,
and their cruel practice of scalping the wounded.
To these were added about an equal number of Canadians, and American
refugees, who were designed to act as scouts, skirmishers, or foragers,
as the occasion might require. Being well skilled in bush-fighting, they
were mostly attached to Frazer's corps, for the purpose of clearing the
woods in his front, getting information, or driving in cattle. With his
Indians and irregulars,[16] Burgoyne's whole force could hardly have
numbered less than ten thousand men.
Taken as a whole, this army was justly thought the equal of twice its
own number of raw yeomanry, suddenly called to the field from the anvil,
the workshop, or the plough. Its strongest arm was its artillery; its
weakest, its Indian allies.
Burgoyne divided his force into three corps, commanded by Generals
Frazer, Phillips, and Riedesel,--all excellent officers. Frazer's corps
was mostly made up of picked companies, taken from other battalions and
joined with the 24th regiment of the line. As its duty was of the
hardest, so its material was of the best the army could afford. Next to
Burgoyne, Frazer was, beyond all question, the officer most looked up to
by the soldiers; in every sense of the word, he was a thorough soldier.
His corps was, therefore, Burgoyne's right arm. Phillips commanded the
artillery; and Riedesel, the Germans.
In the middle of June this army embarked on Lake Champlain. Of many
warlike pageants the aged mountains had looked down upon, perhaps this
was the most splendid and imposing. From the general to the private
soldier, all were filled with high hopes of a successful campaign. In
front, the Indians, painted and decked out for war, skimmed the lake in
their light canoes. Next came the barges containing Frazer's corps,
marshalled in one regular line, with gunboats flanking it on each side;
next, the Royal George and Inflexible frigates, with other armed vessels
forming the fleet. Behind this strong escort, the main body, with the
generals, followed in close order; and, last of all, came the camp
followers, of whom there were far too many for the nature of the service
in hand.
In the distance the American watch-boats saw this gallant array bearing
down upon them, in the confidence of its power. Hastening back to
Ticonderoga, the word was passed along the lines to prepare for battle.
For the Mohawk Valley expedition, St. Leger, who led it, took with him
about seven hundred regular troops, two hundred loyalists, and eight
guns. At Oswego, seven hundred Indians of the Six Nations joined him.
With these, St. Leger started in July for Fort Stanwix, which barred
his way to the Hudson, just as Ticonderoga blocked Burgoyne's advance on
the side of Lake Champlain.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] SOLDIERS WERE HIRED from the petty German princes for the American
war. The Americans called them all Hessians, because some came from the
principality of Hesse. George III. also tried to hire twenty thousand
Russians of Empress Catharine, but she gave him to understand that her
soldiers would be better employed. There was good material among the
Germans, many of whom had served with credit under the Great Frederick;
but the British showed them little favor as comrades, while the
Americans looked upon them as paid assassins. Not one in twenty knew any
English, so that misconception of orders was not unfrequent, though
orders were usually transmitted from headquarters in French. A jealousy
also grew up out of the belief that Burgoyne gave the Germans the
hardest duty, and the British the most praise. At Hubbardton, and on the
19th of September, the Germans saved him from defeat, yet he
ungenerously, we think, lays the disaster of October 7th chiefly at
their door.
[16] INDIANS AND IRREGULARS. It is impossible to give the number of
these accurately, as it was constantly fluctuating. Though Burgoyne
started with only four hundred Indians, the number was increased by five
hundred at Skenesborough, and he was later joined by some of the Mohawks
from St. Leger's force. In like manner, his two hundred and fifty
Canadians and Provincials had grown to more than six hundred of the
latter before he left Skenesborough. Most of these recruits came from
the Vermont settlements. They were put to work clearing the roads,
scouting, getting forward the supplies, collecting cattle, etc. Their
knowledge of the country was greatly serviceable to Burgoyne. In the
returns given of Burgoyne's _regular troops_, only the rank and file are
accounted for. Staff and line officers would swell the number
considerably.
III.
THE FALL OF TICONDEROGA.
(_July 5, 1777._)
A hundred years ago, the shores of Lake Champlain were for the most part
a wilderness. What few settlements did exist were mostly grouped about
the southeast corner of the lake, into which emigration had naturally
flowed from the older New England States. And even these were but feeble
plantations,[17] separated from the Connecticut valley by lofty
mountains, over which one rough road led the way.
Burgoyne's companions in arms have told us of the herds of red deer seen
quietly browsing on the hillsides; of the flocks of pigeons, darkening
the air in their flight; and of the store of pike, bass, and maskelonge
with which the waters of the lake abounded. At one encampment the
soldiers lived a whole day on the pigeons they had knocked off the trees
with poles. So the passage of the lake must have seemed more like a
pleasure trip to them than the prelude to a warlike campaign.
In his way up the lake, Burgoyne landed at the River Bouquet, on the
west shore, where for some days the army rested.
To this rendezvous, large numbers of Indians had come to join the
expedition. It was indispensable to observe the customs which had always
prevailed among these peoples when going to war. So Burgoyne made them a
speech, gave them a feast, and witnessed the wild antics of their war
dance.
He forbade their scalping the wounded, or destroying women and children.
They listened attentively to his words, and promised obedience; but
these commands were so flatly opposed to all their philosophy of war,
which required the extinction of every human feeling, that Burgoyne
might as well have bidden the waters of the lake flow backward, as
expect an Indian not to use his scalping-knife whenever an enemy lay at
his mercy.
Still, it is to Burgoyne's credit that he tried to check the ferocity of
these savages, and we would also charitably believe him at least half
ashamed of having to employ them at all, when he saw them brandishing
their tomahawks over the heads of imaginary victims; beheld them
twisting their bodies about in hideous contortions, in mimicry of
tortured prisoners; or heard them howling, like wild beasts, their cry
of triumph when the scalp is torn from an enemy's head.
While thus drawing the sword with one hand, Burgoyne took his pen in the
other. He drew up a paper which his Tory agents were directed to scatter
among the people of Vermont, many of whom, he was assured, were at heart
loyal to the king. These he invited to join his standard, or offered its
protection to all who should remain neutral. All were warned against
driving off their cattle, hiding their corn, or breaking down the
bridges in his way. Should they dare disobey, he threatened to let loose
his horde of savages upon them. Such a departure from the rules of
honorable warfare would have justified the Americans in declaring no
quarter to the invaders.
Well aware that he would not conquer the Americans with threats,
Burgoyne now gave the order to his army to go forward. His view of what
lay before him might be thus expressed: The enemy will, probably, fight
at Ticonderoga. Of course I shall beat them. I will give them no time to
rally. When they hear St. Leger is in the valley, their panic will be
completed. We shall have a little promenade of eight days, to Albany.
On June 29 the army was near Ticonderoga. This day Burgoyne made a
stirring address to his soldiers, in which he gave out the memorable
watchword, "_This army must not retreat._"
The next day, Frazer's corps landed in full view of the fortress. The
rest of the army was posted on both sides of the lake, which is nowhere
wider than a river as the fortress is approached. The fleet kept the
middle of the channel. With drums beating and bugles sounding, the
different battalions took up their allotted stations in the woods
bordering upon the lake. When night fell, the watch-fires of the
besiegers' camps made red the waters that flowed past them. But as yet
no hostile gun boomed from the ramparts of Ticonderoga.
What was going on behind those grim walls which frowned defiance upon
the invaders? General Gates was no longer there to direct. General St.
Clair[18] was now in command of perhaps four thousand effective men,
with whom, nevertheless, he hoped to defend his miles of intrenchments
against the assaults of twice his own numbers. His real weakness lay in
not knowing what point Burgoyne would choose for attack, and he had been
strangely delinquent in not calling for reenforcements until the enemy
was almost at the gates of the fortress itself.
Burgoyne knew better than to heedlessly rush upon the lines that had
proved Abercromby's destruction.[19] He knew they were too strong to be
carried without great bloodshed, and meant first to invest the fortress,
and after cutting off access to it on all sides, then lay siege to it in
regular form.
[Sidenote: July 2, Mount Hope seized.]
To this end, Frazer's corps was moved up to within cannon-shot of the
works. His scouts soon found a way leading through old paths,[20] quite
round the rear of the fortress, to the outlet of Lake George. This was
promptly seized. After a little skirmishing, the enemy planted
themselves firmly, on some high ground rising behind the old French
lines, on this side; thus making themselves masters of the communication
with Lake George, and enclosing the fortress on the rear or land side.
While this was going on, on the west shore, Riedesel's Germans were
moved up still nearer Mount Independence, on the Vermont shore, thus
investing Ticonderoga on three sides.
A more enterprising general would never have permitted his enemy to
seize his communications with Lake George, without making a struggle
for their possession, but St. Clair appears to have thought his forces
unequal to the attempt, and it was not made. The disaster which followed
was but the natural result.
[Illustration: THE INVESTMENT OF TICONDEROGA.
[_Pen and ink sketch by a British officer._]
A-B, Ticonderoga. C-D-E, Mount Independence. F, Barracks. G, Mount
Defiance. H, Bridge joining the fortress proper with Mount Independence.
I, American Fleet. K, Outlet of Lake George. O, British Fleet. P,
Three-Mile Point. Q, First Landing Place of Burgoyne. R, The Germans.
T-U, Position taken on Mount Hope. W, Second Position of same Troops at
U. Z, Portage to Lake George.]
[Sidenote: Mount Defiance occupied.]
Just across the basin formed by the widening of the outlet of Lake
George, a steep-sided mountain rises high above all the surrounding
region. Its summit not only looks down upon the fortress, in every part,
but over all its approaches by land or water. Not a man could march
without being distinctly seen from this mountain. Yet, to-day, the eye
measures its forest-shagged sides, in doubt if they can be scaled by
human feet. Indeed, its ascent was so difficult that the Americans had
neglected to occupy it at all. This is Mount Defiance, the most
commanding object for miles around.
[Sidenote: July 5.]
Burgoyne's engineers could not help seeing that if artillery could be
got to the top of this mountain, Ticonderoga was doomed. They
reconnoitred it. Though difficult, they said it might be done. St.
Clair's timidity having given them the way to it, the British instantly
began moving men and guns round the rear of the fortress, and cutting a
road up the mountain-side. The work was pushed forward day and night. It
took most of the oxen belonging to the army to drag two twelve-pounders
up the steep ascent, but when they were once planted on the summit,
Ticonderoga lay at the mercy of the besiegers.
[Sidenote: July 6.]
When St. Clair saw the enemy getting ready to cannonade him from Mount
Defiance, he at once gave orders to evacuate the fortress[21] under
cover of the night. Most of the garrison retreated over the bridge
leading to Mount Independence, and thence by the road to Hubbardton.
What could be saved of the baggage and army stores was sent off to
Skenesborough, by water. Hurry and confusion were everywhere, for it was
not doubted that the enemy would be upon them as soon as daylight should
discover the fortress abandoned. This happened at an early hour of the
morning. The British instantly marched into the deserted works, without
meeting with the least resistance. Ticonderoga's hundred cannon were
silent under the menace of two. Burgoyne was now free to march his
victorious battalions to the east, the west, or the south, whenever he
should give the order.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] FEEBLE PLANTATIONS. No permanent settlements were begun west of the
Green Mountains till after the conquest of Canada. After that, the
report of soldiers who had passed over the military road from
Charlestown on the Connecticut River, to Crown Point, brought a swarm of
settlers into what is now Bennington County. Settlement began in Rutland
County in 1771.
[18] GENERAL ARTHUR ST. CLAIR, of Scotch birth, had been a lieutenant
with Wolfe at Quebec; he resigned and settled in Pennsylvania; served
with our army in Canada; made brigadier, August, 1776; major-general,
February, 1777.