POLITICAL SOCIETY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
We have already seen what has been the conduct of the Christian
religion with respect to society; that is to say, that not caring
whether such or such political forms were established in a country,
she has ever addressed herself to man, seeking to enlighten his
understanding and to purify his heart, fully confident that when these
objects were attained, society would naturally pursue a safe course.
This is sufficient to obliterate the reproach imputed to her of being
an enemy to the liberty of the people.
Protestantism has certainly never revealed to the world a single
dogma which exalts the dignity of man, nor created fresh motives
of consideration and respect, or closer bonds of fraternity. The
Reformation cannot, therefore, boast of having given the least impetus
to the progress of modern nations; it cannot, consequently, lay the
least claim to the gratitude of the people in this respect. But as
it frequently happens that people lay aside main points and set a
great value on appearances; and as Protestantism has been supposed
to accord much better than Catholicity with those institutions in
which it is usual to find guarantees for a high degree of liberty; we
must draw a parallel. Besides, we cannot omit it without betraying an
ignorance of the genius of this age, and authorizing the suspicion that
Catholicity cannot derive any advantage from such a comparison. In the
first place, I will observe, that those who look upon Protestantism as
inseparable from public liberty do not in this respect agree with M.
Guizot, who cannot certainly be accused of any want of sympathy for the
Reformation. "In Germany," says this celebrated publicist, "far from
demanding political liberty, it has accepted, I should not like to say
political servitude, _but the absence of liberty_." (_Hist. Gén. de la
Civil. en Eur._ leç. 12.)
I quote M. Guizot, because in Spain we are so accustomed to
translations, because we Spaniards have been led to suppose, that
the best thing for us is to believe foreigners on their bare word;
because amongst us, in questions of importance, it is necessary to
have recourse to foreign authorities; and hence, a writer who appears
to slight such authorities, exposes himself to the risk of being
treated as an ignoramus, as one behind the age. Besides, with a certain
class of writers, the authority of M. Guizot is decisive. In fact, a
multitude of publications have appeared amongst us bearing the title
of "Philosophy of History," whose authors, it is quite clear, have
used the works of that French writer as their text-books. Is this
assertion, that Protestantism is the natural bulwark of liberty, true
or false, accurate or inaccurate? What do history and philosophy teach
us on this point? Has Protestantism advanced the popular cause, by
contributing to the establishment and development of liberal forms of
government? To place the question in its true light, and discuss it
thoroughly, we must take a view of the state of Europe at the close
of the fifteenth century, and at the beginning of the sixteenth. It
is incontestable that individuals and society were then making rapid
progress towards perfection. We have sufficient evidence of this fact
in the wonderful march of intellect at this period, in the numerous
measures of improvement effected at that epoch, and in the better
organization everywhere introduced. This organization is doubtless
still imperfect; but it is nevertheless such as cannot be likened
to that of former times. If we carefully examine into the state of
society at that epoch, as represented either in the writings or in the
events of the time, we shall observe a certain restlessness, anxiety,
and fermentation, which, while they indicated the existence of vast
wants not yet satisfied, were evidence also of a tolerably distinct
knowledge of those wants. Far from discovering in the men of that
period a contempt or forgetfulness of their rights and dignity, or any
discouragement and pusillanimity at the sight of obstacles, we find
them abounding in foresight and ingenuity, swayed by lofty and sublime
thoughts, fired with noble sentiments, and animated with intrepid and
ardent courage. The progress of European society at that epoch was very
rapid; three very remarkable circumstances contributed to render it so:
1. The introduction of the whole body of men to the rank of citizens,
as a necessary consequence of the abolition of slavery and the decline
of feudality; 2. The very nature of civilization, in which every thing
advances together and abreast; 3. In fine, the existence of a means
for increasing its development and rapidity--this means was the art of
printing. To make use of a physico-mathematical expression, we may say,
that the amount of motion must have been very considerable, since it
was the product of the mass by the rapidity, and that the mass, as well
as the rapidity, were then very considerable.
This powerful movement, which proceeds from good, is in itself good,
and is productive of good, is, however, accompanied by inconveniences
and perils; it raises flattering hopes, but it also inspires
apprehensions and fears. The people of Europe are an ancient people,
but they may be said to have become young again; their inclinations,
their wants, urge them to great enterprises; and they enter upon them
with the ardor of an impetuous and inexperienced young man, feeling in
his breast a great heart, and in his head the lively spark of genius.
In this situation, a great problem presents itself for solution, viz.,
to find the most proper means for directing society without impeding
its progress; and for conducting it by a way free from precipices
to the objects of its aim, _intelligence_, _morality_, _felicity_.
A slight glance at this problem startles us at its immense extent;
so numerous are the objects it embraces, the relations it bears, the
obstacles and difficulties with which it is beset. Considering this
question attentively, and comparing it with man's weakness, the mind is
ready to lose courage and despond. The problem, however, exists, not as
a scientific speculation, but as a real and urgent necessity. In such
a case, society is like individuals; it attempts, essays, and makes
efforts to get clear of the difficulty as well as possible.
Man's civil state improves daily; but to maintain this improvement, and
to perfect it, requires a means: and this is the problem of _political
forms_. What ought these forms to be? And, above all, what elements can
we make use of? What is the respective force of these elements? What
are their tendencies, their relations, their affinities? How shall they
be combined? _Monarchy_, _Aristocracy_, _Democracy_--these three powers
present themselves at the same time to dispute for the direction and
government of society. They are certainly not equal, either in force,
means of action, or in practical intelligence; but they all command
our respect, they have all pretensions to a preponderance more or less
decisive, and none of them are without the probability of obtaining it.
This simultaneous concurrence of pretensions, this rivalship of three
powers so different in their nature and aim, forms one of the leading
features of this epoch. It is, as it were, in a great measure the key
to the principal events; and, in spite of the various aspects presented
by this feature, it may be signalized as a general fact among all the
civilized portion of the nations of Europe.
Before proceeding further in our examination of this subject, the mere
indication of such a fact suggests the reflection, that it must be very
incorrect to say that Catholicity has tendencies opposed to the true
liberty of the people; for we see that European civilization, which,
during so many ages, was under the influence and guardianship of this
religion, did not then present one single principle of government
exclusively predominating. Survey the whole of Europe at this period,
and you will not find one country in which the same fact did not
exist. In Spain, France, England, Germany, under the names of Cortes,
States-General, Parliaments, or Diets; the same thing everywhere, with
the simple modifications which necessarily result from circumstances
adapted to each people. What is very remarkable in this case is, that
if there be a single exception, it is in favor of liberty; and, strange
to say, it exists precisely in Italy, where the influence of the Popes
is immediately felt. The names of the Republics of Genoa, Pisa, Sienna,
Florence, Venice, are familiar to all. It is well known that Italy is
the country in which popular forms at that period gained most ground,
and in which they were put in practice, whilst in other countries they
had already abandoned the field. I do not mean to say that the Italian
Republics were a model worthy of being imitated by the other nations of
Europe. I am well aware that these forms of government were attended
with grave inconveniences; but since so much is said of _spirit_ and
_tendencies_, since the Catholic Church is reproached with her affinity
to despotism, and the Popes with a _taste_ for oppression, it is well
to adduce those facts which may serve to throw some doubt upon certain
authoritative assertions, adduced as so many philosophico-historical
dogmas. If Italy preserved her independence in spite of the efforts of
the Emperors of Germany to wrest it from her, she owed it in a great
part to the firmness and energy of the Popes.
In order to comprehend fully the relations which Catholicity bears to
political institutions, in order to ascertain what degree of affinity
it bears to such and such forms, and to form a correct idea of the
influence of Protestantism in this respect over European civilization,
we must examine carefully and in detail each of the elements claiming
preponderance. When we examine them afterwards in their relations with
each other, we will ascertain, as far as possible, where the truth lies
in this shapeless mass. Every one of these three may be considered in
two ways: 1. According to the ideas formed of them at the period we are
speaking of; 2. According to the interests these elements represent,
and the part they play in society. We must lay particular stress upon
this distinction, without which we should expose ourselves to the
commission of serious errors. In fact, the ideas which were entertained
upon such or such principles of government did not coincide with the
interest represented by this same element, and with the part it acted
in society; and although it is clear that these two things must have
had very close relations with each other, and could not be disengaged
from a real and reciprocal influence, yet it is most certain that they
differ considerably, and that this difference, the source of very
various considerations, shows the subject in points of view quite
dissimilar.