MONARCHY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The idea of monarchy has ever existed in the bosom of European society,
even at the time when the least use was made of it; and it is worthy
of remark, that at the time when its energy was taken away, and it
was destroyed in practice, it still retained its force in theory. We
cannot say that our ancestors had any very fixed notions upon the
nature of the object represented by this idea; nor can we wonder
at it, since the continual variations and modifications which they
witnessed must have prevented them from forming any very correct
knowledge of it. Nevertheless, if we peruse the codes in places where
monarchy is treated of, and if we consult the writings which have been
preserved upon this matter, we shall find that their ideas on this
point were more fixed than might have been imagined. By studying the
manner of thinking of this period, we find that men in general were
almost destitute of analytical knowledge, being more erudite than
philosophical; so much so, that they scarcely ventured to express
an idea without supporting it by a multitude of authorities. This
taste for erudition, which is visible at the first glance into their
writings--a mere tissue of quotations--and which must have been very
natural, since it was so general and lasting, had very advantageous
results; not the least of which was the uniting of ancient with
modern society, by the preservation of a great number of records and
memorials, which, had it not been for this public taste, must have been
destroyed, and by exhuming from the dust the remains of antiquity about
to perish. But, on the other hand, it produced many evils; amongst
others, a sort of stifling of thought, which could no longer indulge in
its own inspirations, although they may have been more happy than the
ancient ones on some points.
However it may be, such is the fact: on examining it in relation to the
matter under discussion, we find that monarchy was represented at that
time as one single picture, in which there appeared at the same time
the kings of the Jews and the Roman emperors, whose features had been
corrected by the hand of Christianity. That is to say, the principles
of monarchy were composed of the teachings of Scripture and the Roman
codes. Seek every where the idea of emperor, king, or prince, you
will always find the same thing, whether you look for the origin of
power, its extent, its exercise, or its object. But what ideas were
entertained of monarchy? What was the acceptation of this word? Taken
in a general sense, abstractedly from the various modifications which
a variety of circumstances gave to its signification, it meant, _the
supreme command over society, vested in the hands of one man, who was
to exercise it according to reason and justice_. This was the leading
idea, the only one fixed, as a sort of pole, round which all other
questions revolved. Did the monarch possess in himself the faculty
of making laws without consulting general assemblies, which, under
different names, represented the different classes of the kingdom? From
the moment that we propose this question we come upon new ground. We
have descended from theory to practice; we have brought our ideas into
contact with the object to which they are to be applied. From that
moment, we must allow, every thing vacillates and becomes obscure; a
thousand incoherent, strange, and contradictory facts pass before our
eyes; the parchments upon which are inscribed the rights, liberties,
and laws of the people give rise to a variety of interpretations, which
multiply doubts and increase difficulties. We see, in the first place,
that the relations of the monarch with the subject, or, more properly
speaking, the mode in which government should be exercised, was not
very well defined. The confusion from which society was emerging was
still felt, and was inevitable in an aggregation of heterogeneous
bodies, in a combination of rival and hostile elements; that is, we
discover an embryo, and consequently it is impossible as yet to find
regular and well-defined forms.
Did this idea of monarchy contain any thing of despotism, any thing
that subjected one man to the dominion of another by setting aside the
eternal laws of reason and justice? No; from the moment that we touch
upon this point we discover a new horizon, clear and transparent, upon
which objects present themselves distinctly, without a shade of dimness
or obscurity. The answer of all writers is decisive: Rule ought to be
conformable to reason and justice; if it is not, it is mere tyranny.
So that the principle maintained by M. Guizot, in his _Discours sur la
Democratie moderne_, and in his _History of Civilisation in Europe_,
viz. that the will alone does not constitute a right; that laws, to
be laws, should accord with those of eternal reason, the only source
of all legitimate power;--that this principle, I say, which we might
imagine to be newly applied to society, is as ancient as the world.
Acknowledged by ancient philosophers, developed, inculcated, and
applied by Christianity, we find it in every page of jurists and
theologians.
But we know what this principle was worth in the monarchies of
antiquity, and also in our own days in countries where Christianity has
not yet been established. Who, in such countries, presumes continually
to remind kings of their obligation to be just? Observe, on the
contrary, what is the case among Christians: the words 'reason' and
'justice' are constantly in the mouth of the subject, because he knows
that no one has a right to treat him unreasonably or unjustly; and this
he knows, because Christianity has impressed him with a profound idea
of his own dignity, because it has accustomed him to look upon reason
and justice, not as vain words, but as eternal characters engraven on
the heart of man by the hand of God, perpetually reminding man that,
although he is a frail creature, subject to error and to weakness,
he is, nevertheless, stamped with the image of eternal truth and of
immutable justice. If any one should question the truth of what I
have advanced, it will suffice, to convince him, to remind him of the
numerous texts previously cited in this work, and in which the most
eminent Catholic writers bear testimony to their manner of thinking on
the origin and faculties of civil power.
So much for ideas; as for facts, they vary according to times and
countries. During the incursions of the barbarians, and so long as the
feudal system prevailed, monarchy remained much beneath its typical
idea; but during the course of the sixteenth century, matters assumed
a different aspect. In Germany, France, England, and Spain, powerful
monarchs were reigning, who filled the world with the fame of their
names; in their presence aristocracy and democracy bowed with humility;
or if by chance they ventured to raise their heads, it was only to
suffer still greater degradation. The throne, it is true, had not yet
attained that ascendency of power and importance which it acquired in
the following century; but its destiny was irrevocably fixed--power
and glory awaited it. Aristocracy and democracy might have labored to
take part in future events; but it would have been labor in vain for
them to attempt to appropriate them. A fixed and powerful centre was
essential to European society, and monarchy completely satisfied this
imperative necessity. The people understood and felt it; hence we find
them eagerly grasping at this saving principle, and placing themselves
under the safeguard of the throne.
The question is not, therefore, whether or not the throne ought to
exist, or whether it ought to preponderate over aristocracy and
democracy: these two questions have been already resolved. At the
commencement of the sixteenth century, its existence and preponderance
were already necessary. The question to be resolved is, whether the
throne ought so decisively to have prevailed, that the two elements,
aristocracy and democracy, should be erased from the political world;
whether the combination which had hitherto existed was still to exist:
or, whether these two elements should disappear; whether monarchical
power should be absolute. The Church resisted royal power when it
attempted to lay hands upon sacred things; but her zeal never carried
her so far as to depreciate, in the eyes of the people, an authority
which was so essential to them. On the contrary, besides continually
giving to the power of kings a more solid basis, by her doctrines
favorable to all legitimate authority, she endeavored to give them
a still more sacred character by the august ceremonies displayed at
their coronations. The Church has been sometimes accused of anarchical
tendencies, for having energetically struggled against the pretensions
of sovereigns; by some, on the contrary, she has been reproached with
favoring despotism, because she preached up to the people the duty
of obedience to the _lawful_ authorities. If I mistake not, these
accusations, so opposite to each other, prove that the Church has
neither been adulatory nor anarchical; she has maintained the balance
even, by telling the truth both to kings and their subjects.
Let the spirit of sectarianism seek, on all sides, historical facts,
to prove that the Popes have attempted to destroy civil monarchy by
confiscating it to their own profit. But let us bear in mind what the
Protestant Müller says, that the Father of the faithful was, during the
barbarous ages, a tutor sent by God to the European nations; and let
us not be astonished to find that differences have sometimes occurred
between him and his pupils. To discover the intention which dictated
these reproaches against the Court of Rome, relative to monarchy, we
need only reflect upon the following question. All writers consider as
a great benefit the creation of a strong central authority, and yet
circumscribed within just limits that it may not abuse its power; they
laud to the skies every thing tending, directly or indirectly, among
all the nations of Europe, to establish such an authority. Why, then,
when speaking of the conduct of Popes, do they attribute to a pretended
taste for despotism the support which they give to royal authority,
whilst they qualify with anarchical usurpation their efforts to
restrain, upon certain points, the faculties of sovereigns? The answer
is not difficult.[34]