HOW THE CIVIL POWER MAY BE LAWFULLY RESISTED.
From what has been said in the foregoing chapters it follows, that
it is allowable to resist illegitimate power by force. The Catholic
religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing merely
_de facto_; for morality does not admit a mere fact, unsupported
by right and justice. However, when power is in itself lawful, but
in its exercise tyrannical, does our religion prohibit, in every
instance, resistance by physical force; so that not to resist at all,
forms a part of her dogmas? Is insurrection never allowable, in any
supposition, for any motive? Although I have already eliminated many
questions, it is necessary to draw here a fresh distinction, in order
to fix exactly the point at which dogma ends, and opinions begin. It is
evident, in the first place, that an individual has no right to kill
a tyrant on his own authority. The Council of Constance, in its 15th
session, condemned the following proposition as heretical: "Any vassal
or subject may and should, lawfully and meritoriously, kill any tyrant.
He may even, for this purpose, avail himself of ambushes, and wily
expressions of affection or adulation; notwithstanding any oath or pact
imposed upon him by the tyrant; and without waiting for the sentence
or order of any judge." "Quilibet tyrannus potest et debet licite et
meritorie occidi per quemcumque vassallum suum vel subditum, etiam
per clanculares insidias, et subtiles blanditias vel adulationes, non
obstante quocumque præstito juramento, seu confœderatione factis cum
eo, non expectata sententia vel mandato judicis cujuscumque."
But does this decision of the Council of Constance constitute a
prohibition of every kind of insurrection? No; it speaks of the murder
of a tyrant by any particular individual; but every case of resistance
is not maintained by a single individual; neither is it the aim of
every insurrection to destroy a tyrant. This doctrine only serves to
prevent murder, and a train of evils which would overwhelm society
if it were established that any individual had a right of his own
authority to kill the supreme ruler. Who will venture to accuse this
doctrine of being favorable to tyranny? The liberty of the people
should not be based upon the horrid right of assassination; the defence
of the rights of society should not be confided to the dagger of a
fanatic. The attributes of public power are so extensive and various,
that their exercise must necessarily and frequently inconvenience some
individuals. Man, inclined to extremes and revenge, easily enlarges
upon the grievances which he suffers; passing from a particular to a
general, he is inclined to look upon those who injure or oppose him as
villains. At the slightest shock which he receives from government,
he cries out that tyranny is insupportable; the act of arbitrary
power, real or imaginary, committed against him, becomes, in his
mouth, one of the many iniquities perpetrated, or the commencement of
those that are to be. Grant, therefore, to the individual the right
of killing a tyrant; proclaim to the people that, to render such an
act lawful and meritorious, there is no need of a sentence, or any
judicial condemnation; and from that time this horrible crime will
become frequent. The wisest, the justest kings will fall victims to
the parricidal dagger, or the poisoned cup. You will have furnished no
guarantee to the liberty of the people, and you will have exposed the
dearest interests of society to dreadful hazards.
The Catholic Church, by this solemn declaration, has conferred an
immense service on humanity. The violent death of him who holds the
supreme power seldom happens without causing bloodshed and great
commotion. It provokes measures of suspicious precaution, easily
converted into tyranny. It follows, then, that any crime instigated
by excessive hatred of tyranny contributes to establish it in a form
still more absolute and cruel. Modern nations should feel grateful
to the Catholic Church for having established this sacred and saving
principle. A person must be possessed of very mean sentiments, or very
ferocious instincts, not to appreciate it, or to regret the bloody
scenes of the Roman Empire and the barbarian monarchy. We have seen,
and we still see, powerful nations delivered up to dreadful troubles,
by the neglect of this Catholic maxim. The history of the last three
centuries, and the experience of this, prove that this august precept
of the Church was given to the people in anticipation of the dangers
which were threatening them. In it we find no flattery for kings;
for they are not the only ones benefited by it; it is a general
proposition, including all others, whatever be their titles, who
exercise supreme authority, whatever be the form of government, from
the Russian autocrat to the most democratical republic.
It is worthy of remark, that modern constitutions, proceeding from the
bosom of revolutions, have universally rendered a solemn homage to this
Catholic maxim; they have declared the person of the monarch _sacred
and inviolable_. What does this mean, but that this person should be
placed under an impenetrable safeguard? You reproach the Catholic
Church with placing a sort of shield before the person of kings, and
yet you yourselves declare that person inviolable. The anointing of
kings you ridicule, and yet you yourself declare that the king is
sacred. Since you are forced to imitate the Church, her dogmas and her
discipline must have contained an eternal truth, and high political
principles; with this difference, however, that you represent as the
work of the will of man what she esteems the work of the will of God.
But if supreme power makes a scandalous abuse of its faculties, if it
outsteps its just bounds, if it tramples under foot fundamental laws,
if it persecutes religion, corrupts morality, outrages public dignity,
attacks the honor of citizens, exacts illegal and disproportionate
contributions, alienates national property, dismembers provinces,
inflicts death and ignominy upon the people: in such cases, does
Catholicity also prescribe obedience? does it forbid resistance? does
it command subjects to remain tranquil, like a lamb in the claws of a
wild beast? May there not exist, either in an individual, or in the
principal bodies, or in the most distinguished classes of society, or
in the entire mass of the nation, somewhere, in fine, the right of
opposing, of resisting, after all means of mildness, representation,
counsel, and entreaty have failed? In such disastrous circumstances,
does the Church leave the people without hope, and tyrants without
restraint?
In such extremities, certain very renowned theologians think that
resistance is allowable; but the dogmas of the Church do not descend
to these details. The Church abstains from condemning the opposite
doctrines. In such extreme circumstances, non-resistance is not a
dogmatical prescription. The Church has never taught such a doctrine;
if any one will maintain that she has, let him bring forward a decision
of a Council or of a Sovereign Pontiff to that effect. St. Thomas of
Aquin, Cardinal Bellarmin, Suarez, and other eminent theologians,
were well versed in the dogmas of the Church; and yet, if you consult
their works, so far from finding this doctrine in them, you will find
the opposite one. Now the Church has not condemned them, she has not
confounded them with those seditious writers in whom Protestantism
abounds, nor with modern revolutionists, who are continually disturbing
social order. Bossuet and other authors of repute differ from St.
Thomas, Bellarmin, Suarez; and this gives credit to the opposite
opinion, but does not convert it into a dogma. Upon certain points of
the highest import, the opinions of the illustrious Bishop of Meaux
suffered contradiction; and we know that upon this case of an excess
of tyranny, the Pope at another period was acknowledged to possess
faculties which Bossuet refuses him.
The Abbé de Lamennais, in his impotent and obstinate resistance to the
Holy see, adduced the doctrines of St. Thomas, and those of some other
theologians, pretending that to condemn his own works was to condemn
schools hitherto held irreproachable. (_Affaires de Rome._) The Abbé
Gerbet, in his excellent refutation of M. de Lamennais, after having
very judiciously remarked, that the Sovereign Pontiff's object in
reproving modern doctrines was, to prevent a renewal of the errors of
Wickliffe, observes, at the epoch of this heresiarch's condemnation,
the doctrines of St. Thomas and of other theologians were well known,
and that, nevertheless, no one believed that they were included in
the condemnation. The excellent author of this refutation deemed
this sufficient to deprive M. de Lamennais of the shield under which
he sought to defend and cover his apostacy; and for this reason, he
abstains from drawing a parallel between the two doctrines. In fact,
this reflection alone is sufficient to convince any judicious man that
the doctrines of St. Thomas bear no resemblance to those of M. de
Lamennais. It may, however, be useful to give in few words a comparison
of the two doctrines. At the present time, and in these matters, it
is very proper to know, not only that these doctrines differ, but
likewise wherein they differ. M. de Lamennais' theory may be stated in
the following terms: A natural equality among men, and, as necessary
consequences, 1. Equality of rights, political rights included; 2. The
injustice of every social and political organization not establishing
this equality completely, as is the case in Europe and in the whole
universe; 3. Expediency and legitimacy of insurrection, to destroy
governments, and change social organization; 4. Abolition of all
government, as the object of the progress of the human race.
The doctrines of St. Thomas on the same points may be thus expressed:
_A natural equality among men_; that is to say, an essential equality,
but exclusive of physical, intellectual, and moral gifts--an equality
among men in the eyes of God--an equality in their destination,
inasmuch as they are all created to enjoy God--an equality of means,
inasmuch as they are all redeemed by Christ, and may all receive His
grace; but exclusive of the inequalities which it may please God to
establish by gifts of grace and glory. 1. _An equality of social and
political rights._ According to the holy doctor, such an equality is
impossible. He rather supports the utility and legitimacy of certain
hierarchies; the respect due to those established by law; the necessity
of there being some to command and others to obey; the obligation of
being subject to the established laws of the country, whatever be the
form of government; the preference for monarchical governments. 2. _The
injustice of every social and political organization not establishing
a complete equality._ St. Thomas looks upon this as an error opposed
to reason and to faith. Nay, more; not only is it true that the
inequality founded upon the very nature of man and of society is an
effect and punishment of original sin, in as far as it entails upon
man injury or inconvenience; but, according to the holy Doctor, this
inequality would have existed among men even in a state of innocence.
3. _Expediency and legitimacy of insurrection, to destroy governments,
and to change the social organization._ An erroneous and fatal opinion.
We ought to submit to legitimate governments; it is expedient even to
tolerate such as make an improper use of their power; we must exhaust
every means of entreaty, of counsel and representation, before we
have recourse to others. We can only appeal to force in the greatest
extremities, on rare occasions, and then only under many restrictions,
as will be seen elsewhere. 4. _Abolition of all government, as the
object of the progress of the human race._ An absurd proposition--a
dream that cannot be realized. The necessity of government in every
society; arguments founded upon the nature of man; analogies from the
human body, from the very order of the universe; the existence of
government even in a state of innocence. Such are the doctrines of De
Lamennais and St. Thomas respectively. Let the reader compare them, and
judge for himself.
It is impossible to adduce the words of the holy Doctor--they would
fill the volume. Should any reader wish to consult them himself, let
him read, in addition to the passages inserted in this work, the whole
treatise, _De Regimine Principum_, the commentaries on the Epistle
to the Romans, and those passages of the _Summa_ in which the holy
Doctor treats of the soul, of the creation of man, of the state of
innocence, of the angels and of their hierarchy, of original sin and
its effects, and, above all, his valuable Treatise on Laws and that on
Justice, in which he discusses the origin of the right of property and
of inflicting punishments. After that he will be convinced of the truth
of what I have just advanced; he will then see the injustice of M. de
Lamennais in attempting to make the illustrious writers and saints
venerated on our altars the accomplices of his apostacy. In grave and
delicate matters confusion produces error, the enemies of truth are
interested in spreading darkness, in establishing general and vague
propositions susceptible of various interpretations. They seek with
anxiety a text favorable to some one of the numerous interpretations
that are possible, and proudly exclaim, "How unjust it is in you to
condemn us; what we maintain was asserted centuries ago, by the most
respected and celebrated writers." The Abbé de Lamennais must have
reckoned in a singular manner upon the credulity of his readers, to
think of making them believe that there was no honest man to be found
at Rome capable of informing the Pope, that in condemning the doctrines
of the apostle of revolution, he was condemning also those of the angel
of the schools, and other distinguished theologians. It is possible
that M. de Lamennais never read the authors except in haste and in
fragments, but many persons at Rome have spent their lives in studying
them.
We are not ignorant of the violent declamations of Luther, Zwinglius,
Knox, Jurieu, and other leaders of Protestantism, to stir up the
people to revolt against princes; we are not ignorant of the gross
and violent invectives made use of by these sectaries to excite the
multitude. Catholics look upon such extravagances with horror. In like
manner, they look with dread upon the anarchical doctrine of Rousseau,
establishing that "the clauses of the _social contract_ are so
determined by the very nature of the act, that the _least modification_
of them would render them _vain and null_; so that every one then
resumes his former rights and regains his natural liberty". (_Contrat
Social_, l. i. c. 6.) The doctrine of the theologians above cited does
not contain this fruitful germ of insurrection and disaster; but, on
the other hand, they are not found timid and pusillanimous in the last
extremities. They preach up resignation, patience, and longanimity; but
there is a point at which they stop and exclaim, _Enough_. If they do
not advocate insurrection, they do not prohibit it; it would be in vain
to require them to teach as a dogmatical truth the obligation of not
resisting in extreme cases. They cannot teach the people to consider
as a dogma what they do not acknowledge as such. It is not their fault
if the tempest bursts, if the roaring waves arise; no other hand can
control them than that of God, who rides upon the north wind and sports
with the tempest.
For many centuries there has been inculcated in Europe a doctrine much
criticised by those who do not understand it, the intervention of the
Pontifical authority between the people and their sovereigns. This
doctrine was nothing less than Heaven descending as an arbiter and
judge, to put an end to the disputes of the earth.
The temporal power of the Popes has served as a wonderful theme to
the enemies of the Church to create alarm, and declaim against Rome;
but this power is no less an historical fact and a social phenomenon,
which has filled with admiration the most renowned men of modern
times, including some Protestants. The Scriptures make it a duty
for slaves to obey their masters, even when they are oppressive and
unjust. All that can be inferred from this is, that a prince, by the
simple fact of his being wicked, does not lose his authority over his
subjects, which condemns beforehand the errors of those who make the
right of commanding dependent upon the sanctity of its possessor. Such
a principle is anarchical, and incompatible with the existence of
every society. When it is once established, power remains unsafe and
tottering; every disturber declares all those divested of authority
whom he may deem culpable. But our question is of a different nature,
and the opinion of theologians cited by us has nothing to do with this
error. These theologians also on their part advocate obedience to
rulers, even though they be oppressive and unjust; they also condemn
insurrection, when founded on no other pretext than the vices of
persons exercising supreme power; they do not admit that any abuse of
power justifies resistance; but they do not consider that they impugn
the sacred text by admitting that in extreme cases it is allowable to
place a barrier against the excesses of a tyrant. "If governments do
not lose their power by the simple fact of their being wicked, how,"
it will be said, "can we conceive resistance to them lawful?" This is
certainly not allowable, so long as they do not outstep the bounds of
their faculties; but when they do so, their commands, as St. Thomas
says, are rather acts of violence than laws. "No one has the right of
judging the supreme power." This is true; but above this power exist
the principles of reason, morality, religion. Power, although supreme,
is bound to the execution of its promises, to keep its oaths. Society
is not formed upon the model of Rousseau's ideal _contract_; but there
exist, in certain cases, real pacts between the rulers and the people,
to which both are bound to adhere.
In the celebrated _Catholic Proclamation to his pious Majesty Philip
the Great, King of Spain and Emperor of the Indies by the Counsellors
and the Council of One Hundred of the city of Barcelona_, in 1640, an
epoch so profoundly religious that the Counsellors quote, as a high
title of glory, _the zeal of the Catalonians for the Catholic faith,
the devotion of the Catalonians to our lady the Blessed Virgin and the
most holy Sacrament_;--at that time, which pride and ignorance have
so often taxed with fanaticism, these counsellors said to the king,
"Besides civil obligation, the customs, constitutions, and acts of the
court of Catalonia are binding on conscience, and to violate them would
be a mortal sin; for the prince has no right to annul a contract; it
is made freely, but cannot be revoked without injustice. If a contract
is not subject to the civil law, it is subject to the law of reason;
and although the prince may be the master of the laws, the contracts he
makes with his vassals are inviolable, for in making them he is a mere
individual, and the vassal acquires a right equal to his. A contract,
in fine, should be made between equals. Hence, as the vassal cannot be
unfaithful to his lord, the latter, in like manner, is bound to keep
the promise he has made by solemn engagement; and indeed, the rupture
of a pact ought least of all to be expected on the part of a prince.
If the word of a king is law, that word given in a solemn contract is
still more binding." (_Catholic Proclamation_, sect. 27.) The courtiers
urged the monarch to measures of coercion to reduce the Catalonians to
submission; the Castilian army was preparing to enter the principality.
In this extremity, after exhausting all means of representation and
entreaty, the counsellors thus expressed themselves: "Finally, men who
have vowed an inveterate hatred against the Catalonians have been so
successful in their continual persuasions, that the uprightness and
equity of your majesty have been turned from the means of peace and
tranquillity proposed by us, and which should have been admitted, were
it only on the grounds of experience; and to fill up the cup of their
malice, they now lay your majesty under an obligation of oppressing
the principality still further, by sending an army to sack and pillage
wherever the caprice of the soldier may lead him; which would place
this country in a position to say (were it not for the love it has
borne, still bears, and ever will bear to your majesty) that such
a breach of sworn faith would leave it free, a thing of which the
province is unwilling to think, and prays God to avert. Nevertheless,
the principality knows from experience that these soldiers have neither
respect nor pity for any thing or person, married women and innocent
virgins, temples, or God Himself, images of the Saints or the sacred
vessels of our churches, nay, even the blessed Sacrament has twice this
year been committed to the flames by these soldiers. _The principality
is, therefore, everywhere in arms to defend, in such an urgent and
irremediable extremity, fortune, life, honor, liberty, home, laws, and
above all the sacred temples, the sacred images, and the holy Sacrament
of the altar (be the same for ever praised). In such a case, the holy
theologians do not merely affirm that resistance is lawful, but still
further, that all persons, whether lay or clerical, may take up arms to
avert the evil; that both secular and ecclesiastical property may and
ought to contribute to the defence; that the nations invaded may, as
the cause is universal, unite, confederate, and form juntas with a view
to prevent such evils._" (§36)
Such was the language addressed to kings, at a time when religion
predominated over all things. The counsellors, according to the usage
of the time, took care to make marginal notes of the sources of their
information; and we are not aware that their doctrines have ever been
condemned as heretical. These doctrines cannot, without manifest
dishonesty, be confounded with those of many Protestants and modern
revolutionists. A cursory perusal of these writings will enable any
one to discover how widely they differ. By maintaining that it is
not allowable in any case, in the greatest extremities, not even
when the most precious and sacred interests are at stake, to offer
resistance to the civil power, the thrones of kings are thought to be
strengthened; for it is generally kings that are spoken of. But it
should be remembered, that this doctrine affects every other supreme
power, under every form of government. Since the texts of Scripture
recommending obedience "to the powers that be," do not allude to kings
only, but to all supreme powers, without exception or distinction, it
follows that resistance cannot in any case be offered to the president
of a republic. Will it be said that the faculties of a president are
determined? Are not the faculties of a king also determined? Are
there not, in absolute governments, laws fixing the limits of these
faculties? And is not this the distinction constantly employed by
the supporters of monarchy to repel the errors of their adversaries,
who confound monarchy with despotism? "But," it will be said, "the
president of a republic is only temporary." And what if he were
perpetual? Besides, the faculties are neither increased nor diminished
by the simple fact of their having to last a long or short period. If a
council, a man, a family, is invested with a certain right, by virtue
of a certain law; with certain restrictions, but with certain contracts
and oaths; such a council, such a man or such a family is bound to
adhere to the oath taken, whatever be the extent of its duration,
temporary or perpetual. Such are the principles of natural right; so
certain and simple, that they cannot present any difficulty.
Theologians, even those most attached to the Sovereign Pontiff, teach a
doctrine which we must notice here, on account of the analogy it bears
to the point under discussion. It is known that the Pope, when speaking
_ex cathedra_, is acknowledged to be infallible, but not as a simple
individual; and that, in this latter capacity, he might fall into
heresy. In this case, theologians are of opinion that he would forfeit
his dignity; some maintaining that he ought to be deposed, others that
his deposition is the consequence of his having fallen from the faith.
Whichever of these opinions be admitted, in this case resistance would
become allowable, for this reason, that the Pope would have shamefully
departed from the object of his institution, would have trampled on
the basis of the laws of the Church, which is her dogmas, and would
consequently have nullified the promises and oaths of obedience made to
him. Spedalieri, in adducing this argument, observes, that kings are
certainly not of higher rank than Popes,--that power has been granted
to both _in ædificationem non in destructionem_; adding, that if
Sovereign Pontiffs authorize this doctrine with relation to themselves,
temporal sovereigns cannot object to its application to them.
It is strange that the monarchical zeal of Protestants and incredulous
philosophers imputes to the Catholic religion as a crime, that she has
allowed it to be maintained within her bosom, that, in certain cases,
the subject may be released from his oath of allegiance; whilst other
philosophers of the same school reproach it with having sanctioned
despotism by its _detestable doctrine of non-resistance_, as Dr. Beatty
expresses it. _The direct, indirect, and declaratory powers of the
Popes_ have served as an admirable bugbear to intimidate kings; the
dangerous principles of theological works formed an excellent pretext
for raising the cry of alarm, for representing Catholicity as a nest of
seditious maxims. The hour of revolutions was struck,--circumstances
were changed,--fresh necessities arose, and men adapted their language
to the times. The Catholics, a short time before seditious and
regicidal, were then declared abettors of despotism, fulsome adulators
of civil power. Recently, the Jesuits, leagued with the infernal
policy of Rome, were everywhere undermining thrones, to establish on
their ruins the universal monarchy of the Pope; but the secret of this
horrid plot was discovered, and fortunately so, for the world was
otherwise about to experience a frightful catastrophe. But now that
the Jesuits are expelled, and are expiating their crimes in exile, the
French Revolution, the prelude to so many others, breaks out, and the
aspect of affairs changes immediately. Protestants and unbelievers, the
_supporters of ancient discipline_, _the zealous adversaries of the
abuses of the Court of Rome_, fully comprehending the new situation
of affairs, hasten to conform to it. From that moment, the Jesuits,
the Catholics, the Pope, are no longer seditious or tyrannicides, but
Machiavellian supporters of tyranny, enemies of the liberty of the
people; and just as a league had been supposed to exist between the
Jesuits and the Pope for the foundation of a universal theocracy,
there is now discovered, thanks to the investigations of these eminent
philosophers and _strict, incorruptible Christians_, _an infamous
pact between the Pope and kings_ to oppress, enslave, and degrade the
unfortunate human race.
The answer to this enigma may be thus briefly expressed. So long as
kings maintain their power and the peaceable possession of their
thrones, so long as Providence restrains the tempest, and the monarch,
raising his proud head towards heaven, commands the people with a lofty
air, the Catholic Church does not flatter him. "Thou art dust," she
says to him, "and into dust thou shalt return; power was given thee
not unto destruction, but unto edification; thy faculties are great,
but not boundless. God is thy judge, as well as that of the lowest of
thy subjects." The Church is then accused of insolence; and if any
theologian should venture to investigate the origin of civil power,
to point out, with generous freedom, the duties to which this power
is subject; to write, in a word, with prudence upon public right, but
without servility, the Catholics are then declared seditious. But the
tempest bursts, thrones are overturned, revolution prevails, spills the
blood of the people in torrents, cuts off royal heads, and all in the
name of liberty. The Church says: "This is no liberty, but a succession
of crimes; the fraternity and equality which I have taught, were never
your orgies and guillotines." The Church then becomes a vile flatterer;
her words, her actions, have indubitably revealed that the Sovereign
Pontiff is the surest anchor of despotism; it has been proved that the
Court of Rome has been polluted by an infamous pact.[33]