ON THE FACULTIES OF THE CIVIL POWER.
Having shown that the Catholic doctrine upon the origin of the civil
power does not include any thing but what is perfectly reasonable and
reconcilable with the true interests of the people, let us discuss
the second of the proposed questions. Let us inquire into the nature
of the faculties of this power, and see whether under this aspect the
Church teaches any thing favorable to despotism--to that oppression of
which she is so calumniously accused of being a supporter. We invite
our opponents to demonstrate the contrary, fully confident that they
will find it more difficult to succeed in so doing, than to accumulate
vague accusations, which serve only to lead too confiding minds astray.
To sustain these charges properly, recourse should be had to texts of
Scripture, to tradition, to the decisions of Councils, or to those
of Supreme Pontiffs, to passages of the Fathers; and it should be
shown that these immoderately extend the bounds of power, with the
design of placing undue restraint upon the liberty of the people, or
of destroying it. But it will be said, if the sources retained their
purity, the streams have been polluted by commentators; in other terms,
theologians of latter ages, becoming the adulators of civil power,
have powerfully labored to extend its faculties, and, consequently,
to establish despotism. As many persons too readily claim the right
of criticizing the doctors of what is termed the period of decline,
flippantly censuring those illustrious men, without having ever taken
the trouble to open their works, it is necessary for us to enter into
some details on this subject, and to dispel prejudices and errors which
are seriously injurious to religion, and not less so to science.
The declamations and invectives of Protestants have induced certain
minds to imagine that every idea of liberty would have disappeared
from the heart of Europe, had it not been for the timely intervention
of the pretended Reformation of the sixteenth century. According to
this idea, Catholic theologians are represented as a crowd of ignorant
monks, capable only of writing, in bad language and in still worse
style, a heap of nonsense, the ultimate and only aim of which was to
exalt the authority of Popes and kings, and to support intellectual and
political oppression, obscurantism, and tyranny. That a portion should
become the victim of illusion in matters the investigation of which
is difficult and arduous; that the reader should suffer himself to be
deceived by a writer on whose word he must either rely or remain in
complete ignorance,--as, for example, in the description of a country
or a phenomenon examined only by the narrator,--is nothing strange; but
that any one should adhere to errors which a few moments spent in the
most obscure library would eradicate, that the authors of the brilliant
volumes of Paris should have the privilege of disfiguring with impunity
the opinions of a writer lying covered with dust and forgotten in the
same library, and perhaps on the same shelf upon which the former
glitter; that the reader should peruse with avidity the glossy pages of
the newly-published work, filling his mind with the writer's notions,
without even so much as putting forth his hand to the voluminous tome
within his reach, and which needs only to be opened to furnish at every
page a refutation of the censures in which levity, if not bad faith, is
so ready to indulge; is difficult to be conceived or excused in any man
professing to be a lover of science, and a conscientious investigator
of truth. A great number of writers would assuredly not be so ready and
free to speak of what they have never studied, to analyze books which
they have never read, if they did not reckon upon the docility and
levity of their readers; they would certainly refrain from pronouncing
magisterially upon an opinion, a system, or a school, in fine, upon the
labors of many ages, from deciding the gravest questions by a sally of
wit, if they found that the reader, seized in his turn with distrust,
and particularly with the skepticism of the period, would not place
implicit faith in their assertions, but would take the trouble to
confront them with the facts to which they relate.
Our ancestors did not consider themselves justified, I will not say
in making an assertion, but even a single allusion, without giving
careful references to the source of their information. Their delicacy
on this point was carried to excess; but we have done wrong by going
to the opposite extreme, and judging that we might dispense with all
formality, even in the most important matters which imperiously demand
the testimony of facts. But the opinions of ancient writers are facts,
facts averred in their writings. By judging them hastily, without
entering into details, without imposing upon ourselves the obligation
of quoting authorities, we incur the suspicion of falsifying history,
and history, I repeat, the most precious, that of the human mind. The
levity observable in certain writers proceeds, in a great measure,
from the character which science has assumed in our days. There is no
longer any particular science, but only a general one, embracing them
all, and including in its immense circle all branches of knowledge.
Consequently, minds of ordinary capacity are obliged to remain
satisfied with vague notions, unfortunately only serving to stimulate
abstraction and universality. Never was knowledge so much generalized
as now, and never was it more difficult to obtain deserved renown for
wisdom. In every aspirant to scientific excellence the state of science
requires a laborious activity in the acquisition of knowledge, profound
reflection to regulate and direct it, a comprehensive and penetrating
view to simplify and concentrate it, an intellect of a high order,
elevating him to the regions in which science has established her
abode. How many men are endowed with these qualifications? But let us
revert to the subject.
Catholic theologians are so far from favoring despotism, that I doubt
much whether it would be possible to find better books than theirs
for enabling us to form clear and just ideas of the faculties of
power. I will even add that, generally speaking, they incline, in
a very remarkable manner, to the development of true liberty. The
great type of theological schools, the model to the contemplation of
which they have constantly turned during several centuries, are the
works of St. Thomas of Aquin; and we may with full confidence defy
our opponents to find us a jurist or philosopher who expounds with
more lucidity, wisdom, noble independence, and generous dignity, the
principles to which civil power ought to adhere. His _Treatise upon
Laws_ is immortal, and whoever has fully comprehended it has no further
information to acquire respecting the great principles which ought to
guide the legislator. You think lightly of past times, imagining that
till now nothing was known of politics or public right; and in your
imagination you invent an incestuous alliance between religion and
despotism, fancying you have discovered in the distant obscurity of the
cloister, the plot contrived by this infamous pact. But have you heard
the opinion of a religious of the thirteenth century upon the nature
of law? You already imagine that you see in his ideas force dominating
over all, and constantly invoking religion the better to disguise his
rude snares with a few falsehoods. Learn, then, that you could not
yourself have given a milder definition of law. You would never have
thought, as he has done, of excluding from it the idea of force; you
could never have conceived how, in so few words, he has managed to say
all, and with such exactitude, such lucidity, in terms so favorable
to the true liberty of the people and to the dignity of man. The
definition here spoken of being the summary of his entire doctrine,
and at the same time the guide which has directed theologians, may be
considered as an abridgment of theological doctrines in their relation
to the faculties of civil power. It presents to us at a single glance
what were, in this point of view, the predominating principles among
Catholics.
Civil power acts upon society through the medium of the law; and,
according to St. Thomas, the law is, "_a rule dictated by reason, the
aim of which is the public good, and promulgated by him who has the
care of society_." "Quædam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, et ab
eo qui curam communitatis habet promulgata." (1, 2, quæst. 90, art.
4.) A rule dictated by reason, _rationis ordinatio_. Here by one word
despotism and force are banished; here is the principle that the law
is not a pure effect of the will. The celebrated maxim, _Quod principi
placuit legis habet vigorem_, is here corrected. Although capable of
a reasonable and just interpretation, this maxim was, nevertheless,
incorrect, and inclined to flattery. A celebrated writer of our days
has devoted numerous pages to proving that legitimacy has not its
origin in the will of man, but in reason, inferring from this that
what ought to command men is not in the will of another man, but
reason. With much less pomp, but not less solidity and conciseness, the
holy Doctor expresses this idea in the words above quoted, _rationis
ordinatio_. On reflection we find that despotism, arbitrary power,
and tyranny are nothing else than the absence of reason in power, the
domination of the will. When reason commands, there is legitimacy,
justice, liberty; when the will alone commands, there is illegitimacy,
injustice, despotism. Hence the fundamental idea of all law is, that it
be in accordance with reason, that it be an emanation from reason, an
application of reason to society; and the will, in giving its sanction
to law and carrying it into execution, should be merely auxiliary to
reason, its instrument, its arm.
It is evident that, without the action of the will, there is no law;
for acts of pure reason, without the co-operation of the will, are
thoughts and not commands. They enlighten the mind, but do not produce
action. It is, therefore, impossible to conceive the existence of law
without the combined operation of the will and of reason. But this
is no reason why we should not consider all law to have a rational
foundation and to be conformable to reason, that it may merit the name
of law. These observations have not escaped the penetration of the holy
Doctor; he examines them, and dispels the error of believing that the
law consists in the mere will of the prince. He expresses himself as
follows: "Reason receives its motive power from the will, as we have
observed above (quæst. 17, art. 1;) for whilst the will seeks the end,
reason enjoins the means of its attainment; but the will, to have the
force of law, must be guided by reason. In this sense only can the will
of a sovereign be said to have the force of law; in any other sense it
would not be law, but injustice." "Ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate,
ut supra dictum est. (Quæst. 17, art. 1.) Ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult
finem, ratio imperat de his quæ sunt ad finem, sed voluntas de his quæ
imperantur, ad hoc quod legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua
ratione regulata; et hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis
habet vigorem legis; _alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas
quam lex_." (Quæst. 90, art. 1.)
These doctrines of St. Thomas are the same as those of all theologians.
Impartiality and good sense will tell us whether they are favorable to
absolutism and despotism, whether they are in any way opposed to true
liberty, whether they are not eminently conformable to the dignity of
man. These doctrines form the most explicit and conclusive proclamation
of the limits of civil power, and they certainly have in this respect
more weight than the declarations of imprescriptible rights. That which
humbles man, wounds in him the feeling of a just independence, and
introduces despotism into the world, is the will of man commanding and
exacting submission merely because it is his will; but by submitting
to reason, being guided by her dictates, we are not degraded; on the
contrary, we are elevated, we are dignified, for we live conformably
to eternal order and to the divine will. The obligation of being
subject to the law does not originate in the will of another, but in
reason. Theologians, however, have not considered the latter of itself
sufficient to command. They derive the sanction of the law from a
higher source; when the conscience of man was to be acted upon, to be
bound by duty, they could find nothing in the sphere of created things
capable of attaining so high an object. "Human laws, if they are just,"
says the holy Doctor, "are binding in conscience, and they derive their
power from the eternal law, from which they are formed, according to
what is said in Proverbs, chap. viii., 'By Me kings reign, and the
lawgivers decree just things.'" "Si quidem justæ sunt, habent vim
obligandi in foro conscientiæ a lege eterna, a qua derivantur, secundum
illud Proverb. cap. 8, per me reges regnant, et legum conditores justa
decernunt." (1, 2, quæst. 96, art. 3.) This proves, according to St.
Thomas, that just law is derived not exactly from human reason, but
from the eternal law; and that this is what makes it binding upon
conscience.
This is doubtless more philosophical than to seek the obligatory
force of laws in private reason, in pacts, or in the general will. In
this manner the titles, the true titles of humanity are explained, a
reasonable limit is placed upon civil power, and obedience is easily
obtained; the rights and duties of governments, as well as those of
subjects, are established upon solid and indestructible foundations;
the nature of power, society, command, and obedience become perfectly
comprehensible. It is no longer the will of one man predominating over
that of his fellow-man; it is not his reason, but reason emanating from
God, or more properly speaking the reason of God, the eternal law, God
Himself. A sublime theory, in which power finds its rights, its duties,
its force, its authority, its prestige, and in which society possesses
its safest guarantee of order, well-being, and true liberty; a theory
which divests authority of the will of man, since it changes this will
into an instrument of the eternal law, into a divine ministry, _whose
aim is the public good, ad bonum commune_. This, according to St.
Thomas, is also one of the essential conditions of law. It has been
asked, Whether kings are made for the people, or the people for kings?
Such a question could only arise from a want of due reflection upon
the nature of society, its object, and its origin, and upon the intent
of power. The concise expression above cited, _ad bonum commune_, is a
fitting answer to this question. "Laws," says the holy Doctor, "may be
unjust in two ways; either by being opposed to the commonweal, or by
having an improper aim, as when a government imposes upon its subjects
onerous laws, which do not serve the common interest, but rather
cupidity and ambition. Such laws are rather injustices than laws."
"Injustæ autem sunt leges dupliciter; uno modo per contrarietatem
ad bonum commune, e contrario prædictis; vel ex fine, sicut cum
aliquis præsidens leges imponit, onerosas subditis non pertinentes ad
utilitatem communem, sed magis ad propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam:
...... Et hujusmodi magis sunt violentiæ quam leges." (1, 2, q. 96, art.
4.) From this doctrine it follows, that command must be exercised for
the well-being of all; and, failing in this condition, it is unjust:
governors are invested with it only for the advantage of the governed.
Kings are not, as some philosophers, regardless of the most palpable
inconsistencies, have absurdly maintained, the slaves of their people;
neither is their power a simple commission without any real authority,
and continually subject to the caprice of their people; but, at the
same time, the people are not the property of their kings. The latter
can, by no means, consider their subjects as slaves, to be disposed of
at their free-will: governments are not, by any means, the absolute
arbiters of the lives and fortunes of the governed; they are bound
to watch over them, not as a master over slaves from whom he derives
profit, but as a father over the son whom he loves and whose happiness
he has at heart.
"The kingdom is not made for the king, but the king for the kingdom,"
says the holy Doctor, from whom I continue to quote; and, in a style
remarkable for its force and freedom, he continues as follows: "for God
has constituted kings to rule and govern, and to secure to every one
the possession of his rights; such is the aim of their institution; but
if kings, turning things to their own profit, should act otherwise,
they are no longer kings, but tyrants." (_D. Th. de Reg. Princ._ cap.
11.) From this doctrine it is evident, that the people are not made
for kings; that the subject is not made for the ruler; but that all
governments have been established for the good of society, and that
this alone should be the compass to guide those who are in command,
whatever be the form of government. From the president of the most
insignificant republic to the most powerful monarch, none are exempt
from this law; for it is a law anterior to society,--a law which
presided at the formation of society, and which is superior to human
law, inasmuch as it emanates from the Author of all society, from the
source of all law.
No, the people are not made for kings; kings are all appointed for
the good of the people: and if this object is not accomplished, the
government is useless; and this affects the republic as well as the
monarchy. To flatter kings with opposite maxims is to ruin them.
Religion has not, at any time, done this; this was not the language
of those illustrious men who, clothed in the sacerdotal habit,
delivered to the powerful ones of the earth the messages of Heaven.
"Kings, princes, magistrates," cries out the venerable Palafox, "all
jurisdiction is ordained by God for the preservation of His people,
not for their destruction; for defence, not for offence; for man's
right, and not for his injury. They who maintain that kings can do as
they please, and who establish their power upon their will, open the
way to tyranny. Those who maintain that kings have power to do as they
ought, and what is necessary for the preservation of their subjects
and of their crowns, for the exaltation of faith and religion, for the
just and right administration of justice, the preservation of peace
and the support of just war, for the due and becoming _éclat_ of regal
dignity, the honorable maintenance of their houses and families, speak
the truth without flattery, throw open the gates to justice, and to
magnanimous and royal virtues." (_Hist. Real. Sagrada_, lib. i. cap.
11.) When Louis XIV. said, "I am the state," he had not learned this
maxim either from Bossuet, Bourdaloue, or Masillon. Pride, exalted by
so much grandeur and power, and infatuated by base adulators, was here
speaking by his mouth. How unsearchable are the ways of Providence!
The corpse of this man, who said he was the state, was insulted at his
funeral; and, before the lapse of a century, his grandson suffered
death on the scaffold! Thus the crimes of families are expiated, as
well as those of nations. When the measure of His indignation is filled
up, the Lord reminds terrified man that the God of mercy is likewise a
God of vengeance, and that, as He opened upon the world the floodgates
of heaven, so also He lets loose upon kings and nations the tempests of
revolution. When once the rights and duties of power are founded upon
a base as solid as that of their divine origin, when once they become
established by a rule as exalted as that of the eternal law, there
is no longer any necessity for extolling or exaggerating power, nor
of attributing to it faculties to which it has no claim; and, on the
other hand, it is no longer necessary to exact from it the fulfilment
of its obligations with that imperious haughtiness which enervates by
humiliating it. Flattery and menace become alike needless when there
are other resources for exciting it to action, and other barriers for
restraining it within due bounds. The statue of the king, it is true,
is not set up in the public squares as an object for the people's
adoration; but, on the other hand, the king is no longer placed at the
mercy of democrats, soon to become an object of mockery and derision,
the contemptible laughing-stock of demagogues.
Observe the moderation and mildness of the definition we have just
analysed! It does not contain a single word which can wound the
most delicate susceptibility of the most ardent partisans of public
liberty. The law, according to this definition, consists in the rule
of reason; the common weal is its only aim; and when the authority of
him who promulgates and executes it is spoken of, there is no mention
made of any sovereignty, no expression is used indicative of slavish
subjection, the most measured term which it was possible to select is
made use of--_care_: _Qui CURAM communitatis habet_. Bear in mind,
that the author here quoted is accustomed to weigh his words like
precious metal, and to employ them with the most scrupulous delicacy,
pausing a long time, when necessary, to explain any that may present
the least ambiguity, and you will then understand what ideas this great
man entertained upon power; you will discover whether the spirit of
oppressive doctrines could have prevailed in the Catholic schools,
in which this Doctor was, and is still, acknowledged as an almost
infallible oracle.
Compare the definition given by St. Thomas, and adopted by all
theologians, with that which Rousseau has given. In that of St. Thomas,
law is the expression of reason; in that of Rousseau, the expression
of will: in the former, it is an application of the eternal law; in
the latter, the product of general will. On which side are wisdom and
good sense? Law was understood among the nations of Europe as it is
explained by St. Thomas and all the Catholic schools; and tyranny was
banished from Europe, Asiatic despotism was impossible, the admirable
institution of European monarchy was established. At a later period,
Rousseau's explanation was adopted, and then came the Convention, with
its scaffolds and its horrors.
Publicists have already nearly abandoned the theory of "a general
will;" and even those who contend for the sovereignty of the people,
do not maintain that the will of all the citizens should constitute
the law. The law, say they, is not the expression of general will, but
of general reason. The philosopher of Geneva would have the will of
individuals collected, the aggregate of which he termed the general
will. In like manner, the publicists of whom we are speaking are of
opinion that it is necessary to collect, amongst the governed, the
greatest amount of reason, and to give this to the government for
its guidance, the governing body being merely an instrument for the
application of it. It is not men who command, say they, but the law;
and the law is nothing else than reason and justice.
This theory, so far as it is correct, and apart from the applications
which might be made of it, is not a discovery of modern science; it is
a traditional principle of all Europe, which presided at the formation
of society, and has given to civil power an organisation differing
widely from those of antiquity, and equally so from those of modern
times that have not participated in our civilisation. This, on close
examination, appears to be the reason why European monarchies, even
the most absolute, have been so very different from the Asiatic.
A singular phenomenon: at the very time when society among us had
no legal guarantees against the power of kings, it still had other
very forcible ones which were purely moral. Modern science cannot,
therefore, claim the discovery of a new principle of government; it
has unknowingly resuscitated the ancient one. By rejecting the doctrine
of Rousseau, instead of making, according to the vulgar expression,
a step in advance, it retrograded; but to retrograde is not always
to lose an advantage. What is or can be lost by receding from the
brink of a precipice to enter upon a safe road? Rousseau complains,
and with reason, that certain writers have so far exaggerated the
prerogatives of civil power, as to convert mankind into a common herd,
of which rulers could dispose to serve their interest or caprice. Such
reproaches, however, cannot be applied to the Catholic Church, nor to
any of the illustrious schools sheltered in her bosom. The philosopher
of Geneva makes a severe attack upon Hobbes and Grotius for having
maintained this servile doctrine. Catholics have nothing to do with the
cause of these two writers. I will observe, however, that it would not
be just to place the latter upon a parallel with the former. Grotius
has certainly afforded reason for the accusation. He maintains that
there are cases in which governments are not for the benefit of the
governed, but for that of the governing powers. "Sic imperia quædam
esse possunt comparata ad regum utilitatem." (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_,
lib. i. cap. 3.) But, whilst we acknowledge that this principle has a
dangerous tendency, we grant that the doctrines of the Dutch writer do
not upon the whole tend to the total ruin of morality.
By rendering Grotius his due share of justice, we prevent any
exaggeration of the evil which may exist on the side of our opponents;
it must now be permitted to Catholic hearts to remark with noble
satisfaction, that such doctrines could never be established amongst
the professors of the true faith, and that the fatal maxims which lead
to oppression have originated precisely among those who have deviated
from the teaching of the Chair of St. Peter. No; Catholics have never
brought under discussion whether kings have an unlimited power over
the lives and fortunes of their subjects, to such a degree as to
admit of no opposition, whatever be the excess of the absolutism and
despotism exercised over them. Whenever flattery raised its voice to
exaggerate the royal prerogative, this voice was immediately silenced
by the unanimous outcry of the supporters of sound doctrine. Witness
the remarkable example of a solemn retractation imposed by the tribunal
of the Inquisition upon a preacher who had exceeded his bounds. Not
so in England, a country proverbial for its hatred of Catholicity.
Whilst here, in Spain, it was forbidden under a severe penalty to
circulate maxims so degrading, in England the question was proposed
with the greatest gravity, and writers upon law were divided in their
sentiments. (See end of chapter 39.)
Every impartial reader has already been able to form an opinion on
the value of declamations against the right divine, and on that
pretended affinity of Catholic doctrines with despotism and slavery.
The exposition of these doctrines which I have just given is certainly
not founded upon vain reasoning, sought out on purpose to darken the
question. I have not in any way shunned the difficulty.
The question was, to know in what these doctrines consisted. I have
shown clearly, that those who calumniate them do not understand them,
and that we may even be allowed to suppose that they have never taken
the trouble to examine them, such is the levity and ignorance with
which they express themselves. Perhaps I have adduced too many facts
and quotations; but let the reader bear in mind, that my object is not
to present him with a code of doctrines, but to give to this point
of doctrine an historical investigation. Now, history does not call
for discourses, but facts; and in matters of doctrine, the sentiments
of authors are facts. Whilst beholding the salutary reaction now
taking place in favour of sound principles, let us avoid giving an
incomplete statement of the truth. For the cause of religion it is
highly important that its advocates should be free from even the most
remote suspicion of dishonesty or dissimulation. On this account,
I have, without hesitation, given in their integrity the doctrines
laid down by Catholic writers, just as I find them in their works. By
misrepresenting and confounding facts, Protestants and unbelievers have
succeeded in deceiving; let me hope that, by explaining and elucidating
them, I shall not be unsuccessful in removing the deception.
I purpose examining, in the remaining part of this work, some other
questions relating to the same subject--questions perhaps not more
important, but certainly more delicate. And for this reason, I was
obliged to smooth the way, that I might proceed with more liberty
and ease. I have hitherto made the cause of religion defend itself
with its own weapons, without borrowing the support of auxiliaries
which were superfluous. I shall proceed in the same course, fully
convinced that Catholicity can only lose by any line of vindication
that identifies it with political interests, and confines it within a
circle too limited for its immensity. Empires appear and disappear; the
Church of Christ will last till the end of time. Political opinions
undergo changes and modifications; the august dogmas of our religion
remain immutable. Thrones rise and fall; and the rock upon which Jesus
Christ has built His Church stands unshaken throughout the course of
time, ever defying the powers of hell. When we take up arms in her
defence, let us be impressed with the importance of our mission; let
there be no exaggeration, no flattery--the pure truth in measured, but
accurate and firm language. In addressing ourselves to the people, in
proclaiming the truth to kings, let us bear in mind that religion is
above politics, and God above kings and people.