FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE SPANISH MONARCHY.
Extreme doctrines neither insure the liberty of the people, nor the
force and stability of governments; both require truth and justice,
the only foundations upon which we can build with any hope of the
durability of the edifice. In general, maxims favorable to liberty are
never carried to a higher pitch than on the eve of the establishment
of despotism; and it is to be feared that the overthrow and ruin of
governments are very near when undue adulations are lavished upon their
power. When was the power of kings more extolled than about the middle
of last century? Who is not aware of the exaggerations given to the
prerogatives of royal power, when the Jesuits were to be expelled, and
the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff impugned? In Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Austria, and in France, the unanimous voice of the purest
and most fervent royalism was heard; and yet what became of this
great love, this lively zeal for monarchy, from the moment that the
revolutionary storm had placed it in danger? Observe what, generally
speaking, has been the conduct of men opposed to the ecclesiastical
authority; they have united themselves to demagogues for destroying, at
the same time, the authority of the Church and that of kings; they have
forgotten their base adulations, and abandoned themselves to insults
and violence. People and governments should never lose sight of this
rule of conduct, so useful to men of sense, to mistrust flatterers,
and to confide in those who warn and correct them. Let them beware
whenever they are caressed with an affected tenderness, and their cause
is maintained with especial warmth; it is a sure sign of an attempt
to make use of them as tools for the furtherance of interests very
different from their own. In France, at certain times, monarchical zeal
was carried to such an extent as to call forth, in the assembly of the
States-General, a motion for establishing, as a sacred principle, that
kings receive their supreme authority immediately from God: this was
not carried into effect, but the proposal shows how ardently the cause
of the throne was then maintained. Now, what did all this ardor mean?
Simply an antipathy against the Court of Rome, a dread of the extension
of papal power; it was an obstacle to be opposed to the phantom
of a _universal monarchy_. Louis XIV., so tenacious of the royal
prerogative, assuredly did not foresee the misfortunes of Louis XVI.;
and Charles III., in listening to the Count of Aranda and Campomanes,
little thought that the constituent Cortes of Cadiz was so near.
In the midst of their splendor, monarchs forgot one principle
predominating in the whole modern history of Europe, viz. that social
organization is an emanation of religion, and, consequently, that the
two powers to which the defence and preservation of society appertain
ought to co-exist in perfect harmony.
The power of the Church cannot be diminished without injury to the
civil power; he who sows schism will reap rebellion. During the last
three centuries the most liberal and popular doctrines upon the
origin of power have been circulated amongst us. What did it matter
to the Spanish monarchy, since those very persons who advocated
these doctrines were the first to condemn resistance to the lawful
authorities, to inculcate the obligation of obedience to them, and
to establish in all hearts, respect, love, and veneration for the
sovereign? The disturbances of our epoch, and the dangers constantly
besetting thrones, are not exactly attributable to the propagation of
doctrines more or less democratical, but to the absence of moral and
religious principles. What will be gained by asserting that power comes
from God, if people believe not in God? Point out the sacred character
of the duty of obedience, and what effect will it produce upon those
who admit not the existence of moral order, and to whom duty is merely
a chimerical idea? Suppose, on the contrary, that you have to deal with
men penetrated with moral and religious principles, who bow to the
will of God, and believe themselves bound to submit to it, so soon as
it is manifested to them. What does it matter then whether civil power
proceeds from God directly or indirectly? it is enough to convince
them, in one way or another, that, whatever be its origin, God approves
of it, and wills that it should be obeyed; they will immediately submit
with pleasure, for they will see in this submission the accomplishment
of a duty.
These considerations serve to explain the reason why certain doctrines
appear more dangerous now than formerly: incredulity and immorality
give them perverse interpretations, and apply them so as to create
nothing but excesses and disorders. From the manner in which the
despotism of Philip II. and his successors is now spoken of, we might
be led to suppose that in their time no other doctrines than those in
favor of the most rigid absolutism could be circulated; and yet we find
that there were circulated, without the least apprehension on the part
of power, works maintaining theories which, even in our days, would be
esteemed too bold. Is it not, therefore, remarkable, that the famous
book of Father Mariana, intituled _De Rege et Regis institutione_,
which was burned at Paris by the hand of the public executioner,
had been published in Spain eleven years before, without the least
obstacle to its publication, either on the part of the ecclesiastical
or civil authority? Mariana undertook his task at the instigation and
request of D. Garcia de Loaisa, tutor to Philip III., and subsequently
Bishop of Toledo; so that the work, strange to say, was intended for
the instruction of the heir-apparent. Never was more freedom used in
speaking to kings; never was tyranny condemned in a louder voice; never
were more popular doctrines proclaimed; and the work was, nevertheless,
published at Toledo, in 1599, in the printing-office of Pedro Rodrigo,
printer to the king, with the approbation of P. Fr. Pedro de Ona,
provincial of the Mercenaries of Madrid, with the permission of
Stephen Hojeda, visitor of the Society of Jesus in the province of
Toledo, under the generalship of Claude Aquaviva; and, what is still
more forcible, with the royal sanction, and a dedication to the king
himself. We should also observe, that Mariana was not satisfied with
this dedication placed at the commencement of the book, but he makes
the very title itself serve to show to whom it was addressed: _De
Rege et Regis institutione. Libri 3, ad Philippum 3, Hispaniæ Regem
Catholicum_; and, as if this were not sufficient, in dedicating his
Spanish version of the History of Spain to Philip III., he says to him:
"I last year dedicated to your majesty a work of my own composition,
upon the virtues which ought to exist in a good king, my desire being
that all princes should read it carefully and understand it." "El año
pasado presenté á V. M. un libro que compuse de las virtudes que debe
tener un buen Rey, que deseo lean y entiendan todos los principes con
cuidado."
We will pass over his doctrine upon tyrannicide, which was the
principal cause of its condemnation in France, where there existed,
without doubt, motives of alarm, since kings were perishing there by
the hand of the assassin. On examining his theory upon power, we find
it as popular and liberal as those of modern democrats could be.
Mariana ventures to express his opinions without evasion or disguise.
For example, drawing a parallel between the king and the tyrant,
he says: "The king exercises with great moderation the power which
he has received from his subjects.... Hence, he does not, like the
tyrant, oppress his subjects as slaves, but governs them as free men;
and having received his power from the people, he takes particular
care that during his life, the people shall voluntarily yield him
submission." "Rex quam a subditis accepit potestatem singulari modestia
exercet.... Sic fit, ut subditis non tanquam servis dominetur, quod
faciunt tyranni, sed tanquam liberis præsit, et qui a populo potestatem
accepit, id in primis curæ habet ut per totam vitam volentibus
imperet." (Lib. 1, cap. 4, p. 57.) This was said in Spain by a simple
religious, was sanctioned by his superiors, and attentively listened
to by kings. To what grave reflections does this simple fact lead us!
Where is that strict and indissoluble alliance which the enemies of the
Church have imagined to exist between her dogmas and those of slavery?
If such expressions as the above were tolerated in a country in which
Catholicity predominated so extensively, how can it be maintained that
such a religion tends to enslave the human race, and that its doctrines
are favorable to despotism? Nothing would be easier than to fill whole
volumes with remarkable passages of our writers, both lay and clerical,
showing the extreme liberty granted upon this point, as well by the
Church as by the civil government. What absolute monarch in Europe
would approve of one of his high functionaries expressing the origin of
power after the manner of our immortal Saavedra? "It is from the centre
of justice," says he, "that the circumference of the crown has been
drawn. The latter would not be necessary, if we could dispense with
the former.
Hac una reges olim sunt fine creati,
Dicere jus populis, injustaque tollere facta.
In the first age, there was no necessity for penalties, because the
law did not take cognisance of transgressions; rewards were equally
unnecessary, because integrity and honor were loved for their own
sakes. But vice, growing with the age of the world, intimidated
virtue; simple and confiding, the latter, till then, dwelt in the
country. Equality was despised, modesty and chastity lost, ambition
and force introduced, and after them domination. Prudence, forced by
necessity, and aroused by the light of nature, reduced men to a state
of civil society, to exercise therein those virtues to which reason
inclines them. By means of the articulate voice with which nature had
gifted them, they could explain to each other their mutual thoughts,
manifest to each other their sentiments, and explain their wants,
instruct, counsel, and protect each other. Society once formed, a
power was created _by common consent, in the whole of this community,
enlightened by the law of nature_, for preserving its different
parts, for maintaining them in justice and peace, by punishing vice
and rewarding virtue. _As this power could not remain spread through
the whole body of the people, on account of the confusion which would
have arisen from the resolutions and their execution_, and as it was
absolutely necessary that there should be some to command, and others
to obey, _one portion divested itself of this power, and vested it in
one member, or in a small, or in a great, number of members, that is
to say, in one of the three forms of every state government--monarchy,
aristocracy, or democracy_. Monarchy was the first; because men
selected for their government, out of their families, and afterwards
even from among the whole people, some one who excelled the rest in
goodness: his greatness increasing, they honored his hand with the
sceptre, and encircled his head with a crown as an emblem of majesty,
and as a badge of the supreme power which they had conferred upon him.
This power, however, consists chiefly in that justice which ought to
maintain the people in peace; _this justice failing, the order of
the state fails, and the office of king ceases_, as was the case in
Castile, when the government by judges was substituted for that by
kings, on account of the injustice of D. Ordona and of D. Fruela."
(_Character of a Christian Prince's Policy, set forth in a hundred
Devices_, by D. Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Knight of the Order of St.
James, Member of his Majesty's Supreme Council for the Indies, _device_
22.)
The words _people_, _pact_, _consent_, have ended in becoming the
dread of men of sound ideas and upright intentions, on account of the
deplorable abuses which have been made of them in those immoral schools
which ought rather to be qualified with the epithet of irreligious than
with that of democratical. No, it was not the desire of ameliorating
the condition of the people which led them to overthrow the world, by
overturning thrones and shedding torrents of blood in civil discord;
the real cause was a blind rage for reducing to ashes the work of ages,
by especially attacking religion, the main support of every thing wise,
just, and salutary, that European civilization had acquired. And,
in fact, have we not seen impious schools, whilst boasting of their
liberty, bend under the hand of despotism, whenever they thought it
useful to their designs? Previous to the French Revolution, were they
not the basest adulators of kings, whose prerogatives they extended
immeasurably, with the intention of making regal power the means of
oppressing the Church? After the revolutionary epoch, did we not
see them assembled round Napoleon; and even yet, do they not almost
deify him? And why? Because Napoleon was revolution personified, the
representative and executor of the new ideas sought to be substituted
for the old ones. In the same manner Protestantism extols its Queen
Elizabeth; because it was she who placed the Establishment upon a
solid foundation. Revolutionary doctrines, besides the evils they
inflict upon society, produce indirectly another effect, which may, at
first sight, appear salutary, but which, in reality, is not so. They
occasion dangerous reactions in the order of events, and check the
progress of knowledge, by narrowing and debasing men's ideas, leading
them to condemn as erroneous and pernicious, or to view with mistrust,
principles which would previously have been looked upon as sound, or
that would, at all events, have been regarded as mere harmless errors.
The reason of all this is, simply, that liberty has no worse enemy than
licentiousness.
In support of this last observation, it may be well to show, that
the most rigorous doctrines in political matters have originated in
countries in which anarchy had made the greatest ravages, and precisely
at the time when the evil, still present, or very recent, was most
keenly felt. The religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and
the political commotions consequent upon it, were principally felt in
the north of Europe; the south, and especially Italy and Spain, were
almost entirely preserved from them. Now, these last two countries are
precisely those in which the dignities and prerogatives of civil power
have been the least exaggerated, as well as those in which they were
not disparaged in theory, and were respected in practice. Of all modern
nations, England was the first in which a revolution, properly so
called, was realized; for I do not consider as such the insurrection of
the German peasantry, which, in spite of the terrible catastrophe which
it caused, never effected any change in the state of society; or that
of the United Provinces, which may be considered a war of independence.
Now, it was precisely in England that the most erroneous doctrines
in favor of the supreme authority of civil power appeared. Hobbes,
who, whilst he refused to allow the rights of the Creator, attributed
unbounded authority to the monarchs of the earth, lived at the most
agitated and turbulent epoch in the annals of Great Britain. He was
born in 1588, and died in 1679.
In Spain, where the impious and anarchical doctrines, which had
troubled Europe since the schism of Luther, did not penetrate until the
latter part of the eighteenth century, we have seen that the greatest
license of expression was permitted upon the most important points of
public right, and that doctrines were maintained which, in any other
country, would have been looked upon as dangerous. Error gave rise to
exaggeration; the rights of monarchs were never so much extolled as
under the reign of Charles III.; that is, at the time when the modern
epoch was inaugurated among us.
Religion, which predominated in all consciences, maintained them in
the obedience due to the sovereign, without there being any need of
giving this obedience any extraordinary titles, when its real ones
were sufficient, as they certainly were. For him who knows that God
has prescribed obedience to lawful authority, it matters little
whether this authority emanate from Heaven directly or indirectly, or
whether society has more or less taken part in the determination of
political forms, or in the election of the persons or families who are
to exercise the supreme command. Hence we find that in Spain, although
the words _people_, _consent_, _pacts_, were spoken of, monarchs were
held in the most profound veneration, so much so that modern history
does not mention a single attempt upon their persons. Popular tumults
were also of rare occurrence; and those which did happen are not
attributable to either of the two above-mentioned doctrines. How does
it happen that, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Council of
Castile was not alarmed at the bold principles of Mariana, in his book
_De Rege et Regis institutione_, whilst those of the Abbé Spedalieri,
at the end of the eighteenth century, were such a terror to it? The
reason of this lies not so much in the contents of the works, as in
the epoch of their publication. The former appeared at a time when
the Spanish nation, confirmed in religious and moral principles,
might be compared to those robust constitutions capable of bearing
food difficult of digestion. The latter was introduced among us when
the doctrines and deeds of the French Revolution were shaking all the
thrones of Europe, and when the propagandism of Paris was beginning to
pervert us by its emissaries and books. In a nation in which reason
and virtue prevail, in which evil passions are never excited, in which
the well-being and prosperity of the country are the only aim of every
citizen, the most popular and liberal forms of government may exist
without danger; for in such a nation numerous assemblies produce no
disorder, merit is not obscured by intrigue, nor are worthless persons
raised to the government, and the names of public liberty and felicity
do not serve as means to raise the fortunes or satisfy the ambition of
individuals. So also in a country in which religion and morality rule
in every breast, in which duty is not looked upon as an empty word, in
which it is considered really criminal to disturb the tranquillity of
the state, to revolt against the lawful authorities: in such a country,
I say, it is less dangerous to discuss, with more or less freedom,
questions arising from theories on the formation of society and the
origin of the civil power, and to establish principles favorable to
popular rights. But when these conditions do not exist, it is of little
use to proclaim rigorous doctrines. To abstain from pronouncing the
name of people, as a sacrilegious word, is a useless precaution. How
can it be expected, that he who respects not Divine Majesty, should
respect human? The conservative schools of our age, proposing to
place a restraint upon the revolutionary torrent, and to tranquillize
agitated nations, have almost always been infected with a certain
failing, which consists in forgetting the truth which I have just
noticed: _royal majesty_, _authority of the government_, _supremacy
of the law_, _parliamentary sovereignty_, _respect for established
forms, and order_: such are the terms they are constantly making use
of. This is their palladium of society; and they condemn with all their
might _the state_, _insubordination_, _disobedience to the laws_,
_insurrection_, _riot_, _anarchy_; but they forget that these doctrines
will not suffice, unless there be some fixed point to which the first
link of the chain may be riveted. These schools, generally speaking,
originate in the bosom of revolution; they are directed by men who
have figured in revolutions, who have contributed to prepare them, who
have given them their force, and who, in order to attain the object of
their ardent desires, feared not to ruin the edifice at its foundation,
by diminishing the ascendency of religion and opening the way to moral
relaxation. Hence they become powerless when prudence, or their own
interests, bid them say, "_We have gone far enough_;" and, hurried on
like the rest by the furious whirlwind, they have neither the means of
stopping the movement nor of giving it a proper direction.
We are continually hearing the _Contrat Social_ of Rousseau condemned
on account of its anarchical doctrines, whilst at the same time
doctrines are circulated tending visibly to weaken religion. Can we
possibly believe that the _Contrat Social_ has alone caused all the
commotions of Europe? It has doubtless produced serious evils, but
still more serious ones have been caused by that irreligion which so
deeply undermines the foundations of society, which loosens family
bonds, and delivers up the individual to the caprice of his passions,
with no other restraint or guide than the promptings of his own low
egotism. Men of upright and reflecting minds begin to penetrate these
truths. We find, nevertheless, in the political sphere, this error,
which attributes to the action of civil government sufficient creative
power to form, organize, and preserve society, independently of all
moral and religious influences. It is of little consequence what be
maintained in theory, if this error be acted upon in practice; and what
avails the proclaiming of certain sound principles, if our conduct
is not guided by them? These philosophico-political schools, which
are desirous of ruling the destinies of the world, proceed in a way
diametrically opposite to that of Christianity. The latter, whose
principal object was heaven, did not, however, neglect the happiness of
man upon earth; it addressed itself directly to the understanding and
the heart, considering that the community is regulated by the conduct
of individuals, and that, in order to have a well-regulated society,
it was necessary to have good citizens. To proclaim certain political
principles, to institute particular forms--such is the panacea of some
schools, who deem it possible to govern society without exercising
a due influence over the intelligence and heart of man; reason and
experience agree in teaching us what we may expect from such a system.
Profoundly to impress the minds of men with religion and
morality,--this is the first step towards the prevention of revolutions
and disorganization. When these sacred objects have acquired their
full influence over the hearts of men, there is no longer any thing to
be apprehended from a greater or less latitude in political opinions.
What confidence can a government repose in a man professing highly
monarchical opinions, if he join impiety to them? Will he who refuses
to give to God his rights, respect those of temporal kings? "The first
thing," says Seneca, "is the worship of the gods, and faith in their
existence; we are next to acknowledge their majesty, and bounty,
without which there is no majesty." "Primum est Deorum cultus, Deos
credere; deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine
qua nulla majestas est." (Seneca, _Epist_. 95.) Observe how Cicero, the
first orator and perhaps the greatest philosopher of Rome, expresses
himself: "It is necessary," says he, "that the citizens should be
first persuaded of the existence of gods, the directors and rulers of
all things, in whose hands are all events, who are ever conferring
on mankind immense benefits, who search the heart of man, who see
his actions, the spirit of piety which he carries into the practice
of religion, and who distinguish the life of the pious from that of
the ungodly man." "Sit igitur jam hoc a principio persuasum civibus,
dominos esse omnium rerum, ac moderatores deos; eaque quæ gerantur,
eorum geri ditione ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum
mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid inde admittat, qua
mente, qua pietate colat religiones intueri: piorumque et impiorum
habere rationem." (Cic. _de Nat. Deor._ 2.)
These truths should be profoundly impressed upon the mind: the
evils of society do not principally emanate from political ideas
or systems; the root of the evil lies in religion; and if a check
is not put upon irreligion, it is vain to proclaim the most rigid
monarchical principles. Hobbes did certainly flatter kings a little
more than Bellarmin; and yet, when these two writers are compared, what
sensible monarch would not prefer as a subject the learned and pious
controvertist?[30]