ON RESISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POWER.
The doctrines of Catholicity, therefore, in reference both to the
origin and the exercise of civil power, are unobjectionable. Let us
now proceed to another point--one of greater delicacy and difficulty,
if not of more importance. To state the question frankly, without any
subterfuge or evasion: "_Is it allowable in any case to resist the
civil power?_" It is impossible to speak more distinctly, or to employ
more precise and simple terms in stating this question, which is the
most important, the most difficult, and the most startling of any
that the subject we have in hand presents for our investigation. We
know that Protestantism from its commencement proclaimed the right of
insurrection against civil power; and no one is ignorant of the fact
that Catholicity has ever preached up obedience to this power; so that
if the former has been from its infancy an element of revolution and
of overthrow, the latter has been an element of tranquillity and good
order. This distinction might induce us to believe that Catholicity
favors oppression, since it leaves the people without arms to defend
their liberty. "You preach up obedience to the civil powers," our
adversaries will say; "you pronounce, in all cases, an anathema upon
any insurrection which attacks them; should tyranny prevail, therefore,
you become its most powerful auxiliaries; for, by your doctrine, you
arrest the arm ready to be raised in defence of liberty; you stifle
with the cry of conscience the indignation awakened in generous
hearts." This is a serious charge, which compels us to elucidate, as
far as possible, this important point, and to distinguish in it truth
from error, certainty from doubt.
Some men would shrink from the investigation of such questions, and
prefer drawing a veil over them--a veil which they venture not to
raise, lest they should find an abyss. And assuredly their timidity
is not inexcusable; for there are abysses unfathomable, and dangers
that strike the mind with awe. One false step may lead to destruction;
one move in a wrong direction may let loose tempests that would
lay society in ruins. Whilst, however, I willingly admit the pure
intentions of such persons, I may be permitted to observe, that their
prudence is quite thrown away, that their foresight and precaution are
of no avail. Whether they investigate these questions or not, they are
investigated, agitated, and decided, in a manner that we must deplore;
and, worse still, the theories thence arising have been reduced to
practice. Revolutions are no longer confined to books, they have become
realities; quitting the quiet path of mere speculative philosophy,
they are to be seen in the streets and in the public squares. Since,
then, things have come to such a pass, why seek palliatives, make use
of restrictions, or invoke silence? Let us tell the truth, just as it
is, without concealment; since it is the truth, it will neither shrink
before abundance of knowledge, nor the attacks of error. It is truth;
its manifestation, its diffusion can have no injurious effect. In a
word, God, who is the Author of societies, had no need of establishing
them upon falsehood. This candor is the more necessary, because
political changes may have led some persons to disavow the truths we
are discussing, or no longer to understand them aright; whilst others
imagine that obedience to legitimate authority has been taught only by
a party anxious to make this doctrine the foundation of their tyranny.
Men of erroneous opinions and evil intentions have their own codes, to
which they have recourse whenever it will forward their designs: their
fatal errors or their sordid interests form the rule of their conduct;
this is the source of their knowledge and of their inspirations. Men,
therefore, endowed with a pure heart and with upright intentions,
should know what to hold by in political oscillations; it is no longer
sufficient for them to have a general knowledge of the principle of
obedience to the legitimate authorities; they must also be acquainted
with their applications.
It is true that, in conflicts arising from civil discord, many men
throw aside their own convictions to accommodate themselves to the
exigencies of their interests; but it is no less certain, that there
is still to be found a great number of conscientious men who adhere
to them. We may also add, that the generality of the individuals
composing a nation, not being usually in the urgent necessity of
choosing between the sacrifice of their convictions and the risk of
grave and imminent peril, those who entertain them usually find means
to make their influence felt in preventing great evils or in remedying
them. According to certain _pessimistes_, reason and justice are for
ever banished from the earth, leaving it a prey to self-interest, and
substituting for the dictates of conscience the designs of egotism. In
their estimation, it is labor in vain to discuss and decide questions
which may guide us in practice; for, according to them, whatever a
man's conviction may be in theory, his practical decision will always
be the same. It is my happiness, or misfortune, to take a different
view of the case, and to believe that there still exist in the world,
and particularly in Spain, men of profound convictions, and possessed
of sufficient strength of mind to regulate their conduct by those
convictions. The strongest proof that the inutility of doctrines is
exaggerated, is the zeal evinced by all parties to lay hold of them.
Whether from interest or from delicacy, all appeal to doctrines; and
this interest or delicacy would not exist, if doctrines did not possess
a powerful ascendency in society. Nothing, in discussion, is more
perplexing than the introduction of several questions at the same time;
and for this reason, I shall proceed in such a manner as to distinguish
those which present themselves here. I will resolve, one by one, those
which relate to our object, and pass over those which are foreign to
it. Above all, we must bear in mind the general principle at all times
inculcated by Catholicity, viz. _the obligation of obeying legitimate
authority_. Let us now see how this principle is to be applied. In the
first place, _Are we to obey the civil power when it commands something
that is evil in itself?_ No, we are not; for the simple reason that
what is evil in itself is forbidden by God; now, _we must obey God
rather than men_.
In the second place, _Are we to obey the civil power when it interferes
in matters not included in the circle of its faculties?_ No; for, with
regard to these matters, it is not a power. From the very supposition
that its faculties do not extend so far, we affirm that, in this point
of view, it is not a real power. Besides, what I have advanced does not
exactly and exclusively concern spiritual matters, to which I appear
to allude. I apply this restriction of civil power also to matters
purely temporal. It is necessary to refer here to what I have said in
another part of this work, viz., that whilst we grant to civil power
sufficient force and attributes for the maintenance of order and unity
in the social body, it is just nevertheless, that we should not allow
it to absorb the individual and the family, so as to destroy their
individuality, to deprive them of their own sphere, and leave them only
the means of acting as an integral part of society. This is one of the
distinguishing features between Christian and pagan civilisation: the
latter, in its zeal for the preservation of social unity, excluded
every individual and family right; the former, on the contrary, has
amalgamated the interests of the individual with those of families
and society, so that they neither destroy nor embarrass each other.
Thus, besides the sphere within which the action of the civil power
is properly confined, there are others into which it has no right to
enter, and in which individuals and families live without clashing with
the colossal force of the government.
It is just to observe here, that Catholicity has done much for the
maintenance of this principle, which is a strong guarantee of the
liberty of the people. The separation of the two powers temporal and
spiritual, the independence of the latter with respect to the former,
the distinction of the persons in whom it is vested: such has been one
of the principal causes of this liberty, which, under different forms
of government, is the common inheritance of European nations. Ever
since the foundation of the Church, this principle of the independence
of the spiritual power has at all times served, by the mere fact of its
existence, to remind men that the rights of civil power are limited,
that there are things beyond its province, cases in which a man may
say, and ought to say, _I will not obey_.
This is another of those cases in which Protestantism has given a wrong
direction to the civilisation of Europe, and in which, far from opening
the way to liberty, it has riveted the chains of slavery. Its first
step was the abolition of the Pontifical authority, the overthrow of
the hierarchy, the refusal to grant to the Church any kind of power
whatever, and the placing of spiritual supremacy in the hands of
princes; that is to say, it has retrograded towards pagan civilisation,
in which we find the sceptre united with the pontificate. The grand
political problem was precisely the separation of these two powers, in
order to save society from subjection to one sole unlimited authority,
exercising its faculties without restraint, and from which might
consequently be expected vexation and oppression. This separation was
effected without any political views, any fixed design on the part of
men, wherever Catholicity was established; for her discipline required
and her dogmas inculcated it. Is it not strange that the advocates of
theories of equilibrium and counterpoise, who have so loudly extolled
the utility of separating powers, and of dividing authority among them
with a view to prevent it from being converted into tyranny, should
not have noticed the profound wisdom of this Catholic doctrine, even
when considered merely in a social and political point of view? But no;
it is remarkable, on the contrary, that all modern revolutions have
manifested a decided tendency towards the amalgamation of the civil
and ecclesiastical powers--a convincing proof that these revolutions
have proceeded from an origin contrary to the generative principle
of European civilisation, and that instead of guiding it towards
perfection, they have rather served to lead it astray. The union of
Church and State in England, under the reigns of Henry VIII. and
Elizabeth, produced the most cruel despotism; and if that country at a
later period acquired a higher degree of liberty, it was not assuredly
owing to that religious authority given by Protestantism to the head of
the state, but in spite of it. It is worthy of remark, that in later
times, when England entered upon a more extensive sphere of liberty,
it was owing to the diminution of the civil power on all matters
appertaining to religion, and to a greater development of Catholicity,
opposed in its very principles to this monstrous supremacy. In the
North of Europe, where the Protestant system has also prevailed, civil
authority has been unlimited; and even at the present time, we find the
Emperor of Russia indulging in the most barbarous persecutions against
Catholics; more distrustful of those who defend the independence of
spiritual power, than of the revolutionary clubs. The autocrat is
devoured with a thirst for unlimited authority, and a decided instinct
urges him to attack in particular the Catholic religion, which forms
his principal obstacle.
It is remarkable with what uniformity all power, in this respect,
tends to despotism, whether under a revolutionary or monarchical form.
Impatient of the restraint laid upon him by the spiritual power, Louis
XIV. attempted to crush the power of Rome. He was urged to it by the
same motives as the Constituent Assembly; the monarch rested his
cause upon the rights of royalty, and the liberties of the Gallican
Church--the Constituent Assembly invoked the rights of the nation,
and the principles of philosophy; but in the main they were actuated
by one and the same motive, that of ascertaining whether or not civil
power should be restricted: in the former case, it was monarchy tending
to despotism; in the latter, democracy advancing to the terrors
of the Convention. When Napoleon wished to bruise the head of the
revolutionary hydra, to reorganize society, to create a power, he made
use of religion as the most potent element. Catholicity was the only
predominating religion in France; to this he had recourse, and signed
the _Concordat_. But, observe, that no sooner did he imagine his work
of reparation complete, and the critical moment of the establishment of
his power passed, than he began to think of extending it, of freeing
himself from all restraint. He began to look upon that pontiff, whose
presence at his coronation had so much gratified him, with a more
supercilious eye. At first he had some serious disputes with him, and
ended by becoming his most inveterate enemy.
These observations, to which I invite the attention of every reflecting
mind, acquire more importance from the consideration of what has taken
place in our own religious and most Catholic monarchy. In spite of
the preponderating influence of the Catholic religion in Spain, the
principle of resistance to the court of Rome has ever been preserved
in a particular and remarkable manner; thus, whilst the Austrian
dynasty and the Bourbons endeavoured to lay aside our old laws, so
far as they were favourable to political liberty, they preserved as a
sacred deposit the traditional resistance of Ferdinand the Catholic,
of Charles V., and of Philip II. The deep root which Catholicity had
taken in Spain doubtless prevented matters from being carried to
extremes; but it is no less true that the germ existed, and was handed
down from generation to generation, as if its complete development
was expected at some more favourable period. This fact was placed in
peculiarly strong relief at the time of the Bourbon accession, when
the monarchy of Louis XIV. was introduced amongst us, and the last
vestiges of the ancient liberties of Castile, Aragon, Valencia, and
Catalonia disappeared; the mania for kingly rights was at its height in
the reigns of Charles III. and Charles IV. Strange coincidence! The
epoch in which the greatest jealousy was entertained against the Court
of Rome and the independence of Church authority, was exactly that in
which ministerial despotism was in its greatest force, and in which
there was seen something still worse--the despotism of a favorite,
with all its pitiful show. True, the ideas of the French schools were
at that time influencing Spain; and of this neither the King, nor,
probably, some of his ministers, were aware: but this does not militate
against the reflections we are making; on the contrary, it comes in
support of them, by showing their applicability to circumstances quite
dissimilar, and consequently their soundness and importance. The
object here aimed at was the overthrow of the established authority,
to make way for another equally unlimited; to effect this, it was
necessary to urge on the former to abuse its prerogatives, and, at the
same time, to establish precedents to fall back upon, so soon as the
revolution should have displaced the absolute monarchy. What important
reflections are here presented to us! What strange analogies rise to
view between circumstances apparently most antagonistic! In our times,
we have seen bishops brought to trial from the same motives that were
alleged in a celebrated cause in the reign of Charles III.; and the
_Supreme Tribunals_ of our own days have heard from the lips of their
_fiscals_[B] the same doctrines formerly propounded by those of the
_Council_. Thus do doctrines meet, and thus, by different ways, do
we arrive at the same end. According to the ancient _fiscals_, the
authority of the king was every thing; the rights of the crown, like
the ark of old, were held so sacred, that to touch, or even to look
upon them, was accounted a sacrilege. Well, the ancient monarchy has
disappeared--the throne is no longer any thing more than a shadow
of what it once was--the Revolution has triumphed over it; and yet,
despite a change so profound, it is not long since a _fiscal_ of the
Supreme Tribunal, charging a bishop with an offence against the rights
of the civil power, made use of these words: "In the state, a leaf
cannot be plucked without the permission of government." These words
need no comment; the writer of these lines heard them uttered; and this
plain, unequivocal declaration of arbitrary power seemed to him to
throw a new ray of light upon history.
[B] Crown attorneys, charged with the prosecution of criminal and other
causes.
The gravity and importance of this subject required this digression;
it was incumbent on me to show how far the Catholic principle of the
independence of spiritual power may serve the cause of true liberty.
This principle, in fact, eminently teaches that the faculties of civil
power are limited, and it is, consequently, a perpetual condemnation
of despotism. To revert to the original question. It remains, then,
established, that we are to be subject to the civil power so long as it
does not go beyond its proper limits; but that the Catholic doctrine
never enjoins obedience when civil power oversteps the limits of its
faculties.
It will not be uninteresting to the reader to learn how the principle
of obedience was understood by one of the most illustrious interpreters
of Catholic doctrine--by the holy Doctor so often cited. According
to him, whenever laws are unjust (and observe, that, in his opinion,
they may be so in many ways), they are not binding on conscience,
unless for fear of creating scandal, or causing greater evils; that is
to say, that, in certain cases, an unjust law may become obligatory,
not by virtue of any duty which it imposes, but from motives of
prudence. These are his words, to which I crave the reader's particular
attention: "Laws are unjust in two ways; either because they are
opposed to the common weal; or on account of their aim, as is the case
when a government imposes upon its subjects onerous laws, not for the
good of the commonweal, but for the sake of self-interest or ambition;
or on account of their author, as when any one makes a law without
being invested with proper faculties; again, they may be unjust in
form, as when the taxes are unequally divided among the multitude,
although in other respects tending to the public good. Such laws are
rather outrages than laws; since, as St. Augustin observes (lib. i. _de
Lib. Arb._ cap. 5), 'An unjust law does not appear to be a law.' Such
laws, therefore, are not binding in conscience, unless, perhaps, for
the avoiding of scandal and trouble--a motive which ought to induce man
to give up his right, as St. Matthew observes: 'And whosoever shall
force thee to go one mile, go with him other two; and if any man will
go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak
also.' Laws may also be unjust in another point of view, when they are
contrary to the will of God; as the laws of tyrants enforcing idolatry,
or anything else contrary to divine law. With respect to such laws, it
is not allowable, under any circumstances, to obey them; for, as it is
said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'We must obey God rather than man.'"
"Injustæ autem sunt leges dupliciter; uno modo per contrarietatem ad
bonum commune e contrario prædictis, vel ex fine, sicut cum aliquis
præsidens leges imponit onerosas subditis non pertinentes ad utilitatem
communem, sed magis ad propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex
auctore, sicut cum aliquis legem fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem;
vel etiam ex forma cum inæqualiter onera multitudinis dispensantur,
etiamsi ordinentur ad bonum commune; et hujusmodi magis sunt violentiæ
quam leges, quia sicut Augustinus dicit (lib. i. _de Lib. Arb._ cap.
5, parum a princ.) lex esse non videtur quæ justa non fuerit, unde
tales leges in foro conscientiæ non obligant, nisi forte propter
vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam homo juri suo
cedere debet secundum illud Math. cap. v. 'Qui te angariaverit mille
passus, vade cum eo alia duo, et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam da ei et
pallium.' Alio modo leges possunt esse injustæ per contrarietatem ad
bonum divinum, sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes ad idololatriam, vel
ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem divinam, et tales leges nullo
modo licet observare, quia sicut dicitur Act. cap. v.: 'Obedire oportet
Deo magis quam hominibus.'" (_D. Th._ 1, 2, quæst. 90, art. 1.)
This doctrine furnishes us with the following rules:
1. We cannot, under any circumstances, obey the civil power when its
commands are opposed to the divine law.
2. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in conscience.
3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from motives of prudence;
that is, in order to avoid scandal and commotions.
4. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes:
When they are opposed to the common weal--when their aim is not the
good of the commonweal--when the legislator outsteps the limits of his
faculties--when, although in other respects tending to the good of
the commonweal, and proceeding from competent authority, they do not
observe suitable equity; for instance, when they divide unequally the
public imposts.
We have quoted and copied the venerable text whence these rules are
derived: their illustrious author has been the guide of all the
theological schools during the last six centuries; his authority has
never been called in question in these schools on points of dogma or
morality; these rules may, therefore, be regarded as the recapitulation
of the doctrines of Catholic theologians with reference to the
obedience due to authority. We may now, without doubt, appeal with
entire confidence to every man of good sense. Let him judge whether
these doctrines are in the least inclined to despotism, whether they
have the least tendency to tyranny, in fine, whether they aim the
slightest blow at liberty. It is vain to seek in them the slightest
appearance of flattery to the civil power, whose limits are marked out
with rigorous severity; if it outsteps them, it is openly told, "Thy
laws are not laws, but outrages; they are not binding in conscience;
and if, in some instances, thou art obeyed, it is not owing to any
obligation, but to prudence, in order to avoid scandal and commotion;
it is thenceforth such a dishonor to thee, that thy triumph, far from
entitling thee to renown, assimilates thee to the robber who despoils
the peaceable man of his garment, and to whom the latter, for the
sake of peace, gives up his cloak also." If these are doctrines of
oppression and despotism, we also are advocates for such oppression and
despotism; for we cannot conceive doctrines more favorable to liberty.
Upon these principles the admirable institution of European monarchy
was founded. This teaching has created the moral defences by which that
monarchy is surrounded; defences restraining it within the limits of
its duties, even where political guarantees do not exist. The mind,
wearied with foolish declamations against the _tyranny of kings_, and,
on the other hand, not less tired of the boisterous adulations lavished
upon power in modern times, expands and rejoices on meeting with this
pure, disinterested, and sincere expression of the rights and duties of
governments and of people, on hearing this language, impressed with as
much of wisdom as of upright intention and generous freedom. What books
were consulted by men making use of such language? The Scriptures, the
Fathers, the collections of ecclesiastical documents. Could they have
received their inspirations from the society which surrounded them? No;
for in that same society disorder and confusion prevailed; sometimes a
turbulent disobedience, at others despotism was predominant. And yet
they speak with as much discretion, tact, and calmness as if they were
living in the midst of well-regulated society. They were guided by
divine revelation, which taught them truth. How often did they see it
forgotten and trampled under foot! But uninfluenced by circumstances,
however unfavorable, they wrote in a region far above the atmosphere of
human passions. Truth is of all times; proclaim it ever, and God will
effect the rest.[31]