TRANSMISSION OF POWER, ACCORDING TO THE CATHOLIC DOCTORS.
The difference of opinion concerning the mode in which God communicates
civil power, however grave in theory, does not appear to be of great
importance in practice. We have already observed, that, among those who
assert that this power comes from God, some maintain that it proceeds
from Him _directly_, others _indirectly_. In the opinion of the former,
when once the nomination of the persons appointed to exercise authority
is made, society not only lays down the necessary conditions for the
communication of power, but actually communicates it, having first
received it from God. The latter maintain that society merely makes
the appointment, and, by means of this act, God confers the power upon
the person appointed. I repeat, that, in practice, the result is the
same, and the difference therefore vanishes. Nay, even in _theory_, the
divergence may not be so great as it appears at first sight. I shall
endeavor to demonstrate this by submitting the two opinions to rigorous
investigation.
The explanation given of the origin of power by both parties may
be set forth in the following terms: In the opinion of some, God
says, "Society, for thy preservation and well-being, thou requirest
a government; choose, therefore, under what form this government
shall be exercised, and appoint the persons who are to take charge
of it; I, on my part, will confer upon them the faculties necessary
for the fulfilment of their mission." In the opinion of others, God
says, "Society, for thy preservation and well-being, thou requirest
a government: I confer upon thee the faculties necessary for the
fulfilment of this object; choose thyself the form under which this
government shall be exercised, and, appointing the persons who are
to take charge of it, transmit to them the faculties which I have
communicated to thee."
In order to be convinced of the identity of the results of these two
formulas, we must examine them in their relations: 1. to the sanctity
of their origin; 2. to the rights and duties of power; 3. to the rights
and duties of the subject. Whether God has communicated power to
society, to be transmitted by it to the persons appointed to exercise
it, or has merely conferred upon it the right of determining the form
and appointing such persons, that, by means of this determination
and appointment, the rights annexed to supreme power may be directly
communicated to the persons intrusted with the exercise of it, it
follows, in either case, that this supreme power, wherever it exists,
emanates from God; and is not less sacred because it passes through
an intermediate means appointed by Him. I will illustrate these ideas
by a very simple and obvious example. Suppose there exists in a state
some particular community, instituted by the sovereign, and having no
rights but those granted by him; no duties but those which he imposes
upon it; in fine, a community indebted to the sovereign for all that
it is and has. This community, however small it may be, will require
a government: this government may be formed in two ways; either the
sovereign who has given it its laws has conferred upon it the right
of governing itself, and of transmitting this right to the person
or persons whom it may think proper to elect; or he has left to the
community itself the determination of the form and the appointment of
the persons, adding that such determination and appointment being once
made, it shall be understood that, by this simple act, the sovereign
grants to the persons appointed the right of exercising their functions
within lawful bounds. It is evident that the parity is complete; and
now I ask, Is it not true that, in this case, as in the other, the
faculties of him who governs should be considered and respected as an
emanation from the sovereign? Is it not true that it would be difficult
to discover any difference between these two kinds of investiture? In
both suppositions, the community would have the right of determining
the form and appointing the person; in both cases, he who governs could
only obtain his powers by virtue of the previous determination and
appointment; in neither case would there need any new manifestation
on the part of the sovereign, that the person nominated might be
understood to be invested with faculties corresponding to the exercise
of his functions. In practice, therefore, there would be no difference;
further, I will assert that, in theory even, it would be difficult to
trace the point of separation between the two cases.
Certainly, if we view the matter with the eye of an acute
metaphysician, we may very easily discover this difference, by
considering the moral entity which we call _power_; not as it is in
itself, and in its effects, but as an abstract being, passing from one
hand to another, in the manner of corporeal objects. But, instead of
examining the question for the curiosity of knowing whether this moral
entity, before arriving at one person, has not first passed through
another, let us first seek to verify from whence it emanates, and what
are the faculties it confers, the rights it imposes: we shall then
find that, in saying, "I confer this faculty upon you, transmit it to
whomsoever you think proper, and in whatever way you think proper,"
the sovereign expresses no more than if he should say: "Such or such
a faculty shall be conferred by me upon the person you wish, and in
the manner you wish, by the simple fact of the election you have
made." It follows hence, that whether we adopt the opinion of direct
communication, or the contrary one, the supreme rights of hereditary
monarchies, of elective monarchies, and in general of all supreme
powers, whatever be their forms of government, will not on this account
be less sacred, less certainly sealed with divine authority. Difference
in the forms of government does not in the least diminish the
obligations of submitting to civil power, lawfully established; so that
the refusing of obedience to the president of a republic, in a country
in which republicanism is the legal form of government, is no less
a criminal resistance to the ordinance of God, than the refusing of
the same obedience to the most absolute monarch. Bossuet, so strongly
attached to monarchy, and writing in a country and at a period in which
the king might exclaim, "_I am the state_;" and in a work, in which he
proposed nothing less than to offer a complete treatise on Politics,
taken from the words of Holy Scripture; established, nevertheless,
in a manner the most explicit and conclusive, the truth which I have
just pointed out. "We ought to be subject," says he, "to the form of
government established in our country." And he afterwards quotes these
words of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, chap. xiii.: "Let every
soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God;
and those that are, are ordained of God; therefore he that resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." "There is no form of
government," continues Bossuet, "nor any human institution, without its
inconveniences; so that it is necessary to remain in the state to which
length of time has inured the people. For this reason, God _takes under
His protection all legitimate governments, in whatever form they may be
established_; whoever undertakes to overturn them, is not only an enemy
to the public, but also to God." (Liv. ii. prop. 12.)
It is of little consequence whether power be communicated directly
or indirectly; the respect and obedience due to it are not in the
least changed, and consequently the sacredness of the origin of power
remains the same, whichever opinion be adopted; neither do the rights
and duties of government, and those of the subject, remain less
sacred. These rights and duties suffer no change, whether there be
or not an intermediate means for the communication of power; their
nature and limits are founded upon the very object of the institution
of society; but this object is totally independent of the mode in
which God communicates power to man. Against what I have advanced
upon the small amount of difference existing between these various
opinions, the authority of the theologians, whose texts I have cited
in the preceding chapter, will be objected. "These theologians,"
it will be said, "certainly understood these affairs; and as they
placed so much importance upon the distinction here under discussion,
they undoubtedly saw in it some great truth proper to be taken into
account." This objection acquires the more force, when we consider
that the distinction made upon this point by these theologians does
not proceed from a spirit of subtilty, as it might be suspected in the
case of those scholastic theologians, whose writings are replete with
dialectic arguments, rather than with reasoning founded upon Scripture,
upon the apostolical traditions and other theological resources, from
which we ought principally to take our arguments in controversies of
this nature; but the theologians whom I have quoted are certainly not
of this class. We need only name Bellarmin, to recognise a grave and
extremely solid author, who opposed the Protestants with Scripture,
with traditions, with the authority of the holy Fathers, the decisions
of the universal Church and of the Sovereign Pontiffs: Bellarmin was
not one of those theologians who excited the lamentations of Melchior
Cano, and of whom he said, that in the hour of combat against heresy,
instead of wielding well-tempered weapons, they wielded only long
reeds: _arundines longas_. Such was the importance given to this
distinction, that James, King of England, complained loudly that
Cardinal Bellarmin taught that the power of kings came from God only
indirectly; and the Catholic schools were so far from looking upon
this distinction as insignificant, that they defended it against the
attacks of King James; and that one of their most illustrious doctors,
Suarez, entered the lists to contend for the doctrines of Bellarmin.
It appears, then, at first sight, that I am wrong in what I have
said upon the slight importance of the distinction here mentioned. I
believe, nevertheless, that the difficulty may be easily removed, and
that it will suffice for this purpose to distinguish the different
aspects under which the question presents itself. First of all, I will
observe, that the Catholic theologians proceeded upon this point with
admirable prudence and foresight; and truly the question, such as it
was then proposed, comprehended more than a subtilty; I am inclined to
think that it included one of the most serious points of public right.
In order to examine deeply these doctrines of Catholic theologians,
and to lay hold of their true sense, we must fix our attention upon
the tendencies which the religious reform of the sixteenth century
communicated to European monarchy. Even before this reform, thrones had
acquired a great deal of force and solidity, through the decline in
the power of the feudal lords, and the development of the democratic
element. That element, which in due time was destined to acquire the
power of which it is now possessed, was not then in sufficiently
favorable circumstances to exert its action on the vast scale which it
embraces in our days. On this account, it was obliged to take refuge
under the shadow of the throne--an emblem of order and justice elevated
in the midst of society--a sort of universal regulator and leveller,
destined gradually to destroy the extreme inequalities so harassing
and obnoxious to the people. Thus, democracy itself, which, in after
ages, was to overturn so many thrones, served them, at that time,
as a firm support, sheltering them from the attacks of a turbulent
and formidable aristocracy, unwilling to be transformed into mere
courtiers. There was nothing in this state of things very mischievous,
so long as matters remained within the limits prescribed by reason and
justice; but, unfortunately, good principles were exaggerated, regal
authority was gradually converted into an absorbent force, which would
have concentrated in itself all other forces. European monarchy lost
thus its true character, which consists in monarchy having just limits,
even when these limits are not marked out and guarded by political
institutions.
Protestantism exalts to an incredible degree the pretensions of
kings, by attacking the spiritual power of the Pope, by painting in
the darkest colors the dangers of his temporal power, and especially
by establishing the fatal doctrine, that the supreme civil power has
ecclesiastical affairs totally under its direction; and by accusing of
abuse, of usurpation, of unbounded ambition, the independence which
the Church claims by virtue of the sacred canons, of the guarantee
afforded by the civil law, of the traditions of fifteen centuries, and
above all, of the institution of her Divine Founder. He had no need of
the permission, of any civil power to send His apostles to preach the
Gospel, and to baptize in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of
the Holy Ghost. A glance at the history of Europe at the epoch here
mentioned will convince us of the evil consequences of such a doctrine,
and show us how agreeable it must have been to the ears of power,
which it invested with unbounded faculties, even in matters purely
religious. This exaggeration of the rights of civil power, coinciding
with the efforts made on the other hand to repress the pontifical
authority, must have favored the doctrine which attempted to place the
power of kings upon a level, in every respect, with that of Popes;
and consequently, it was very natural that its authors should wish to
establish, that sovereigns received their power from God, in the same
manner as the Popes, without any difference whatever. The doctrine of
_direct_ communication, although very susceptible, as we have seen, of
a reasonable explanation, might involve a more extensive meaning, which
would have made the people oblivious of the special and characteristic
manner in which the supreme power of the Church was instituted by God
himself. What I have just advanced cannot be considered as merely
conjectural; the whole is supported by facts which cannot have been
forgotten. The reigns of Henry VIII. and of Elizabeth of England,
and the usurpations and violence in which Protestant powers indulged
against the Catholic Church, are a sufficient confirmation of these
sad truths. But, unfortunately, even in countries where Catholicity
remained triumphant, attempts were then, have since been, and still are
witnessed, that show clearly enough how strong was the impulse given
in this sense to the civil power; for even now it is but too prone to
transgress its legitimate bounds.
The circumstances under which the two illustrious theologians above
cited, Bellarmin and Suarez, wrote, are another reason in support of
what I have just adduced. I have quoted remarkable passages from a
work by Suarez, written in refutation of a publication of King James
of England. This King could not bear the idea of Cardinal Bellarmin's
having established that the power of kings does not emanate directly
from God, but is communicated through the medium of society, which
receives it in a direct manner. Possessed, as is well known, with the
mania for theological debates and decisions, King James did not confine
himself to simple theory; he reduced his theory to practice, and said
to his Parliament: "that God had appointed him absolute master; and
that all privileges which co-legislative bodies enjoyed were pure
concessions proceeding from the bounty of kings." His courtiers, in
their adulations, decreed him the title of the modern Solomon; he
might well, therefore, feel displeased with the Italian and Spanish
theologians for endeavoring to humble the pride of his presumptuous
wisdom, and restrain his despotism. If we reflect upon the words of
Bellarmin, and especially on those of Suarez, we shall find that the
aim of these eminent theologians was to point out the difference
between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, with respect to the mode
of their origin. They admit that both powers come from God; that it
is an indispensable duty to be subject to them; and that to resist
them is to resist the ordinance of God; but not finding, either in
the Scripture or in tradition, the least foundation for establishing
that civil power, like that of the Sovereign Pontiffs, has been
instituted in a special and extraordinary manner, they are anxious
that this difference should remain obvious, and seek to avoid the
introduction, in a point of such import, of a confusion of ideas, from
which dangerous errors might arise. "This opinion," says Suarez, "is
new, singular, and apparently invented to exalt the temporal over the
spiritual power." (See above.) Hence, in discussing the question of the
origin of civil power, they require you to bear in mind the influence
of society. "_By means of man's counsel and election_," says Bellarmin;
thus reminding the King, that how sacred soever his authority might
be, it had been very differently instituted from that of the Sovereign
Pontiff. The distinction between direct and indirect communication
served, in a particular manner, to prove the difference in question;
for this very distinction recalled to mind that civil power, although
established by God, owed its existence to no extraordinary measure, and
could not be considered as supernatural, but was to be looked upon as
dependent upon human and natural right, sanctioned, nevertheless, in an
express manner, by right divine.
These theologians would not, perhaps, have forcibly insisted upon this
distinction, had it not been for the efforts made by others to efface
it. It was a matter of consequence with them to humble the pride of
power, to prevent it from assuming, whether in respect to its origin
or its rights, titles not appertaining to it; to prevent its ascribing
to itself an unlawful supremacy, even in religious affairs, and thus
causing monarchy to degenerate into a sort of Oriental despotism, in
which the governing power is every thing, the people and their affairs
nothing. If we weigh their words attentively, we shall find that the
predominating idea with them was that which I have just stated. At
first sight, their language appears exceedingly democratical, from
their frequent use of the words _community_, _state_, _society_,
_people_; but on examining closely their system of doctrine, and
paying attention to the expressions they use, we perceive that they
had no subversive design, and that anarchical theories never once
entered their minds. They advocated on the one hand the rights of
authority, whilst they protected on the other those of the subject,
thus endeavoring to resolve the problem which formed the continual
occupation of all honest political writers; to limit power without
destroying it, or placing it under too great restraint; to protect
society against the disorder of despotism, without rendering it at the
same time refractory or turbulent. From the above reasoning we see
that the distinction between direct and indirect communication may be
of great or of little importance, according to the view we take of
it. It is of great importance when serving to remind the civil power
that the establishment of governments and the regulation of their
forms has in some way been dependent upon society itself, and that no
individual, no family, can presume upon having received from God the
government of the people without regard to the laws of the country, as
if those laws, in whatever form, were a free offering made by them to
the people. This same distinction serves, in short, to establish the
origin of civil power as an emanation from the Deity, the Author of
nature, but not as instituted in an extraordinary manner, as something
supernatural, as in the case of the supreme ecclesiastical power. From
this latter consideration two consequences follow, one of which is of
more importance than the other to the legitimate liberties of mankind
and the independence of the Church. To call in the intervention,
express or tacit, of society for the establishment of governments and
the regulation of their forms, is to prevent the concealment of their
origin under any veil of mystery; it is simply and plainly to define
their object, consequently to explain their duties, as well as to
point out their faculties. By these means a restraint is put upon the
disorders and abuses of authority, which it is thenceforth clearly seen
are not to find support in enigmatical theories.
The independence of the Church is thus established upon a solid basis.
Whenever the civil power attempts to offer it violence, the Church
may say: "My authority is established directly and immediately by God
in a special, extraordinary, and miraculous manner; yours likewise
emanates from God, but through the intervention of man, through the
intermediary of the laws, in the ordinary course pointed out by nature
and determined by human prudence; but neither man nor the civil
power has a right to destroy or change what God Himself, deviating
from the course of nature and making use of ineffable prodigies, has
thought proper to institute." So long as the ideas here set forth are
respected, so long as _direct_ communication is not received in too
extensive a sense, and care taken not to confound things whose limits
so gravely affect religion and society, the distinction here spoken of
is of little importance. We have seen, even, that the two opinions may
be reconciled with each other. At all events, this distinction will
have served to illustrate with what exalted views Catholic theologians
have discussed the grave questions of public right. Guided by sound
philosophy, and without ever losing sight of the beacon of revelation,
they have given equal satisfaction to the desires of both schools. They
have not fallen into the errors of either; democratical without being
anarchists, monarchical without being base adulators. In establishing
the rights of the people, they were not, like modern demagogues, under
the necessity of destroying religion, but made her the guardian of the
rights of the people, as well as of those of kings. Liberty was not
with them a synonyme for license and irreligion; in their opinion, men
might be free without being rebellious or impious; liberty consisted in
being subject to the law; and, as they could not conceive that law was
possible without religion and without God; in like manner also they
believed that liberty was not possible without God and religion. What
reason, revelation, and history taught them has become evident to us by
experience. Shall we be told of the dangers, grave or slight, in which
theologians could involve governments? But people now-a-days are not
led astray by affected and insidious declamations; and kings well know
whether the schools of theologians have exiled royalty, and led it to
the scaffold.[29]