THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY, ACCORDING TO CATHOLIC DIVINES.
There is nothing more instructive or more interesting, than the
study of public law in those writers who, pretending not to pass for
statesmen, and entertaining no views of ambition, express themselves
without flattery and without bitterness; and explain these matters
with as much calmness and tranquillity as they would theories of rare
application and limited extent. At the present time it is almost
impossible to open a book without immediately perceiving to which of
the two contending parties the author belongs; it seldom happens that
his ideas are not affected by passion, or adapted to serve particular
designs; and it not unfrequently happens that, without conviction, he
speaks according to the dictates of his interest.
It is not so with the old writers, of whom we are speaking. Let
us render them at least this justice; that their opinions are
conscientious, their language loyal and sincere; and whatever may be
the judgment with respect to them, whether we consider them as real
sages, or as ignorant men and fanatics, we cannot call in question
their sincerity; that they are animated by a religious idea, that
they develop a philosophical system, that their pens are the faithful
interpreters of their thoughts.
Rousseau attempts to seek the origin of society, and of the civil
power; and begins the first chapter of his work with these words: "Man
is born free, and he is everywhere in fetters." Do you not immediately
perceive the tribune under the mantle of the philosopher? Do you not
observe that, instead of addressing himself to the reason, the writer
appeals to the passions; and wounds the most susceptible of them--viz.
pride. It is in vain for the philosopher to endeavor to make us
believe that he does not intend to reduce his doctrines to practice;
his language betrays his design. In another place, where he attempts
nothing less than to give advice to a great nation, he has hardly begun
when he holds over Europe the torch of an incendiary.
"When we read ancient history, we fancy ourselves transported to
another world, and among other beings. What have the French, the
English, the Russians, in common with the Greeks and Romans? Hardly any
thing but the form. The great souls of the latter appear to the others
as exaggerations of history. How can they, who feel themselves to be
so little, imagine that such great men ever existed? They did exist,
however; and they were human like ourselves. What hinders our being men
like them? Our prejudices, our low philosophy, and grovelling passions,
combined with the egotism of men's hearts, by absurd institutions,
directed by men of little minds." (_Considerations on the Government
of Poland_, _&c._, Chap. 2.) Do you not observe the poison conveyed
in these words of the publicist? And is it not palpable that he had
something more in view than enlightening the mind? See with what
address he attempts to produce a feeling of irritation, by harsh and
indecent reproaches.
Let us take the opposite extreme of the comparison, and see in how
different a tone St. Thomas of Aquin, in his work _De Regimine
Principum_, begins his explanation on the same subject, and gives
directions for good government.[a][A]
[A] This subject is so important, so delicate, that I shall not be
satisfied with giving a translation of the passages which I quote,
however careful I may be to render them exact and literal, at the risk
of irregularity of style and violation of the idiom of our language.
I wish, therefore, to set before the reader the original texts
themselves, desiring him to judge from them and not from my version.
[They will be found in the Appendix.]
"If man," he says, "was intended to live alone, like many animals, he
would not require any one to govern him; every man would be his own
king, under the supreme command of God; inasmuch as he would govern
himself by the light of reason given him by the Creator. But it is
in the nature of man to be a social and political animal, living
in community, differently from all other animals; a thing which is
clearly shown by the necessities of his nature. Nature has provided
for other animals food; skins for a covering, means of defence,--as
teeth, horns, claws,--or, at least, speed in flight; but she has not
endowed man with any of those qualities; and instead she has given him
reason, by which, with the assistance of his hands, he can procure what
he wants. But to procure this, one man alone is not enough; for he
is not in a condition to preserve his own life; it is, therefore, in
man's nature to live in society. Moreover, nature has granted to other
animals the power of discerning what is useful or injurious to them:
thus the sheep has a natural horror of his enemy the wolf. There are
also certain animals who know by nature the herbs which are medicinal
to them, and other things which are necessary for their preservation.
But man has not naturally the knowledge which is requisite for the
support of life, except in society; inasmuch as the aid of reason
is capable of leading from universal principles to the knowledge of
particular things, which are necessary for life. Thus, then, since
it is impossible for man alone to obtain all this knowledge, it is
necessary that he should live in society, one aiding another; each one
applying to his own task; for example, some in medicine; some in one
way, and some in another. This is shown with great clearness in that
faculty peculiar to man, language--which enables him to communicate
his thoughts to others. Indeed, brute animals mutually communicate
their feelings; as the dog communicates his anger by barking, and other
animals their passions by various ways. But man, with respect to his
fellows, is more communicative than any other animal; even than those
who are the most inclined to live in union, as cranes, ants, and bees.
In this sense, Solomon says, in Ecclesiastes: 'It is better, therefore,
that two should be together than one; for they have the advantage of
their society.' Thus, if it be natural for man to live in society, it
is necessary that some one should direct the multitude; for if many
were united, and each one did as he thought proper, they would fall
to pieces, unless somebody looked after the public good, as would be
the case with the human body, and that of any other animal, if there
did not exist a power to watch over the welfare of all the members.
Thus Solomon says: 'Thus, where there is no one to govern, the people
will be dispersed.' In man himself the soul directs the body; and in
the soul, the feelings of anger and concupiscence are governed by the
reason. Among the members of the body, there is one principal one,
which directs all; as the heart or the head. There ought, then, to be
in every multitude some governing power." (St. Thomas, _De Regimine
Principum_, lib. i. cap. 1.)
This passage, so remarkable for profound wisdom, clearness of ideas,
solidity of principles, vigor and exactness of deductions, contains,
in a few words, all that can be said with respect to the origin of
society, and of power; to the rights enjoyed by the latter, and the
obligations incumbent upon it: the matter being considered in general,
and by the light of reason alone. In the first place, it was required
to show, with clearness, the necessity of the existence of society;
and this the holy doctor does by this very simple reasoning--man is
of such a nature that he cannot live alone, and then he has need of
being united to his fellows. If a proof of this fundamental truth be
required, it is found in the fact that he is endowed with speech;
this is a sign that by nature he is destined to communicate with
other men, and consequently to live in society. After having proved
this invincible necessity, it remained to demonstrate a necessity
not less absolute--viz. the necessity of a power to govern society.
In order to make this demonstration, St. Thomas does not invent
extravagant systems, or unfounded theories; he does not appeal to
absurd suppositions; he is satisfied with a reason founded on the
nature of things, dictated by common sense, and supported by daily
experience--viz. that in all bodies of men, there is a director
requisite; since, without him, disorder, and even dispersion, are
inevitable; for in all societies there must be a chief.
It must be allowed that this clear and simple explanation enables us
to understand the theory of the origin of society much better than all
the subtilties of explicit and implicit pacts; it is enough for a thing
to be founded on nature itself, for it to be viewed as demonstrated as
a real necessity, in order that its existence may be easily conceived;
why then seek, by subtilties and suppositions, what is apparent at the
first view?
Let us not, however, suppose that St. Thomas does not acknowledge
divine right, or is ignorant that the obligation of obedience to power
may be founded on it: far from it; this truth he establishes in many
places in his works; but he does not forget the natural and the human
law, which, on this point, are combined and allied with the divine,
in such a way, that the latter is only a confirmation of, and gives
a sanction to, the others. We ought thus to interpret the passages
in which the holy doctor attributes the civil power to human law,
considering this law with that of grace. For example, when examining
whether infidels can have dominion or supremacy over the faithful, he
says:[b] "It is necessary here to consider that dominion or supremacy
is introduced by virtue of human law; the distinction between the
faithful and infidels, is by divine law. Divine law, which emanates
from grace, does not take away human law, which is founded on the law
of natural reason; therefore the distinction between the faithful and
infidels, considered in itself, does not take away the dominion or
supremacy of infidels over the faithful."
When inquiring, in another place, if the prince who has apostatized
from the faith by this fact loses dominion over his subjects, so that
they are no longer called upon to obey him, he expresses himself
thus:[c] "As has been said before, infidelity does not destroy dominion
itself; for dominion was introduced by the law of nations, which is
human right; while the distinction between the faithful and infidels
is by a divine, which does not take away the human right." Again;
when examining if man is obliged to obey another man, he says:[d]
"As natural actions proceed from natural powers, so human operations
proceed from the human will. In natural things, it was necessary that
inferior things should be brought into their respective operations by
the excellence of the natural virtue which God has given to superior
things. In the same way, also, it is necessary that in human things,
those which are superior should urge on the inferior, by the force of
authority ordained by God. To move, by means of reason and the will,
is to command; and as, by virtue of the natural order instituted by
God, inferior things in nature are necessarily subject to the motion
of superior things, so also, in human things, those which are inferior
ought, by natural and divine right, to obey those which are superior."
On the same question, St. Thomas examines whether obedience is a
special virtue, and he answers,[e] "That to obey a superior is a duty
conformable to the divine order communicated to things." In the 6th
article, he states the question whether Christians are obliged to obey
the secular powers, and says:[f] "The faith of Christ is the principle
and cause of justice, according to what is said in the Epistle to the
Romans, chap. iii. 'the justice of God by the faith of Jesus Christ.'
Thus the faith of Christ does not take away the law of justice, but
rather confirms it. This law wills that inferiors should obey their
superiors; for without that, human society could not be preserved;
and thus the faith of Christ does not exempt the faithful from the
obligation of obeying the secular powers." I have quoted at some
length these passages from St. Thomas, in order to show that he does
not understand the divine right in the sense in which the enemies of
Catholicity have made it a reproach to us; but that, properly speaking,
while he adheres to a dogma so expressly taught in the sacred text, he
considers the Divine law as a confirmation and sanction of the natural
and human law. We know that for six centuries Catholic doctors have
regarded the authority of St. Thomas as worthy of the highest respect
in all that concerns faith and morality.
We have just seen that this angel of the schools establishes, as
founded on the natural, human, and divine law, the duty of obeying
authority, affirming that the source of all power is found in God,
without entering into the question whether God communicates this power
_directly_ or _indirectly_ to those who exercise it, and leaving a vast
field where human opinions may debate without violating the purity of
faith. In the same way, the most eminent doctors who have succeeded him
in the Catholic pulpits have contented themselves with establishing and
enforcing the doctrine, without rashly making use of the authority of
the Church in its application. To prove this I will here insert some
passages from distinguished theologians. Cardinal Bellarmin expresses
himself in these words:[g] "It is certain that public authority comes
from God, from whom alone emanate all things good and lawful, as is
proved by St. Augustin throughout almost all the forty-five books of
the _City of God_. Indeed, the Wisdom of God, in the Book of Proverbs,
chap. viii., cries out, 'It is by Me that kings reign;' and further
on, 'It is by Me that princes rule.' The prophet Daniel, in the second
chapter, 'The God of heaven has given thee the kingdom and the empire;'
and the same prophet, in the fourth chapter, 'Thy dwelling shall be
with cattle and with wild beasts, and thou shalt eat grass as an ox,
and shalt be wet with the dew of heaven, and seven years shall pass
over thee, till thou know that the Most High ruleth over the kingdom
of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will.'" After having proved,
by the authority of the Holy Scriptures, this dogma, via. that the
civil power comes from God, the illustrious writer explains the
sense in which it ought to be understood:[h] "But," he says, "it is
necessary to make some observations here. In the first place, political
power, considered in general, and without descending in particular to
monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, emanates immediately from God
alone; for being necessarily annexed to the nature of man, it proceeds
from Him who has made that nature. Besides, that power is by natural
law, since it does not depend upon men's consent, since they must have
a government whether they wish it or not, under pain of desiring the
destruction of the human race, which is against the inclination of
nature. It is thus that the law of nature is divine law, and government
is introduced by divine law; and it is particularly this which the
Apostle seems to have had in view when he says to the Romans, chap.
xiii., 'He who resists authority, resists the ordinance of God.'"
This doctrine destroys all the theory of Rousseau, who makes the
existence of society and the right of the civil power depend on human
conventions; it also overturns the absurd systems of some Protestants,
and other heretics, their predecessors, who, in the name of Christian
liberty, pretended to condemn all authority. No! the existence of
society does not depend on the consent of man; society is not his work;
it satisfies an imperious necessity, which, if it were not satisfied,
would entail the destruction of the human race. God, when he created
man, did not deliver him to the mercy of chance; He has given him the
right of fulfilling his necessities, and has imposed on him the care of
his own preservation as a duty; therefore the existence of the human
race includes also the existence of government, and the obligations of
obedience. There is no theory so clear, simple, and solid. Shall it be
called the enemy and oppressor of human freedom? Is it any disgrace
to man to acknowledge himself the creature of God? to confess that he
has received from Him what is necessary for his preservation? Is the
intervention of God any infringement of human liberty, and cannot man
be free without being an Atheist? It is absurd to say there is any
thing favorable to servitude in a doctrine which tells us "God wills
not that you should live like wild beasts: He commands you to be united
in society, and for this purpose He orders you to live in submission to
an authority legitimately established." If this be called servitude and
oppression, we desire this servitude, we willingly give up the right
which is pretended to be granted to us of wandering in the woods like
wild beasts: true liberty does not exist in man when he is stripped of
the finest attribute of his nature, that of acting in conformity with
reason.
Such is the explanation of divine right according to the illustrious
commentator whom we have just quoted; let us now see the applications
which he makes of it, and learn in what way, according to him, God
communicates the civil power to those who are charged with its
exercise. After the words quoted above, Bellarmin continues:[i] "In
the second place, observe, that this power resides _immediately_, as
in its subject, in all the multitude, for it is by divine right. The
divine right has not given this power to any man in particular, for it
has given it to the multitude; besides, the positive law being taken
away, there is no reason why one should rule rather than another, among
a great number of equal men; therefore power belongs to the whole
multitude. In fine, society should be a perfect state; it should have
the power of self-preservation, and, consequently, that of chastising
the disturbers of the peace."
This doctrine has nothing in common with the foolish assertions of
Rousseau and his followers; no one who has studied public law will
confound things so different. Indeed, what the Cardinal establishes
in the passage quoted, viz. that power resides immediately in the
multitude, is not in opposition to what he himself taught a little
before, when he said that it comes from God, and is not owing to human
conventions. His doctrine may be conveyed in this form. Suppose a
number of men without any positive law; there is then no reason why
any one of them should have a right to rule the rest. Nevertheless,
this law exists, nature itself indicates its necessity, God ordains
a government; therefore there exists among this number of men the
legitimate power of instituting one. To explain more clearly the ideas
of this illustrious theologian, let us suppose that a considerable
number of families, perfectly equal among themselves and absolutely
independent of each other, were thrown by a tempest on a desert island.
The vessel being destroyed, they have no hope either of returning
home or of pursuing their journey. All communication with the rest of
mankind is become impossible: we ask, whether these families could live
without government? No. Has any one among them a right of governing
the rest? Clearly not. Can any individual among them pretend to such
a right? Certainly not. Have they a right to appoint the government
of which they stand in need? Certainly they have. Therefore in this
multitude, represented by the fathers of families or in some other
way, resides the civil power, together with the right of transmitting
it to one or more persons, according as they shall judge proper. It is
difficult to make any valid objection to the doctrine placed in this
point of view. That this is the real meaning of his words is clearly
shown by the observations which follow:[k] "In the third place," he
says, "observe that the multitude transfers this power to one person or
more by natural right; for the republic not being able to exercise it
by itself, is obliged to communicate it to one or to a limited number;
and it is thus that the power of princes, considered in general, is
by natural and divine law; and the whole human race, if assembled
together, could not establish the contrary, viz. that princes or
governors did not exist."
But the fundamental principle being once established, Bellarmin allows
to society an ample right of appointing the form of government which
they think proper. This ought to refute the accusations made against
the Catholic doctrine, of favoring servitude; for if all forms of
government are reconcilable with this doctrine, it is evident that it
cannot justly be accused of being incompatible with liberty. Hear how
the same author continues on this point:[l] "Observe, in the fourth
place," he says, "that particular forms of government are by the law
of nations, and not by divine law, since it depends upon the consent
of the multitude to place over themselves a king, consuls, or other
magistrates, as is clear; and, for a legitimate reason, they can change
royalty into aristocracy, or into democracy, or _vice versâ_, as it was
done in Rome.
"Observe, in the fifth place, that it follows, from what we have said,
that this power in particular comes from God, but by means of the
counsel and election of man, like all other things which belong to the
law of nations; for the law of nations is, as it were, a conclusion
drawn from the natural law by human reasoning. Thence follows a twofold
difference between the political and the ecclesiastical power: first,
difference with regard to the subject, since political power is in
the multitude, and ecclesiastical in a man _immediately_, as in its
subject; second, difference with respect to the cause, since political
power, considered generally, is by divine law, and in particular by
the law of nations, while the ecclesiastical power is in every way by
divine law, and emanates immediately from God."
These last words show clearly how correct I was in saying that
theologians understand the divine law in a very different manner,
according as it is applied to the civil or to the ecclesiastical power.
It must not be supposed that the doctrine now stated is peculiar
to Cardinal Bellarmin; the generality of theologians follow him on
this point; but I have preferred quoting his authority, because he,
being so strongly attached to the See of Rome, if the latter were
imbued with the principles of despotism, as it has been charged with
being, no doubt, something of them would appear in the writings of
this theologian. It is easy to anticipate the objection that will be
made to this explanation; we shall be told that Bellarmin, having for
his object the exaltation of the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff,
with this view attempted to lower the power of kings, in order to
take away or diminish all opposition to the authority of the Popes. I
will not now enter into an examination of the opinions of Bellarmin
with respect to the two powers--this would be foreign to my design;
besides, such points of civil and ecclesiastical law excited at that
time great interest, on account of circumstances at that period, but
now very little, on account of the new course which events have taken,
and the great change which has been brought about in ideas. I shall,
nevertheless, reply to this supposed difficulty by two very simple
observations. The first is, that we have not to inquire the intentions
of Bellarmin in explaining his doctrine, but in what that doctrine
consists. Whatever his motive may have been, we see an author of vast
renown, whose opinion has great weight in Catholic schools, and who
wrote at Rome, where, so far from his writings being condemned, he was
surrounded with respect and honor: this theologian, I say, explaining
the doctrine of the Church on the Divine origin of the civil power,
does it in such terms that, while giving sacred guarantees for the good
order of society, he does not infringe on the liberty of the people;
this is the vindication of Rome against the attacks made upon her. The
second is, that Cardinal Bellarmin does not here profess an isolated
opinion--the generality of theologians are on his side; therefore, all
that can be said against him personally proves nothing against his
doctrines. Among the many authors that I could quote, I will select
some who will represent many different periods: and as the obligation
of being brief confines me within narrow limits, I beg the reader
himself to examine the works of Catholic theologians and moralists; he
will thus make sure of becoming acquainted with their thoughts on this
subject. Hear how Suarez explains the origin of power:[m] "Herein," he
says, "the common opinion seems to be, that God, inasmuch as He is the
author of nature, gives the power; so that men are, so to speak, the
matter and subject capable of this power; while God gives the form by
giving the power." (_De Leg._ lib. iii. c. 3.)
He goes on to develop his doctrine, relying on the reason usually made
use of in this matter; and when he comes to draw the conclusions, he
explains how society, which, according to him, receives the power
immediately from God, communicates it to certain persons. He adds:[n]
"In the second place, it follows from what has been said, that the
civil power, whenever it is found in a man or a prince, has emanated
according to usual and legitimate law, from the people and the
community, either directly or remotely, and that it cannot otherwise be
justly possessed." (_Ibid._ cap. 4.)
Perhaps some of my readers may not know that a Spanish Jesuit
maintained against the King of England in person, the doctrine that
princes receive power _mediately_ from God, and _immediately_ from the
people. This Jesuit is Suarez himself, and the book to which I allude
is called,[o] "_Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the
errors of the Anglican sect; accompanied by a Reply to the Apology for
the Oath of Fidelity, and to the monitory Preface published by the most
serene James, King of England._ By P. D. François Suarez, Professor
at the University of Coimbra; addressed to the most serene Kings and
Princes of the Christian world."
In the third book, chapter second, where he discusses the question,
Whether the political sovereignty comes _immediately_ from God or
from divine institution, Suarez says: "Here the most serene King not
only gives a new and singular opinion, but also acrimoniously attacks
Cardinal Bellarmin, for having affirmed that Kings have not received
authority _immediately_ from God like the Popes. He himself affirms
that Kings hold their power not from the people, but _immediately_ from
God; and he attempts to support his opinion by arguments and examples
the value of which I shall examine in the next chapter.
"Although _this controversy does not immediately concern the dogmas
of faith_ (_for we have nothing in reference to it either in the
Scriptures or in the Fathers_), it may nevertheless be well to discuss
and explain it carefully; 1. because it might possibly lead to error
in other dogmas; 2. because the above opinion of the King, as he
maintains and explains it, is new, singular, and apparently invented
to exalt the temporal at the expense of the spiritual power; and 3.
because we consider the opinion of the illustrious Bellarmin _ancient_,
_received_, _true_, and _necessary_." But we must not attribute these
opinions to the circumstances of the times, nor suppose that they
disappeared from the schools of theologians as soon as they were
advanced. In support of them, a multitude of authors might very easily
be cited, who would show that Suarez was correct in saying that the
opinion of Bellarmin was received and ancient; they would, moreover,
show that this doctrine continued to be admitted as a matter of
course, without any doubt of its orthodoxy, or of its containing any
thing dangerous to the stability of monarchies. In proof of what is
here adduced, I will cite passages from distinguished authors, proving
that at Rome this mode of explaining the right divine has never been
called in question; and that in France and Spain, where absolute
monarchy had taken so deep root, this opinion was no longer regarded
as dangerous to the stability of thrones. A long period had already
elapsed--the critical position which might more or less influence
the direction of ideas had consequently disappeared, yet theologians
still maintained the same doctrines. Cardinal Gotti, who wrote in the
early part of the last century, gives, in his Treatise upon Laws,
the above opinion as previously admitted, without even attempting to
confirm it.[p] In the Moral Theology of Herman Busenbaum, enlarged by
St. Alphonsus Liguori, book 1st, second Treatise upon Laws, (chap.
i. dub. 2, § 104,) it is expressly said: "It is certain that the
power of making laws exists among men, but as far as civil laws are
concerned, this power belongs naturally to no individual. It belongs
to the community, who transfer it to one or to more, that by them the
community itself may be governed."
Should any one say that I quote the Jesuits only, or suspect that
these doctrines are mere casuistry, I will cite remarkable passages
from other theologians, who are neither casuists nor prepossessed
in favor of the Jesuits. Father Daniel Concina, who wrote at Rome
about the middle of the last century, supports the same doctrine as
generally admitted; in his _Théologie chrétienne dogmatico-morale_,
Roman edition, 1768, he expresses himself as follows:[q] "All writers
generally assert that the origin of supreme power is of God, as Solomon
declares in the Book of Proverbs, c. viii., saying, 'By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things:' as truly as subordinate princes are
dependent upon the supreme temporal majesty, so, in like manner, this
majesty itself must depend upon the supreme King and Lord of lords.
Theologians and jurists dispute whether this supreme power comes
_immediately_ from God, or merely in an _indirect manner_. Many affirm
that it emanates _immediately_ from God, because it cannot emanate
from men, whether we consider them collectively or individually; for
all fathers of families are equal, and each possesses, with regard
to his own family, a power merely economical; from which it follows,
that they cannot confer upon others that civil and political power
which they themselves do not possess. Moreover, if the community, in
its superiority, had delegated to one or to more the power here under
discussion, it could revoke it at pleasure, for the superior is always
at liberty to withdraw the facilities he has delegated to another, and
this would be very injurious to society.
"In support of the opposite opinion, many answer, and _certainly with
more probability and truth_, that, in reality, all power proceeds
from God, but that it is not delegated to any particular individual
_directly_, unless by consent of civil society. That this power is not
vested _directly_ in any individual, but in the entire collection of
men, is what St. Thomas expressly teaches (1, 2, qu. 90, art. 3, ad
2, et qu. 97, art. 3, ad 3), followed by Dominic Soto (lib. i. qu. 1,
art. 3); by Ledesma (2 part. qu. 18, art. 3); and by Covarruvias (in
Pract. cap. i.). The reason of this is evident; for as all men are born
free with regard to civil society, no one has any civil power over
another, since this power exists not in each, nor in any of them in a
fixed manner; it follows, therefore, that it is vested in the whole
collection of men. _God does not confer this power by any special act
distinct from creation, but it is a property of right reason, inasmuch
as right reason dictates that men, united in one moral whole, shall
prescribe, by express or tacit consent, in what manner society shall be
governed, preserved, and upheld._"
It is proper to remark, that Father Concina, speaking here of _tacit_
or _express consent_, has not in view the actual existence of society,
nor the authority by which it is governed, but merely the mode of
exercising this authority for the direction, preservation, and defence
of society. Hence, his opinion coincides with that of Bellarmin;
society and power are of right divine and natural, but the _mode_ of
organizing society, and of transmitting and exercising authority, is
human. After having shown in what sense we are to understand that
civil power comes from God, Concina resumes the question which he had
proposed, viz. in what manner authority exists in kings, princes,
and other supreme heads of government. He proceeds as follows:[r]
"It is evident, therefore, that the power existing in the prince,
the king, or in many persons whether nobles or plebeians, emanates
from the community itself, directly or indirectly; for, if it came
immediately from God, it would be manifested to us in a particular
manner, as in the instances of Saul and David, who were chosen by God.
We consider, therefore, erroneous, the doctrine that God confers this
power immediately and directly upon the king, the prince, or any other
head of supreme government whatever, to the exclusion of the tacit or
express consent of the public. This discussion, it is true, is one of
words rather than of things, for this power comes from God, the author
of nature, inasmuch as He has ordained and appointed that the public
itself shall confer upon one or more the power of supreme government,
for the preservation and defence of society. The nomination of the
person or persons appointed to command being once made, their power
is said to come from God, because society itself is bound by natural
and divine right to obey him who commands. In fact, it is the will
of God that society shall be governed, whether by one individual or
by several. In this manner the several opinions of theologians are
reconciled with each other, and the oracles of Scripture appear in
their true sense: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance
of God.' 'There is no power but from God.' 'Be subject, therefore, to
every human creature for God's sake, whether to the king,' &c. 'Thou
wouldst not have any power against Me, unless it were given thee
from above.' These testimonies, and others of a like nature, ought
to convince us that all is ordained and directed by God, the supreme
Mediator. This, however, does not exclude the operations of human
institutions, as is very justly interpreted by St. Augustin and St.
John Chrysostom."
Father Billuart, who lived in the early part of last century, and,
consequently, at the same epoch when the highly monarchical traditions
of Louis XIV. were in all their vigor, expressed the same ideas on this
subject as the theologians above cited. In his work on Moral Theology,
which, for almost a century, has been widely circulated, he thus
expresses himself:[s] "I maintain, in the first place, that legislative
power belongs to the community, or to its representative." After
quoting St. Thomas and St. Isidore, he continues: "Reason proves, that
to make laws belongs of right to him who is appointed to watch over
the public good; for the maintenance of the public good, as has been
already said, is the end and aim of the laws. It is the duty of the
community, or of its ruler, to watch over the public good; for as the
welfare of an individual is a fit object for individual agency, so is
the public good for the agency of the community, or of him to whom its
functions have been delegated; the power of legislation, therefore, is
vested in the community, or in its representative. I will confirm what
is here advanced. The law has the power of commanding and of coercing
in such a manner that no individual has any authority to command or
restrain the multitude. This authority belongs exclusively to the
community, or to its representative; to these, therefore, legislative
power belongs." Having made these reflections, Billuart starts another
difficulty with regard to the extreme extension which he appears to
have given to the rights of the multitude. On this occasion he develops
his system still further.[t]
"It will be objected," says he, "that the right of commanding and
compelling is vested in the superior, and cannot belong to the
community, since it is not superior to itself. To this I reply:
Society, in one sense, is not superior to itself, but in another it is.
The community may be considered collectively as one moral body, and
in this sense it is superior to itself as considered distributively
in each of its members. Again; it may be considered as acting in the
place of God, from whom emanates all legislative power, as it is said
in Proverbs: 'By Me kings reign and the lawgivers decree just things;'
or as capable of being governed conformably to the public good. In the
former case, it is superior and legislative; in the latter, inferior
and subject to the law."
As this explanation might appear somewhat obscure, Billuart proceeds to
investigate more profoundly the origin of society and of civil power.
He endeavors to show how the natural, the divine, and the human laws
agree on this point, defining what belongs to each. He then continues
as follows:[u] "To render this more clear, it must be observed, that
man, unlike other animals, is born destitute of many things necessary
both for body and soul, and that for these he is indebted to society
and the assistance of his fellow-mortals; consequently he is, by his
very nature, a social animal. This society, which nature and reason
prescribe to him as indispensable, cannot long exist without some power
to direct it, according to what is said in Proverbs: 'Where there is no
governor, the people will come to ruin.' Whence it follows, that God,
who has given this nature, has also given the power of governing and of
legislating. He, in fact, who gives the form, gives, at the same time,
all that such form necessarily requires. But as it is not possible for
this executive and legislative power to be exercised by the entire
multitude, since it would be difficult for all and each forming
this multitude to assemble on all occasions when the affairs of the
commonweal are to be discussed, or laws to be established, it is usual
for the multitude to transfer its right or governing power, either to
a number of people selected from all classes, and bearing the name
of a democracy; or to a select number of the nobles, which takes the
name of an aristocracy; or to one alone, for himself only, or for his
successors, by virtue of the right of hereditary succession, which is
styled a monarchy. From which it is evident that all power comes from
God, as the Apostle says, in his Epistle to the Romans, chap. xiii.
This power resides in the community, _directly and by natural right_,
but in kings and other rulers merely _indirectly and by human right_,
unless God confers it directly upon certain individuals, as He did upon
Moses over the Jews, and as Christ has conferred it upon the Supreme
Pontiff over the whole Church." What is still more remarkable, our
absolute monarchies were never alarmed at these theological doctrines,
not only previous to the French Revolution, but since that Revolution,
and up to the time commonly styled with us the _fatal decade_, (from
1823 to 1833, the latter part of the reign of Ferdinand VII.) It is
well known that during that period the _Compendium Salmaticense_
(Compendium of Salamanca) had a most favorable reception in this
country, and served as a text-book among the professors of ethics
in the colleges and universities. Ye who are continually declaiming
against this epoch, imagining, without doubt, that in those days no
other doctrines than those in favor of the most arrant despotism could
be circulated, listen to what is said in the above book, which was
then placed in the hands of every youth destined to the ecclesiastical
state. After having established the existence of a civil legislative
power, the author thus proceeds:[x] "You will ask me, in the second
place, whether the prince receives this civil legislative power
_immediately_ from God. I reply, It, is universally admitted that
princes receive this power from God; but, at the same time, it is
maintained with more truth, that they do not receive it _directly_,
but _through the medium_ of the people's consent; for all men are
naturally equal, and there is no natural distinction of superiority
or inferiority. Since nature has not given any individual power over
another, God has conferred this power upon the community; which, as
it may think it more proper to be ruled by one or by many appointed
persons, transfers it to one or to many, that by them it may be ruled;
according to St. Thomas (1, 2, qu. 90, art. 3, ad 2). From this
natural principle arises the variety in the forms of civil government;
for if a state transfers all its power to a single individual, this
government is termed monarchical; if it confers it upon the nobles of
the nation, it takes the name of an aristocracy; if the people or the
state retain this power in their own hands, the civil government is
styled a democracy. Princes, therefore, receive from God the power of
commanding; for supposing the election made by the whole state, God
confers upon the prince the power which was vested in the community.
Whence it follows, that the prince rules and governs in the name of
God, and whoever resists him resists the ordinance of God, according to
the words of the Apostle above cited."