RELIGION AND LIBERTY.
In the thirteenth chapter of this work we said, "The heart is filled
with generous indignation when we hear the religion of Jesus Christ
reproached with a tendency towards oppression. It is true, that if we
confound the spirit of real liberty with that of demagogues, we shall
not find it in Catholicity. But if we abstain from a monstrous abuse of
the name, if we give to the word liberty its reasonable, just, useful,
and pleasant meaning, then the Catholic religion may fearlessly claim
the gratitude of the human race, for she has civilized the nations who
have professed her, and civilization is true liberty." From what we
have already shown, the reader may judge whether Catholicity has been
favorable, or otherwise, to European civilization, and, consequently,
whether she has done any injury to real liberty. On the various points
on which we have compared her with Protestantism, we have seen the
injurious tendencies of the one and the advantages of the other; the
judgment of clear and enlightened reason cannot be doubtful.
As the real liberty of nations does not consist in appearances, but
resides in their intimate organization, in the same way as the life
does in the heart, I might dispense with entering into a comparison
of the two religions with respect to civil liberty; but I do not wish
to be accused of having avoided a delicate question, from a fear that
Catholicity would not come out of it with honor, or to allow it to be
suspected that my faith has any difficulty in sustaining a parallel as
advantageously on this ground as on others.
In order to clear up this question completely, it is necessary to
examine thoroughly the vague accusations which have been made on this
matter against Catholicity, and the eulogiums lavished on the pretended
Reformation. It is necessary to show that only gratuitous calumny has
been able to reproach the Catholic religion with favoring servitude and
oppression; it is necessary to dissipate, by the light of philosophy
and history, that deceitful prejudice, by the aid of which freethinkers
and Protestants have labored to persuade the people that Catholicity
is favorable to servitude, that the Church is the bulwark of tyrants,
that the name of Pope is synonymous with that of friend and natural
protector of whoever desires to debase men and reduce them to servitude.
There are two ways in which this question may be decided; by doctrines
and by facts.
Those who have said that the human race had lost its rights, and that
they were revived by Rousseau, certainly have not given themselves much
trouble in examining what are the real rights of the human race, and
what are the apocryphal rights advanced by the philosopher of Geneva
in his _Contrat Social_. Indeed, it may be said with more truth, that
the human race had very valuable rights, acknowledged as such, and
which Rousseau lost sight of. He undertook to examine thoroughly the
origin of the civil power, and his wild notions, instead of explaining
the matter, have only served to confuse it. I believe that on this
important point men have never had ideas less clear and distinct
than now. Revolutions have upset every thing in theory and in fact;
governments have been sometimes revolutionary, sometimes reactionary;
and sometimes revolution, and sometimes reaction, has been predominant.
It is extremely difficult to obtain from modern books a clear,
accurate, and exact knowledge of the nature of the civil power, of its
origin, and of its relations with subjects; in some of these you will
find the doctrines of Rousseau, in others those of Bonald: Rousseau is
a miner who saps in order to overturn; Bonald is the hero who saves
in his arms the tutelary deities of the city delivered to the flames;
but in his fear of profanation, he carries them covered with a veil.
However, it would not be just to attribute to Rousseau the melancholy
honor of having begun the confusion of ideas on this point; at various
times there have been found misguided men, who have labored to disturb
society by anarchical doctrines; but the embodiment of these doctrines,
and the forming of them into seductive theories, dates chiefly from the
birth of Protestantism. Luther, in his book _De Libertate Christiana_,
sowed the seeds of endless troubles by the extravagant doctrine, that
a Christian is subject to no one. In vain did he have recourse to the
evasive declaration, that he did not speak of magistrates or civil
laws; the peasants of Germany drew their own consequences; they rose
up against their lords, and enkindled a dreadful war. The divine right
held by Catholics has been accused of favoring despotism; and it has
been considered as so much opposed to the rights of the people, that
the two expressions are often antithetically employed. Divine right,
well understood, is not opposed to the rights, but to the excesses of
the people; so far from giving unlimited extent to power, it confines
it within the limits of reason, justice, and public advantage. In his
lectures on the general history of civilization in Europe, M. Guizot,
speaking of this right as proclaimed by the Church, says: "The rights
of liberty and political guarantees are combined with difficulty with
the principle of religious royalty; but that principle in itself is
elevated, moral, and salutary." (Lecture ix.) When men like M. Guizot,
who have made these questions their special study, are so lamentably
deceived on this point, who can be astonished that the same thing
occurs to the generality of writers!
Before I go further, I will make one observation, which we ought always
to have present to our minds. On these questions we continually hear
mention made of the schools of Bossuet and of Bonald; private names are
put forward, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. Much as I
respect the merits of these men, and of others not less illustrious
produced by the Catholic Church, yet I must observe that she is not
responsible for any doctrines but those which she herself teaches;
that she is not personified in any doctor in particular; and that
being herself appointed by God himself to be the oracle of infallible
truth in faith and morality, she does not permit the faithful to defer
blindly to the mere word of any private man, however great may be his
merit in science and in sanctity. If you wish to know what the Catholic
Church teaches, consult the decisions of her Councils and her Pontiffs;
consult also her doctors of distinguished and unsullied reputation; but
beware of confounding the opinions of an author, however respectable he
may be, with the doctrines of the Church and the voice of the Vicar of
Jesus Christ. By this warning I do not mean to prematurely condemn the
opinions of any one, but simply to put those on their guard who, little
versed in ecclesiastical studies, might, in certain cases, confound
revealed dogmas with what is mere human thought. Having premised this
much, let us enter freely into the question.
Wherein does this divine right, of which we hear so much, consist? In
order to explain this matter completely, we must state the objects over
which this right extends; for these objects being widely different,
there will also be a great difference in the application made to them
of the principle. A great number of questions present themselves in
this very important matter; but it appears to me that they may all be
reduced to these, which embrace the rest, viz. What is the origin of
the civil power? How far does it extend? Is it lawful to resist it in
any case?
The first question is, _What is the origin of the civil power? How
do we know that this power is from God?_ There is much confusion
prevailing on these points; and certainly it is to be lamented, that at
a time so disturbed as the present they should be misunderstood; for
whatever may be said to the contrary, doctrines are never wholly laid
aside, either in revolutions or in restorations; men's interests, no
doubt, have great weight therein, but they are not left alone in the
arena. The best way of forming clear ideas on these points is to have
recourse to ancient authors, especially those whose doctrines have
been respected for a long period of time, who continue to be respected
down to this day, and who are looked upon as safe guides in the right
interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrines. This way of studying the
question which now occupies us ought to be acceptable to those even
who entertain contempt for the writers of whom we speak; for we are
now engaged more in seeking in what the doctrine consists, than in
examining into its truth. Now for this purpose we cannot find witnesses
better informed, or interpreters more competent, than men who have
devoted their whole lives to the study of the doctrine.
This last reflection is in no way contradictory to what we have said
above, on the care which we ought to take not to confound the mere
opinions of men with the doctrines of the Church; it only tends to
remind us of the necessity which exists of perusing a certain class of
authors, who are certainly not worthy of the ungrateful neglect with
which they are treated; indeed, it is impossible that their important
labors, conscientiously pursued for so long a time, should produce no
fruit. In order to understand the better the opinion of these writers
on the matter which now occupies us, we ought to observe the difference
which they make in the application of the general principle of divine
right to the origin of the civil or to that of the ecclesiastical
power. From this comparison there arises a bright light, which
resolves and clears up all difficulties. Open the works of the most
distinguished theologians, consult their treatises on the origin of the
power of the Pope, and you will see that in establishing this power
on divine right, they mean that it emanates from God, not only in a
general sense, that is, inasmuch as all being comes from God; not only
in a social sense, that is, inasmuch as the Church being a society, God
has willed the existence of a power to govern it; but in a most special
manner that God has Himself instituted this power, that He has Himself
established its form, that He has Himself pointed out the person, and
that consequently the successor to the chair of St. Peter is of divine
right the supreme pastor of the universal Church, having over the whole
of this Church supreme honor and jurisdiction.
With respect to the civil power, these authors speak thus. In the first
place, all power comes from God; for power exists, and all existence
comes from God; power is sovereignty, and God is the lord, the supreme
master of all things; power is a right, and in God is found the source
of all right; power is a moral movement, and God is the universal cause
of all sorts of movements; power tends towards an exalted end, and God
is the end of all creatures; His Providence ordains and directs all
things with mercy and efficacy. Thus we see that St. Thomas, in his
work _De Regimine Principum_, affirms that all power comes from God as
supreme master, as may be shown in three ways: as it is a being, as it
is a mover, and as it is an end. (Lib. 3, cap. 1.)
As I am treating of this method of explaining the origin of power, I
must pause for a moment to refute Rousseau, who, in the allusion which
he made to this doctrine, showed that he did not understand it. He
says, "All power comes from God, I allow; but all diseases also come
from Him. Are we, therefore, to say that it is forbidden to call in a
physician?" (_Contrat Social_, liv. i. c. 3.) It is true that one of
the senses in which the divine origin of power is affirmed is, that all
finite beings emanate from an infinite being; but this sense is not
the only one. Indeed, theologians knew very well that this idea, by
itself, did not imply its legitimacy, and that it extended as well to
physical force; for as the author of the _Contrat Social_ adds: "the
pistol held by a robber in a wood is also a power." Rousseau, in this
passage, has sacrificed the sense to show his ingenuity; the love of
making a brilliant sally has seduced him into removing the question
from its proper ground. It was easy, indeed, to see that, with respect
to the civil power, men do not speak of a physical, but of a moral, a
legitimate power; in any other way it would be in vain to seek for its
origin: as well might they seek the source of riches, health, strength,
courage, subtilty, or the other qualities which contribute to form the
material force of all power. The question is with regard to the moral
being which is called power; and in the moral order, illegitimate
power is not power, it is not a being, it is nothing. Consequently,
there is no need of seeking its origin in God, or in any thing else.
Therefore, power emanates from God as the source of all right, justice,
and legitimacy; and in considering power, not as a mere physical, but
as a moral being, it is affirmed that it can come from God alone,
who is the plenitude of all being. Not only is this doctrine, taken
generally, above all difficulty, but it must be admitted by all who do
not profess themselves atheists; they alone can call it in question.
Let us now descend to particulars, and see whether Catholic doctors
teach any thing which is not perfectly reasonable even in the eyes of
philosophers.
Man, they say, was not created to live alone; his existence supposes a
family; his inclinations urge him to form an alliance, without which
the human race could not be perpetuated. Families are connected with
each other by intimate and indestructible ties; they have common wants;
none can insure happiness, or even preservation, without the aid of
others. Therefore they are bound to enter into society. Society cannot
exist without order, or order without justice; and both require a
guardian, an interpreter, an executor. This is the civil power. God,
who created man, and willed also his preservation, consequently willed
the existence of society, and the power which it requires. Now the
existence of the civil power is as conformable to the will of God as
the existence of the paternal; if families have need of the paternal,
society has no less need of the civil power. Our Lord has condescended
to secure us from mistakes on this important point by telling us in
the Scriptures, that all power emanates from Him, that we are obliged
to obey it, that whoever resists it resists the Divine command. I
seek in vain for an objection to this way of explaining the origin of
society, and of the power which governs it. This doctrine preserves
natural, human, and divine right; all these rights are connected, and
support each other. The sublimity of the theory rivals its simplicity;
revelation sanctions what was shown by the light of reason, and grace
fortifies nature. Such, then, is the famous divine right, presented
as a bugbear to the ignorant and unsuspecting, in order to make them
believe that the Catholic Church, when she teaches the obligation of
obeying the legitimate power, and founds this obligation on the law of
God, proposes a dogma injurious to true human liberty.
To hear some men ridicule the divine right of kings, one would say
that we Catholics believed that certain individuals and families have
received bulls of institution from Heaven, and that we are grossly
ignorant of the history of the changes of the civil power. If they had
examined the matter more deeply, they would have found that, far from
being liable to the reproach of such folly, we have only established
a principle the necessity of which was acknowledged by all the
legislators of antiquity, and that our belief is quite reconcilable
with true philosophical doctrines and the events recorded by history.
In support of what I have said, see with what admirable clearness St.
Chrysostom explains this point in his 23d homily on the Epistle to
the Romans: "There is no power that does not come from God." What do
you say? Is every prince, then, appointed by God? I do not say that;
for I do not speak of any prince in particular, but of the thing
itself, that is, of the power itself: I affirm that the existence of
principalities is the work of the divine wisdom, and that to it it is
owing that all things are not given up to blind chance. Therefore it is
that the Apostle does not say, "That there is no prince who does not
come from God;" but he says, speaking of the thing in itself, "There
is no power which does not come from God." "Non est potestas, nisi a
Deo. Quid dicis? Ergo omnis princeps a Deo constitutus? Istud non dico.
Non enim de quovis principe mihi sermo est, sed de re ipsa, id est de
ipsa potestate. Quod enim principatus sint, quodque non simpliciter
et temere cuncta ferantur, divinæ sapientiæ opus esse dico. Propterea
non dicit: non enim princeps est nisi a Deo. Sed de re ipsa disserit
dicens: non est potestas nisi a Deo." (_Hom. 23, in Epist. ad Rom._)
It appears, from the words of St. John Chrysostom, that the meaning of
divine right, according to Catholics, is, that there exists a power for
the government of society, and that it is not abandoned to the mercy
of passion and imagination. This doctrine, which insures public order,
by establishing the obligation of obedience on motives of conscience,
does not descend to the inferior questions, which do not affect the
fundamental principle.
It may perhaps be objected, that if we admit the interpretation of St.
John Chrysostom, it was not necessary for the sacred text to teach
that which reason so clearly dictated. To this our reply is twofold:
1st, that the sacred Scripture expressly prescribes to us several
obligations which nature imposes on us independently of all divine
right, as to honor parents, not to kill, not to rob, and other things
of the kind; 2d, that in the present case the Apostles had very good
reason to recommend particularly obedience to legitimate power, and
to sanction in a clear and conclusive manner this obligation, founded
on the natural law itself. Indeed, the same St. Chrysostom tells
us, "that at that time a very widely-spread opinion represented the
Apostles as seditious men and innovators, laboring by their speeches
and acts to bring about the downfall of laws." "Plurima tunc temporis
circumferebatur fama, traducens Apostolos veluti seditiosos rerumque
novatores; qui omnia ad evertendum leges communes et facerent et
dicerent." (_Hom. 23, in Epist. ad Tim._)
It was no doubt to this that St. Paul alluded when, admonishing the
faithful of the obligation of obeying authority, he told them that
"such was the will of God, that by acting thus they might put to
silence the imprudence of foolish men." (Epist. i. c. 2.) We also know
from St. Jerome, that in the beginning of the Church, some, hearing
the Gospel liberty preached, imagined that universal liberty also was
meant. The necessity of inculcating a duty, the fulfilment of which
is indispensable for the preservation of society, will be clearly
perceived if we consider with what ease an error so flattering to
proud and rebellious minds might take root. After fourteen centuries
had passed away, we see the error reproduced in the time of Wickliff
and John Huss. The Anabaptists made a dreadful application of it when
they inundated Germany with blood. At a later period, the fanatical
sectaries of England raised the greatest disorders and brought about
fearful catastrophes by a similar doctrine, condemning alike the civil
and ecclesiastical power.
The religion of Jesus Christ, the law of peace and love, when preaching
liberty, spoke of that liberty which draws us from the slavery of sin
and the power of the devil, renders us co-heirs of Jesus Christ, and
participators of grace and glory. But she was very far from propagating
doctrines which could favor disorder, or subvert law and authority. It
was, then, of the greatest importance to her to disprove the calumnies
by which her enemies attempted to injure her; it was necessary for
her to proclaim, by her words and acts, that the public interest had
nothing to fear from her doctrines. We also see that after the Apostles
had inculcated this sacred obligation on several occasions, the Fathers
of the earliest times insist again and frequently on the same point.
St. Polycarp, quoted by Eusebius, (lib. iv. _Hist._ cap. 15,) says,
when speaking to the proconsul: "It is ordained to render to the
magistrates and powers appointed by God the honor which we owe them."
St. Justin, in his _Apology for the Christians_, also recalls the
precept of Jesus Christ touching the payment of tributes: Tertullian,
in his _Apology_, chapter third, reproaches the Gentiles with the
persecution they directed against the Christians, even at the time when
the latter, with their hands raised to heaven, were praying for the
safety of the emperors. The zeal of the saints who were charged with
the instruction and direction of the faithful succeeded in inculcating
this precept so well, that the Christians were everywhere a model of
submission and obedience. Thus Pliny, writing to the Emperor Trajan,
avowed that, religion excepted, he could not accuse them of being at
all wanting in the fulfilment of the laws and imperial edicts.
Nature herself has pointed out the persons in whom resides the paternal
power; the wants of the family mark the limits of this power; the
feelings of the heart prescribe its object and regulate its conduct. In
society it is otherwise: the rights of the civil power are tossed about
by the storms of human events; here this right resides in one person,
there in several; to-day it belongs to one family, to-morrow to
another; one day it is exercised under one form, the next under another
very different. The infant who weeps at his mother's bosom reminds her
of the obligation of nourishing and watching over it; woman, weak and
unsupported, calls unmistakably on man to protect her and her child;
youth, without strength to sustain or knowledge to direct itself, shows
parents their obligation of care and guardianship. We see clearly the
will of God; the order of nature forcibly expresses it; the tenderest
feelings are its echo and interpreter; we do not require any thing
else to show us what is the will of God; we do not need any refinement
to convince us that the parental power is from above. The rights and
duties of parents and children are written in characters as distinct
as they are beautiful. But where shall we find, with respect to the
civil power, an expression as unequivocal? If power comes from God,
by what means does he communicate it? In what channel is it conveyed?
This leads us to other secondary questions, which all conduce to the
explanation and solution of the principal question.
Was there ever a man who by natural right found himself invested with
civil power? It is clear that in this case power would have no other
origin than paternal authority; that is to say, in that case, the civil
power ought to be considered as an amplification of that authority, as
a transformation of domestic into civil power. We immediately see the
difference between the domestic and the social order, their separate
objects, the diversity of rules by which they must be regulated, and
we see how different are the means which they both use for their
government. I do not deny that the type of society is found in the
family, and that society is in the most desirable condition when
it most resembles the family in command and in obedience; but mere
analogies do not suffice to establish rights, and it always remains
indubitable that those of the civil power must not be confounded with
those of the paternal.
On the other hand, the nature of things shows that Providence, in
ordaining the destinies of the world, did not establish the paternal
as the source of the civil. Indeed, we do not see how such a power
could have been transmitted, and the legitimacy of its claims have
been justified. We can easily understand the limited rule of an old
man, governing a society, composed of two or three generations only,
who were descended from him; but as soon as this society increased,
extended to several countries, and consequently was divided and
subdivided, the patriarchal power must have disappeared, its exercise
must have become impossible, and we can no longer understand how the
pretenders to the throne could come to an understanding with each other
and the rest of the people, to justify and legitimize their rule. The
theory which acknowledges the paternal as the origin of the civil
power may be as promising as you please; it may sustain itself on the
example of the patriarchal government, which we observe in the cradle
of society; but there are two things against it. First, it asserts, but
does not prove; second, it has no means of attaining the end for which
it was intended, viz. the consolidation of government, for it cannot
establish itself by proving its legitimacy. The greatest of kings and
the humblest of subjects equally know that they are the sons of Noe;
nothing more. I have not been able to find this theory either in St.
Thomas, or in any of the other principal theologians; and to go still
higher, I do not know that it can find any authority in the doctrines
of the Fathers, in the tradition of the Church, or in Scripture
itself. It is consequently a mere philosophical opinion, of which the
explanation and proof belong to those who advance it. Catholicity says
nothing either for or against it.
It is then demonstrated that the civil power does not reside in any
man of natural right, and on the other hand, we know that power comes
from God. Who receives this power from God, and how does he receive
it? It is necessary first to observe, that the Catholic Church, while
acknowledging the divine origin of the civil power, an origin which is
expressly stated in Scripture, does not define any thing either as to
the form of this power, or the means which God employs in communicating
it. So that after the Catholic doctrine is established, there still
remains to be examined and discussed, who _immediately_ receives the
power, and how it is transmitted? This is acknowledged by theologians
when they have treated of this matter; this should be enough to remove
the prejudices of those who consider the doctrine of the Church on
this point as conducive to popular degradation. The Church teaches the
obligation of obeying legitimate authority, and adds that the power
which it exercises emanates from God; this doctrine is as applicable to
republics as to absolute monarchies, and does not prejudge either the
forms of government or the particular claims of legitimacy. As to these
latter questions they cannot be answered in general terms; they depend
upon a variety of circumstances into which the general principles which
are the foundation of the good order and peace of society cannot enter.
I think it is so important to give clear ideas on this point, and to
state the doctrines of the most distinguished Catholic divines, that I
consider it necessary to devote an entire chapter to this subject.