OF THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE IN GENERAL.
When enumerating, in the twentieth chapter, the characteristics
which mark European civilization, I pointed out, as one of them, "an
admirable public conscience, rich in sublime maxims of morality, in
rules of justice and equity, in sentiments of honor and dignity, a
conscience which survives the shipwreck of private morality, and does
not allow the open corruption to go so far as it did in ancient times."
We must now explain more at length in what this public conscience
consists, what is its origin, what are its results, showing at the
same time what share Catholicity and Protestantism have had in its
formation. This delicate and important question is, I will venture to
say, untouched; at least I do not know that it has yet been attempted.
Men constantly speak of the excellence of Christian morality, and on
this point all the sects, all the schools of Europe are agreed; but
they do not pay sufficient attention to the way in which that morality
has become predominant, by first destroying Pagan corruption, then by
maintaining itself for centuries in spite of the ravages of infidelity,
so as to form an admirable public conscience; a benefit which we now
enjoy without appreciating it as we ought, and without even thinking
of it. In order fully to comprehend this matter, it is above all
necessary to form a clear idea of what is meant by conscience.
Conscience in the general, or rather ideological sense of the word,
means the knowledge which each man has of his own acts. Thus we say
that the soul is conscious of its thoughts, of the acts of its will,
and of its sensations; so that the word conscience, taken in this
sense, expresses a perception of what we do and feel. Applied to the
moral order, this word signifies the judgment which we ourselves form
of our actions as good or evil. Thus, when we are about to perform an
action, conscience points it out to us as good or bad, and consequently
lawful or unlawful; and it thus directs our conduct. The action being
performed, it tells us whether we have done well or ill, it excuses
or condemns us, it rewards us with peace of mind, or punishes us with
remorse.
This explanation being given, we shall easily understand what is
meant by public conscience; it is nothing but the judgment formed of
their actions by the generality of men. It results from this that,
like private conscience, the public conscience may be right or wrong,
strict or relaxed; and that there must be differences on this point
among societies of men, the same as there are among individuals; that
is to say, that, as in the same society we find men whose consciences
are more or less right or wrong, more or less strict or relaxed, we
must also find societies superior to others in the justice of the
judgment which they form on actions, and in the delicacy of their moral
appreciation.
If we observe closely, we shall see that individual conscience is the
result of widely different causes. It is an error to suppose that
conscience resides solely in the intelligence; it is also rooted in the
heart. It is a judgment, it is true; but we judge of things in a very
different way according to the manner in which we feel them. Add to
this, that the feelings have an immense influence on moral ideas and
actions; the result is, that conscience is formed under the influence
of all the causes which forcibly act on our hearts. Communicate to two
children the same moral principles, by teaching them from the same book
and under the same master; but suppose that one in his own family sees
what he is taught constantly practised, while the other sees there
nothing but indifference to it; suppose, moreover, that these two
children grow up with the same moral and religious conviction, so that
as far as the intellect is concerned there is no difference between
them; nevertheless, do you believe that their judgment of the morality
of actions will be the same? By no means; and why? Because the one has
only convictions, while the other has also feelings. In the one, the
doctrine enlightens the mind; while, in the other, example engraves it
constantly on the heart. Thus what one regards with indifference, the
other looks upon with horror; what the one does with negligence, the
other performs with the greatest care; and the same subject that to one
is of slight interest, is to the other of the highest importance.
Public conscience, which, in fact, is the sum of private consciences,
is subject to the same influences as they are; so that mere instruction
is not enough for it, and it requires the concurrence of other
causes to act on the heart, as well as the mind. When we compare
Christian with pagan society, we instantly see that the former must be
infinitely superior to the latter on this point; not only on account
of the purity of its morality, and the strength of the principles and
motives sanctioning it, but also because it follows the wise course of
continually inculcating this morality, and impressing it strongly on
the mind by constant repetition. By this constant repetition of the
same truths, Christianity has done what other religions never could do;
none of them, indeed, have ever succeeded in organizing and putting
into practice so important a system. But I have said enough on this
point in the fourteenth chapter; it is useless to repeat it here; I
pass on to some observations on the public conscience in Europe.
It cannot be denied that, generally speaking, reason and justice
prevail in that public conscience. If you examine laws and actions,
you will not find those shocking acts of injustice or those revolting
immoralities which are to be met with among other nations. There
are certainly evils, and very grave ones, but they are at least
acknowledged, and called by their right names. We do not hear good
called evil, or evil good; that is to say, society, in certain things,
is like those persons of good principles and bad morals who are
the first to acknowledge that their conduct is blamable, and that
their words and deeds contradict each other. We often lament the
corruption of morals, the profligacy of our large towns; but what is
all the corruption and profligacy of modern society compared with
the debauchery of the ancients? It certainly cannot be denied that
there is a fearful extent of dissoluteness in some of the capitals of
Europe. The records of the police, as well as those of the benevolent
establishments where the fruits of crime are received, show shocking
demoralization. In the highest classes dreadful ravages are caused by
conjugal infidelity, and all sorts of dissipation and disorder; yet
these excesses are very far from reaching the extent which they did
among the best-governed nations of antiquity, the Greeks and Romans. So
that our society, which we so bitterly lament, would have appeared to
them a model of modesty and decorum. Need we call to mind the infamous
vices then so common and so public, and which have scarcely a name
among us now, whether it be because they are so rarely committed, or
because the fear of public conscience forces them to hide themselves
in the dark places, and, so to speak, in the bowels of the earth?
Need we recall to mind the infamies which stain the writings of the
ancients as often as they describe the manners of their times? Names
illustrious in science and in arms have passed down to posterity
with stains so black that we cannot consent to describe them. Now,
how corrupt must have been the state of the other classes, when such
degradation was attributed to men who, by their elevated positions or
other circumstances, were the lights of society!
You talk of the avarice which is so prevalent now-a-days; but look at
the usurers of antiquity who sucked the blood of the people everywhere;
read the satirical poets, and you will see what was the state of
manners on this point; consult, in fine, the annals of the Church, and
you will see what pains she took to diminish the effects of this vice;
read the history of ancient Rome, and you will find the _cursed thirst
for gold_, and lenders without mercy, who, after having impudently
robbed, carried in triumph the fruits of their rapine to live with
scandalous ostentation, and buy votes again to raise them to command.
No, in European civilization, among nations taught and elevated by
Christianity, such evils would not be long tolerated. If we suppose
administrative disorder, tyranny, and corruption of morals carried as
far as you please, still public opinion would raise its voice and frown
on the oppressors. Partial injustice may be committed, but rapine will
never be formed into a shameless system, or be regarded as the rule of
government. Rely upon it, the words _justice_, _morality_, _humanity_,
which constantly resound in our midst, are not vain words; this
language produces great results; it destroys immense evils. These ideas
impregnate the atmosphere we breathe; they frequently restrain the
arm of criminals, and resist with incredible force materialistic and
utilitarian doctrines; they continue to exert an incalculable influence
on society. We have among us a feeling of morality which mollifies and
governs all; which is so powerful that vice is compelled to assume the
appearance of virtue, and cover itself with many veils, in order to
escape becoming the subject of public execration.
Modern society, it would seem, ought to have inherited the corruption
of the old, since it was formed out of its ruins, at a time when its
morals were most dissolute. We must observe, that the irruption of the
barbarians, far from improving society, contributed, on the contrary,
to make it worse; and this, not only on account of the corruption
belonging to their fierce and brutal manners, but also on account of
the disorder introduced among the nations they invaded, by violating
laws, throwing their manners and customs into confusion, and destroying
all authority. Whence it follows, that the improvement of public
opinion among modern nations is a very singular fact; and that this
progress can only be attributed to the influence of the active and
energetic principle which has existed in the bosom of Europe for so
many centuries.
Let us observe the conduct of the Church on this point--it is perhaps
one of the most important facts in the history of the middle ages.
Imagine an age when corruption and injustice most unblushingly raised
their heads, and you will see that, however impure and disgusting
the fact may be, the law is always pure; that is to say, that reason
and justice always found some one to proclaim them, even when they
appeared to be listened to by nobody. The state of ignorance was the
darkest, licentious passions were uncontrolled; but the instructions
and admonitions of the Church were never wanting; it is thus that,
amidst the darkest night, the lighthouse shines from afar, to guide the
mariners in safety.
When in reading the history of the Church we see on all sides assembled
councils proclaiming the principles of the gospel morality, while
at every step we meet with the most scandalous proceedings; when we
constantly hear inculcated the laws which are so often trodden under
foot, it is natural to ask, of what use was all this, and of what
benefit were instructions thus unheeded? Let us not believe that these
proclamations were useless, nor lose courage if we have to wait long
for their fruits.
A principle which is proclaimed for a long time in society will in
the end acquire influence; if it is true, and consequently contains
an element of life, it will prevail in the end over all that opposes
it, and will rule over all around it. Allow, then, the truth to
speak--allow it to protest continually; this will prevent the
prescription of vice. Thus vice will preserve its proper name; and you
will prevent misguided men from deifying their passions, and placing
them on their altars after having adored them in their hearts. Be
confident that this protest will not be useless. Truth in the end will
be victorious and triumphant; for the protests of truth are the voice
of God condemning the usurpations of His creatures. This is what really
happened; Christian morality, first contending with the corrupt manners
of the empire, and afterwards with the brutality of the barbarians,
had for centuries rude shocks to sustain; but at last it triumphed
over all, and succeeded in governing legislation and public morals.
We do not mean to say that it succeeded in raising law and morals
to the degree of perfection which the purity of the gospel morality
required, but at least it did away the most shocking injustice; it
banished the most savage customs; it restrained the license of the most
shameless manners; it everywhere gave vice its proper name; it painted
it in its real colors, and prevented its being deified as impudently
as it was among the ancients. In modern times, it has had to contend
against the school which proclaims that private interest is the only
principle of morals; it has not been able, it is true, to prevent this
fatal doctrine from causing great evils, but at least it has sensibly
diminished them. Unhappy for the world will be the day when men shall
say without disguise, "_My own advantage is my virtue_; _my honor is
what is useful to myself_; _all is good or evil, according as it is
pleasing or displeasing to me_." Unhappy for the world will be the day
when such language will no longer be repudiated by public conscience.
The opportunity now presenting itself, and wishing to explain so
important a matter as fully as possible, I will make some observations
on an opinion of Montesquieu respecting the censors of Greece and Rome.
This digression will not be foreign to the purpose.