highest and at the same time the most profound conception of sanctifying
grace is that it is a real, though of course only accidental and
analogical, participation of the soul in the nature of God. That
sanctifying grace makes us “partakers of the divine nature” is of faith,
but the manner in which it effects this participation admits of different
explanations.
a) The fact itself can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 4:
“By whom [Christ] He [the Father] hath given us great and precious
promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine
nature.”(1020) To this text may be added all those which affirm the
regeneration of the soul in God, because regeneration, being a new birth,
must needs impart to the regenerate the nature of his spiritual
progenitor. Cfr. John I, 13: “Who are born, not of blood, ... but of
God.”(1021) John III, 5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.”(1022) St. James I, 18:
“For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth.”(1023) 1
John III, 9: “Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin.”(1024)
The Fathers of the Church again and again extol the deification
(_deificatio_, θείωσις) of man effected by sanctifying grace and compare
the union of the soul with God to the commingling of water with wine, the
penetration of iron by fire, etc. St. Athanasius(1025) begins his
Christological teaching with the declaration: “He was not, therefore,
first man and then God, but first God and then man, in order that He might
rather deify us.”(1026) St. Augustine describes the process of deification
as follows: “He justifies who is just of Himself, not from another; and He
deifies who is God of Himself, not by participation in another. But He who
justifies also deifies, because He makes [men] sons of God through
justification.... We have been made sons of God and gods; but this is a
grace of the adopting [God], not the nature of the progenitor. The Son of
God alone is God; ... the others who are made gods are made gods by His
grace; they are not born of His substance, so as to become that which He
is, but in order that they may come to Him by favor and become co-heirs
with Christ.”(1027) The idea underlying this passage has found its way
into the liturgy of the Mass,(1028) and Ripalda is justified in declaring
that it cannot be denied without rashness.(1029)
b) In trying to explain in what manner grace enables us to partake of the
divine nature, it is well to keep in view the absolutely supernatural
character of sanctifying grace and the impossibility of any deification of
the creature in the strict sense of the term. The truth lies between these
two extremes.
A few medieval mystics(1030) and modern Quietists(1031) were guilty of
exaggeration when they taught that grace transforms the human soul into
the substance of the Godhead, thus completely merging the creature in its
Creator. This contention(1032) leads to Pantheism. How can the soul be
merged in the Creator, since it continues to be subject to concupiscence?
“We have therefore,” says St. Augustine, “even now begun to be like Him,
as we have the first-fruits of the Spirit; but yet even now we are unlike
Him, by reason of the old nature which leaves its remains in us. In as
far, then, as we are like Him, in so far are we, by the regenerating
Spirit, sons of God; but in as far as we are unlike Him, in so far are we
the children of the flesh and of this world.”(1033)
On the other hand it would be underestimating the power of grace to say
that it effects a merely external and moral participation of the soul in
the divine nature, similar to that by which those who embraced the faith
of Abraham were called “children of Abraham,” and those who commit heinous
crimes are called “sons of the devil.” According to the Fathers(1034) and
theologians, to “partake of the divine nature” means to become internally
and physically like God and to receive from Him truly divine gifts, _i.e._
such as are proper to God alone and absolutely transcend the order of
nature.(1035) Being self-existing, absolutely independent, and infinite,
God cannot, of course, be regarded as the formal cause of created
sanctity; yet the strictly supernatural gifts which He confers on His
creatures, especially the beatific vision and sanctifying grace, can be
conceived only _per modum causae formalis_ (not _informantis_), because
through them God gives Himself to the creature in such an intimate way
that the creature is raised up to and transfigured by Him.(1036)
Consequently, the so-called _deificatio_ of the soul by grace is not a
real deification, but an assimilation of the creature to God.(1037)
c) Which one of God’s numerous attributes forms the basis of the
supernatural communication made to the soul in the bestowal of grace, is a
question on which theologians differ widely. The so-called incommunicable
attributes, (self-existence, immensity, eternity, etc.), of course, cannot
be imparted to the creature except by way of a hypostatic union.(1038)
Gonet(1039) misses the point at issue, therefore, when He declares the
essential characteristic of deification to be the communication to the
creature of the divine attributes of self-existence and infinity.
Self-existence is absolutely incommunicable.(1040) Somewhat more
plausible, though hardly acceptable, is Ripalda’s opinion that deification
formally consists in the participation of the creature in the holiness of
the Creator, particularly in the supernatural vital communion of the soul
with God in faith, hope, and charity, thus making sanctifying grace the
_radix totius honestatis moralis_.(1041) While it is perfectly true that
the supernatural life of the soul is a life in and through God, and that
the very concept of sanctifying grace involves a peculiar and special
relation of the soul to God, the Biblical term κοινωνία θείας φύσεως
points to a still deeper principle of the sanctifying _vita deiformis_.
This principle, as some of the Fathers intimate, and St. Thomas expressly
teaches,(1042) is the absolute intellectuality of God. Hence the object of
sanctifying grace is to impart to the soul in a supernatural manner such a
degree of intellectuality as is necessary to perceive the absolute
Spirit—here on earth in the obscurity of faith, and in the life beyond by
the _lumen gloriae_.(1043) This view is to a certain extent confirmed by
Sacred Scripture, which describes the regeneration of the sinner as a
birth of spirit from spirit.(1044) It is also held by some of the Fathers,
who attribute to sanctifying grace both a deifying and a spiritualizing
power. Thus St. Basil(1045) says: “The spirit-bearing souls, illuminated
by the Holy Ghost, themselves become spiritual(1046) and radiate grace to
others. Hence ... to become like unto God,(1047) is the highest of all
goals: to become God.”(1048) Finally, since the Holy Ghost, as the highest
exponent of the spirituality of the divine nature, by His personal
indwelling crowns and consummates both the regeneration of the soul and
its assimilation to God, there is a strong theological probability in
favor of Suarez’s view. Of course the process does not attain its climax
until the creature is finally admitted to the beatific vision in Heaven.
Cfr. 1 John III, 2: “We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet
appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.”(1049)
Article 2. The Effects Of Sanctifying Grace
We shall better understand the nature of sanctifying grace by studying
what are known as its “formal effects.” As the _causa efficiens_ of a
thing is commonly farther removed from our mental grasp than its effects,
we are ordinarily more familiar with the latter than with the former. For
this reason the glories of divine grace can be best explained to children
and to the faithful in general by describing the effects it produces in
the soul.(1050)
1. SANCTITY.—The first among the formal effects of sanctifying grace (an
effect connoted by its very name) is sanctity. Eph. IV, 24: “Put on the
new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of
truth.”(1051) The Tridentine Council explicitly mentions sanctity as an
effect of sanctifying grace: “Justification ... is not remission of sins
merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man through
the voluntary reception of the grace and of the gifts whereby man from
unjust becomes just.”(1052) It follows that the two elements of active
justification, _viz._: remission of sin and sanctification, are also
constitutive elements of habitual or sanctifying grace. For it is
precisely by the infusion of sanctifying grace that sin is wiped out and
sanctity established in its place.(1053)
a) By sanctifying grace the justified man becomes a living member
(_membrum vivum_) of the mystical body of Christ. His sins, it is true,
did not forfeit membership in the Church, so long as he preserved the
faith, but by sinning he became a dead member who can regain life only by
returning to the state of grace. Grace is the life of the soul, sin its
death. Hence the evil of mortal sin can be most effectively illustrated by
contrast with the glory of divine grace, and _vice versa_. Cfr. Gal. II,
20: “And I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.”(1054)
b) He who hates mortal sin and faithfully obeys the will of God, enjoys
peace of heart,(1055) whereas the sinner is incessantly harassed by qualms
of conscience. The faithful Christian rejoices in serving His Master and
combats the flesh, the world, and the devil with a fortitude that not
infrequently rises to heroic proportions, as the example of many holy men
and women proves.
c) Sanctifying grace entails a particular providence, inasmuch as, by
means of it, God grants man His special assistance towards preserving the
state of grace, without, of course, interfering with free-will. Cfr. Is.
XLIX, 16: “Behold, I have graven thee in my hands.”(1056) Rom. VIII, 28:
“... to them that love God, all things work together unto good.”(1057)
Mediately, God also proves his special love for the just man by shielding
him from bodily and spiritual danger.
2. SUPERNATURAL BEAUTY.—Though we can quote no formal ecclesiastical
definition to prove that sanctifying grace beautifies the soul, the fact
is sufficiently certain from Revelation. If, as is quite generally held by
Catholic exegetes, the Spouse of the Canticle typifies the human soul
endowed with sanctifying grace, all the passages describing the beauty of
that Spouse must be applicable to the souls of those whom Christ embraces
with His tender love. The Fathers of the Church frequently extol the
supernatural beauty of the soul in the state of grace. Ambrose calls it “a
splendid painting made by God Himself;” Chrysostom compares it to “a
statue of gold;” Cyril, to “a divine seal;” Basil, to “a shining light,”
and so forth. St. Thomas says: “Divine grace beautifies [the soul] like
light,”(1058) and the Roman Catechism declares: “Grace ... is a certain
splendor and light that effaces all the stains of our souls and renders
the souls themselves brighter and more beautiful.”(1059)
In defining beauty as “the representation of an idea in a sensual form,”
modern aesthetics has eliminated the spiritual element and in consequence
is unable to appreciate the spiritual beauty of God and of the soul. Being
composed of body and soul, man is naturally most impressed by beauty when
it appears in a material guise. But this does not prove that there is no
spiritual beauty, or that true beauty abides solely in matter. Some
present-day writers strongly emphasize the need of realism as against an
idealism which, they claim, is not truly human because it exalts the
spiritual at the expense of the material. In its last conclusions this
perverted realism harks back to the sophistry of Protagoras who held that
“man is the measure of all things.”(1060) Idealism, on the other hand, is
based on the true Platonic doctrine that God is the measure of all
things.(1061) St. Augustine defines beauty as “unity in variety,” which is
a correct definition, because it is adaptable to both the spiritual and
the material order.(1062) Applying this definition we find that the soul
is not only naturally beautiful by the substantial unity and simplicity
which shines forth in the variety of its faculties and powers, but also
supernaturally by virtue of sanctifying grace, which transfuses nature
into a new unity with the supernatural,—at the same time producing a
variety of theological and moral virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and thus creating a true work of art. Moreover, by enabling man to
participate in the Divine Nature,(1063) grace produces in the soul a
physical reflection of the uncreated beauty of God, a likeness of the
creature with its Creator, which far transcends the natural likeness
imprinted by creation. True, only God and the Elect in Heaven perceive and
enjoy this celestial beauty; but we terrestrial pilgrims can, as it were,
sense it from afar and indulge the hope that we may one day be privileged
to contemplate and enjoy the divine beauty that envelops the souls endowed
with grace.
The beauty produced by sanctifying grace must be conceived not merely as a
reflection of the absolute nature of God, who is the pattern-exemplar of
all beauty, but more specifically as an image of the Trinity impressed
upon the soul. St. Paul teaches that the soul is transformed into an image
of the Divine Logos, to whom, as the holy Fathers tell us, beauty is
appropriated in an especial manner.(1064) Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29: “Whom he
foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his
Son.”(1065) Gal. IV, 19: “My little children, of whom I am in labor again,
until Christ be formed in you.”(1066) In virtue of the adoptive sonship
effected by grace,(1067) the soul becomes a true “temple of the Holy
Ghost.”(1068)
3. THE FRIENDSHIP OF GOD.—Closely connected with the beauty which
sanctifying grace confers, is the supernatural friendship it establishes
between God and the soul. True beauty elicits love and benevolence. By
nature man is merely a servant of God; in fact, since the fall, he is His
enemy. Sanctifying grace transforms this hostile relation into genuine
friendship. By grace, says the Council of Trent, “man of unjust becomes
just, and of an enemy a friend.”(1069) And again: “Having been thus
justified and made the friends and domestics of God.”(1070) God loves the
just man as His intimate friend and enables and impels him, by means of
habitual grace and habitual charity, to reciprocate that love with all his
heart. Here we have the two constituent elements of friendship. The Bible
frequently speaks of friendship existing between God and the just. Cfr.
Wisd. VII, 14: “They [the just] become the friends of God.”(1071) John XV,
14 sq.: “I will not now call you servants, ... but I have called you
friends.”(1072) This friendship is sometimes compared to a mystic
marriage. Cfr. Matth. IX, 15: “And Jesus said to them: Can the children of
the bridegroom mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them?”(1073) Apoc.
XIX, 7: “The marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath prepared
herself.”(1074)
a) Friendship (φιλία), according to Aristotle,(1075) is “the conscious
love of benevolence of two persons for each other.” Hence, to constitute
friendship, there must be (1) two or more distinct persons; (2) pure love
of benevolence _(amor benevolentiae_, not _concupiscentiae_), because only
unselfish love can truly unite hearts; (3) mutual consciousness of
affection, because without a consciousness of the existing relation on
both sides there would be merely one-sided benevolence, not friendship. It
follows that true friendship is based on virtue and that a relation not
based on virtue can be called friendship in a qualified or metaphorical
sense only (_amicitia utilis, delectabilis_).
From what we have said it is easy to deduce the essential characteristics
of true friendship. They are: (1) benevolence; (2) love consciously
entertained by both parties; (3) a mutual exchange of goods or community
of life; (4) equality of rank or station. The first condition is based on
the fact that a true friend will not seek his own interest, but that of
his friend. It is to be noted, however, that one’s joy at the presence or
prosperity of a friend must not be inspired by selfishness or sensual
desire, for in that case there would be no true friendship.(1076) The
second condition is based on the necessity of friendship being mutual
love, for friendship is not a one-sided affection, nor does it spend
itself in mutual admiration. The third condition is necessary for the
reason that love, if it is to be more than “Platonic,” must result in acts
of benevolence and good will.(1077) Of the fourth condition St. Jerome
says: “Friendship finds men equal or makes them equal.”(1078)
b) All these conditions are found in the friendship with which Almighty
God deigns to honor those who are in the state of sanctifying grace.
(1) That God loves the just man with a love of pure benevolence and
eagerly seeks his companionship, is proved by the mysteries of the
Incarnation and the Holy Eucharist. Cfr. Prov. VIII, 31: “And my delight
[is] to be with the children of men.”(1079)
(2) The just man is enabled to return God’s love by the habit of
theological charity, which is inseparably bound up with and spontaneously
flows from sanctifying grace.(1080) God’s consciousness of this mutual
love is, of course, based on certain knowledge, whereas man can have
merely a probable conjecture. This, however, suffices to establish a true
friendship, as the example of human friends shows.(1081)
(3) There is also community of life and property between God and man when
the latter is in the state of sanctifying grace; for not only is he
indebted to God for his very nature and all natural favors which he
enjoys, but likewise and especially for the supernatural blessings
bestowed upon him.(1082) On his own part, it is true, he cannot give his
Benefactor anything in return which that Benefactor does not already
possess; but the just man is ever eager to further God’s external
glorification, agreeable to the first petition of the Our Father:
“Hallowed by Thy name.”(1083) God has furthermore given him a kind of
substitute for operative charity in the love of his neighbor, which has
precisely the same formal object as the love of God. Cfr. 1 John III, 17:
“He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in
need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God
abide in him?”(1084)
(4) There can be no real equality between God and the human soul, but God
in His infinite goodness, elevating the soul to a higher plane and
allowing it to participate in His own nature,(1085) makes possible an
_amicitia excellentiae s. eminentiae_, which is sufficient to constitute a
true relation of friendship. Without this elevation of the soul by grace
there could be no friendship between God and man.(1086)
4. ADOPTIVE SONSHIP.—The formal effects of sanctifying grace culminate in
the elevation of man to the rank of an adopted child of God (_filius Dei
adoptivus_), with a claim to the paternal inheritance, _i.e._ the beatific
vision in Heaven. This truth is so clearly stated in Scripture and
Tradition that its denial would be heretical. The Tridentine Council
summarily describes justification as “the state of grace and of the
adoption of the sons of God,”(1087) The teaching of Holy Scripture can be
gathered from such texts as the following. Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: “... You
have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba
(Father). For the spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we
are the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and
joint heirs with Christ.”(1088) 1 John III, 1 sq.: “Behold what manner of
charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and
should be the sons of God.... Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of
God.”(1089) Gal. IV, 5: “... that we might receive the adoption of
sons.”(1090) That the just become the adopted sons of God follows likewise
as a corollary from the doctrine of regeneration so frequently taught by
Scripture. This regeneration is not a procession of the soul from the
divine essence, but a kind of accidental and analogical procreation
substantially identical with adoption (_filiatio adoptiva_, υἱοθεσία).
Cfr. John I, 12 sq.: “... He gave them power to be made the sons of God,
... who are born ... of God.”(1091)
a) St. Thomas defines adoption as “the gratuitous acceptance of a child of
other parents to be the same as one’s own child and heir.”(1092) Adoption
implies (1) that the adopted child be a stranger to the adopting father;
(2) that it have no legal claim to adoption; (3) that it give its consent
to being adopted; (4) that it be received by the adopting father with
parental love and affection. All these elements are present, in a far
higher and more perfect form, in the adoption of a soul by God.
(1) The rational creature, as such, is not a “son” but merely a “servant
of God,”(1093) and, if he be in the state of mortal sin, His enemy.
(2) That adoption is a gratuitous favor on the part of the Almighty,
follows from the fact that the adopted creature is His enemy and that
grace is a free supernatural gift, to which no creature has a natural
claim. Adoption furthermore implies the right of inheritance.(1094) The
heritage of the children of God is a purely spiritual possession which can
be enjoyed simultaneously by many, and consequently excels every natural
heritage. Men, as a rule, do not distribute their property during life,
while, after their death, it is usually divided up among several
heirs.(1095)
(3) Whereas adoption among men owes its existence to the desire of
offspring on the part of childless parents, the adoption of the soul by
God springs from pure benevolence and unselfish love, and for this reason
presupposes (in the case of adults) the free consent of the adopted. No
one can become an adopted son of God against his will.(1096)
(4) Whereas human adoption supposes substantial equality between father
and child, and therefore at best amounts to no more than a legal
acceptance, adoption by God elevates the soul to a higher level by
allowing it to participate in the Divine Nature, and consequently is a
true (even though merely an accidental and analogical) regeneration in
God.
b) From what we have said it follows—and this is a truth of considerable
speculative importance—that there are essential points of difference as
well as of resemblance between Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and the
justified sinner adopted by the Heavenly Father.
α) The difference between the “natural Son of God” and an “adopted son” is
exactly like that between God and creature. The Logos-Son, engendered by
eternal generation from the divine substance, is the true natural Son of
the Father, the Second Person of the Divine Trinity, and Himself
God.(1097) The just man, on the other hand, is a child of God merely by
the possession of sanctifying grace,(1098) which can be lost by mortal sin
and consequently is founded upon a free relation that may be terminated by
man as freely as it was entered into between himself and God.
Intimately related to this distinction is another:—Christ is the Son of
the Father alone, the just man is an adopted child of the whole
Trinity.(1099) This fact does not, however, prevent us from
“appropriating” adoptive sonship to each of the three Divine Persons
according to His peculiar hypostatic character:—the Father as its author,
the Son as its pattern, and the Holy Ghost as its conveyor.(1100) Now, if
Christ, as the true Son of God, is the efficient cause (_causa efficiens_)
of that adoptive sonship of which, as God, He is also the pattern-exemplar
(_causa exemplaris_), it follows that He cannot be an adopted son of God.
“_Christus est incapax adoptionis_,” as Suarez puts it.(1101) To say that
He is both the natural and an adopted Son of God would be heretical.(1102)
Consequently, sanctifying grace, in Him, did not exercise one of the
functions it invariably exercises in the souls of men, _i.e._ it did not
make Him an adopted son of God.
β) It is to be noted, however, that the unique position enjoyed by our
Lord gives rise, not only to essential distinctions but also to an equal
number of analogies between the Only-begotten Son of God and His adopted
sons. The first and most fundamental of these analogies is the attribution
of the common appellation “son of God” both to Christ and to the just.
Though Christ is the only true Son of God, the Heavenly Father has
nevertheless charitably “bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and
should be, the sons of God.”(1103) According to John I, 13, Christ “gave
power to be made the sons of God” to them “who are born ... of God.” Hence
divine sonship formally consists in an impression of the hypostatic
likeness of the Only-begotten Son of God, by which the soul in a
mysterious manner becomes an image of the Trinity, and especially of the
Only-begotten Son of God, who is the archetype and pattern-exemplar of
adoptive sonship. This hypostatic propriety and exemplariness was the
reason why the Second Person of the Trinity became man.(1104) That the
soul of the justified is transformed into “an image of the Son of God” is
expressly taught by the Greek Fathers. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says:
“Christ is truly formed in us, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost impresses on us
a certain divine likeness by means of sanctity and justice.... But if any
one is formed in Christ, he is formed into a child of God.”(1105)
These considerations also explain the points of resemblance between the
adoptive sonship of God and the Holy Eucharist. Being our Father by
adoption, God is bound to provide us with food worthy of a divine
progenitor. The food He gives us (the Holy Eucharist) corresponds to our
dignity as His children, sustains us in this sublime relation, and at the
same time constitutes the pledge of a glorious resurrection and an eternal
beatitude.
c) Is the adoptive sonship of the children of God constituted entirely by
sanctifying grace, or does it require for its full development the
personal indwelling in the soul of the Holy Ghost?(1106) This subtle
question formed the subject of an interesting controversy between Joseph
Scheeben and Theodore Granderath, S. J. Father Granderath claimed on the
authority of the Tridentine Council that divine sonship is an inseparable
function of sanctifying grace, and through that grace alone, without the
_inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, constitutes the _unica causa formalis_ of
justification. Against this theory Dr. Scheeben maintained with great
acumen and, we think, successfully, that sanctifying grace of itself
alone, without the aid of any other factor, not only completely justifies
the sinner but raises him to the rank of an adopted son of God, though
there is nothing to prevent us from holding that the indwelling of the
Holy Ghost forms the climax of the process, and develops and perfects the
already existing _filiatio adoptiva_.(1107)
Petavius had contended(1108) that the just men of the Old Testament,
though in the state of sanctifying grace, were not adopted children of
God, because the _filiatio adoptiva_ is an exclusive privilege of those
living under the Christian Dispensation. This theory became untenable when
the Tridentine Council defined sanctity and adoptive sonship as
inseparable formal effects of sanctifying grace. There can no longer be
any doubt, therefore, that the patriarchs, together with sanctifying grace
also enjoyed the privilege of adoptive sonship, though, as Suarez
observes,(1109) adoptive sonship under the Old Covenant depended both as
to origin and value upon the adoptive sonship of the New Testament, and
therefore was inferior to it in both respects.(1110)
READINGS:—Scheeben, _Lehrbuch der Dogmatik_, Vol. II, § 168 sqq.,
Freiburg 1878.—J. Kirschkamp, _Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren
Zusammenhang_, Würzburg 1878.—P. Hagg, _Die Reichtümer der
göttlichen Gnade und die Schwere ihres Verlustes_, Ratisbon
1889.—Card. Katschthaler, _De Gratia Sanctificante_, 3rd ed.,
Salzburg 1886.—P. Einig, _De Gratia Divina_, Part II, Treves
1896.—Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp.
575 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Scheeben, _Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen
Gnade_, 8th ed., by A. M. Weiss, O. P., Freiburg 1908 (English
translation, _The Glories of Divine Grace_, 3rd ed., New York _s.
a._).—Th. Bourges, O. P., _L’Ordre Surnaturel et le Devoir
Chrétien_, Paris 1901.—*B. Terrien, _La Grâce et la Gloire ou la
Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu Etudiée dans sa Réalité,
ses Principes, son Perfectionnement et son Couronnement Final_, 2
vols., Paris 1897.—*P. Villada, _De Effectibus Formalibus Gratiae
Habitualis_, Valladolid 1899.—L. Hubert, _De Gratia
Sanctificante_, Paris 1902.
Article 3. The Supernatural Concomitants Of Sanctifying Grace
Besides producing the effects described in the preceding Article,
sanctifying grace also confers certain supernatural privileges, which,
though not of the essence of grace, are, in the present economy at least,
inseparably connected with it and may therefore be regarded as its regular
concomitants.
The existence of these privileges is established by the fact that certain
councils (_e.g._ those of Vienne and Trent), couple “grace and gifts” in
their official definitions.(1111) The doctrine is clearly stated by the
Roman Catechism as follows: “To this [sanctifying grace] is added a most
noble accompaniment of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the
soul together with grace.”(1112)
We will treat of the supernatural concomitants of sanctifying grace in
four theses.
*Thesis I: The three divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity are
infused into the soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace.*
Some theologians (notably Suarez, Ripalda, and De Lugo) declare this
thesis to be _de fide_, while others (Dom. Soto, Melchior Cano, and
Vasquez) hold it merely as certain. Under the circumstances it will be
safest to take middle ground by characterizing it as _fidei proxima_.
Proof. The Council of Trent teaches: “Man through Jesus Christ, in whom he
is ingrafted, receives, in the said justification, together with the
remission of sins, all these [gifts] infused at once—faith, hope, and
charity.”(1113)
a) That theological charity, as a habit, is infused together with
sanctifying grace can be convincingly demonstrated from Holy Scripture.
Cfr. Rom. V, 5: “... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.”(1114) In connection with charity,
Holy Scripture frequently mentions faith. Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 2: “And if I
should have ... all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not
charity, I am nothing.”(1115) All three of the theological virtues are
expressly enumerated in 1 Cor. XIII, 13: “And now there remain faith,
hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is
charity.”(1116) Unlike certain other texts, the one last quoted leaves no
doubt that faith, hope, and charity are to be conceived as _dona
inhaerentia_, _i.e._ habits or qualities inherent in the soul. This
interpretation is approved by the Fathers and Scholastics.
b) St. Thomas proves the necessity of the three theological virtues for
salvation as follows: “In order that we be properly moved towards our end
[God], that end must be both known and desired. Desire of an end includes
two things: first, hope of attaining it, because no prudent man will
aspire to that which he cannot attain; and secondly, love, because nothing
is desired that is not loved. And hence there are three theological
virtues,—faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust to obtain
Him; and charity, by which we love Him.”(1117)
When are the three theological virtues infused into the soul? This is an
open question so far as faith and hope are concerned. Of charity we know
that it is always infused with habitual grace. Suarez contends that, when
the soul is properly disposed, faith and hope are infused before
justification proper, that is to say, in the process leading up to it. St.
Thomas and St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, hold that faith and hope,
like charity, are infused at the moment when justification actually takes
place in the soul. This last-mentioned opinion is favored by the
Tridentine Council.(1118)
Mortal sin first destroys sanctifying grace together with the habit of
charity that is inseparable from it. Faith and hope may continue to exist
in the soul, and if hope, too, departs, faith may remain alone. But the
loss of faith invariably entails the destruction of hope and charity.
*Thesis II: Together with sanctifying grace there are also infused the
supernatural moral virtues.*
This proposition may be characterized as _sententia communior et
probabilior_. Though denied by some theologians, it can claim a high
degree of probability.(1119)
Proof. The infused moral virtues (_virtutes morales infusae_) differ from
the theological virtues in that they have for their immediate formal
object, not God Himself, but the creature in its relation to the moral
law.
The moral virtues may be reduced to four, _viz._: prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance. These are called the “cardinal” virtues; first,
because they perfect the principal faculties of the soul; secondly,
because all the other virtues may be scientifically deduced from
them.(1120) In the supernatural order the infusion of the cardinal virtues
and of the other virtues subordinate to them has for its object the
government of intellect and will in their relation towards created things
and the guidance of these faculties to their supernatural end.
a) The existence of supernaturally infused moral virtues is intimated in
Wis. VIII, 7: “And if a man love justice: her labors have great virtues;
for she teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,
which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in
life.”(1121) The teacher of the three cardinal virtues here mentioned is
“Divine Wisdom,” _i.e._ God Himself, and we may assume that He inculcates
them by the same method which He employs in infusing the theological
virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
Another relevant text is Ezechiel XI, 19 sq.: “... and I will take away
the stony heart out of their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh, that
they may walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments.”(1122) Here
Yahweh promises to give the just men of the New Covenant a “heart of
flesh” as opposed to the “stony heart” of the Jews. The meaning evidently
is that a disposition to do good will be a characteristic of the New
Testament Christians in contradistinction to the hardhearted Old Testament
Jews. He who has a “heart of flesh” will walk in God’s commandments and
keep His judgments. Hence “heart” signifies the sum-total of all those
habits which impel and enable a man to lead a good life. Since it is God
Himself who gives the “heart of flesh,” _i.e._ the moral virtues, it
follows that they are supernaturally infused.(1123)
b) Some of the Fathers ascribe the moral virtues directly to divine
infusion.
Thus St. Augustine observes that the cardinal virtues “are given to us
through the grace of God.”(1124) And St. Gregory the Great says that the
Holy Ghost does “not desert the hearts of those who are perfect in faith,
hope, and charity, and in those other goods without which no man can
attain to the heavenly fatherland.”(1125) St. Thomas shows the theological
reason for this by pointing to the parallel that exists between nature and
the supernatural. “Effects,” he says, “must always be proportionate to
their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral,
which we acquire by our acts, proceed from certain natural principles
preëxisting in us.... In lieu of these natural principles God confers on
us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural
end.... Hence there must correspond to these theological virtues,
proportionally, other habits caused in us by God, and which bear the same
relation to the theological virtues that the moral and intellectual
virtues bear to the natural principles of virtue.”(1126)
*Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are also infused with
sanctifying grace.*
This proposition may be qualified as “_probabilis_.”
Proof. The Church’s teaching with regard to the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost is based on Isaias XI, 2 sq.: “And the spirit of the Lord shall rest
upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of
counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. And
he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Four of these
supernatural gifts (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) perfect
the intellect in matters pertaining to salvation, while the remaining
three (fortitude, godliness, and the fear of the Lord) direct the will to
its supernatural end. Are these seven gifts, (or some of them), really
distinct from the infused moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual
dispositions, or merely transient impulses or inspirations? What are their
mutual relations and how can they be divided off from one another? These
and similar questions are in dispute among theologians. The prevailing
opinion is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused habitual
dispositions, _realiter_ distinct from the theological and moral virtues,
by which the soul is endowed with a supernatural capacity for receiving
the inspirations of the Holy Ghost and a supernatural readiness to obey
His impulses in all important matters pertaining to salvation.(1127)
That the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into the soul simultaneously
with sanctifying grace, can be demonstrated as follows: Christ, as the
mystical head, is the pattern of justification for the members of His
spiritual body, who are united to Him by sanctifying grace.(1128) Now the
Holy Ghost dwelled in Christ with all His gifts as permanent habits.(1129)
Consequently, these gifts are imparted by infusion to those who receive
the grace of justification. This is manifestly the belief of the Church,
for she prays in the “_Veni Sancte Spiritus_”:
“Shed upon thy faithful fold,
By unbounded hope controlled,
Thy seven gifts.”(1130)
*Thesis IV: The process of justification reaches its climax in the
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the just.*
This thesis embodies what is technically called a _propositio certa_.
Proof. There are two ways in which God may dwell in the soul, either by
virtue of His created grace (_inhabitatio per dona accidentalia_,
ἐνοίκησις κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν) or by virtue of His uncreated substance
(_inhabitatio substantialis sive personalis_, ἐνοίκησις κατ᾽ οὐσίαν). The
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, therefore, may consist in a twofold
grace: _gratia creata_ and _gratia increata_, of which the former is the
groundwork and necessary condition of the latter, while the latter may be
described as the climax and consummation of the former.(1131) The
indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just is taught by Holy
Scripture and attested by the Fathers.
a) Holy Scripture draws a clear-cut distinction between the accidental and
the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost.
α) Our Lord Himself, in addition to the charismata, promised His Apostles
the Holy Ghost in Person. John XIV, 16 sq.: “... the Father ... shall give
you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, ... but you
shall know him, because he shall abide with you, and shall be in
you.”(1132) This promise was made to all the faithful. Cfr. Rom. V, 5:
“... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
who is given to us.”(1133) Hence the Holy Ghost abides in the just and
sets up His throne in their souls. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 11: “And if the spirit
of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up
Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because
of his Spirit that dwelleth in you.”(1134) By His indwelling our souls
become temples of God. 1 Cor. III, 16 sq.: “Know you not that you are the
temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?... For the
temple of God is holy, which you are.”(1135) 1 Cor. VI, 19: “Or know you
not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you,
whom you have from God; and you are not your own?”(1136)
β) Agreeable to this teaching of Scripture the Fathers, especially those
of the East, assert the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the
souls of the just.
The fact that no one but God can dwell substantially and personally in a
creature was cited by the Greek Fathers in their controversies with the
Pneumatomachians to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. St. Athanasius
writes to Serapion:(1137) “If we by receiving the Holy Ghost are allowed
to participate in the Divine Nature, no one but a fool will assert that
the Holy Ghost is not of divine but of human nature. For all those in whom
He abides become deified(1138) for no other reason. But if He constitutes
them gods, there can be no doubt that His nature is divine.” St. Basil
comments as follows on Ps. LXXXI, 6 (_Ego dixi, dii estis_): “But the
Spirit that causes the gods to be gods, must be divine, and from God, ...
and God.”(1139) St. Cyril of Alexandria(1140) glowingly describes the soul
inhabited by the Holy Ghost as inlaid with gold, transfused by fire,
filled with the sweet odor of balsam, and so forth.
The Latin Fathers, with one exception, are less definite on this point.
St. Augustine says that the Holy Ghost “is given as a gift of God in such
a way that He Himself also gives Himself as being God,”(1141) and that
“the grace of God is a gift of God, but the greatest gift is the Holy
Spirit Himself, who therefore is called a grace.”(1142) Again: “... the
Holy Spirit is the gift of God, the gift being Himself indeed equal to the
giver, and therefore the Holy Ghost also is God, not inferior to the
Father and the Son.”(1143)
b) While theologians are unanimous in accepting the doctrine of the
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the just as clearly contained in
Sacred Scripture and Tradition, they differ in explaining the manner in
which He dwells in the soul.
α) The great majority hold that the Holy Ghost can not dwell in the soul,
as the human soul dwells in the body, _per modum informationis_, nor yet
by a hypostatic union, as godhead and manhood dwell together in the Person
of Christ; and that consequently His indwelling is objectively an
indwelling of the whole Trinity, which is appropriated to the Third Person
merely because the Holy Ghost is “hypostatic holiness” or “personal love.”
This view is based on what is called “the fundamental law of the Trinity,”
_viz._: “In God all things are one except where there is opposition of
relation.”(1144) Sacred Scripture speaks of the personal indwelling of the
Father and the Son as well as of the Holy Ghost. Cfr. John XIV, 23: “If
any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we
will come to him and will make our abode with him.”(1145) St. Athanasius
concludes from these words that “the _energia_ of the Trinity is one....
Indeed when the Lord says: I and the Father will come, the Spirit also
comes, to dwell in us in precisely the same manner in which the Son dwells
in us.”(1146) And St. Augustine teaches: “Love, therefore, which is of God
and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed
abroad in our hearts,—that love by which the whole Trinity dwells in
us.”(1147) Accordingly, the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost consists
in the state of grace as bearing a special relation to the Third Person of
the Trinity; the “higher nature” which sanctifying grace imparts to the
soul is not an absolute but a relative form (σχέσις), by which the soul is
mysteriously united with the Three Divine Persons and, by appropriation,
with the Holy Ghost, thereby becoming a throne and temple of God. It is in
this sense that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul is called the
climax of justification.(1148)
β) Other eminent theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, Schrader, Scheeben,
Hurter, _et al._) regard the explanation just given as unsatisfactory.
They contend that the Fathers, especially those of the East, conceived the
indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just, not as an
indwelling (ἐνοίκησις) of the Trinity, appropriated to the Holy Ghost, but
as a union (ἕνωσις) of the Holy Ghost Himself with the soul.(1149) This
union, they say, is neither physical nor hypostatic, but an altogether
unique and inexplicable relation by which the soul is morally,
accidentally, and actively united to the person of the Holy Ghost.(1150)
γ) Unfortunately this exalted and mystic theory cannot be squared with the
theological principles underlying the Catholic teaching on the Trinity,
especially that portion of it which concerns the appropriations and
missions of the three Divine Persons.(1151) It is true that sanctifying
grace culminates in a communication of the Divine Nature, and that this
θείωσις is effected by imprinting upon the soul an image of the divine
processes of generation and spiration,—the first by adoptive filiation,
the second by an indwelling of the Holy Ghost.(1152) In fact all the
Trinitarian relations are reflected in the justification of the sinner.
Thus regeneration corresponds to the generation of the Logos by the
Father; adoptive sonship and the accompanying participation of the soul in
the Divine Nature corresponds to our Lord’s natural sonship and his
consubstantiality with the Father; the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and
His union with the soul, on the other hand, corresponds to the divine
process of Spiration, inasmuch as it is preëminently a supernatural union
of love and effects a sort of mutual inexistence or perichoresis of the
soul in the Holy Ghost or the three Divine Persons respectively.(1153)
Since, however, this union of the soul with the substance of the three
Divine Persons in general, and the Holy Ghost in particular, is not a
substantial and physical but only an accidental and moral union, the
regeneration of the sinner must be conceived as generation in a
metaphorical sense only, divine sonship as adoptive sonship, the
deification of man as a weak imitation of the divine _homoousia_, and the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul as a shadowy analogue of the
Divine Perichoresis.(1154)
READINGS:—Deharbe, _Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes nach dem hl.
Thomas von Aquin_, Ratisbon 1856.—Marchant, _Die theologischen
Tugenden_, Ratisbon 1864.—Mazzella, _De Virtutibus Infusis_, 4th
ed., Rome 1894.—G. Lahousse, S. J., _De Virtutibus Theologicis_,
Louvain 1890.—S. Schiffini, S. J., _Tractatus de Virtutibus
Infusis_, Freiburg 1904.—J. Kirschkamp, _Der Geist des
Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe_,
Paderborn 1894.—C. Weiss, _S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis
Spiritus Sancti Doctrina Proposita et Explicata_, Vienna 1895.
On the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just see
A. Scholz, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti_, Würzburg
1856.—*Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, pp. 625 sqq., Rome
1881.—Oberdörffer, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in Animabus
Iustorum_, Tournai 1890.—* B. Froget, O. P., _De l’Inhabitation du
S. Esprit dans les Âmes Justes d’après la Doctrine de S. Thomas
d’Aquin_, Paris 1901.—De Bellevue, _L’Oeuvre du S. Esprit ou la
Sanctification des Âmes_, Paris 1901.
On the historic development of the dogma see Schwane,
_Dogmengeschichte_, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56-75, Freiburg 1895.
Section 3. The Properties Of Sanctifying Grace
By a property (_proprium_, ἴδιον) we understand a quality which, though
not part of the essence of a thing, necessarily flows from that essence by
some sort of causation and is consequently found in all individuals of the
same species.(1155) A property, as such, is opposed to an accident
(_accidens_, συμβεβηκός), which is neither part of, nor necessarily
attached to, the essence, but may or may not be present in the individual.
Thus the ability to laugh is a property of human nature, whereas the color
of the skin is an accident.
How do the properties of grace differ from its formal effects, and from
its supernatural concomitants? The formal effects of grace, as we have
seen, are the elements constituting its nature, the properties are
determinations necessarily flowing from that nature, while the
supernatural concomitants are free gifts superadded by God.
According to the Protestant theory, justification is absolutely certain,
equal in all men, and incapable of being lost. The Catholic Church, on the
contrary, teaches that justification is (1) uncertain, (2) unequal, and
(3) amissible. We will explain this teaching in three theses.
*Thesis I: No man knows with certainty of faith whether he is justified or
not.*
This proposition is _de fide_.
Proof. The Tridentine Council rejected the “fiduciary faith”(1156) of
Luther as “an empty heretical confidence,”(1157) and in three distinct
canons denied the properties attributed to faith by the early Protestant
dogmaticians.(1158)
a) Holy Scripture again and again warns us that we can never be sure of
our salvation. St. Paul, though himself “a vessel of election,” freely
admits: “I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet I am not hereby
justified; but he that judgeth me is the Lord,”(1159) and declares: “I
chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have
preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.”(1160) He exhorts
the faithful to work out their salvation “with fear and trembling.”(1161)
b) The Fathers also teach the uncertainty of justification in the
individual, and attribute it to the fact that, while we know that God
pardons penitent sinners, no man can be entirely certain that he has
complied with all the conditions necessary for justification.
“Our fate,” says St. Chrysostom, “is uncertain for a number of reasons,
one of which is that many of our own works are hidden from us.”(1162) St.
Jerome, commenting on Eccles. IX, 1 sq.,(1163) observes: “In the future
they will know all, and all things are manifest to them, that is to say,
the knowledge of this matter will precede them when they depart this life,
because _then_ the judgment will be pronounced, while _now_ we are still
battling, and it is now uncertain whether those who bear adversities, bear
them for the love of God, like Job, or because they hate Him, as do many
sinners.”(1164) Pope St. Gregory the Great said to a noble matron who
asked him whether she could be sure of her salvation: “You ask me
something which is both useless and difficult [to answer]; difficult,
because I am unworthy to receive a revelation; useless, because it is
better that you be uncertain with regard to your sins, lest in your last
hour you should be unable to repent.”(1165)
c) We now proceed to the theological explanation of the dogma embodied in
our thesis.
α) The purpose of this dogma is not, as Harnack(1166) thinks, “partly to
assuage and partly to excite the restlessness that still remains, by means
of the sacraments, indulgences, liturgical worship and ecclesiastical
encouragement of mystical and monkish practices,” but to prevent undue
security and careless assurance. What the Church condemns, in accordance
with Sacred Scripture and Tradition, is the _certitudo fidei_, that vain
confidence which leads men to feel certain that they are in the state of
grace (_inanis fiducia_), not the _certitudo spei_, _i.e._ humble trust in
God’s abundant mercy. “As no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of
God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the
sacraments,” says the Tridentine Council, “even so each one, when he
regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and
apprehension touching his own grace; seeing that no one can know with a
certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained
the grace of God.”(1167)
One needs but to apply to theology the epistemological principles and
criteria furnished by philosophy to perceive that the Catholic dogma is as
reasonable as the Protestant theory is absurd. The Protestant syllogism:
“I know with a certainty of faith that the penitent sinner who does his
share, is justified through the grace of Christ; now, I, who am a penitent
sinner, know with a certainty of faith that I have done my share;
therefore, I know with a certainty of faith that I am justified,” may be
formally correct, but the minor premise embodies a material error, because
no man knows with a certainty of faith that he has done his share, unless
it be specially revealed to him by God. No matter how sure I may feel of
my own goodness, I have no certainty of faith, such as that which Mary
Magdalen had, or that which was vouchsafed to the penitent thief on the
cross, that I am justified. It is one of the approved rules of syllogistic
reasoning that “the conclusion must follow the weaker premiss.”(1168)
Hence, in the above syllogism the certainty cannot be of faith, but human
and moral only. We do not mean to deny that God may grant to this or that
individual a certainty of faith with regard to his justification; in fact
theologians expressly teach that in such a rare and exceptional case the
privileged person would be obliged to believe in his own justification,
_fide divinâ_.(1169)
β) Can any one, without a special revelation, be _theologically_ certain
that he is justified? Theological certainty (_certitudo theologica_) is
the result of a syllogism which embodies an article of faith in one of its
premises and an obvious truth of reason in the other. Ambrosius
Catharinus(1170) stands alone among Catholic theologians in holding that
there are rare cases in which men do have a theological certainty as to
their justification without a private revelation. All other writers deny
the possibility: (1) because Scripture and Tradition do not countenance
the proposition; (2) because there are no criteria available for such
certainty outside of private revelation, and (3) because the Tridentine
Council censured the assertion “that they who are truly justified must
needs, without any doubt whatever, settle within themselves that they are
justified.”(1171)
γ) For precisely the same reasons no man can be _metaphysically_ certain
of his own justification. Hence there remains only _moral_ certainty.
Moral certainty admits of varying degrees. The highest degree of moral
certainty concerning justification can be had in the case of baptized
infants, though, of course, we can never be metaphysically certain even in
regard to them, because there is always room for doubt as to the intention
of the minister and the validity of the matter and form employed in the
administration of the sacrament. In the case of adults, certainty
regarding justification varies in proportion to the measure in which it
can be ascertained whether one has complied with all the requirements
demanded by God. However, certainty may be so great as to exclude all
reasonable doubt. St. Paul says: “I am sure that neither death nor life
... shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ
Jesus our Lord.”(1172) And St. Augustine: “What do we know? We know that
we have passed from death to life. Whence do we know this? Because we love
our brethren. Let no one ask another. Let each question his own heart; if
he there finds fraternal charity, let him be sure that he has passed from
death to life.”(1173) This teaching has led theologians to set up certain
criteria by which the faithful may be relieved of unreasonable anxiety and
obtain some sort of assurance as to the condition of their souls. Such
criteria are: a taste for things spiritual; contempt of earthly pleasures;
zeal and perseverance in doing good; love of prayer and pious meditation;
patience in suffering and adversity; a fervent devotion to the Blessed
Virgin Mary; frequent reception of the sacraments, etc.(1174)
*Thesis II: Sanctifying grace admits of degrees and therefore can be
increased by good works.*
Both propositions contained in this thesis are _de fide_.
Proof. The Protestant contention that the grace of justification is shared
in an equal measure by all the justified, was a logical deduction from
Luther’s false principle that men are justified by faith alone through the
external justice of Christ. If this were true, good works would be
superfluous, and all Christians would enjoy an equal measure of grace.
Luther formally asserted this in his sermon on the nativity of the Blessed
Virgin: “All we who are Christians are equally great and holy with the
Mother of God.”(1175) The Catholic Church rejects this teaching. She holds
that justification is an intrinsic process by which the justice and
holiness of Christ becomes our own through sanctifying grace, and that
consequently sanctifying grace may be present in the soul in a greater or
less degree, according to the liberality of God and the disposition of the
individual Christian, and those who are in the state of grace may augment
it by good works. The Council of Trent formally defines these truths when
it says: “[We receive] justice within us, each one according to his own
measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and
according to each one’s proper disposition and coöperation.”(1176) And:
“[The justified], faith coöperating with good works, increase in that
justice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are
still further justified....”(1177) The second and more important of these
truths is re-iterated and emphasized in the canons of Session VI: “If
anyone saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased
before God through good works, but that those works are merely the fruits
and signs of justification obtained, but not a cause of the increase
thereof: let him be anathema.”(1178)
a) The Tridentine Fathers base their teaching on a number of Scriptural
texts which either expressly declare or presuppose that grace is capable
of being increased in the soul after justification.
Thus we read in Prov. IV, 18: “The path of the just, as a shining light,
goeth forwards and increaseth even to perfect day.”(1179) Ecclus. XVIII,
22: “Let nothing hinder thee from praying always, and be not afraid to be
justified even to death: for the reward of God continueth for ever.”(1180)
2 Pet. III, 18: “Grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and
Saviour Jesus Christ.”(1181) 2 Cor. IX, 10: “[God] will increase the
growth of the fruits of your justice.”(1182) Eph. IV, 7: “But to every one
of us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of
Christ.”(1183) Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: “He that is just, let him be justified
still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still. Behold, I come
quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every man according to his
works.”(1184)
Such texts could easily be multiplied.
b) Tradition found definite utterance as early as the fourth century.
When Jovinian attempted to revive the Stoic theory of the absolute
equality of all virtues and vices, he met with strenuous opposition on the
part of St. Jerome, who wrote a special treatise _Contra Iovinianum_, in
which he said: “Each of us receives grace according to the measure of the
grace of Christ (Eph. IV, 7); not as if the measure of Christ were
unequal, but so much of His grace is infused into us as we are capable of
receiving.”(1185) St. Augustine teaches that the just are as unequal as
the sinners. “The saints are clad with justice (Job XXIX, 14), some more,
some less; and no one on this earth lives without sin, some more, some
less: but the best is he who has least.”(1186) But, we are told, life as
such is not capable of being increased; how then can there be an increase
of spiritual life? St. Thomas answers this objection as follows: “The
natural life pertains to the substance of man, and therefore can be
neither augmented nor diminished; but in the life of grace man
participates _accidentaliter_, and consequently he can possess it in a
larger or smaller degree.”(1187)
c) From what we have said it is easy to understand the distinction which
theologians make between justification as _gratia prima_ and justification
as _gratia secunda_. The latter is merely another term for an increase of
grace after justification.
α) Such an increase may be effected either _ex opere operantis_, that is,
by good works, or _ex opere operato_, through the sacraments, and is
called justification (_iustificatio_, δικαίωσις) partly because Sacred
Scripture refers to it by that name(1188) and partly because “to become
just” (_iustum fieri_) and “to become more just” (_iustiorem fieri_) both
imply true sanctification.
In this connection the question may be raised whether sanctifying grace is
diminished by venial sin. Venial sin does not destroy the state of grace
and consequently cannot augment or diminish grace. To assume that it
could, would lead to the absurd conclusion that a definite number of
venial sins might eventually grow into a mortal sin, or that repeated
venial sins gradually diminish grace until finally it disappears. The
first-mentioned assumption is impossible because venial differs
generically from mortal sin, and a transition from the one to the other
would be a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. The second assumption would entail
the heretical inference that the state of grace can be lost without mortal
sin.(1189) No doubt venial sin influences the state of grace unfavorably;
but this evil influence must be conceived as indirect—by committing venial
sins man weakens his will-power, and temptation eventually grows so strong
as to make mortal sin inevitable. “He that contemneth small things, shall
fall little by little.”(1190)
β) If we inquire how sanctifying grace increases in the soul, we find that
the process must be conceived as a growing intensity analogous to that of
light and heat in the physical order.
_Gratia prima_, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is a supernatural
physical quality.(1191) Hence its increase, _i.e._ _gratia secunda_, must
be an increase of physical quality. Such an increase is called in
Scholastic parlance _intensio_.(1192) In what does this process consist?
Certain Thomists(1193) describe it as a _maior radicatio in subiecto_,
while the majority of theologians hold that it is simply an _additio
gradus ad gradum_. This latter explanation is probably the correct one.
Sanctifying grace is either capable of gradual increase, or it is not. If
it is, there is no reason why God should deny such an increase under
certain conditions. If it is not, Luther would have been right in
contending that a newly baptized infant enjoys the same measure of
holiness as the Blessed Virgin Mary or the human soul of our Divine Lord.
It is impossible to imagine how grace could produce a quantitatively
higher holiness by simply striking its roots deeper into the soul.(1194)
γ) A question of greater practical importance is this: Is the increase of
sanctifying grace accompanied by a corresponding increase of the infused
virtues, and _vice versa._
Every increase or decrease of sanctifying grace must _eo ipso_ entail a
corresponding increase or decrease, respectively, of theological charity.
Charity is either identical with grace or it is not.(1195) If it is, an
increase of the one implies an increase of the other; if it is not, the
one cannot increase without an increase of the other, because they are
inseparable and related to each other as nature to faculty, or root to
blossom. Moreover, the degree of heavenly glory enjoyed by a soul will be
commensurate with the measure of charity which it possessed at death. Now
grace and glory bear a proportional relation to each other. Consequently,
grace is augmented as charity increases, and _vice versa_. The same
argument applies to the infused moral virtues.
The case is different, however, with the theological virtues of faith and
hope. These may continue to exist in the soul after charity has departed,
and hence are not inseparable from sanctifying grace and charity, nor from
the moral virtues. This consideration led Suarez to infer that, as the
theological virtues of faith and hope may be infused into the soul
independently of charity and before justification, they must be
susceptible of increase in the course of justification without regard to
the existing state of grace and charity.(1196) This is true of the sinner.
In the justified, as Suarez himself admits, an increase of grace (or
charity) probably always entails an increase of faith and hope,(1197)—a
proposition which finds strong support in the decree of Trent which says:
“This increase of justification Holy Church begs, when she prays: ‘Give
unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and charity.’ ”(1198)
δ) A final question forces itself upon the enquiring mind, _viz._: Is
sanctifying grace capable of an indefinite increase, or is there a limit
beyond which it cannot grow? In trying to find an answer to this question
we must draw a careful distinction between the absolute and the ordinary
power of God.
There is no intrinsic contradiction in the assumption that grace can be
indefinitely augmented. True, it can never become actually infinite, as
this would involve an absurdity.(1199) But if we regard the power of God
as He sees fit to exercise it in the present economy (_potentia Dei
ordinata_), we find that it is limited by two sublime ideals of holiness
to which neither man nor angel can attain, _viz._: the overflowing measure
of sanctifying grace in the human soul of our Lord Jesus Christ(1200) and
the “fulness of grace” granted to His Mother.(1201) Though these ideals
are beyond our reach, we must not be discouraged, but try to approach them
as nearly as possible.(1202)
*Thesis III: Sanctifying grace is lost by mortal sin.*
This thesis also embodies an article of faith.
Proof. Calvin asserted that neither justification nor faith can be lost by
those who are predestined to salvation, and that the unpredestined are
never truly justified. Luther held that justifying grace is lost solely
through the sin of infidelity. Against the former the Council of Trent
declared: “If anyone saith that a man once justified can sin no more, nor
lose grace, and that therefore he that falls and sins was never truly
justified; ... let him be anathema.”(1203) Against the latter the same
council defined: “If anyone saith that there is no mortal sin but that of
infidelity, or that grace once received is not lost by any other sin,
however grievous and enormous, save by that of infidelity, let him be
anathema.”(1204) At the same time, however, the Holy Synod expressly
declared that venial sin does not destroy the state of grace: “For
although during this mortal life, men, how holy and just soever, at times
fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,
they do not therefore cease to be just.”(1205)
a) This teaching is so obviously in accord with Sacred Scripture that we
confine ourselves to quoting three or four passages. Ezechiel says that
sanctifying grace may be irretrievably lost: “If the just man turn himself
away from his justice, and do iniquity according to all the abominations
which the wicked man useth to work, shall he live? All his justices which
he hath done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication, by which he
hath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he
shall die.”(1206) Our Lord Himself admonishes His Apostles: “Watch ye and
pray, that ye enter not into temptation.”(1207) St. Paul not only warns
the faithful in general terms: “He that thinketh himself to stand, let him
take heed lest he fall;”(1208) but expressly designates certain mortal
sins as a bar to Heaven: “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor
adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor
covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the
kingdom of God.”(1209)
b) The teaching of Tradition was brought out clearly in the fight against
Jovinian.
That wily heretic claimed the authority of St. John for the assertion that
the grace of Baptism can never be lost. The Johannean passage in question
reads: “Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin: for His seed abideth
in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.”(1210) St. Jerome in
his reply paraphrases the passage as follows: “Therefore I tell you, my
little children, whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, in order
that you may not sin and that you may know that you will remain sons of
God so long as you refrain from sin.”(1211) St. Augustine teaches: “If a
man, being regenerate and justified, relapses of his own will into an evil
life, assuredly he cannot say: ‘I have not received,’ because of his own
free choice of evil he has lost the grace of God that he has
received.”(1212) And St. Gregory the Great:
“As he who falls away from the faith is an apostate, so he who returns to
an evil deed is regarded by Almighty God as an apostate, even though he
may seem to retain the faith; for the one without the other can be of no
use, because faith availeth nought without [good] works, nor [good] works
without faith.”(1213) The penitential discipline of the primitive Church
furnishes additional proofs for the doctrine under consideration. If grace
could be lost in no other way than by unbelief, the Sacrament of Penance
would be useless.(1214)
c) In connection with this subject theologians are wont to discuss the
question whether or not the forfeiture of sanctifying grace involves the
loss of its supernatural concomitants.
Theological love or charity is substantially identical with sanctifying
grace, or at least inseparable from it, and hence both are gained and lost
together. This is an article of faith. To lose sanctifying grace,
therefore, is to lose theological love. On the other hand, it is equally
_de fide_ that theological faith (_habitus fidei_) is not destroyed by
mortal sin;(1215) it can be lost only by the sin of unbelief.(1216) The
same is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of theological hope. True, the Church
has not definitely declared her mind with regard to hope, but it may be
set down as her teaching that hope is not lost with grace and charity but
survives like faith.(1217) The two contrary opposites of hope are
desperation and presumption, concerning which theologians commonly hold
that the former destroys hope, while the latter probably does not. But
even if hope and charity are lost, faith may remain in the soul like a
solitary root, from which, under more favorable conditions, new life is
apt to spring. As regards the infused moral virtues and the seven gifts of
the Holy Ghost (and, _a fortiori_, His personal indwelling in the
soul),(1218) it is the unanimous teaching that these disappear with
sanctifying grace and charity, even though faith and hope survive. The
reason is that these virtues and gifts are merely supernatural adjuncts of
sanctifying grace and cannot persist without it. “_Accessorium sequitur
principale._”(1219)
Chapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works
The principal fruit of justification, according to the Tridentine
Council,(1220) is the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the
state of sanctifying grace.
Merit (_meritum_), as we have explained in the first part of this
treatise,(1221) is that property of a good work which entitles the doer to
a reward (_praemium, merces_).
Ethics and theology distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit or
merit in the strict sense of the term (_meritum adaequatum sive de
condigno_), and (2) congruous merit or quasi-merit (_meritum inadaequatum
sive de congruo_). Condign merit supposes an equality between service and
return. It is measured by commutative justice and confers a strict claim
to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of
strict proportion between service and recompense, confers no such claim
except on grounds of equity.(1222)
In this treatise we are concerned with merit only in the theological sense
of the term, _i.e._ supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its
Existence,(1223) (2) its Requisites,(1224) and (3) its Objects.(1225)
Section 1. The Existence Of Merit
1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—a) The medieval
Beguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state
of holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or
good works.(1226) Luther, holding that justification consists in the
covering up of sin and the external imputation of the justice of Christ,
consistently though falsely asserted that “the just man sins in every good
work,”(1227) that “a good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial
sin,”(1228) and that “every work of the just deserves damnation and is
mortally sinful, if it be considered as it really is in the judgment of
God.”(1229) Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and
defilements,”(1230) which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus
Christ and which He sometimes rewards with temporal blessings but never
with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least
attenuated these harsh doctrines.(1231)
b) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the
time of the “Reformers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as
early as 529: “Good works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace,
which is a free gift, precedes good works and is a necessary condition of
them.”(1232) The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: “Not
only virgins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who
please God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to
obtain eternal happiness.”(1233) The Tridentine Council goes into the
matter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we
read _inter alia_: “And for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to
those working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace
mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a
reward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully
rendered to their good works and merits.”(1234)
The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical:
“If anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least
venially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently
deserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not
damned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be
anathema.”(1235) The positive teaching of the Church may be gathered from
the following condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, for
their good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense
from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that
they persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments;
let him be anathema.”(1236) The existence of merit in the true and proper
sense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: “If anyone saith
that ... the justified, by the good works which he performs through the
grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is,
does not truly merit increase of grace...; let him be anathema.”(1237) The
quietistic errors of Michael de Molinos were condemned by Pope Innocent
XI, Nov. 20, 1687.(1238)
2. THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF GOOD WORKS DEMONSTRATED FROM SCRIPTURE AND
TRADITION.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition employ _opus bonum_ and
_meritum_ as reciprocal or correlative terms.
a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to
be meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just shall
live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.”(1239) Ecclus.
XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of
God continueth for ever.”(1240) The New Testament teaching culminates in
the “eight beatitudes,” each of which is accompanied by a special reward.
After enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine
Saviour significantly adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very
great in heaven.”(1241)
St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratuitousness of
Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to
which a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. II, 6 sq.: “[God] will render to
every man according to his works, to them indeed who according to patience
in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.”(1242)
2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course,
I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of
justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and
not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”(1243) 1 Cor. III,
8: “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own
labor.”(1244) Col. III, 23 sq.: “Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart,
as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord
the reward of inheritance.”(1245) The most eloquent exponent of the
necessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their
meritoriousness: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he
hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath
promised to them that love him.”(1246) In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “Be
thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life.”(1247)
b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective commentary on the
Scriptural doctrine just expounded, as may be seen from their homilies
reproduced in the Roman Breviary.
St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “Suffer me to be eaten by the beasts,
through whom I can attain to God.”(1248) St. Irenæus: “Precious should be
to us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by
combat, the more precious it is.”(1249) St. Ambrose: “Is it not evident
that the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?”(1250) St.
Augustine: “Eternal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which
we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man
before he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is
more just than God? We should not then demand the reward before we deserve
to get it.”(1251) And again: “As death is given, so to speak, to reward
the merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice,
... and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.”(1252)
c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the
providence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the
divine laws,—not only the natural law (_lex naturae_), but, _a fortiori_,
the “law of grace” (_lex gratiae_), as the supernatural order is so much
more important than the natural.
α) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace,
and with the aid of actual graces (_in gratia et ex gratia_), man acquires
a twofold merit,—he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in
regard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the external
glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of creation. For this he is
entitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double
punishment for the injury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he
reflects upon his Creator.(1253)
It is objected against this argument that our supernatural merits, being
finite, are in no proportion to the possession and enjoyment of an
Infinite Good. This objection vanishes in the light of the following
considerations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of _deificatio_, which
raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his
actions.(1254) (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally
good works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus
Christ.(1255) (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in
an infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there _is_ a due
proportion between good works and merit.(1256)
One difficulty still remains, _viz._: By what title do infants who die in
the state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they
have been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims
to Heaven, one as a child of God,(1257) and another as a laborer in His
vineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason,
possess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life
enjoy also the _titulus mercedis_ and consequently are entitled to a
richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the merits of Jesus
Christ.(1258)
β) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion
that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works
derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “self-righteousness.”
Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume
that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a
limited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity
of God as the _causa prima_ to assume that He communicates to His
creatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true
_causae secundae_, instead of being mere _causae occasionales_, as the
Occasionalists assert?(1259) As regards the other charge, no true Catholic
is guilty of “self-righteousness” because he regards his good works as
“fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “self-righteousness”
of which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The
faithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his
merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness
that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection
against self-righteousness and presumption.(1260)
3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—Though the Tridentine Council
merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state
of sanctifying grace are meritorious,(1261) it is theologically certain
that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity.
a) According to Pallavicini(1262) the Fathers of Trent without exception
were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a _meritum de
condigno_, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term
_vere_ to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of
the Schools is called _meritum de congruo_.(1263) They refrained from
expressly employing the term _meritum de condigno_, because _meritum
verum_ is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that
they wished to avoid certain theological controversies regarding the
nature of the _meritum de condigno_ and its requisites.(1264)
b) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign
merit supposes an equality between service and reward. The proposition can
be proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The _meritum de
condigno_ is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now
the Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man
in strict justice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: “For God is not unjust, that he
should forget your work.”(1265) 2 Tim. IV, 8: “... there is laid up for me
a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in
that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his
coming.”(1266) James I, 12: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation;
for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which
God hath promised to them that love him.”(1267) That there must be a
_condignitas_ between service and reward is clearly apparent from such
texts as these:—Wis. III, 5: “... God hath tried them and found them
worthy of himself.”(1268) 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “... in all your persecutions
and tribulations, which you endure, for an example [as a token] of the
just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of
God, for which also you suffer.”(1269) Apoc. III, 4: “... they shall walk
with me in white, because they are worthy.”(1270) Not merely as their
benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say to the elect on judgment
day: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for
you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to
eat....”(1271) Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the _principium
dignificativum operum_, called the “seed of God,”(1272) because it
contains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St.
Thomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,(1273) in another part of
the _Summa_(1274) defends the theological axiom: “_Deus punit circa
condignum et remunerat ultra condignum_,” but he does not mean to deny the
equality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity
that prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more
bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: “Give, and it shall be
given to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and
running over shall they give into your bosom.”(1275)
Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit
As we are dealing with the “fruits of justification,” it becomes necessary
to ascertain the requisites or conditions of true merit. There are seven
such; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent
who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward.
1. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE MERITORIOUS WORK.—A work, to be
meritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of
actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive.
a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so
the notion of merit supposes a morally good work (_opus honestum_).
Cfr. Eph. VI, 8: “Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the
same shall he receive from the Lord.”(1276) 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be
manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive
the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be
good or evil.”(1277) There are no morally indifferent works _in
individuo_, _i.e._ practically; and if there were, they could be neither
meritorious nor demeritorious, but would become meritorious in proportion
as they are made morally good by means of a “good intention.” It would be
absolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of
supererogation (_opera supererogatoria_), such as the vow of perpetual
chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful
observance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of
obligation are also meritorious, because goodness and meritoriousness are
correlative terms.(1278) Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in
itself meritorious, is doubtful.(1279) But most theologians are agreed in
holding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal
act, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and
intensifies its operation. This and similar questions properly belong to
moral theology.
b) The second requisite of merit is moral liberty (_libertas indifferens
ad actum_), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal
compulsion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.(1280)
That there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred
Scripture. Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have a
reward.”(1281) Matth. XIX, 17: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments.”(1282) “Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, “there
is neither a crown nor damnation.”(1283) The morality of an act depends
entirely on its being an _actus humanus_. Now no act is truly “human”
unless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an
indispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit.
What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit?
Theologians answer by saying that it is _libertas contradictionis sive
exercitii_. If I do a good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I
perform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the
_libertas specificationis_, (that freedom by which a person may act thus
or otherwise, _e.g._ give alms to one applicant in preference to another,
or mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no
doubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and
meritorious. However, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in
which an action may be _physically_ free without being meritorious. It is
when one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as
he is able to choose between two actions exactly equal in moral worth.
This would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten
dollars and were left free to pay it either in coin or in currency. The
more common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack
of that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and
therefore meritorious.(1284)
c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident
from the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and
consequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and
coöperating grace.(1285)
d) Merit further requires a supernatural motive, for the reason that every
good work must be supernatural, both as regards object and circumstances
(_ex obiecto et circumstantiis_), and the end for which it is performed
(_ex fine_). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive,
however, theologians differ widely.
α) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist persuasion, demand the
motive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of
charity (_caritas habitualis sive status caritatis et gratiae_) as
essential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state
of grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural
though inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This
rigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every single
good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of
divine charity (_toties quoties_), or whether the virtual influence of one
act is sufficient to endow a series of subsequent acts with
meritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians(1286) defend the
first-mentioned theory. The majority(1287) hold that the _influxus
virtualis caritatis_ is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by
Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not enough to make a general good
intention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all
future actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each
particular act to God before it is performed.”(1288) The advocates of this
theory base their opinion on certain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and
especially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand.(1289)
The dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being
inspired by supernatural charity, has nothing to do with the moral problem
whether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to
time, except in so far as habitual charity,—_i.e._ the state of charity,
which is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of
sanctifying grace,—cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from
time to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.(1290) St.
Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at
least once a month, but he is contradicted by other eminent moralists. In
practice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such
acts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good
works incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the
importance of making a “good intention” every morning before beginning the
day’s work.(1291)
β) There is a second group of very eminent theologians, including
Suarez,(1292) Vasquez,(1293) De Lugo, and Ballerini, who hold that, to be
meritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need
only conform to the divine law, no special motive being required. These
writers base their teaching on the Tridentine decree which says: “For this
is that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight
and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and
not only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus
Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified,—as
the head into the members and the vine into the branches,—and this virtue
always precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which
without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God
(can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified
to prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have
been done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of
this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, to be obtained also in
its [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.”(1294) This
teaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act
of charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the “eight
beatitudes”(1295) our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which
are not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal
or virtual. When He was asked: “Master, what good shall I do that I may
have life everlasting?”(1296) he did not answer with Bellarmine: “Steep
all thy works in the motive of charity,” but declared: “If thou wilt enter
into life, keep the commandments.”(1297) And when requested to specify, He
simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Decalogue.(1298) We also know
that at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the “kingdom of
His Father” solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have
done.(1299)
Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works
performed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally
meritorious, this would be attributable to one of three causes. Either the
just would sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity
would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be
no strict equality between service and reward. All three of these
suppositions are untenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or
Jansenism.(1300) The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite
proportion (_condignitas_) between service and reward is furnished by
sanctifying grace or habitual charity, which, as _deificatio_, adoptive
sonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which
the _motivum caritatis_ is demanded.
We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opinion, whence the act of
charity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar
proportionality or _condignitas_ with the beatific vision. Surely not from
itself, because as an act it is merely _primus inter pares_, without in
any essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but
to attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just
man and his works by sanctifying grace.
For these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as
sufficiently well established and the faithful are largely guided by it in
practice.(1301)
2. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE AGENT WHO MERITS.—The agent who
merits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace.
a) The wayfaring state (_status viae_) is merely another name for life on
earth. Death as the natural, though not essentially necessary limit of
life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy
Scripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the
next.(1302)
b) The second requisite is the state of sanctifying grace. Only the just
can be “sons of God” and “heirs of heaven.”(1303) Cfr. John XV, 4: “As the
branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so
neither can you, unless you abide in me.”(1304) Rom. VIII, 17: “And if
sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.”(1305)
Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive
influence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This
question can be easily solved on the theological principle that the
supernatural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in
sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who
is holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who
is less holy.(1306) All other theologians(1307) hold with St. Thomas(1308)
that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in proportion to the
godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of
sanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of
the greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often
deigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to
others.(1309)
3. THE REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF GOD.—Merit requires but one
thing on the part of God, _viz._: that He accept the good work _in actu
secundo_ as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not
agreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less
well-founded opinion.
Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from
the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, _in actu
primo_, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by
God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a
wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious _in actu
secundo_, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly
superadded.
In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians
are divided into three schools.
The Scotists(1310) hold that the _condignitas_ of a good work rests
entirely on God’s gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which
even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it
even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow
theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to
the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of
the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Biblical
terms as “crown of justice,” “prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc.
Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced
equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice
(_ex obligatione iustitiae_), prior to and apart from any formal act of
acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific
vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on
which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His
creatures,(1311) and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that “The
sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to
come.”(1312)
Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,(1313) Vasquez,(1314) and De
Lugo(1315) that the _condignitas_ or equality existing between merit and
reward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work
itself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This
solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit _in actu primo_,
without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works
not because He is obliged to do so by the merits of a mere creature, but
solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus
God’s justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there
is no violation of justice (_iniuria_) on His part. “From the fact that
our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,”
says St. Thomas, “it does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is
His own debtor, _i.e._ He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are
obeyed.”(1316) This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr.
James I, 12: “He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised
to them that love him.”(1317) It is reechoed by St. Augustine: “God is
made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased
Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to
a man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You
owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give
back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since
it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we
possess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner,
therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast
promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself
that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.”(1318) The
Tridentine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: “Life eternal
is to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is,
according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to
their good works and merits.”(1319)
Section 3. The Objects Of Merit
After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates
its objects as follows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the good
works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace,
eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so,
however, that he depart in grace,—and also an increase of glory: let him
be anathema.”(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an
increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of
that glory. The expression “_vere mereri_” shows that all three of these
objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (_de
condigno_). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain
conclusion.
1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.—The first grace of justification
(_gratia prima_) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the
above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good
works. This increase is technically called _gratia secunda_. All
Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in
different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by
the performance of meritorious works.(1322)
a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (_gratia prima
actualis_), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it,
and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely
gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (_gratia
prima habitualis_) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for
justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: “But we are
therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things
which precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself
of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works;
otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”(1323) To
deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace
(because if the first grace given before active justification could be
strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the _gratia prima
actualis_), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the _gratia
prima habitualis_ is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains
why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both
of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification
proper.(1324) “This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, “without which
neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits,
but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. ‘Being
justified,’ says the Apostle, ‘freely through His blood.’ ”(1325)
In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by
Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely _per modum
dispositionis_ or _per modum causae formalis_. Both contrition and
charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose
the soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is
capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (_merendo_),
nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal
cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council,
sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the _unica causa formalis_
of justification.(1327)
b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the
question whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual
graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between
merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328)
that merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so
efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would
necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum
perseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming
that the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia
efficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious
grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth
grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter
of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict
right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the
greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from
righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions
neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of
merit.(1330)
2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.—The second object of merit is eternal
life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331)
Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace
and as a reward.
a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same
Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of
merit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal
life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between “eternal life”
and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward,
and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was
the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently
coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable
eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is
not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide
with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then
depends upon the condition of the soul: “_si tamen in gratia decesserit_”
(provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod
also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying
grace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired
merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal
sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his
former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new
justification.(1335)
b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to
another difficulty. Can the _gloria prima_ be merited? In defining the
_gratia secunda_ as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly
excludes the _gratia prima_. It makes no such distinction in regard to
glory, but names both “eternal life” (_gloria prima_) and “increase of
glory” (_gloria secunda_) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the
query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the _gloria prima_,
seeing that he is unable to merit the _gratia prima_? Some
theologians(1336) contend that the justified are entitled to the _gloria
prima_ only as a heritage (_titulo haereditatis_), never as a reward
(_titulo mercedis_). Because of its intimate causal connection with the
_gratia prima_, which is beyond the reach of merit, the _gloria prima_,
they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the
assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to
the _gloria prima_. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying
grace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this
difficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the _gratia
prima_, the _gloria prima_ may under certain conditions be an object of
strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a
necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state
of grace is, the former may _positis ponendis_ be an effect of the
_meritum de congruo_, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the
problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we
distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct
hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of
baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in
Heaven, solely to God’s mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than
that of heredity (_titulus hereditatis_). Adults who preserve their
baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the _gloria
prima_ by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to
it through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but
do not merit, the _gloria prima_, to which these souls are already
entitled _titulo haereditatis_. The case is quite different with
catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an
act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament
of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that
they merit for themselves _de condigno_, not indeed the first grace of
justification, but the _gloria prima_, because perfect contrition, being
an _opus operans_, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an _opus
meritorium_ entitled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority
of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond
imperfect contrition (_attritio_), and therefore are not justified until
they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever
grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to
the _opus operatum_ of the Sacrament.(1341)
3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.—The third object of merit, according to the
Tridentine Council, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond
to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the
performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection
between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in
Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: “For the
Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.”(1342) 1
Cor. III, 8: “And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his
own labor.”(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal
apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is
based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that
grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of
glory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)
4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.—Congruous, as distinguished from
condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim
based on equity (_ex quadam aequitate_, _congruentia_, _decentia_).
Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus,
but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word “equity”
Dominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of
the term _meritum de congruo_ in theology. But this was a mistake. The
Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St.
Augustine,(1346) did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is
entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical
with those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,—the _meritum
de congruo_ does not require the state of grace.
a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians
dissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment
he begins to coöperate with supernatural grace, merit _de congruo_ by good
works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification,
and ultimately justification itself.
“Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “condign merit on justice. And
therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he
does not merit in strict justice.”(1349) This teaching is based partly on
Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is
confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By
conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner
probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps.
L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled
heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.”(1350) Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy
sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor:
perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.”(1351) St. Augustine says:
“The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for
it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was
moved to say: ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away
justified through the merit of faithful humility.”(1352)
b) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice
(_de condigno_), but as a matter of equity (_de congruo_), final
perseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and
also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.
α) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians
without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (_donum
perseverantiae_) cannot be merited in the strict sense (_de condigno_).
Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This
_meritum_ is technically called _meritum de congruo fallibili_. Those who
deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly
obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.(1353)
β) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question
whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of
conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin.
Following the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative
view,(1354) on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace
and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings,
however, the Angelic Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based
on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon
mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it
is just, _i.e._ congruous, that a man who has performed many good works
should merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and
love.”(1355) Scotus,(1356) Bonaventure,(1357) and Suarez(1358) regard this
as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported by Holy Scripture. The
prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: “Thou helpest the ungodly,
and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and
therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works
are found in thee.”(1359) To this argument add the following
consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby
man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent
meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by
subsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard,
of course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future
sins.(1360) To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of
future mortal sin, is always good and useful,(1361) because it cannot but
please God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His
friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.(1362)
γ) The just man may congruously merit for others whatever he is able to
merit for himself, _e.g._ the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and
also the first prevenient grace (_gratia prima praeveniens_), which no man
in the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.(1363) The
reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of
friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and
God.(1364) However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of
the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the
abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor
would be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of
grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable
petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be
obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained
by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: “Pray for one another
that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth
much.”(1365) This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the
Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible(1366) and
ecclesiastical history,(1367) and by the traditional practice of the
Church in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful
and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.(1368)
δ) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit
such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success
in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to
eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas
seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as
objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of
congruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.(1369) We have no
space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish
to call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more
effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual
favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for
earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to
God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our “exceeding great
reward.”(1370)
READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1
sqq.—Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—*Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, V, 1-22.—*Suarez, _Opusc. de Divina
Iustitia_.—IDEM, _De Gratia_, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.—Oswald, _Lehre
von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl_, § 7,
3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol.
III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq.,
Freiburg 1908.—*S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 594 sqq.,
Freiburg 1901.—Kneib, _Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral_,
Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., _Supernatural Merit_, St. Louis
1914.—A. Devine, C. P., _The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed.,
London 1905, pp. 74-89.—L. Labauche, S. S., _God and Man_, pp.
254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, _The
Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)—B. J.
Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St.
Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.
On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Möhler,
_Symbolik_, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).
INDEX
A
Acceptance of good works by God, 419 sqq.
Actual Grace, 3 sqq.;
Its nature, 5 sqq.;
Its relation to habitual Grace, 14 sqq.;
Definition of, 15;
Its two-fold causality, 15 sqq.;
Division of, 19 sqq.;
Properties of, 49 sqq.;
Necessity of, 50 sqq.;
Gratuity of, 131 sqq.;
Universality of, 152 sqq.;
Its relation to free-will, 222 sqq.;
As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqq.
_Actus humanus_, 412.
Adoption, 357.
Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq.
Adults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq.
_Affectus credulitatis_, 105.
Albertus Magnus, 206, 432.
Alexander VIII, 179 sq.
Alexander of Hales, 206.
Aloysius, St., 211.
Alphonsus, St., 415.
Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243.
Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404.
_Amor affectivus et effectivus_, 68.
Amsdorf, 291.
Anabaptists, 322.
Aquaviva, 260, 262.
Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353.
Arnauld, 180.
Athanasius, St., 341 sq., 373, 374.
Attributes, Divine, 344 sq.
“_Auctorem Fidei_,” Bull, 74 sq.
Augustine, St., 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36,
37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 56, 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,
83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108
sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159
sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq., 191 sq., 194, 197, 203 sq.,
210, 215, 228 sqq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 264, 289,
308, 319 sq., 337 sq., 339, 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 sq., 375,
383, 387, 394, 404, 421, 424 sq., 430, 431.
Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq.
B
Baius and Bajanism, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74 sqq., 147, 417.