δ) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists

triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that “man

... while he receives that inspiration [_i.e._ efficacious grace], ... is

also able to reject it.” And again: “If any one saith that man’s

free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and

calling, does in no wise coöperate towards disposing and preparing itself

for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its

consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing

whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.”(734) To adjust their

system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed

that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the _gratia sufficiens_, to

which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is

untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will

coöperates by giving its consent (_cooperatur assentiendo_) and which it

can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with

the grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and

under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will

remains inanimate and merely passive. This can only be the _gratia

efficax_. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious

sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally

chose the term _dissentire_ (_sensus divisus_) rather than _resistere_

(_sensus compositus_), in order to indicate that under the predetermining

influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent

(_posse dissentire_) but not to offer resistance (_posse resistere_).(735)

This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has

defined that “Faith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a

gift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by

which man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and

coöperating with His grace, which he is able to resist.”(736) If

efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that

“irresistible” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.(737)

-------------------------------------

B. The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the

philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God

foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His

relation to sin.

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course,

underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God’s

foreknowledge of the free acts of the future.

-------------------------------------

The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous

and weighty that in our treatise on God(738) we made no attempt to

demonstrate the _scientia media_ by stringent arguments, but merely

accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific

basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the

natural and the supernatural order.

b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the

Thomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that God

predetermines men to sin.

α) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles God would have

to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the

will to justification can take no other form than the _gratia per se

efficax_, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the

predetermining influence of the _motor primus_.(739) Without this

assumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the

absolute will of God an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future

sins. Bañez says on this point: “God knows sin with an intuitive

knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the

same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe

the law.”(740) Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the

immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises.

And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged _praemotio ad malum_

is as irresistible as the _praemotio ad bonum_; and secondly, because the

material element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element;

otherwise God would foreknow sin merely _materialiter_ as an act but not

_formaliter_ as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was

clearly defined by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is not

in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God

worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly

and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own

proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.”(741)

If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act,

resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an

act practically cannot be separated from its physical entity, then in the

Thomistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the _entitas_ but

likewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral

means, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us

physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the

_praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This

consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called “sins of malice”

are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some

pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology

in forbidding sin forbids its physical entity. How gladly would not those

who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the

entity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their

passion without offending God!

β) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend

themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him

indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the

soul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such

reasoning as follows: “The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked

shinbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through

physical premotion.”(742)

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that

Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. “It is

impossible for a man to sin unless God lends His coöperation. Do not,

therefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those who argue

in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction

between the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio

physica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful

act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to

offer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins

as a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits

as it were the free consent of the will before it coöperates with the

sinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743)

For this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a

well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in

that of the Thomists.(744)

2. AUGUSTINIANISM.—This system, so called because its defenders pretend to

base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity

with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect,

especially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with

great deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not

physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence

Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the

_praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti,

O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis

Disciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that

Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary

theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict

XIV instituted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree

permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.

a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor

primus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_

or _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1)

Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial

delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally

precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every

instance constitutes the law and standard of the will’s disposition to do

good.

(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence

(_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man,

and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as

celestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with,

concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to

which it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio

coelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that

free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth

principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the

essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the

_delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to

choose between good and evil.(748)

b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the

Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely

sufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or

at best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_

(_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio

coelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to

perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and

specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the

performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on

the _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as

_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_,

according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of

the _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to

a constitutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its

evil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_

(_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall,

when the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo

non_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the

delectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically

compel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while

the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it

does not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty,

though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient

grace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of

the will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of

exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who,

though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on

a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.—On account of its uncritical methods

Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so

far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.

Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in

support of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian

terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have

a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet

how widely does not the “Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called,

differ from the “Augustinus Hipponensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly

misconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call

attention to one or two points only.

a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false

conception of sufficient grace.

How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first

described in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same

breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia

magna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of “grace” can that

be which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the

prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of

that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the

distinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St.

Augustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace,

but the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia

magna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a

good act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)

b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio

moralis_ with the dogma of free-will.

Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be

conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is

physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough

that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty.

In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines

the will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter,

there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of

rational creatures on the part of God, because the Augustinians reject the

_scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace

which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because

of the condition of his heart.(755)

c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are

false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.

It is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of

all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred,

fear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of God or a sense of duty

is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of

treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard “celestial

delectation” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence

as the characteristic note of sin.(757)

The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise

false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity

cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that

the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively

stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that

does not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but

not that _libertas a necessitate_ which constitutes the notion of liberty.

There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist

delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the

Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also

false.(758)

READINGS:—The literature on the different systems of grace is

enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.

On the Thomist side: *Bañez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S.

Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.—*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae

et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.—IDEM, _Responsionum Libri

Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.—Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae

Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.—*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae

Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.—Contenson, O. P.,

_Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.—De Lemos, O. P.,

_Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Liège 1676.—Goudin, O. P.,

_De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.—*Gotti, O.

P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_,

Venice 1750.—Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema

Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.—*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5

(ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).—IDEM, _Le Thomisme

Triomphant_, Paris 1725.—*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des

hl. Thomas über die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.—IDEM, in

Commer’s _Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_,

1894 sqq.—*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis

Physicae_, Paris 1886.—I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis

Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.—Joh. Ude,

_Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_,

Graz 1905.—Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols.,

Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.—P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et

le Néomolinisme_, Paris 1917.

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae

Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.—*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_,

8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.—Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo

Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.—L. de

Thomassin, _Mémoires sur la Grâce, etc._, Louvain 1668.

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.

Article 2. Molinism And Congruism

The point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they

differ from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of efficacious

grace as _efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_.

This conception was violently attacked by the Spanish Dominican Bañez and

other divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Bañez

and the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special

commission to settle it. This was the famous _Congregatio de Auxiliis_,

consisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit

orders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a

decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the suggestion of St. Francis de Sales,

declared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade

the contending parties to denounce each other as heretical.(759)

While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the defense of grace, Molinism

made it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will.

1. MOLINISM.—Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who

published a famous treatise under the title _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum

Gratiae Donis_ at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as

follows:

a) In _actu primo_ there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an

extrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient

grace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes

efficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains

inefficacious (_inefficax_) and _merely_ sufficient (_gratia mere

sufficiens_). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in

one case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.(760)

b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of

grace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty,

and _in actu primo_, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient

grace (_gratia praeveniens_), which imparts to it all the moral and

physical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the

_actus secundus_ be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the

result of grace coöperating with free-will.(761) Consequently, the will by

giving its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace

which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts.

To say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to

assert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the

freedom of the latter.(762)

c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to

be explained not by God’s absolute will, but by His infallible

foreknowledge through the _scientia media_,—a Molinistic postulate which

was first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.

J., the teacher of Suarez.(763) God foreknows not only the absolutely free

acts (_futura_) of His rational creatures by the _scientia visionis_, but

likewise their hypothetically free acts (_futuribilia_) by means of the

_scientia media_, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what

attitude the free-will of man would assume in each case if grace were

given him. Consequently, when God, in the light of this eternal

foreknowledge, actually bestows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious

or inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give

or withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace

be reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other

dogmas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because

God by virtue of the _scientia media_ has it absolutely in His power to

give or withhold His graces in each individual case.(764)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF MOLINISM.—Even the most determined opponents of

Molinism admit that this system possesses three important advantages.

a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the sufficiency of “merely

sufficient grace,” which in its physical nature does not differ

essentially from efficacious grace.

Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by denying that efficacious grace

either physically or morally predetermines the will to one course of

action.

Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satisfactory manner why efficacious

grace is infallibly efficacious. God in virtue of the _scientia media_

knows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each

individual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the

will and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow

or withhold grace according to His absolute decrees.

b) The question may justly be raised, however, whether, in endeavoring to

safeguard freewill, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after

all the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation.

There is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or

inefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a

created will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by

the consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be

an effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the councils of the

Church do not say: “_Deus facit, si volumus_,” but they declare: “_Deus

facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et

perficere_,” and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need

not concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, humors, etc.,

but it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard

to anything except the decree of the Divine Will. On account of this and

similar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector

of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism(765) in favor of

Congruism.(766)

c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably

led the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers

of theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic

element in the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in

harmony with the principles defended by the Jesuit members of the

_Congregatio de Auxiliis_ before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva’s order

is of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume:

“_Nostri in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re

ipsâ habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non

tantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu liberi arbitrii etiam

cooperantem gratiam habentis effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in

ipso actu primo, quod positâ scientiâ conditionalium [scientiâ mediâ] ex

efficaci Dei proposito atque intentione efficiendi certissime in nobis

boni, de industria ipse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert,

quo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, aliis usurus, si haec

inefficacia praevidisset. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione beneficii

plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo

contineri: atque hac ratione efficere Deum, ut re ipsâ faciamus, non

tantum quia dat gratiam quâ facere possimus. Quod idem dicendum est de

perseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est._” This modified, or perhaps we

had better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called

Congruism.(767)

2. CONGRUISM.—The system thus recommended by Aquaviva in its fundamental

principles really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the

great Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the

official system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645)

and Piccolomini (d. 1651).

a) The distinction between _gratia congrua_ and _gratia incongrua_ is

founded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as

“_congruenter vocati_.”(768) The Congruists maintain against the extreme

Molinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free

determination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace

is bestowed under circumstances favorable to its operation, _i.e._

“congruous” in that sense. When the circumstances are comparatively

adverse (_incongrua_), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father

who knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the

right word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if

it is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case,

thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the

city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded

convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his

environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is

conferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations,

prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort

of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible

means of executing His decrees.(769)

b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, considered _in actu primo_, is

undoubtedly a special gift of God, and hence the _gratia congrua_

possesses a higher value than the _gratia incongrua sive inefficax_. An

entitatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under comparatively

favorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails

in its purpose by reason of unfavorable circumstances created by

inclination, training, or environment. Little David accomplished more with

a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.(770)

c) Congruism assigns a far more important rôle to grace than extreme

Molinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy

of grace upon the will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the

example of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribution of

internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another

untouched.(771)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF CONGRUISM.—Among the different systems devised for

the purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism

probably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two

extremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism

and Jansenism on the other, and its principal theses can be supported by

clear and unmistakable passages from the writings of St. Augustine.

a) Other points in its favor are the following: “Sufficient grace,” in the

Congruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as God is concerned,

because its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will.

That free-will is properly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious

grace (_gratia congrua_) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing

schools. True, Congruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion,

but as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circumstances of

daily life. As favorable circumstances (education, association,

temperament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so

supernatural grace (_gratia congrua s. efficax_) may soften the will and

occasionally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases

excepted)(772) will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct

advance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference

between _gratia efficax_ (_congrua_) and _gratia inefficax_ not entirely

on the will of man, but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able to

explain such formulas as “_Deus facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus est, qui

discernit_,” _etc._, in a manner entirely compatible with the dogmatic

teaching of the Church.(773)

The _modus operandi_ of the _gratia congrua_ (efficacious grace) is

explained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a

threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (_efficacia virtutis_), the

efficacy of union (_efficacia connexionis_), and the efficacy of

infallible success (_efficacia infallibilitatis_). Grace (both efficacious

and sufficient) does not derive its _efficacia virtutis_ from the

free-will of man, nor from the knowledge of God (_scientia media_), but

from itself. The _efficacia connexionis_ (of union between act and grace)

on the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to

the Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace

does not operate irresistibly but can be “cast off.” The _efficacia

infallibilitatis_ springs from God’s certain foreknowledge (_scientia

media_), which cannot be deceived.(774)

b) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend that Congruism solves

all difficulties. The mystery surrounding both the unequal distribution of

efficacious grace and the _scientia media_ still remains. Moreover, the

theory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circumstances of His

creatures, can hardly be reconciled with His dignity and omnipotence. It

would no doubt be far worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will

of man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He wishes it to

perform. Whoever has studied the lives of saints and eminent converts

knows that the sudden and seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which

many of them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles in the

strict sense, though on the other hand it seems certain that grace worked

in them with little or no regard to the “congruity” of circumstances.

Again, it is one of the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to

be balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape them by changing a

man’s temperament, dulling concupiscence, weakening the power of

temptation, and so forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but

controls and fashions the circumstances of the recipient.

After all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and free-will still

remains an unsolved mystery.(775)

3. SYNCRETISM.—Seeing that each of the different systems which we so far

reviewed contains grains of truth, some theologians(776) have adopted the

good points of all four and combined them into a fifth, called Syncretism.

These authors begin by assuming the existence of two quite distinct sorts

of efficacious grace, the (Thomistic-Augustinian) _gratia efficax ab

intrinseco_, and the (Molinistic-Congruistic) _gratia efficax ab

extrinseco_. The former, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of

more difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temptations,

observing onerous precepts, exercising patience in severe tribulation,

etc.; while the latter enables man to accomplish less difficult acts, such

as short prayers, slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between

the two is prayer, which has been instituted for the purpose of enabling

man to obtain that _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_ which is necessary for

the performance of the more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture

teaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding upon all men,

and that it accomplishes its purpose infallibly.(777)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF SYNCRETISM.—The outstanding characteristic of

Syncretism is its insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to say

the most important, factor in the work of salvation.

a) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubtedly right. Sacred Scripture

and Tradition both strongly emphasize the importance and necessity of

prayer, so much so that one naturally expects to find prayer playing an

essential and indispensable rôle in every complete and orthodox system of

grace. “The present economy of grace is essentially and intrinsically an

economy of prayer,” is a theological axiom which cannot be too strongly

insisted upon. To have brought out this great truth forcibly and

luminously is the merit of Syncretism.

b) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the Syncretistic theory has

solved the problem of the relation between free-will and grace. On the

contrary, by adopting two such heterogeneous concepts as _gratia efficax

ab intrinseco_ and _gratia efficax ab extrinseco_ it has actually

increased the difficulties found in the other systems. For now we are put

before the dilemma:—the Thomistic _gratia efficax_ either supposes

free-will or it does not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this

grace to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does not, then the

_gratia efficax_ can be of no assistance in the performance of more

difficult works, because these too, to be meritorious, require the

coöperation of free-will.

The Syncretists try to evade this dilemma by contending that prayer, as

the connecting link, communicates its own liberty and meritoriousness to

the salutary acts performed through its agency, in other words, that these

acts are the effect of prayer (_effectus orationis_). But aside from the

fact that prayer itself is quite often a difficult act, the more arduous

works of salvation would in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their

meritoriousness and degraded to the level of a _voluntarium in causa_,

which is an untenable assumption.(778) Finally, there is something

illogical and unsatisfactory in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two

such incompatible notions as the Thomistic _cognitio Dei in decretis

praedeterminantibus_ and the Molinistic _scientia media_.

Thus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas of grace and

free-will fail to solve the mystery, and we are compelled to exclaim with

St. Paul: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of

God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His

ways!”(779)

READINGS:—Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance are:

*Molina, S. J., _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_,

Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876).—Platel, S. J., _Auctoritas contra

Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media_, Douai

1669.—Henao, S. J., _Scientia Media Historice Propugnata_, Lyons

1655.—IDEM, _Scientia Media Theologice Defensa_, Lyons 1674-6.—De

Aranda, S. J., _De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante seu

Schola Scientiae Mediae_, Saragossa 1693.—*Suarez, S. J., _De

Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei_, new ed., Paris 1856.—IDEM, _De

Auxilio Efficaci_, Paris ed., 1856, t. XI.—IDEM, _De Vera

Intelligentia Auxilii Efficacis_ (_Op. Posthum._, t. X,

Appendix).—*Lessius, S. J., _De Gratia Efficaci_ (_Opusc._, t. II,

Paris 1878).—Sardagna, S. J., _Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica_,

Ratisbon 1771.—Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), _De Gratia_, new

ed., Paris 1853.—Murray, _De Gratia_, Dublin 1877.—B. Jungmann, S.

J., _De Gratia_, 6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.—Th. de Régnon, S. J.,

_Bañez et Molina, Histoire, Doctrines, Critique, Métaphysique_,

Paris 1883.—Card. Mazzella, S. J., _De Gratia Christi_, 3rd ed.,

Rome 1882.—Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.

49-58, Gulpen 1885.—*V. Frins, S. J., _S. Thomae Doctrina de

Cooperatione Dei cum Omni __ Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu

S. Thomas Praedeterminationis Physicae Adversarius_, Paris

1890.—*Schiffini, S. J., _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 5, Freiburg

1901.—Card. Billot, S. J., _De Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis

Arbitrio_, I, Rome 1908.—Limbourg, S. J. “_Selbstzeichnung der

thomistischen Gnadenlehre_,” in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für

kath. Theologie_, 1877.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the

History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 493 sqq.

Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism and

Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphonsus de’

Liguori, *Tournely, _De Gratia_, Venice 1755.—Card. Jos. Pecci,

_Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l’Influsso di Dio sulle Azioni delle

Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media_, Rome 1885.—A.

Adeodatus, J. _Pecci’s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas über den

Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert_, Mainz 1888.—C. Krogh-Tonning,

_De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina_,

Christiania 1898.—J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., _De Divina Gratia_, Rome

1904.

The history of the great controversy between Thomism and Molinism

can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., _Historia Congregationum de

Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae_, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 1709.—Livinus

de Meyer, S. J., _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae

Auxiliis_, Antwerp 1705.—*Schneemann, S. J., _Entstehung der

thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg 1879.—*IDEM,

_Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_,

Freiburg 1880.—*IDEM, _Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae

Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881.

PART II. SANCTIFYING GRACE

The grace of justification, commonly called sanctifying grace, is related

to actual grace as an end to its means. Actual grace introduces the state

of sanctifying grace or preserves and augments it where it already exists.

This fact makes it advisable to consider the genesis of sanctifying grace

before studying its nature and effects.

We shall therefore treat in three chapters: (1) of the Process of

Justification (_iustificatio in fieri_); (2) of the State of Justification

(_iustificatio in esse_), and (3) of the Fruits of Justification

(_iustificatio in facto esse_), or the Merit of Good Works.

Chapter I. The Genesis Of Sanctifying Grace, Or The Process Of

Justification

The justification of an adult human being does not take place suddenly,

but runs through certain well-defined stages, which in their totality are

called the process of justification.

Being a “regeneration in God,” justification bears a striking resemblance

to the development of the fœtus in the maternal womb. Like physical birth,

spiritual regeneration is preceded by travailing, _i.e._ fear and painful

contrition.

The dogmatic teaching of the Catholic Church on justification is formally

defined by the Tridentine Council, whose decrees(780) contain a masterly

analysis of this most interesting of psychological processes. The holy

Synod puts faith at the beginning. “Faith,” it says, “is the beginning of

human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification.”(781)

The nature of faith and the part it plays in justification were the chief

points in dispute between the Church and the so-called Reformers. Luther

and his followers denatured the traditional Catholic teaching by basing

justification solely on faith, which they falsely defined as mere

confidence or trust in the mercy of God.

Section 1. The Necessity Of Faith For Justification

1. THE LUTHERAN HERESY VS. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Protestant

Reformers, notably Luther and Calvin, did not deny that justification is

wrought by faith, but they defined justifying faith in a manner altogether

foreign to the mind of the Church.

a) They distinguished three kinds of faith: (1) belief in the existence of

God and the historical fact that Christ has come on earth, suffered, and

ascended (_fides historica_); (2) the sort of trust which is required for

exercising the gift of miracles (_fides miraculorum_); and (3) faith in

the divine promises with regard to the remission of sin (_fides

promissionum_). The last-mentioned species of faith they subdivided into

general and particular. _Fides generalis_ is that by which we believe that

the righteousness of Christ “covers” (but does not wipe out) our sins.

_Fides specialis_ or fiduciary faith (_fiducia_) is that by which a man

applies to himself the righteousness of the Redeemer, firmly trusting that

his sins are for Christ’s sake not imputed to him. Thus the Reformers

erroneously transferred the seat of justifying faith from the intellect to

the will and completely subverted the Catholic notion of faith as an

intellectual assent to revealed truth.

b) To this fundamental error the Fathers of Trent opposed the orthodox

doctrine that (adults) “are disposed unto justice when, excited and

assisted by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are freely

moved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has

revealed and promised, ...”(782) and they solemnly anathematized those who

assert “that justifying faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine

mercy which remits sin for Christ’s sake, or that this confidence alone is

that whereby we are justified.”(783)

Hence it is _de fide_ that the faith whereby man is justified, is not a

confident persuasion of being esteemed righteous in the sight of God, but

a dogmatic or theoretical belief in the truths of Divine Revelation.

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FIDUCIARY FAITH.—Whenever Sacred

Scripture and Tradition speak of justifying faith, they mean a dogmatic

belief in the truths of Revelation,—that faith which the Protestants call

_fides historica_.

a) Christ Himself solemnly commanded His Apostles and their successors to

preach the Gospel to all nations, and before baptizing them to convert

them to a firm belief in certain specified truths which no man may reject

except at the peril of his eternal salvation.

α) Mark XVI, 15 sq.: “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the

gospel(784) to every creature: He that believeth [_i.e._ in the Gospel]

and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be

condemned.” Agreeable to this injunction St. John declares it to be the

object of his Gospel “that you may believe that(785) Jesus is the Christ,

the Son of God, and that believing, you may have life in his name.”(786)

The Gospel is written “that we may believe.” What must we believe? That

“Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.” This is a revealed truth by firmly

believing which we shall be saved. When the treasurer of Queen Candace

begged to be baptized, Philip the deacon said to him: “If thou believest

with all thy heart, thou mayest.” The eunuch replied: “I believe that

Jesus Christ is the Son of God,” whereupon Philip baptized him.(787)

β) St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians eloquently

insists on the necessity of faith, not a mere _fides fiducialis_, but a

believing acceptance of Divine Revelation. Cfr. Rom. X, 9 sq.: “For if

thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that

God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the

heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto

salvation.”(788) We must confess with the mouth and believe with the

heart. External profession and internal faith go together and have for

their common object a certain truth open to our knowledge, _viz._: the

resurrection of Christ,—a dogma in which the whole teaching of the

atonement lies imbedded.

The character of justifying faith is still more plainly evident from Heb.

XI, 6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh

to God [he that is to be justified], must believe that He is [the

existence of God], and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”(789) The

Apostle here clearly asserts both the necessity of justifying faith and

the minimum of doctrine to be explicitly “believed,” _viz._: the existence

of God and eternal retribution.(790)

γ) The Lutherans appeal chiefly to Matth. IX, 2, Luke XVII, 19, Rom. IV,

5, and Heb. XI, 1. But not a single one of these texts represents

fiduciary faith as the instrumental cause of justification. The word

πίστις occurs no less than eighty times in the Synoptic Gospels and in St.

Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, but there are only six passages in which it

could possibly be construed as synonymous with _fiducia_, and in none of

these is the interpretation entirely certain. Not once does the New

Testament employ πίστις in the sense of “fiduciary faith,” _i.e._ a

confident persuasion of one’s own righteousness.(791)

b) Tradition is in such perfect agreement with Scripture on this point

that the Reformers did not venture to deny that their doctrine ran counter

to the time-honored teaching of the Church. The Fathers unanimously insist

on the necessity of dogmatic faith as a requisite of justification.

α) St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, who is regarded as “the best theologian of his

time” (468-533),(792) in his golden booklet _De Fide seu de Regula Verae

Fidei ad Petrum_, says: “I rejoice that you take care to preserve the true

faith without which conversion is useless, nay, impossible. Apostolic

authority tells us that we cannot please God without faith. For faith is

the foundation of all good [works]; it is the beginning of human

salvation, and without it no one can obtain a place among the children of

God, because without it no one can obtain the grace of justification in

this world or possess eternal life in the next.”(793) St. Fulgentius was a

faithful disciple of St. Augustine, and the whole trend of his treatise

shows that by _vera fides_ he understands not the Lutheran _fiducia

propriae iustificationis_, but Catholic belief in revealed truth.(794)

β) This teaching is corroborated by the ancient practice of instructing

the catechumens in the truths of revelation and requiring them to make a

public profession of faith before Baptism. It was because they believed

and professed the true faith that the early Christians, who knew nothing

of the Lutheran _fides fiducialis_, were called “faithful” (_fideles_,

πιστοί), to distinguish them from false believers or heretics

(_haeretici_, αἱρητικοὶ, from αἱρεῖσθαι to choose), who denied some

portion or other of the orthodox creed.

c) In analyzing the notions of _fides_ and _necessitas_ theologians

distinguish between _fides explicita_ and _fides implicita_, and between

_necessitas medii_ and _necessitas praecepti_.

_Fides explicita_ is an express and fully developed belief in the truths

of revelation; _fides implicita_, a virtual belief in whatever may be

contained in a dogma explicitly professed. I make an act of implicit faith

when I say, for instance: “I believe whatever the Church teaches,” or: “I

heartily accept whatever God has revealed.”

The _necessitas medii_ is based on the objective relation of means to an

end, and consequently binds all men, even the ignorant and those who are

in error without their own fault. Such, for example, is the necessity of

the eye for seeing, of wings for flying, of grace for performing salutary

acts, of the _lumen gloriae_ for the beatific vision. The _necessitas

praecepti_, on the other hand, is founded entirely on the will of God, who

positively commands or forbids under pain of grievous sin, but is willing

to condone non-compliance with his precepts when it is owing to guiltless

ignorance. This applies to all positive divine precepts, _e.g._ the law of

fasting and abstinence. It is to be noted that the _necessitas medii_

always involves the _necessitas praecepti_, because God must needs will

and impose upon us by positive precept whatever is objectively necessary

as a means of salvation.

α) The first question that arises with regard to this twofold faith and

necessity is: Are sinners preparing for justification, and the faithful in

general, obliged by necessity of precept to believe explicitly all

revealed truths? The answer is, No; because this is practically

impossible, and God does not demand the impossible.

Generally speaking, it is sufficient to have an explicit knowledge of, and

give one’s firm assent to, the more important dogmas and moral

precepts—the twelve articles of the Apostles’ Creed, the Commandments of

God and the Church, the Sacraments (as needed), and the Our Father. All

other revealed truths need be held only _fide implicitâ_.(795) More is of

course demanded of educated persons and those who are in duty bound to

instruct others, such as priests and teachers.(796)

β) A more important and more difficult question is this: Are there any

dogmas, and if so how many, which must be believed by all men _fide

explicitâ_ and _necessitate medii_? St. Paul says: “Without faith it is

impossible to please God, for he that cometh to God, must believe that He

is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”(797)

With but few exceptions,(798) Catholic theologians maintain that the

Apostle in this passage means theological faith, based upon supernatural

motives. This interpretation is borne out by the context, by such parallel

texts as John III, 11 sqq., 32 sqq., 2 Tim. I, 12, 1 John V, 9 sq., and by

the decisions of several councils.(799) There can be no reasonable doubt

that all men, to be justified and saved, must have an explicit belief in

at least two dogmas, _viz._: the existence of God and eternal retribution.

Pope Innocent XI condemned the Jansenist proposition that explicit belief

in divine retribution is not necessary for salvation.(800)

Are there any other dogmas which must be explicitly believed _necessitate

medii_? The only dogmas which might come in question are: the Trinity, the

Incarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The

last-mentioned two may be omitted from the list, because St. Paul does not

mention them,(801) and for the additional reason that belief in

immortality is included in the dogma of eternal retribution, while the

necessity of grace is inseparably bound up with the dogma of Divine

Providence, which in its turn is but a particular aspect of eternal

retribution.(802) Hence the only two dogmas in regard to which the

question at the beginning of this paragraph can reasonably be asked, are

the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation.

Theologians are divided in the matter. Some maintain that no human being

can or could ever be saved without explicit belief in both the Trinity and

the Incarnation. Others(803) hold that this _necessitas medii_ did not

exist under the Old Covenant. A third school(804) avers that no such

necessity can be proved either for the Old or the New Dispensation.

The first of these three opinions is excessively rigorous and

intrinsically improbable. The Jews had no clearly revealed knowledge of

the Trinity and the Incarnation, and consequently were under no obligation

to believe them. As the divinely constituted guardians of the Messianic

prophecies, they were bound to believe in the Redeemer, though only

_necessitate praecepti_. The gentiles were dispensed even from this.

The second opinion, which limits the _necessitas medii_ to the New

Testament, lacks solid proof. The Scripture texts cited in its support

merely prove the efficaciousness of belief in Christ,(805) or the duty of

embracing that belief on the strength of the Apostolic preaching,(806) or,

finally, the impossibility of redemption except through the mediation of

Jesus;(807)—all truths which in themselves have nothing to do with the

question under discussion.

The third and most probable opinion is that even under the New Covenant,

explicit faith in Christ, and _a fortiori_ in the Divine Trinity, cannot

be regarded as an indispensable medium of justification and salvation, (1)

because St. Paul does not mention these two dogmas in the decisive

passage, Heb. XI, 6; and (2) because a supernatural act of justifying love

and contrition may be inspired by belief in the existence of God and

divine retribution; and (3) because this latter belief implicitly, by way

of desire (_fides in voto_), includes belief in Christ and the

Trinity.(808) Nevertheless it must be held that an adult who desires to be

received into the Church and is baptized in the name of the Most Holy

Trinity, is bound to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation by more

than a mere _necessitas praecepti_, namely, by what is technically called

_necessitas medii per accidens_, a necessity from which God dispenses only

in exceptional cases, when it is either physically or morally impossible

to elicit an act of explicit faith.(809) It is for this reason that the

Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office decided, February 28, 1703, that

missionaries are bound to explain to all adult converts who have the use

of reason, even though they be near death, those mysteries of the faith

which are necessary for salvation _necessitate medii_, especially the

Trinity and the Incarnation.(810)

Section 2. The Necessity Of Other Preparatory Acts Besides Faith

1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Martin Luther, to

quiet his conscience, evolved the notion that faith alone justifies and

that the Catholic doctrine of the necessity of good works is pharisaical

and derogatory to the merits of Jesus Christ. This teaching was

incorporated into the symbolic books of the Lutherans(811) and adopted by

Calvin.(812) It has been called one of the two basic errors of

Protestantism. The Tridentine Council solemnly condemns it as follows: “If

anyone saith that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as

to mean that nothing else is required to coöperate in order to obtain the

grace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be

prepared and disposed by the movement of his own will; let him be

anathema.”(813) Other acts that dispose or prepare the soul for

justification, according to the same Council, are: the fear of divine

justice; hope in God’s mercy; charity, which is the font of all

righteousness; detestation of sin, and penitence.(814)

2. REFUTATION OF THE SOLA FIDES THEORY.—The Lutheran theory involves an

open rupture with the traditional teaching of the Church and is positively

unscriptural. Luther himself felt this, as appears from his interpolation

of the word “alone” in Rom. III, 28 and his rejection of the entire

canonical Epistle of St. James.(815)

a) The teaching of the Bible in regard to the rôle played by good works in

the process of justification may be summarized as follows:

(1) A man may believe all that the Church teaches and yet be lost for want

of good works or because he has not the love of God; consequently, faith

alone does not justify or insure eternal salvation. Our Divine Saviour

Himself declares: “Not every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter

into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is

in heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.”(816) St. James

says: “Do you not see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith

only?”(817) And St. Paul: “If I should have all faith, so that I could

remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.”(818)

(2) Besides faith, justification requires certain other preparatory or

dispositive acts. There is, for example, the fear of divine justice. Cfr.

Ecclus. I, 28: “He that is without fear cannot be justified.”(819) Also,

hope in God’s mercy. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 24: “For we are saved by hope.”(820)

Again, charity. Cfr. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she

hath loved much.”(821) Furthermore, contrition or penitence. Cfr. Luke

XIII, 3: “Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise

perish.”(822) Finally, good works in general. Cfr. St. James II, 17: “So

faith also, if it have not works, is dead in itself.”(823) No one who

ponders these and similar texts can maintain, as Calvin and Melanchthon

did, that the good works mentioned merely accompany justification, for

they are unmistakably described as causes which dispose and prepare the

sinner for it.

(3) It is not faith alone that justifies, but faith informed and actuated

by charity. Cfr. Gal. V, 6: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision

availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh by

charity.”(824) The Greek text shows that the word _operatur_ in the

Vulgate must be taken passively, so that a more correct translation would

be: “... but faith effected or formed by charity.” But even if ἐνεργουμένη

were used as a deponent (ἐνεργεῖσθαι=_agere_, _operari_) the meaning would

be substantially the same, _i.e._ a dead faith, without charity, avails

nothing. Cfr. St. James II, 26: “For even as the body without the spirit

is dead, so also faith without works is dead.”(825)

In Rom. III, 28: “For we account a man to be justified by faith, without

the works of the law,”(826) Luther deliberately inserted the word “alone.”

The context shows that this is a falsification. The Apostle contrasts

justifying faith, not with those preparatory acts of salvation which

spring from it, but with the sterile “works of the law” (_i.e._ the Old

Testament), which, as such, possessed no more power to justify than the

good works of the heathen. Keeping this contrast in mind, it would not be

incorrect to say, and St. Paul might well have said, that “supernatural

faith alone (_i.e._ only) justifies, while the works of the law do not.”

But if faith be taken in contradistinction to the other acts operative in

the process of justification, such as fear, hope, contrition, love,—and

this is the sense in which Luther takes it,—then it is false and contrary

to the mind of St. Paul to say: “Faith alone justifies, nothing else is

required.” For in this sense faith is merely the beginning, the

foundation, the root of justification and cannot justify the sinner until

it has absorbed the other preparatory acts required by Holy Scripture and

transformed them into perfect love. This fact was already pointed out by

St. Augustine. “Unintelligent persons,” he says, “with regard to the

Apostle’s statement: ‘We conclude that a man is justified by faith without

the works of the law,’ have thought him to mean that faith is sufficient

for a man, even if he leads a bad life and has no good deeds to allege. It

is impossible that such a character should be deemed ‘a vessel of

election’ by the Apostle, who, after declaring that ‘in Christ Jesus

neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision,’ adds the

important remark: ‘but faith that worketh by charity.’ It is such faith

which separates the faithful children of God from unclean devils,—for even

these ‘believe and tremble,’ as the Apostle James says, but they do no

good works. Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just man

lives,—the faith which operates through love in such wise that God

recompenses it according to its works with eternal life.”(827)

There is another sense in which faith alone may be said to justify,

_viz._: if the term be taken to include all those things which God has

ordained for our salvation, that is to say, the sum-total of “revelation”

or “the true religion” as opposed to “heresy.” The term πίστις (_fides_)

is sometimes employed in this sense by the Fathers, but never in Sacred

Scripture.(828)

b) There is a unanimous and unbroken tradition in favor of the Catholic

doctrine. St. Polycarp writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: “... the

faith (πίστις) given you, which is the mother of us all when hope (ἐλπίς)

follows and love (ἀγάπη) goes before.”(829) St. Augustine teaches that

while faith is _per se_ separable from hope and love, it is ineffective

without them. “Man begins with faith, but the demons, too, believe and

tremble; to faith, therefore, must be added hope, and to hope, love.”(830)

And again: “Without love, faith can indeed exist, but it availeth

nothing.”(831) St. Gregory the Great, paraphrasing St. James, says:

“Perhaps some one will say to himself: I have believed, I shall be saved.

He speaks truly if he sustains faith by works. For that is true faith

which does not contradict by deeds what it asserts in words.”(832)

c) This teaching is in perfect conformity with reason.

α) No supernatural enlightenment is needed to perceive the intrinsic

propriety of a moral preparation for justification. Not only must the

sinner learn to know God as His supernatural end and the source of all

righteousness, but he must also be persuaded that it is his duty, with the

help of sufficient grace, to direct his will towards this final end.

Every tendency or movement presupposes a _terminus a quo_, from which it

starts, and a _terminus ad quem_, to which it tends. The movement of the

will in the process of justification, besides faith, demands a voluntary

withdrawal from sin (contrition, good resolutions) and an approach to

righteousness (hope, love, desire).(833)

This argument would have made no impression on Luther, since he bluntly

denied free-will in the moral order and regarded human nature as so

radically depraved by original sin as to be incapable of coöperating with

divine grace. In fact he compared man to a “log, stick or stone.” This

view was shared by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, whereas Osiander and

Butzer admitted that “inherent righteousness” is at least a partial factor

in justification. Melanchthon, in an endeavor to reconcile the

contradictions of this discordant system, unwittingly gave rise to the

so-called Synergist dispute. When Pfeffinger(834) undertook the defence of

free-will, many Lutheran theologians, especially of the University of

Jena, boldly attacked the log-stick-and-stone theory(835) and tried to

force their adversaries to admit that man is able to coöperate with grace.

The “Half-Melanchthonians,” as they were called, succeeded in smuggling

Synergism into the “Book of Torgau;”(836) but before the “Formulary of

Concord” was finally printed in the monastery of Bergen, near Magdeburg

(A. D. 1577), the strict Lutherans had eliminated that article as

heterodox and substituted for it the log-stick-and-stone theory as it

appears in the official symbols of the Lutheran Church. In the Syncretist

dispute, and through the efforts of the Pietists, this harsh teaching was

afterwards moderated. But what probably contributed most to the crumbling

of the system was the rapid growth of Socinianism and Rationalism among

the Lutherans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, with

the exception of a small band of “orthodox” Lutherans in Saxony and the

United States, Protestants no longer hold the log-stick-and-stone theory.

The school of Luther proclaimed it as the distinguishing tenet of

Protestantism, as “the criterion of a standing or falling

church,”(837)—and by this criterion the Lutheran Church has indeed fallen.

Common sense has led modern Protestants to admit that contrition and

penance are quite as necessary for justification as faith, an opinion

which, in the words of Dorner,(838) “comes dangerously near the Catholic

system.” In Scandinavia, according to Dr. Krogh-Tonning,(839) the Lutheran

Church has experienced a “quiet reformation” and now unconsciously defends

the Catholic doctrine of justification.(840)

β) As the sufficiency of the Bible without Tradition is the formal

principle of “orthodox” Protestantism, so justification by faith alone may

be said to be its material principle. The absurdity of the Lutheran

position is evident from the fact that these two principles are mutually

destructive. So far from teaching justification by faith alone, the Bible

inculcates the exact contrary, while its sufficiency as the source of

faith could be proved from its own pages, if at all, only by a vicious

circle.(841) Thus the whole Protestant system is based on contradiction.

The _sola fides_ theory is open to serious objection also from the ethical

point of view. It cannot be put into practice without grave danger. “Sin

lustily,” writes Luther, “but be yet more lusty in faith.”(842) The first

part at least of this injunction was promptly obeyed by his followers, and

the rapid deterioration of morals which followed was but a natural sequel

of the _sola fides_ theory. If faith alone were sufficient for

justification, it would make no difference what kind of life a man led,

for unbelief, _i.e._ the loss of fiduciary faith, would be the only sin.

No wonder this ethical antinomism of the Lutheran system, so radically

opposed to the teaching of St. James, was rejected by Hugo Grotius, George

Buller, and other honest Protestants.

Another weighty objection against the Lutheran theory of justification is

that it disregards the law of causation. According to Luther a man is

justified by the firm belief and trust that his sins are forgiven. This

“belief” is either true or false. If it is false, I can have no certainty

with regard to my salvation, but am deceiving myself. If true, it

presupposes that which it is to effect, in other words, it puts the cause

before the effect. An orthodox Lutheran theologian of the old school would

probably retort: My sins are actually forgiven by virtue of the atonement,

because all men without exception are redeemed through the merits of Jesus

Christ. If this be true, then why not be consistent and say: All men are

justified because all are redeemed, consequently there is no need of faith

and sacraments, and keeping the commandments is a matter of indifference!

It is at this point that the incompatibility of Luther’s teaching with the

Bible and sound ethics becomes most glaringly apparent. True, Luther

himself at times emphasized the necessity of good works; but this merely

proves that he had lucid intervals when his honest nature rebelled against

the inconsistency of his teaching.(843)

3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—The Council of Trent assigned to

faith its proper place in the process of justification,(844) and gave a

luminous and profound analysis of the process itself.(845) Scholastic

theology, in elaborating the teaching of Scripture and Tradition, drew a

distinction between _fides formata_, which truly justifies, and _fides

informis_, which falls short of justification.

a) As regards the intrinsic relation of (dogmatic) faith to other

preparatory acts in the process of justification, the Tridentine Council

declares: “Faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and

the root of all justification.”(846) Supernatural faith, therefore, is the

beginning of salvation, and not, as Harnack makes Luther say, “at once the

beginning, the middle, and the end,” because no man can be converted

unless he has believingly embraced God as his final goal. This faith is

preceded by certain preliminary conditions, of which the first is an

illumination of the intellect and a strengthening of the will, which

results in the _affectus credulitatis_ (_initia fidei_). For justifying

faith does not flash forth suddenly, like a _deus ex machina_, but

requires time for its development, as the history of many conversions

proves.(847)

Faith is called the “foundation” of justification because it not only

marks its beginning, but constitutes the basis upon which all subsequent

stages of the process rest. To exclude the mistaken notion that the

process of justification is a series of mechanical and disconnected acts,

the Council calls faith the “root” of justification, from which the other

preparatory acts spring organically, as the trunk of a tree from its root.

The psychological description of the whole process given by the Tridentine

Fathers, which even Harnack admits to be “a masterly piece of work,” runs

as follows: “Now they [adults] are disposed unto justice when, excited and

assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by hearing, they are freely

moved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has

revealed and promised,—and this especially, that God justifies the impious

by His grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ; and when,

understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves from

the fear of divine justice, whereby they are profitably agitated, to

consider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, confiding that God will

be propitious to them for Christ’s sake; and they begin to love Him as the

fountain of all justice, and are therefore moved against sins by a certain

hatred and detestation, to wit: by that penitence which must be performed

before Baptism; lastly, when they purpose to receive Baptism, to begin a

new life, and to keep the commandments of God....”(848) The four ordinary

stages in the process of justification, therefore, are: (1) From faith to

fear of divine justice; (2) from fear to hope; (3) from hope to initial

love;(849) (4) from initial love to contrition and a firm purpose of

amendment.(850) If contrition is dictated and transfused by perfect

love,(851) and the sinner has an explicit or at least implicit desire for

the Sacrament,(852) justification takes place at once. If, on the other

hand, the sinner’s sorrow is imperfect (_attritio_), he attains

justification only by actual reception of the Sacrament (Baptism or

Penance).(853)

b) Does conversion always follow this conciliary schema? No. The Council

did not mean to define that these acts must follow one another in strict

sequence or that they are one and all absolutely indispensable for

justification. It is certain, however, that the process invariably begins

with faith and ends with contrition accompanied by a firm purpose of

amendment. In exceptional cases (_e.g._ the Prodigal Son, Mary Magdalen)

perfect charity seems immediately to follow faith, and may then be said

virtually to include the intermediate stages of fear, hope, and

contrition. Yet this is not the usual way. Ordinarily faith elicits fear,

which in turn produces two kinds of hope—hope of forgiveness (_spes

veniae_) and hope in God (_spes theologica_), which marks the beginning of

charity (_amor concupiscentiae_). Contrition is always a _conditio sine

qua non_, because there can be no forgiveness of sin without sorrow for

it.(854) It is for this reason that, according to St. Thomas, explicit

contrition for mortal sins is necessary for justification even when there

is perfect charity, and the sufficiency of the so-called _poenitentia

virtualis_ is limited to venial offenses and such grievous sins as cannot

be remembered.(855) Fear, while not absolutely indispensable, is seldom

absent. Holy Scripture tells us that “the fear of God is the beginning of

wisdom,” and it is natural for the sinner seeking forgiveness to detest

his sins out of fear of divine justice before he attains to the motive of

perfect charity.(856)

c) Certain utterances of Scripture and the Fathers with regard to the

possibility of a “dead” faith(857) have led theologians to distinguish

between _fides informis_ and _fides formata_. _Fides informis_ is a dead

faith, devoid of charity, and without justifying power. The only faith

that can justify a man is that which is animated by charity and productive

of good works.(858) This is the _fides formata_ of the Schoolmen, which

includes all the preparatory acts enumerated by the Tridentine Council,

from fear to perfect charity. These acts, however, though united in the

_fides formata_, retain their respective independence, and can disappear

singly, one after another, as they came. Zwingli’s assertion that faith,

hope, and charity are identical, or at least inseparable, has been

expressly condemned by the Tridentine Council: “If any one saith that,

grace being lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that

the faith which remains, though it be no live faith, is not a true faith;

or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian; let him be

anathema.”(859)

READINGS:—Besides the respective chapters in the various

text-books, the student may consult: *A. Vega, _De Iustificatione

Doctrina Universa Libris XV Absolute Tradita_, Venice 1548

(reprinted at Cologne, 1572).—*Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione

Impii_, 1. V (ed. Fèvre, Vol. VI, pp. 149 sqq. Paris

1873).—*Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. VI sqq.—Becanus, _Theol.

Scholast._, “_De Gratia Habituali_,” Rouen 1658.—L. Nussbaum, _Die

Lehre der kath. Kirche über die Rechtfertigung_, München 1837.—C.

von Schätzler, _Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma von der Gnade

und das Wesen des christl. Glaubens_, Mainz 1867.—Oswald, _Die

Lehre von der Heiligung_, § 5, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—B.

Bartmann, _St. Paulus und St. Jakobus und die Rechtfertigung_,

Freiburg 1897.—L. Galey, _La Foi et les Oeuvres_, Montauban

1902.—W. Liese, _Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, sein Begriff und

Inhalt_, Freiburg 1902.—Card. Newman, _Lectures on the Doctrine of

Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900.—Hugh Pope, O. P.,

art. “Faith” in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. V.—J. Mausbach,

_Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_ (tr. by A. M.

Buchanan), pp. 150 sqq., New York 1914.—L. Labauche, S. S., _God

and Man_, pp. 203 sqq., N. Y. 1916.

On the teaching of the Reformers cfr. *Möhler, _Symbolik_, § 18

sqq., 11th ed., Mainz 1890 (English tr. by James Burton Robertson,

pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906); Ad. Harnack, _Lehrbuch der

Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1910;

Denifle-Weiss, O. P., _Luther und Luthertum in der ersten

Entwicklung_, Vol. II, Mainz 1909; H. Grisar, S. J., _Luther_,

Vol. I, Freiburg 1911 (English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913).

Chapter II. The State Of Justification

Though the term “justification” may be extended to the preparatory acts

that lead up to the state of justice, strictly speaking it signifies only

that decisive moment in which the sinner is cleansed from mortal sin by an

infusion of sanctifying grace. Hence a careful distinction must be made

between justification as an act (_actus iustificationis_) and

justification as an habitual state (_habitus iustificationis s. status

gratiae sanctificantis_). The transient act introduces a permanent state,

just as the Sacrament of Holy Orders constitutes a man in the sacerdotal

state or priesthood.

Both as an act and as a state justification possesses three distinct

properties; it is uncertain, unequal, and capable of being lost.

This gives us the basis for a division of the present Chapter into three

Sections: (1) On the Nature of Justification, (2) On Justifying, _i.e._

Sanctifying Grace, and (3) On the Properties of that Grace.

Section 1. The Nature Of Justification

Justification in the active sense (_iustificatio_, δικαίωσις) is defined

by the Tridentine Council as “a translation from that state wherein man is

born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and of the adoption

of the sons of God through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our

Saviour.”(860)

Justification, therefore, has both a negative and a positive element. The

positive element is interior sanctification through the merits of Jesus

Christ. The negative element consists in the forgiveness of sin. Though

these elements are objectively inseparable, the forgiveness of sin being

practically an effect of interior sanctification, yet we must treat them

separately in order to be able to refute more effectively the Lutheran

heresy that sin is not wiped out but merely “covered,” and that

justification consists in an external “imputation” of the righteousness of

Christ.

Article 1. The Negative Element Of Justification

1. THE HERESY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMERS AND THE TEACHING OF THE

CHURCH.—Luther held that human nature was radically depraved by original

sin(861) and that justification consists in this, that sin (original and

mortal) is no longer “imputed” to the sinner; that is to say, it is not

blotted out but merely “covered” by the merits of Christ.

a) Forgiveness of sins, therefore, according to Luther, consists simply in

their being no longer imputed.(862) This heresy was incorporated in the

Formula of Concord and other symbolical books of the Lutheran Church,(863)

and subsequently adopted by Calvin.(864)

b) The Catholic Church has always maintained that justification is a

renewal of the soul by which a man’s sins are blotted out and he becomes

truly just. This applies first of all to original sin. “If,” says the

Council of Trent, “anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus

Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is

remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and

proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only raised or

not imputed, let him be anathema.”(865) What it here defines in regard to

original sin, the Council elsewhere reaffirms in respect of mortal

sin.(866)

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY.—The theory thus solemnly condemned

by the Tridentine Fathers is unscriptural and opposed to Catholic

Tradition.

a) The teaching of the Bible on this point may be reduced to four distinct

heads.

(1) The remission of sin granted in the process of justification is a real

annihilation of guilt; that is to say, the sins remitted cease to exist in

the moral (though not, of course, in the historical) order. Cfr. Ps. L, 3:

“Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy; and according to

the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my iniquity.”(867) Is. XLIII,

25: “I am he that blot out thy iniquities.”(868) After God has blotted out

a sin, it no longer exists. Cfr. Is. XLIV, 22: “I have blotted out thy

iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist.”(869) Acts III, 19: “Be

penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted

out.”(870) Elsewhere God is said to “take away” sin. Cfr. 2 Kings XII, 13:

“The Lord also hath taken away thy sin.”(871) 1 Paral. XXI, 8: “I beseech

thee, take away the iniquity of thy servant.”(872) When He takes away sin,

it is really and truly blotted out. Cfr. Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “Who is a God

like to thee, who takest away iniquity?... He will put away our

iniquities, and he will cast all our sins into the bottom of the

sea.”(873) Ps. X, 15: “His sin shall be sought, and shall not be

found.”(874) Ps. CII, 12: “As far as the east is from the west, so far

hath he removed our iniquities from us.”(875) Consequently, when our

Divine Saviour said of Mary Magdalen: “Many sins are forgiven her,”(876)

He meant that her sins were completely blotted out and taken away.

(2) Justification washes the soul from iniquity and purifies the heart.

Cfr. Ps. L, 4: “Wash me yet more from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my

sin.”(877) Is. I, 16: “Wash yourselves, be clean.”(878) After one’s sins

are washed away, the heart is clean and pure. Cfr. Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “And

I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your

filthiness, ... and I will give you a new heart.”(879) 1 Cor. VI, 11: “And

such [fornicators, etc.] some of you were; but you are washed, but you are

sanctified, but you are justified.”(880) Spotless purity takes the place

of the impurity that previously defiled the soul of the sinner. Cfr. Ps.

L, 9: “Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed: thou

shalt wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow.”(881) Is. I, 18: “If

your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow: and if they

be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.”(882) No trace of sin

remains in the soul after it has been washed in the Precious Blood of

Christ. Apoc. I, 5: “... Jesus Christ, ... hath loved us, and washed us

from our sins in his own blood.”(883) 1 John I, 7: “... the blood of Jesus

Christ ... cleanseth us from all sin.”(884)

(3) Justification is an awakening of the sinner from death to life, a

transition from darkness to light. Cfr. 1 John III, 14: “We know that we

have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren; he that

loveth not, abideth in death.”(885) Col. II, 13: “And you, when you were

dead in your sins, ... he hath quickened together with him, forgiving you

all offences.”(886) Eph. V, 8: “For you were heretofore darkness, but now

light in the Lord.”(887)

(4) Baptism, in particular, completely removes all guilt. Cfr. Acts XXII,

16: “Rise up, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins.”(888) Hence, though

concupiscence remains, the soul has no longer in it anything damnable,

_i.e._ any trace of original or mortal sin. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 1: “There is

now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.”(889)

It requires no special acuteness to perceive that this Biblical teaching

is irreconcilably opposed to the Protestant theory of non-imputation. If,

as the Lutherans allege, God merely _declared_ the believer just,

justification would not blot out or take away sin, nor could it be

truthfully said that light and life take the place of death and darkness;

something deserving of condemnation would still remain in those that are

in Christ Jesus.(890)

There are a few Scriptural texts that seem to favor the Lutheran view, but

they must be interpreted in conformity with the general teaching of the

Bible as outlined above. Among these texts is Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: “Blessed

are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.

Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose

spirit there is no guile.”(891) The parallelism apparent in this verse

allows us to conclude that “covered” is used in the sense of “remitted”

and that “he to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin” is identical with the

man “in whose spirit there is no guile.” The text manifestly refers to a

real _forgiveness_ of sins, for any sin that God “covers” and ceases to

“impute,” must be blotted out and swept away, because “all things are

naked and open to the eyes” of the omniscient Creator.(892)

Another favorite text of the Lutheran theologians is Rom. VII, 17: “Now

then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.”(893) This

passage clearly refers to concupiscence, which remains in the sinner after

justification, but, according to Rom. VIII, 1 and James I, 14 sq., is not

truly and properly sin but merely called “sin”(894) by metonymy,

“because,” in the words of the Tridentine Council, “it is of sin and

inclines to sin.”(895)

b) The Fathers of the Church, both Greek and Latin, unanimously teach that

justification effects the forgiveness of sins.

St. Justin Martyr says: “By doing penance, all who desire it can obtain

mercy from God, and Scripture calls them blessed in saying: ‘Blessed is he

to whom God hath not imputed sin,’ which means that he receives

forgiveness of his sins from God, not as you, deceiving yourselves, and

others like you aver, that God does not impute [their] sin to them, though

they are [still] sinners.”(896) Clement of Alexandria likens Baptism to “a

bath in which sins are washed off.”(897) St. Gregory Nazianzen says: “It

is called Baptism [βαπτισμός, from βάπτειν, to immerse] because the sin is

buried in water, ... and a bath (λουτρόν), because it washes off.”(898)

St. Augustine indignantly opposes the erroneous opinion of the Pelagians

that Baptism does not take away sins but merely “trims them off.” “Who but

an unbeliever,” he exclaims, “can affirm this against the Pelagians? We

say, therefore, that Baptism gives remission of all sins and takes away

crimes, not merely trims them off (_radere_) in such wise that the roots

of all sins may be preserved in an evil flesh, as of hair trimmed on the

head, when the sins cut down may grow again.”(899) Pope St. Gregory the

Great seems almost to have foreseen the heresy of the Protestant

Reformers, for he says: “But if there are any who say that in Baptism sins

are forgiven as to outward appearance only, what can be more un-Catholic

than such preaching?... He who says that sins are not completely forgiven

in Baptism might as well say that the Egyptians did not perish in the Red

Sea. But if he admits that the Egyptians actually died [in the Red Sea],

let him also admit that of necessity sins completely die in Baptism.”(900)

c) The theological argument may be briefly formulated as follows: We can

imagine but two reasons why God should not truly forgive us our sins in

the process of justification: inability and unwillingness. To say that He

is _unable_ to forgive us our sins would be to assert that the remission

of sin involves a metaphysical impossibility. This no Protestant will

admit, because all believe that “nothing defiled shall enter into

heaven.”(901) To assert that God is _unwilling_ to forgive our sins would

be to contradict the plain teaching of Scripture, as set forth above.

Consequently there is no reason whatever for assuming that God does not

truly forgive us our sins in the process of justification. Furthermore, it

would be incompatible with His veracity and holiness to assume that He

merely declares the sinner to be “free from sin,” without actually

cleansing his soul. It would be a contradiction to assert that a man whom

the truthful and all-holy God has declared free from sin, remains steeped

in iniquity. Cfr. Prov. XVII, 15: “He that justifieth the wicked [_i.e._

absolves him from his sins], and he that condemneth the just, both are

abominable before God.”

According to Revelation the justification of the sinner is not a mere

change, with a privation for its _terminus a quo_(902) and an indifferent

form for its _terminus ad quem_, but involves a movement from extreme to

extreme, and hence the genesis of the one extreme must coincide with the

destruction of the other. Sin, being in contrary opposition to

righteousness, must depart when righteousness enters the soul.(903)

Article 2. The Positive Element Of Justification

1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE CHURCH.—Calvin held that justification

consists essentially and exclusively in the remission of sins.(904) The

other “Reformers” maintained that there must also be a positive element in

the process, but differed in determining its nature.

a) The ambiguous language employed by Luther and Melanchthon gave rise to

many different opinions, which agreed only in one point, that is, in

holding, contrary to Catholic teaching, that the positive element of

justification is not inward sanctification or inherent righteousness

(_i.e._ sanctifying grace). Probably the view most common among the

supporters of the Augsburg Confession was that the sinner, by a “fiduciary

apprehension” of God’s mercy, as proclaimed in the Gospel, “apprehends”

the extrinsic justice of Christ, and with it covers his sins, which are

thereupon no longer “imputed” to him. In other words, he is outwardly

accounted and declared righteous in the sight of God, though inwardly he

remains a sinner. With the exception of “_sola fides_” there was probably

no shibboleth in the sixteenth century so persistently dinned into the

ears of Catholics and Protestants alike as “_iustitia Christi extra nos_.”

It is found in the _Apologia_ written in defence of the Augsburg

Confession(905) and recurs in the Formula of Concord.(906) According to

the “orthodox” Lutheran view, therefore, justification on its positive

side is a purely forensic and outward imputation of the righteousness of

Christ, which the sinner seizes with the arm of faith and puts on like a

cloak to hide the wounds of his soul.(907)

b) Against this dismal heresy the Tridentine Council solemnly declared

that “Justification ... is not remission of sins merely, but also the

sanctification and renewal of the inward man through the voluntary

reception of the grace and of the gifts,”(908) and anathematized all those

who say that “men are justified either by the sole imputation of the

justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of

the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the

Holy Ghost and is inherent in them, or even that the grace whereby we are

justified is only the favor of God.”(909)

In thus defining the doctrine of the Church, the Council did not, however,

mean to deny that the sinner is in a true sense “justified by the justice

of Christ,”—in so far namely, as our Lord has merited for us the grace of

justification. He merely wished to emphasize the fact that a sinner is not

_formaliter_ justified by the imputation of Christ’s justice. For the sake

of greater clearness the various “causes” of justification are enumerated

as follows: “Of this justification the causes are these: the final cause

indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting;

while the efficient cause is a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies

gratuitously; ... but the meritorious cause is His most beloved

only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who ... merited justification

for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the Cross; ... the

instrumental cause is the Sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of

faith, without which no man was ever justified; lastly, the sole formal

cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that

whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed are

renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed, but are truly

called, and are, just.”(910)

So important did the distinction between the _causa meritoria_ and the

_causa formalis_ of justification appear to the Fathers of Trent, that

they made it the subject of a separate canon, to wit: “If anyone saith

that men are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us

to be justified; or that it is by that justice itself that they are

formally just; let him be anathema.”(911) Justification in the Catholic

sense, therefore, is not a mere outward imputation of the justice of

Christ, but a true inward renewal and sanctification wrought by a grace

intrinsically inhering in the soul. This grace theologians call the “grace

of justification.”

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION.—Nothing is so foreign

to both the spirit and the letter of Holy Scripture as the idea that

justification merely covers a man’s sins with a cloak of justice and

leaves him unsanctified within.

Justification is described in the Bible not only as a remission of

sins,(912) but likewise as the beginning of a new life,(913) a renewal of

the spirit,(914) a new creation,(915) a regeneration,(916) a supernatural

likeness of God,(917) etc. All these similes point to a permanent state of

sanctity in the soul of the just.

α) The Lutheran theory of imputation can be most effectively refuted by an

analysis of the Scriptural term “regeneration” (_regeneratio_,

ἀναγέννησις, παλιγγενεσία). “Unless a man be born again of water and the

Holy Ghost,” says our Divine Lord, “he cannot enter into the kingdom of

God.”(918) This spiritual rebirth wipes out sin and inwardly sanctifies

the soul. The regenerate sinner receives a new and godlike nature. That

this nature can be conceived in no other way than as a state of sanctity

and justice appears clearly from Tit. III, 5 sqq.: “Not by the works of

justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us, by

the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom he hath

poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour: that,

being justified by His grace, we may be heirs, according to the hope of

life everlasting.”(919) Both text and context show that the Apostle is

here speaking of the justification of adult sinners in Baptism, which he

describes as a “laver of regeneration and renovation” resulting in an

“outpouring of the Holy Ghost.” These phrases plainly denote a positive

quality of the soul as well as a permanent interior grace. Regeneration

consists in the remission of sin through Baptism, and also, more

particularly, in man being made like God, _i.e._ becoming a child of

God,(920) while “renovation” means “putting off the old man”(921) and

“putting on the new.”(922) The “outpouring of the Holy Ghost” effected by

Baptism is not, of course, an outpouring of the Hypostasis of the Third

Person of the Trinity, but of created grace, which re-forms the sinner and

makes him just.(923) This justifying grace must not be conceived as an

actual grace, much less as a series of actual graces, for it is not given

us merely as an aid in the performance of some particular act, but as a

new nature. Regeneration and renovation denote a state of being, as we can

plainly see in the case of baptized infants. It is for this reason that

the Apostle speaks of it as a lasting state;—that which theologians call

the _status gratiae sanctificantis_.(924)

Closely akin to the notion of “regeneration” is that of “re-creation.”

Justification renews the sinner inwardly and makes of him, so to speak, a

new creature, which has sloughed off sin and become just and holy in the

sight of God. Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17: “If then any be in Christ a new creature,

the old things are passed away, behold all things are made new.”(925) This

is all the more true since re-creation effects an “incorporation of man

with Christ,” and is closely connected with “regeneration of God.” Cfr.

James I, 18: “For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of

truth, that we might be some beginning of his creature.”(926) A comparison

with Gal. VI, 15 and Gal. V, 6 fully establishes it as a Biblical truth

that in the process of justification the sinner, through faith informed by

charity, is changed into a new creature. “For in Christ Jesus,” says St.

Paul, “neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a

new creature.”(927) And again: “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision

availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by

charity.”(928) In both these texts the Jewish rite of circumcision is

rejected as useless and contrasted with justification, which by means of

the _fides formata_ gives birth to a “new creature.” This is incompatible

with the Protestant notion that a man is justified by being declared

righteous in the sight of God, though he remains inwardly unchanged.(929)

β) The Lutherans vainly appeal to the fact that Holy Scripture employs the

word “justify”(930) for the purpose of declaring a man to be just in a

purely forensic sense, as in Is. V, 23: “Who justify the wicked for

gifts.” This proves nothing against the Catholic doctrine, which is based

entirely on texts that exclude the judicial meaning of the term and

plainly refer to inward sanctification.(931)

The word “justification” also occurs in two other meanings in the Bible.

Ps. CXVIII, 8 and 26 it stands in the plural for the “law”: “I will keep

thy justifications;”(932) and “Teach me thy justifications.”(933) Apoc.

XXII, 11 and in a few other passages it signifies “growth” in interior

holiness, which theologians call _iustificatio secunda_.(934)

The Lutherans are equally unfortunate in maintaining that St. Paul

countenances their theory when he speaks of “putting on Christ.” Cfr. Gal.

III, 27: “For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on

Christ.”(935) The Apostle in employing this simile does not mean to say

that justification consists in putting on an outward cloak of grace to

cover sins which inwardly endure, but precisely the contrary, _viz._: that

the sinner by being justified is inwardly cleansed from sin and becomes a

new creature and a child of God. This interpretation is supported by

various parallel texts(936) and by the staple of St. Paul’s teaching.

Another passage which the Lutherans cite in their favor is 1 Cor. I, 30:

“... who [Christ Jesus] of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and

sanctification, and redemption.”(937) Christ is made unto us justice and

sanctification, in what sense? Manifestly in the same sense in which He is

made unto us wisdom of God, that is to say, in so far as He imparts to us

wisdom, which thereupon becomes our own, but not in the sense that the

wisdom of Christ is outwardly imputed to us. Note that St. Paul in this

and many other passages of his Epistles merely wishes to emphasize the

gratuity of the Redemption and of grace to the exclusion of all natural

merit on the part of man.(938)

b) As regards the teaching of the Fathers, the “Reformers” themselves

admitted that it was against them.(939)

We read in the Epistle of Barnabas, which was probably composed about A.

D. 100:(940) “Since then He made us new by the remission of sins, he made

us another type, that we should have the soul of children, as though He

were creating us afresh.”

The reason why St. Paul calls Baptism the “laver of regeneration” rather

than the laver of forgiveness, is explained by St. John Chrysostom(941) as

follows: “Because it [Baptism] not only remits our sins and wipes out our

misdeeds, but accomplishes all this in such a way as if we were born

anew;(942) for it entirely re-creates and re-forms us.”(943)

St. Ambrose regards innocence as the positive element of justification:

“After this [_i.e._ Baptism] you received a white robe, to indicate that

you stripped off the vesture of sin and put on the chaste garments of

innocence.”(944)

Harnack claims that St. Augustine first stemmed the current dogmatic

tradition and reshaped it by going back to St. Paul. Bellarmine(945)

refuted this audacious assertion long before it was rehashed by the German

rationalist. The Council of Trent was so thoroughly imbued with the

teaching of Augustine that its decrees and canons on justification read as

though they were lifted bodily from his writings. The great “Doctor of

Grace” flatly contradicts the Protestant theory of imputation in such

utterances as these: “He [St. Paul] does not say, ‘the righteousness of

man,’ ... but ‘the righteousness of God,’—meaning not that whereby He is

Himself righteous, but that with which He endows man when He justifies the

ungodly.... The righteousness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ, that is,

by the faith wherewith one believes in Christ. For _here_ is not meant the

faith with which Christ Himself believes, just as _there_ was not meant

the righteousness whereby God is Himself righteous. Both no doubt are

ours; but yet they are called [in one case] God’s, and [in the other]

Christ’s, because it is by their bounty that these gifts are bestowed upon

man.”(946) Again: “When righteousness is given to us, it is not called our

own righteousness, but God’s, because it becomes ours only so that we have

it from God.”(947) Again: “The grace of God is called the righteousness of

God through our Lord Jesus Christ, not that by which the Lord is just, but

that by which He justifies those whom from unrighteous He makes

righteous.”(948) Again: “The love of God is said to be shed abroad in our

hearts, not because He loves us, but because He makes us lovers of

Himself; just as the righteousness of God is used in the sense of our

being made righteous by His gift.”(949) According to St. Augustine,

therefore, justification culminates in a true sanctification of the soul.

“When he [St. Paul] says: ‘We are transformed into the same image,’ he

assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it ‘the

same,’ he means that very image which we see in the glass,... and that we

pass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright,... and this

[human] nature, being the most excellent among things created, is changed

from a form that is defaced into a form that is beautiful, when it is

justified by its Creator from ungodliness.”(950)

The Augustinian passages which we have quoted (and they are not by any

means all that could be quoted) enumerate the distinguishing marks of

sanctifying grace in so far as it is the formal cause of

justification.(951)

c) The argument from Revelation can be reinforced by certain philosophical

considerations which show the absurdity of the imputation theory from the

standpoint of common sense.

A man outwardly justified but inwardly a sinner would be a moral monster,

and Almighty God would be guilty of an intrinsic contradiction were He to

regard and treat such a one as just. This contradiction is not removed but

rather intensified by the Lutheran appeal to the extraneous justice of

Christ.(952)

The incongruity of the Lutheran doctrine of justification becomes fully

apparent from the consequences which it involves, to wit: (1) all

Christians without distinction would possess exactly the same degree of

sanctity and justice; (2) justification once obtained by fiduciary faith

could not be lost except by the sin of unbelief; and (3) children would

not be justified by Baptism because they are not sufficiently advanced in

the use of reason to enable them to “apprehend” the external righteousness

of Christ. The first of these inferences runs counter to common sense and

experience. The second, which Luther clothed in the shameful exhortation,

“_Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et

mille stupra_,”(953) is repugnant to the teaching of Scripture and

destructive of morality.(954) The third consistently led to the rejection

of infant baptism by the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other Protestant

sects.

3. SANCTIFYING GRACE THE SOLE FORMAL CAUSE OF JUSTIFICATION.—In declaring

that “inherent grace” is the “sole formal cause of justification,” the

Council of Trent(955) defined it as an article of faith that sanctifying

grace of itself is able to produce all the formal effects of

justification, _e.g._ forgiveness of sins, the sanctification of the

sinner, his adoption by God, etc.,(956) and consequently requires no

supplementary or contributory causes. In other words, justification is

wholly and fully accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace.

a) It appears from the discussions preceding its sixth session that the

Tridentine Council not only meant to condemn the heretical contention of

Butzer that “inherent grace” must be supplemented by the “imputed justice

of Christ” as the really essential factor of justification,(957) but also

wished to reject the view of divers contemporary Catholic theologians(958)

that “intrinsic righteousness” is inadequate to effect justification

without a special _favor Dei externus_.(959) In this the Fathers of the

Council were on Scriptural ground. The principal effects of

justification,—forgiveness of sins and internal sanctification,—are both

produced by sanctifying grace. Sacred Scripture is perfectly clear on this

point. It represents sin as opposed to grace in the same way in which

darkness is opposed to light,(960) life to death,(961) the new man to the

old.(962) The one necessarily excludes the other. Sanctifying grace and

sin cannot co-exist in the same subject.

Internal sanctification may be defined as a permanent, vital union with

God, by which the soul becomes righteous and holy in His sight and obtains

a claim to Heaven. That this is also a function of sanctifying grace

appears from those Scriptural texts which treat of the positive element of

justification.(963) With this doctrine Tradition is in perfect accord, and

consequently the Fathers of Trent were right in teaching as they did, in

fact they could not have taught otherwise.(964)

b) While all Catholic theologians admit the incompatibility of grace and

sin in the same subject, they differ as to the kind and degree of

opposition existing between the two. Some hold that this opposition is

purely moral, others that it is physical, again others that it is

metaphysical.

α) Nominalists(965) and Scotists(966) before the Tridentine decision

maintained that the distinction between sanctifying grace and (original or

mortal) sin is based on a free decree of the Almighty, and therefore

purely moral. God, they held, by a _favor externus superadditus_,

externally supplies what sanctifying grace internally lacks, just as a

government’s stamp raises the value of a coin beyond the intrinsic worth

of the bullion. Followed to its legitimate conclusions, this shallow

theory means that sanctifying grace is of itself insufficient to wipe out

sin, and that, but for the superadded divine favor, grace and sin might

co-exist in the soul. This is tantamount to saying that justification

requires a twofold formal cause, _viz._: sanctifying grace and a _favor

Dei superadditus_,—which runs counter to the teaching of Trent. Henno

tries to escape this objection by explaining that the _favor Dei

acceptans_ appertains not to the formal but merely to the efficient cause

of justification. But this contention is manifestly untenable. Sanctifying

grace is either able to wipe out sin, or it is unable: if it is unable to

produce this effect, the _favor Dei acceptans_ must be part of the _causa

formalis_ of justification, and then, in Henno’s hypothesis, we should

have a _duplex causa formalis_, which contradicts the Tridentine decree.

If, on the other hand, sanctifying grace is able to wipe out sin without

any _favor superadditus_, then the Scotistic theory has no _raison

d’être_.

β) From what we have said it follows that there must be at least a

physical contrariety between grace and sin. The difference between

physical and metaphysical opposition may be illustrated by the example of

fire and water. These two elements are incompatible by a law of nature.

But as there is no metaphysical contradiction between them, Almighty God

could conceivably bring them together. It is this physical kind of

opposition that Suarez and a few of his followers assume to exist between

grace and sin. Absolutely speaking, they say, there is no intrinsic

contradiction in the assumption that God could preserve the physical

entity of sanctifying grace in a soul guilty of mortal sin.(967) In so far

as this school admits the existence of an internal opposition, which

actually prevents original or mortal sin from ever co-existing in the soul

with justifying grace, its teaching may be said to be acceptable to all

Catholic theologians. The Scotistic view, on account of its

incompatibility with the teaching of the Tridentine Council, is no longer

held.

It may be questioned, however, whether Suarez goes far enough in this

matter, and whether the opposition between grace and sin could really be

overcome by a miracle. The simultaneous co-existence of grace and sin

seems to involve an absolute, _i.e._ metaphysical, contradiction.

γ) This is what the Thomists maintain with the majority of Jesuit

theologians.(968) As some subtle objections have been raised against this

view, it cannot be accepted as theologically certain; but it undoubtedly

corresponds better than its opposite to the spirit and letter of

Scripture. The Bible, as we have already pointed out, likens the

opposition existing between grace and sin to that between life and

death,(969) justice and injustice, Christ and Belial, God and an

idol.(970) But these are contradictories, _ergo_.(971) The same conclusion

can be reached by arguing from the character of sanctifying grace as a

_participatio divinae naturae_.(972) If grace is a participation in the

divine nature, it must be opposed to sin in the same way in which God

Himself is opposed to it. Now God as the All-Holy One is metaphysically

opposed to sin; consequently, the same kind of opposition must exist

between sanctifying grace and sin.

It is alleged against this teaching that between habitual grace and

habitual sin there is merely a disparate opposition, _i.e._ that of a

physical to a moral form, the concepts of which are not mutually

exclusive. But sanctifying grace is more than a physical ornament of the

soul; it is an ethical form which has for its essential function to render

the soul holy and righteous in the sight of God.(973)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, and the

commentators, especially Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 7, art. 1

sqq.; *Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, l. II (_Opera Omnia_, ed.

Fèvre, Vol. VI, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1873).

Besides the current text-books cfr. *Jos. Wieser, _S. Pauli

Apostoli Doctrina de Iustificatione_, Trent 1874; H. Th. Simar,

_Die Theologie des hl. Paulus_, 2nd ed., §33 sqq. Freiburg 1883.

On the Protestant notion of justification cfr. Möhler, _Symbolik_,

§10 sqq., Mainz 1890 (Robertson’s translation, pp. 82 sqq., 5th

ed., London 1906); _Realenzyklopädie für prot. Theologie_, Vol.

XVI, 3rd ed., pp. 482 sqq., Leipzig 1905 (summarized in English in

the _New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge_, Vol.

VI, pp. 275 sqq., New York 1910); Card. Newman, _Lectures on the

Doctrine of Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900; J.

Mausbach, _Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_, New York

1914, pp. 150 sqq.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of

Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 246 sqq., 464 sq., 470 sqq.

Section 2. Justifying Or Sanctifying Grace

Sanctifying grace is defined by Deharbe as “an unmerited, supernatural

gift, imparted to the soul by the Holy Ghost, by which we are made just,

children of God, and heirs of Heaven.” As it makes sinners just,

sanctifying grace is also called justifying, though this appellation can

not be applied to the sanctification of our first parents in Paradise or

to that of the angels and the sinless soul of Christ. Justification, as we

have shown, consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace, and hence it is

important that we obtain a correct idea of the latter. We will therefore

consider (1) The Nature of Sanctifying Grace, (2) Its Effects in the Soul,

and (3) Its Supernatural Concomitants.

Article 1. The Nature Of Sanctifying Grace

1. SANCTIFYING GRACE A “PERMANENT QUALITY” OF THE SOUL.—Having no

intuitive knowledge of sanctifying grace, we are obliged, in order to

obtain an idea of its true nature, to study its effects, as made known to

us by Revelation. Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church do,

however, enable us to form certain well-defined conclusions, of which the

most important is that sanctifying grace must be conceived as a permanent

quality (_qualitas permanens_) of the soul. If it is a permanent quality,

sanctifying grace cannot be identical with actual grace or with “uncreated

grace,” _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost.

a) In conformity with such Biblical expressions as “the new life,”

“renovation of the spirit,” “regeneration,” “divine sonship,” etc., the

Council of Trent defines justifying grace as a supernatural something

“infused” into and “inherent” in the soul. Both ideas denote a permanent

state, not a mere transient act or the result of such acts. “The charity

of God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those that are

justified, and is inherent therein.”(974) “That justice which is called

ours, because we are justified from its being inherent in us, that same is

(the justice of God) because it is infused into us by God, through the

merit of Christ.”(975) “If any one saith that men are justified ... to the

exclusion of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their

hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them,... let him be

anathema.”(976) Hence Justification is defined by the Fathers of Trent as

“a translation ... to the state of grace and adoption of the sons of

God.”(977)

Before the Tridentine Council a number of theologians held that

sanctifying grace consists in some particular actual grace or in a

consecutive series of actual graces. This view is incompatible with the

definition just quoted; in fact Suarez, Bellarmine, Ripalda, and others

regard it as positively heretical or at least intolerably rash. During the

preliminary debates at Trent some of the Fathers asked for an express

declaration of the Council to the effect that justification is wrought by

the instrumentality of an infused habit; but their request was set aside

on the ground that the nature of justifying grace as a stable habit is

sufficiently indicated by the word “_inhaeret_.”(978)

That sanctifying grace is a permanent state of the soul may also be

inferred from the Catholic teaching that the grace which Baptism imparts

to children does not differ essentially from that which it imparts to

adults. True, this teaching was not always regarded as certain;(979) but

at the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, A. D. 1311, Pope Clement V declared

it to be “the more probable opinion,”(980) and it was rendered absolutely

certain by the Tridentine decision that infant Baptism results not only in

the remission of sins, but likewise in an infusion of sanctifying grace.

This being so, there can be no essential difference between the

justification of children and that of adults. Now it cannot be actual

grace which renders children righteous in the sight of God, for they are

unable to avail themselves of actual grace on account of the undeveloped

state of their intellect. The grace that Baptism imparts to them is

consequently a _gratia inhaerens et informans_, that is, a permanent state

of grace; and it must be the same in adults.(981)

Peter Lombard(982) identified sanctifying grace with the _gratia

increata_, _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost. This notion was combatted

by St. Thomas(983) and implicitly rejected by the Tridentine Council when

it declared that sanctifying grace inheres in the soul and may be

increased by good works.(984) To say that the Holy Ghost is poured forth

in the hearts of men, or that He may be increased by good works, would

evidently savor of Pantheism. The Holy Ghost pours forth sanctifying grace

and is consequently not the formal but the efficient cause of

justification.(985)

b) The _gratia inhaerens permanens_ is not a mere relation or _denominatio

extrinseca_, but a positive entity productive of real effects,(986) and

must consequently be conceived either as a substance or as an accident. We

have shown that it is not identical with the uncreated substance of the

Holy Ghost. Neither can it be a created substance. The idea of an

intrinsically supernatural created substance involves a

contradiction.(987) Moreover, sanctifying grace in its nature and purpose

is not an entity independently co-existing with the soul but something

physically inherent in it. Now, a thing which has its existence by

inhering in some other thing is in philosophic parlance an “accident.” St.

Thomas expressly teaches that, “since it transcends human nature, grace

cannot be a substance nor a substantial form, but is an accidental form of

the soul itself.”(988) Agreeable to this conception is the further

Thomistic teaching that sanctifying grace is not directly created by God,

but drawn (_educta_) from the _potentia obedientialis_ of the soul.(989)

Not even the Scotists, though they held grace to be created out of

nothing(990) claimed that it was a new substance.

An accident that inheres in a substance permanently and physically is

called a quality (_qualitas_, ποιότης). Consequently, sanctifying grace

must be defined as a supernatural quality of the soul. This is the express

teaching of the Roman Catechism: “Grace ... is a divine quality inherent

in the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light that effaces

all the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and

more beautiful.”(991)

2. SANCTIFYING GRACE AN INFUSED HABIT.—Sanctifying grace may more

specifically, though with a lesser degree of certainty, be described as a

habit (_habitus_). Being entitatively supernatural, this habit must be

infused or “drawn out” by the Holy Ghost.

a) Aristotle(992) distinguishes four different sets of qualities: (1)

habit and disposition; (2) power and incapacity; (3) _passio_ (the power

of causing sensations) and _patibilis qualitas_ (result of the

modification of sense); (4) figure and circumscribing form (of extended

bodies). As sanctifying grace manifestly cannot come under one of the

three last-mentioned heads, it must be either a habit or a disposition.

Habit denotes a permanent and comparatively stable quality, by which a

substance, considered as to its nature or operation, is well or ill

adapted to its natural end.(993) As a permanently inhering quality,

sanctifying grace must be a habit. Hence its other name, “habitual grace.”

The Scholastics draw a distinction between entitative and operative

habits. An operative habit (_habitus operativus_) gives not only the power

(_potentia_) to act, but also a certain facility, and may be either good,

bad, or indifferent. An entitative habit (_habitus entitativus_) is an

inherent quality by which a substance is rendered permanently good or bad,

_e.g._ beauty, ugliness, health, disease.

Philosophy knows only operative habits. But sanctifying grace affects the

very substance of the soul. Hence the supplementary theological category

of entitative habits. “Grace,” says St. Thomas, “belongs to the first

species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit, because

it is not immediately ordained to action, but to a kind of spiritual

being, which it produces in the soul.”(994) There is another reason why

grace cannot be called a habit in the philosophical sense of the term:—it

supplies no acquired facility to act. This consideration led Suarez to

abstain altogether from the use of the term “habit” in connection with

grace,(995) and induced Cardinal Bellarmine to describe sanctifying grace

as a _qualitas per modum habitus_,(996) by which phrase he wished to

indicate that it imparts a supernatural perfection of being rather than a

facility to act. To obviate these and similar subtleties the Council of

Trent defined sanctifying grace simply as a permanent quality.

Nevertheless scientific theology employs the term _habitus_ because it has

no other philosophical category ready to hand. This defect in the

Aristotelian system is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that

besides the supernatural, there are distinctly natural qualities which

“belong to the first species,” though they impart no facility to act but

merely a disposition to certain modes of being, _e.g._ beauty, health,

etc.

There is also a positive reason which justifies the definition of

sanctifying grace as a habit. It is that grace imparts to the soul, if not

the facility, at least the power to perform supernaturally meritorious

acts, so that it is really more than a _habitus entitativus_, namely, a

_habitus_ (at least remotely) _operativus_.(997)

b) The Scholastic distinction between native and acquired habits does not

apply in the supernatural domain, because the supernatural by its very

definition can never be either a part or an acquisition of mere

nature.(998) It follows from this that supernatural habits, both

entitative and operative, can be imparted to the human soul in no other

way than by infusion (or excitation) from above. Hence the name _habitus

infusus_. When the Holy Ghost infuses sanctifying grace, the _habitus

entitativus_ imparts to the soul a supernatural principle of being, while

the _habitus operativus_ confers upon it a supernatural power, which by

faithful coöperation with (actual) grace may be developed into a facility

to perform salutary acts. Hence, if we adopt the division of habits into

entitative and operative, sanctifying grace must be defined first as an

entitative habit (_habitus entitativus_), because it forms the groundwork

of permanent righteousness, sanctity, divine sonship, etc.; and, secondly,

as an infused habit, because it is not born in the soul and cannot be

acquired by practice. This view is in accord with Sacred Scripture, which

describes the grace of justification as a divine seed abiding in man,(999)

a treasure carried in earthen vessels,(1000) a regeneration by which the

soul becomes the abode of God(1001) and a temple of the Holy Ghost.(1002)

3. THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE ALLEGED IDENTITY OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND

CHARITY.—As justifying grace and theological love (charity) are both

infused habits, the question arises as to their objective identity. The

answer will depend on the solution of the problem, just treated, whether

sanctifying grace is primarily an entitative or an operative habit. Of

theological love we know that it is essentially an operative habit, being

one, and indeed the chief of the “three theological virtues.” What we have

said in the preceding paragraph will enable the reader to perceive, at the

outset, that there is a real distinction between grace and charity, and

that consequently the two can not be identical.

a) Nevertheless there is an imposing school of theologians who maintain

the identity of grace with charity. They are Scotus(1003) and his

followers,(1004) Cardinal Bellarmine,(1005) Molina, Lessius, Salmeron,

Vasquez, Sardagna, Tournely, and others. Their principal argument is that

Holy Scripture ascribes active justification indiscriminately to

theological love and sanctifying grace, and that some of the Fathers

follow this example. Here are a few of the Scriptural texts quoted in

favor of this opinion. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her, because

she hath loved much.”(1006) 1 Pet. IV, 8: “Charity covereth a multitude of

sins.”(1007) 1 John IV, 7: “Every one that loveth is born of God.”(1008)

St. Augustine seems to identify the two habits in such passages as the

following: “Inchoate love, therefore, is inchoate righteousness; ... great

love is great righteousness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.”(1009)

According to the Tridentine Council, “the justification of the impious”

takes place when “the charity of God is poured forth ... in the hearts of

those that are justified, and is inherent therein.”(1010) It is argued

that, if charity and grace produce the same effects, they must be

identical as causes, and there can be at most a virtual distinction

between them. This argument is strengthened by the observation that

sanctifying grace and theological love constitute the supernatural life of

the soul and the loss of either entails spiritual death.

These arguments prove that grace and charity are inseparable, but nothing

more. All the Scriptural and Patristic passages cited can be explained

without recourse to the hypothesis that they are identical. Charity is not

superfluous alongside of sanctifying grace, because the primary object of

grace is to impart supernatural being, whereas charity confers a special

faculty which enables the intellect and the will to elicit supernatural

salutary acts.

b) The majority of Catholic theologians(1011) hold with St. Thomas(1012)

and his school that grace and charity, while inseparable, are really

distinct, sanctifying grace as a _habitus entitativus_ imparting to the

soul a supernatural being, whereas charity, being purely a _habitus

operativus_, confers a supernatural power.

Let us put the matter somewhat differently. Grace inheres in the substance

of the soul, while charity has its seat in one of its several faculties.

Inhering in the very substance of the soul, grace, by a physical or moral

power, produces the three theological virtues—faith, hope, and love. “As

the soul’s powers, which are the wellsprings of its acts, flow from its

essence,” says the Angelic Doctor, “so the theological virtues flow from

grace into the faculties of the soul and move them to act.”(1013) And St.

Augustine: “Grace precedes charity.”(1014)

This is a more plausible view than the one we have examined a little

farther up, and it can claim the authority of Scripture, which, though it

occasionally identifies the effects of grace and charity, always clearly

distinguishes the underlying habits. Cfr. 2 Cor. XIII, 13: “The grace of

our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God.”(1015) 1 Tim. I 14: “The

grace of our Lord hath abounded exceedingly with faith and love.”(1016)

Furthermore, “regeneration” and “new-creation” in Biblical usage affect

not only the faculties of the soul, but its substance. Finally, many

councils consistently distinguish between _gratia_ and _caritas_ (_dona_,

_virtutes_)—a distinction which has almost the force of a proof that grace

and charity are not the same thing.(1017) These councils cannot have had

in mind a purely virtual distinction, because theological love presupposes

sanctifying grace in exactly the same manner as a faculty presupposes a

substance or nature in which it exists. The Roman Catechism expressly

designates the theological virtues as “concomitants of grace.”(1018)

The question nevertheless remains an open one, as neither party can fully

establish its claim, and the Church has never rendered an official

decision either one way or the other.(1019)