The gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though God
distributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men without
exception, because He wills all to be saved.
This divine “will to save” (_voluntas Dei salvifica_) may be regarded in
relation either to the wayfaring state or to the _status termini_.
Regarded from the first-mentioned point of view it is a merciful will
(_voluntas misericordiae_) and is generally called first or antecedent
will (_voluntas prima s. antecedens_) or God’s salvific will (_voluntas
Dei salvifica_) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to
the _status termini_, it is a just will, as God rewards or punishes each
creature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will
(_voluntas secunda s. consequens_) is called “predestination” in so far as
it rewards the just, and “reprobation” in so far as it punishes the
wicked.
God’s “will to save” may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere
desire to justify all men and make them supernaturally happy. As _voluntas
antecedens_ it is conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man;
as _voluntas consequens_, on the other hand, it is absolute, because God
owes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his
deserts.(464)
Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of
God’s will to save; (2) Of the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as the will to
give sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of
predestination, and (4) Of reprobation.
Article 1. The Universality Of God’s Will To Save
Although God’s will to save all men is practically identical with His will
to redeem all,(465) a formal distinction must be drawn between the two,
(a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either
is supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen
angels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, _viz._
the fate of unbaptized children.
*Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined,
but of all the faithful without exception.*
This proposition embodies an article of faith.
Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who
heretically maintain that God wills to save none but the predestined.
Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: “If any one saith that the
grace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined unto
life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive
not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him
be anathema.”(466)
The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died exclusively for the
predestined,(467) was censured as “heretical” by Pope Innocent X. Hence it
is of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are
these “others”? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: “[Christ]
descended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,”(468) it is
certain that at least all the faithful are included in the saving will of
God. We say, “at least all the faithful,” because in matter of fact the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we
shall show further on.(469)
a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of passages that God
wills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus
Himself says in regard to the Jews: Matth. XXIII, 37: “Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent
unto thee, how often would I (_volui_) have gathered together thy
children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou
wouldst not (_noluisti_).” Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our
Lord’s earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the
instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the
refusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the
New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (III, 16): “God so loved
the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in
him(470) may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” However, since
many who believe in Christ do actually perish,(471) the divine _voluntas
salvifica_, in principle, extends not only to the predestined, but to all
the faithful, _i.e._ to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism.
b) The teaching of the Fathers can be gathered from the quotations given
under Thesis II, _infra_.
c) The theological argument may be briefly summarized as follows: God’s
will to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (_filiatio
adoptiva_), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity.
Now, some who were once in the state of grace are eternally lost.
Consequently, God also wills the salvation of those among the faithful who
do not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not
predestined.
*Thesis II: God wills to save every human being.*
This proposition is _fidei proxima saltem_.
Proof. The existence of original sin is no reason why God should exclude
some men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the
Calvinistic “Infralapsarians.” Our thesis is so solidly grounded on
Scripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call it an
article of faith.
a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstration to two classical
passages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.
α) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God’s omnipotence, says of His
mercy: “But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things,
and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou
lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast
made.... Thou sparest all, because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest
souls.”(472)
In this text the mercy of God is described as universal. _Misereris
omnium, parcis omnibus_. This universality is based (1) on His omnipotence
(_quia omnia potes_), which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally
boundless, must therefore include all men without exception. The
universality of God’s mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship
and dominion (_quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia quae fecisti_). As there is
no creature that does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He does
not love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of God’s
mercy in the passage quoted is based (3) on His love for souls (_qui amas
animas_). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult,
Christian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. Consequently the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ is universal, not only in a moral, but in the
physical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of
Adam.
β) 1 Tim. II, 2 sqq.: “I desire therefore, first of all, that
supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all
men.... For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour,
who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the
truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man
Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.”(473)
The Apostle commands us to pray “for all men,” because this practice is
“good and acceptable in the sight of God.” Why is it good and acceptable?
Because God “will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of
the truth.” In other words, God’s will to save is universal.
The question arises: Is the universality of the divine _voluntas
salvifica_, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical,
admitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold
reason given by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediatorship of
Christ, and the universality of the Redemption. (1) “For there is [but]
one God.”(474) As truly, therefore, as God is the God of all men without
exception, is each and every man included in the divine _voluntas
salvifica_. (2) “There is [but] ... one mediator of God and men, the man
Christ Jesus.” The human nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is
common to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his
mediator.(475) (3) Christ “gave himself a redemption [_i.e._ died] for
all.” That is to say, God’s will to save is co-extensive with His will to
redeem. The latter is universal,(476) consequently also the former.(477)
b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their
teaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated
that they regarded the truth therein set forth as divinely revealed.
Passaglia(478) has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no
less than two hundred authorities.
α) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen citations. St. Ambrose
declares that God wills to save all men. “He willed all to be His own whom
He established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants
even those who flee, and does not will that those in hiding should
perish.”(479) St. Gregory of Nazianzus holds God’s _voluntas salvifica_ to
be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atonement. “The law,
the prophets, and the sufferings of Christ,” he says, “by which we were
redeemed, are common property and admit of no exception: but as all [men]
are participators in the same Adam, deceived by the serpent and subject to
death in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to
salvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from
which we had fallen.”(480) St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are
in duty bound to pray for their fellowmen, God must needs be willing to
save all without exception. “We must sincerely believe,” he says, “that
God wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes
supplication to be made for all.”(481) The question why so many perish,
Prosper answers as follows: “[God] wills all to be saved and to come to
the knowledge of truth, ... so that those who are saved, are saved because
He wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they
deserve to perish.”(482) In his _Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum
Vincentianarum_ the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine
against the accusation that his teaching on predestination is incompatible
with the orthodox doctrine of the universality of God’s saving will.(483)
β) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his
general teaching on predestination and more particularly by his
interpretation of 1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this
Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise _De
Spiritu et Litera_ he describes the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as
strictly universal in the physical sense.(484) In his _Enchiridion_ he
restricts it to the predestined.(485) In his _Contra Iulianum_ he says:
“No one is saved unless God so wills.”(486) In his work _De Correptione et
Gratia_: “God wills all men to be saved, because He makes us to will this,
just as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba,
Father, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Father.”(487) How did St.
Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways?
Some think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and
Semipelagians with Scriptural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly
have induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent interpretations
which never occurred to any other ecclesiastical writer before or after
his time. The conundrum can only be solved by the assumption that
Augustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held
that over and above (or notwithstanding) the _sensus obvius_ every exegete
is free to read as much truth into any given passage as possible, and that
such interpretation lay within the scope of the inspiration of the Holy
Ghost quite as much as the _sensus obvius_. In his _Confessions_(488) he
actually argues in favor of a _pluralitas sensuum_. He was keen enough to
perceive, however, that if a Scriptural text is interpreted in different
ways, the several constructions put upon it must not be contradictory. As
he was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between _voluntas antecedens_
and _consequens_,(489) his different interpretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can
be reconciled by assuming that he conceived God’s _voluntas salvifica_ as
_antecedens_ in so far as it is universal, and as _consequens_ in so far
as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the difficulty in a similar manner:
“The words of the Apostle, ‘God will have all men to be saved, etc.,’ can
be understood in three ways: First, by a restricted application, in which
case they would mean, as Augustine says, ‘God wills all men to be saved
that are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish to be
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will.’ Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not of every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that ‘God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition.’ Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood
of the antecedent will of God, not of the consequent will. The distinction
must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is
nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the things willed. To understand
which we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by
God. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be
good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstance is taken into
account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary.
Thus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil,
absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a
murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him
live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he
wills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be
hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.
Hence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular
circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing
consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the
hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to
live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a
willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever
God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not
take place.”(490)
*Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though difficult to reconcile
with the universality of God’s saving will, furnishes no argument against
it.*
Proof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine _voluntas
salvifica_—a real _crux theologorum_—is the fate of unbaptized children.
The Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and
theologians hold widely divergent opinions.
Bellarmine teaches that infants who die without being baptized, are
excluded from the divine _voluntas salvifica_, because, while the
non-reception of Baptism is the proximate reason of their damnation, its
ultimate reason must be the will of God.
a) This rather incautious assertion needs to be carefully restricted. It
is an article of faith that God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as
the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is
certain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his
representatives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely
administration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents
cannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at
the door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional
cases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood
(_baptismus sanguinis_), _i.e._ death for Christ’s sake. On the whole it
may be said that God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of
little children by the institution of infant Baptism.
b) But there are many cases in which either invincible ignorance or the
order of nature precludes the administration of Baptism. The well-meant
opinion of some theologians(491) that the responsibility in all such cases
lies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does God, then, really
will the damnation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the
physical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many
innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing
up the awful mystery.(492) For God is the author of the natural as well as
of the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing
obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary
providence.(493) Klee’s assumption that dying children become conscious
long enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (_baptismus
flaminis_), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of
Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in
original sin, forthwith descend to hell.”(494) A still more unsatisfactory
supposition is that the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of
desire and saves their children from hell. This theory, espoused by
Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent,(495) and Pope Pius
V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan’s
works.(496)
A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who,
holding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a
kind of natural beatitude, think it possible that God, in view of their
sufferings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby
place them in a state of innocence.(497) This theory is based on the
assumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of
the beatific vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation (_poena
damni, infernum_), and that the remission of original sin has for its
object merely to enable these unfortunate infants to enjoy a perfect
natural beatitude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable
to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness
through no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort
of natural beatitude, to which their very nature seems to entitle them.
“Hell” for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision
of God, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere
of those prerogatives to which human nature has a claim by the fact of
creation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of
salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ in the same measure. Needless to say, it can
claim no more than probability, and we find ourselves constrained to
admit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and perfect
solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess
their ignorance.(498)
c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way
impair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited
above(499) clearly prove that God wills to save all men without exception.
In basing the universality of God’s mercy on His omnipotence, His
universal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom(500)
evidently implies that the unbaptized infants participate in that mercy in
all three of these respects. How indeed could Divine Omnipotence exert
itself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are
inevitably and without any fault of their own deprived of Baptism? Who
would deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to God’s
universal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if God
loves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants?
1 Tim. II, 4(501) applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking
only adults can “come to the knowledge of the truth.” But St. Paul employs
certain middle terms which undoubtedly comprise children as well. Thus, if
all men have but “one God,” this God must be the God of infants no less
than of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if
Jesus Christ as God-man is the “one mediator of God and men,” He must also
have assumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from
original sin. Again, if Christ “gave himself a redemption for all,” it is
impossible to assume that millions of infants should be directly excluded
from the benefits of the atonement.(502)
Article 2. God’s Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human Beings
In Particular
In relation to adults, God manifests His saving will by the bestowal of
sufficient grace upon all.(503) The bestowal of sufficient grace being
evidently an effluence of the universal _voluntas salvifica_, the granting
of such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes another
proof for the universality of grace.
God gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each
_efficacious_ graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach
his supernatural destiny is coöperation with sufficient grace, especially
with the _gratia prima vocans_, which is the beginning of all salutary
operation.
To prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult human beings without
exception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just,
(2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three
distinct theses.
*Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His
commandments.*
This is _de fide_.
Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: “If any one saith that the
commandments of God are, even for one that is justified and constituted in
grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.”(504)
A contrary proposition in the writings of Jansenius(505) was censured by
Pope Innocent the Tenth as “foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and
heretical.”
The Church does not assert that God gives to the just sufficient grace at
all times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal
whenever they are called upon to obey the law (_urgente praecepto_). Nor
need God always bestow a _gratia proxime sufficiens_; in many instances
the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_) fully serves the
purpose.(506)
This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most
important texts.
a) 1 John V, 3 sq.: “For this is the charity of God, that we keep his
commandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born
of God, overcometh the world.”(507) According to this text the “charity of
God” manifests itself in “keeping his commandments” and “overcoming the
world.” This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: “My
yoke is sweet and my burden light.”(508) Hence it must be possible to keep
His commandments, and therefore God does not withhold the absolutely
necessary graces from the just.
St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that God will not suffer
them to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy
issue, provided they faithfully coöperate with His grace. 1 Cor. X, 13:
“God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which
you are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be
able to bear it.”(509) As it is impossible even for the just to overcome
grievous temptations without supernatural aid,(510) and as God Himself
tells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference
that He bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that
St. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says:
“Therefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he
fall.”(511) But there is no exegetical objection to applying the text to
all the faithful without exception.(512)
b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writings of the Fathers. Some of
them, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended
the proposition that “grace is not given to all men,”(513) but they meant
_efficacious_ grace.
α) A typical representative of this group of ecclesiastical writers is the
anonymous author of the work _De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,(514) whom Pope
Gelasius praised as “_probatus Ecclesiae magister_.” This fifth-century
writer, who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, discusses the
question whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are
not saved. He begins by drawing a distinction between God’s general and
His special providence.(515) “It so pleased God,” he says, “to give His
efficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none,
in order that it might appear from both [actions] that what is conferred
upon a portion is not denied to the entire race.”(516)
β) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teaching to such Patristic
passages as the following: “After the withdrawal of the divine assistance
he [St. Peter] was unable to stand;”(517) and: “He had undertaken more
than he was able to do.”(518) But the two Fathers from whose writings
these passages are taken (SS. Chrysostom and Augustine) speak, as the
context evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately
sufficient grace in punishment of Peter’s presumption. Had St. Peter
followed our Lord’s advice(519) and prayed instead of relying on his own
strength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St.
Augustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work _De
Unitate Ecclesiae_: “Who shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not
have betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice
denied his Master?”(520)
c) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows:
Since the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happiness, it
must also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it.
To assert that God denies the just sufficient grace to observe His
commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace,
would be to gainsay His solemn promise to His adopted children: “This is
the will of my Father that sent me: that every one who seeth the Son and
believeth in him, may have life everlasting, and I will raise him up in
the last day.”(521) Consequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to
bestow sufficient graces upon the just.
Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are
obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of God and the
precepts of His Church.(522) But this is impossible without the aid of
grace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient grace to his servants,
for _ad impossibile nemo tenetur_.(523)
*Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (1)
that ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin
and do penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His grace even from
the obdurate.*
The first part of this thesis embodies a theological conclusion; the
second states the common teaching of Catholic theologians.
1. _Proof of the First Part._ The distinction here drawn between
“ordinary” and “obdurate” sinners has its basis in revelation and is
clearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the
two parts of our thesis.
An “ordinary” sinner is a Christian who has lost sanctifying grace by a
grievous sin. An “obdurate” sinner is one who, by repeatedly and
maliciously transgressing the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and
hardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an habitual
sinner (_consuetudinarius_) and a backslider, without being obdurate, or,
which comes to the same, impenitent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful
habits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the Holy
Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion.
With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis asserts that they always
receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance.
a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not
hasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the
fault of Almighty God, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the
fault of the sinner who fails to coöperate with the proffered supernatural
assistance.
α) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is
contained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that
God suffers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,(524) this must
surely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing
mortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of God “are not heavy” and
that faith is “the victory which overcometh the world.”(525) Faith in
Christ remains in the Christian, even though he be guilty of mortal sin,
and consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace,
to overcome the “world,” _i.e._ the temptations arising from
concupiscence,(526) and thus to cease committing mortal sins.
β) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Augustine lays down two
theological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike.
“God does not enjoin impossibilities,” he says, “but in His injunctions
counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in
what you cannot do.”(527) It follows that the sinner always receives at
least the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls _gratia
initialis sive parva_, and of which he says that its right use ensures the
_gratia magna_.
The second principle is this: “_Cum lege coniuncta est gratia, quâ lex
observari possit._” That is, every divine law, by special ordinance,
carries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the
laws of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant
sufficient grace to keep them.(528)
b) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted,
follows from the Scriptural injunction of conversion. If conversion to God
is a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of
grace,(529) the divine command obviously implies the bestowal of
sufficient grace.
That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: “As
I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that
the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil
ways!”(530) “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but
dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but
that all should return to penance.”(531)
This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition.
2. _Proof of the Second Part._ Obduracy is a serious obstacle to
conversion because the obdurate sinner has confirmed his will in
malice(532) and by systematic resistance diminished the influence of
grace. The question here is whether or not God in such cases eventually
withdraws His grace altogether.
Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the
sinner greater tortures in hell.(533) Though this assertion cannot be said
to contravene the dogma of the universality of God’s salvific will, (its
defenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these
unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the _sententia __ communis_,
that God grants even the most obdurate sinner—at least now and then,
_e.g._ during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible
catastrophe—sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for
this opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last
analysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis.
a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no
distinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the
Book of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations,
the Canaanites, as a shining object of divine mercy and patience.(534)
According to St. Paul, God calls especially upon hardened and impenitent
sinners to do penance. Rom. II, 4 sq.: “Or despisest thou the riches of
his goodness, and patience, and long suffering? Knowest thou not that the
benignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But according to thy hardness
and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day
of wrath, and revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to
every man according to his works.”(535)
There are some Scriptural passages which seem to imply that God withdraws
His grace from those who are obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their
hearts in punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharao: “I shall harden
his heart,”(536) and Moses tells us: “The Lord hardened Pharao’s heart,
and he harkened not unto them.”(537) But it would be wrong to assume that
this denotes a positive action on the part of God. Pharao, as we are told
further on, “hardened his own heart” (_ingravavit cor suum_).(538) The
fault in all cases lies with the sinner, who obstinately resists the call
of grace. God’s co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The greater
and stronger graces which He grants to ordinary sinners, He withholds from
the obdurate in punishment of their malice. This is, however, by no means
tantamount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.(539)
b) The Fathers speak of God’s way of dealing with obdurate sinners in a
manner which clearly shows their belief that He never entirely withdraws
His mercy. They insist that the light of grace is never extinguished in
the present life. “God gave them over to a reprobate mind,” says St.
Augustine, “for such is the blindness of the mind. Whosoever is given over
thereunto, is shut out from the interior light of God: but not wholly as
yet, whilst he is in this life. For there is ‘outer darkness,’ which is
understood to belong rather to the day of judgment; that he should rather
be wholly without God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses
correction.”(540)
It follows that no sinner, how desperate soever his case may appear, need
be despaired of. As long as there is life there is hope.(541) The Fathers
consistently teach that the reason why reprobates are lost is not lack of
grace but their own malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on Isaias’
prophecy regarding the impenitence of the Jews: “The reason they did not
believe was not that Isaias had predicted their unbelief, but his
prediction was based on the fact that they would not believe. They were
unable to believe, _i.e._ they had not the will to believe.”(542)
c) The theological argument for our thesis is well stated by St. Thomas.
He distinguishes between _obstinatio perfecta_ and _obstinatio imperfecta_
and says: Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy is
that of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil that he is
incapable of any but the faintest impulses towards virtue, though even
these are sufficient to prepare the way for grace.(543) “If any one falls
into sin after having received Baptism,” says the Fourth Lateran Council,
“he can always be restored by sincere penance.”(544) As the power of the
keys comprises all sins, even those against the Holy Ghost, so divine
grace is held out to all sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the
unforgivableness of the “three capital sins” (apostasy, murder, and
adultery) was already condemned as heretical during the life-time of
Tertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness only by receiving the
sacrament of Penance or making an act of perfect contrition.(545) Justly,
therefore, does the Church regard despair of God’s mercy as an additional
grievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting that God in the end
absolutely abandons the sinner, there could be no hope of forgiveness, and
despair would be justified.
*Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient graces for salvation.*
This proposition may be qualified as _certa_.
Proof. The “heathens” are those whom the Gospel has not yet reached. They
are called _infideles negativi_ in contradistinction to the _infideles
positivi_, _i.e._ apostates and formal heretics who have fallen away from
the faith. We assert that God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to
know the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, on December 7, 1690,
condemned Arnauld’s Jansenistic proposition that “pagans, Jews, heretics,
and others of the same kind experience no influence whatever from Christ,
and it may therefore be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude and
helpless will, lacking sufficient grace.”(546) A proposition of similar
import, set up by Quesnel, was censured by Clement XI.(547) Though not
formally defined, it is a certain truth—deducible from the infallible
teaching of the Church—that God does not permit any one to perish for want
of grace.
a) The Biblical argument for our thesis is based on the dogma that God
wills all men to be saved. 1 Tim. II, 4: “[God] will have all men to be
saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth [_i.e._ the true faith].”
In speaking of the “day of wrath,” St. Paul emphasizes the fact that the
Almighty Judge “will render to every man according to his works,”—eternal
life to the good, wrath and damnation to the wicked.(548) And he
continues: “But glory, and honor, and peace to every one that worketh
good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek; for there is no respect of
persons with God.”(549) “Greek” is here evidently synonymous with gentile
or heathen. It follows that the heathens are able to perform supernatural
salutary acts with the aid of grace, and that they will receive the reward
of eternal beatitude if they lead a good life.
In another passage (1 Tim. IV, 10) the Apostle calls Christ “the Saviour
of all men, especially of the faithful.”(550) Consequently, Christ is the
Saviour also of unbelievers and heathens.(551)
b) St. Paul’s teaching is faithfully echoed by the Fathers. Thus St.
Clement of Rome,(552) in commenting on the penitential sermons of Noë and
the prophet Jonas, says: “We may roam through all the ages of history and
learn that the Lord in all generations(553) gave opportunity for penance
to all who wished to be converted, ... even though they were strangers to
him.”(554)
St. Chrysostom says in explanation of John I, 9: “If He enlightens every
man that comes into this world, how is it that so many are without light?
For not all know Christ. Most assuredly He illumines, so far as He is
concerned.... For grace is poured out over all. It flees or despises no
one, be he Jew, Greek, barbarian or Scythian, freedman or slave, man or
woman, old or young. It is the same for all, easily attainable by all, it
calls upon all with equal regard. As for those who neglect to make use of
this gift, they should ascribe their blindness to themselves.”(555)
Similar expressions can be culled from the anonymous work _De Vocatione
Omnium Gentium_(556) and from the writings of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius,
and especially from those of Orosius, who says that grace is given to all
men, including the heathen, without exception and at all times.(557)
c) Catholic theologians have devoted considerable thought to the question
how God provides for the salvation of the heathen.
To the uncivilized tribes may be applied what has been said regarding the
fate of unbaptized infants. The real problem is: How does the merciful
Creator provide for those who are sufficiently intelligent to be able to
speculate on God, the soul, the future destiny of man, etc.? Holy
Scripture teaches: “Without faith it is impossible to please God, for he
that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek him.”(558) Faith here means, not any kind of religious belief, but
that theological faith which the Tridentine Council calls “the beginning,
the foundation, and the root of all justification.”(559) Mere intellectual
assent to the existence of God, immortality, and retribution would not be
sufficient for salvation, even if elevated to the supernatural sphere and
transfigured by grace. This is evident from the condemnation, by Pope
Innocent XI, of the proposition that “Faith in a wide sense, based on the
testimony of the created universe, or some other similar motive, is
sufficient unto justification.”(560) The only sort of faith that results
in justification, according to the Vatican Council, is “a supernatural
virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe
that the things which He has revealed are true; not because of the
intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but
because of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, and who can
neither be deceived nor deceive.”(561) Of special importance is the
following declaration by the same Council: “Since without faith it is
impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of His children,
therefore without faith no one has ever attained justification....”(562)
The Catechism demands of every one who desires to be saved that he have a
supernatural belief in six distinct truths: the existence of God,
retribution in the next world, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the
immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The first two are
certainly necessary for salvation, both _fide explicitâ_ and _necessitate
medii_. With regard to the other four there is a difference of opinion
among theologians. We base our argumentation on the stricter, though not
absolutely certain view, that all six articles must be believed
_necessitate medii_. On this basis God’s method of providing sufficient
graces for the heathen may be explained in one of two ways, according as a
_fides explicita_ is demanded from them with regard to all the
above-mentioned dogmas, or a _fides implicita_ is deemed sufficient in
regard to all but the first two. By _fides explicita_ we understand the
express and fully developed faith of devout Christians; by _fides
implicita_, an undeveloped belief of desire or, in other words, general
readiness to believe whatever God has revealed.
α) The defenders of the _fides explicita_ theory are compelled to assume
that God must somehow reveal to each individual heathen who lives
according to the dictates of his conscience, the six truths necessary for
salvation. “Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of
Christ.”(563)
But how can the gentiles believe in a revelation that has never been
preached to them? Here is an undeniable difficulty. Some theologians say:
God enlightens them interiorly about the truths necessary for salvation;
or He miraculously sends them an apostle, as He sent St. Peter to
Cornelius;(564) or He instructs them through the agency of an angel.(565)
None of these hypotheses can be accepted as satisfactory. “Interior
illumination” of the kind postulated would practically amount to private
revelation. That God should grant a special private revelation to every
conscientious pagan is highly improbable. Again, an angel can no more be
the _ordinary_ means of conversion than the miraculous apparition of a
missionary. Nevertheless, these three hypotheses admirably illustrate the
firm belief of the Church in the universality of God’s saving will,
inasmuch as they express the conviction of her theologians that He would
work a miracle rather than deny His grace to the poor benighted
heathen.(566) The difficulties to which we have adverted constitute a
strong argument in favor of another theological theory which regards
explicit belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation merely as a _necessitas
praecepti_, from which one may be dispensed.
β) The _fides implicita_ theory is far more plausible, for it postulates
no miracles, implicit faith (or _fides in voto_) being independent of the
external preaching of the Gospel, just as the baptism of desire
(_baptismus in voto_) is independent of the use of water.
Cardinal Gotti regards the first-mentioned of the two theories as safer
(_tutior_), but admits that the other is highly probable, because it has
the support of St. Thomas.(567) However, a great difficulty remains.
Though it may suffice to hold the dogmas of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, and _a fortiori_ those of the immortality of the soul and the
necessity of grace, with an implicit faith, it is the consentient teaching
of Revelation, the Church, and Catholic divines that the two principal
truths of religion, _viz._: the existence of God and retribution, must be
held _fide explicitâ_ and _necessitate medii_, because a man cannot be
converted to God unless He knows Him. But how is he to acquire a knowledge
of God? Does this not also necessitate a miracle (_e.g._ the sending of an
angel or of a missionary, which we have rejected as improbable)? There can
be but one answer to this question. Unaided reason may convince a
thoughtful pagan of the existence of God and of divine retribution, and as
these two fundamental truths have no doubt penetrated to the farthest
corners of the earth also as remnants of primitive revelation, their
promulgation may be said to be contained in the traditional instruction
which the heathen receive from their forebears. This external factor of
Divine Revelation, assisted by interior grace, may engender a supernatural
act of faith, which implicitly includes belief in Christ, Baptism, etc.,
and through which the heathen are eventually cleansed from sin and attain
to justification.(568)
Some theologians hold that those to whom the Gospel has never been
preached, may be saved by a quasi-faith based on purely natural
motives.(569)
For the rest, no one will presume to dictate to Almighty God how and by
what means He shall communicate His grace to the heathen. It is enough,
and very consoling, too, to know that all men receive sufficient grace to
save their souls, and no one is eternally damned except through his own
fault.(570)
READINGS:—*Didacus Ruiz, _De Voluntate Dei_, disp. 19
sqq.—Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 4 sqq.; _De Incarnatione_, XIII, 1
sqq.—Fontana, _Bulla __“__Unigenitus__”__ Dogmatice Propugnata_,
prop. 12, c. 5, Rome 1717.—Passaglia, _De Partitione Voluntatis
Divinae in Primam et Secundam_, Rome 1851.—*Franzelin, _De Deo
Uno_, thes. 49-51, Rome 1883.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 59-62, Gulpen 1885.—A. Fischer, _De Salute
Infidelium_, Essen 1886.—*J. Bucceroni, _De Auxilio Sufficiente
Infidelibus Dato_, Rome 1890.—Fr. Schmid, _Die ausserordentlichen
Heilswege für die gefallene Menschheit_, Brixen 1899.—Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 144 sqq.,
Freiburg 1906.—L. Capéran, _Le Problème du Salut des Infidèles_,
Paris 1912.—A. Wagner, _Doctrina de Gratia Sufficiente_, Graz
1911.—J. Bainvel, S. J., _Is There Salvation Outside the Catholic
Church?_ (tr. J. L. Weidenhan), St. Louis 1917.
Article 3. The Predestination Of The Elect
1. WHAT IS MEANT BY PREDESTINATION.—We have shown that God antecedently
wills to save all men,(571) and that He gives to all sufficient grace to
work out their eternal salvation.
On the other hand, Sacred Scripture assures us that some are lost through
their own fault. Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41: “Depart from me, you cursed, into
everlasting fire.”
It follows that God’s will to save, considered as _voluntas consequens_,
remains ineffective with regard to a portion of the human race, and
consequently, in this respect, is no longer universal but particular.
Being omniscient, God has foreseen this from all eternity and disposed His
decrees accordingly. It is in this sense that Catholic theology teaches
the existence of a twofold predestination: one to Heaven, for those who
die in the state of grace, another to hell, for those who depart this life
in mortal sin.
Present-day usage reserves the term _predestination_ for the election of
the blessed.
a) Rightly does the Council of Trent call predestination a “hidden
mystery.”(572) For in the last analysis it rests solely with God, who are
to be admitted to Heaven and who condemned to hell. But why does God give
to some merely sufficient grace, with which they neglect to coöperate,
while on others He showers efficacious graces that infallibly lead to
eternal salvation? In this unequal distribution of efficacious grace lies
the sublime mystery of predestination, as St. Augustine well knew, for he
says in his treatise On the Gift of Perseverance: “Therefore, of two
infants equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other
left; and of two wicked men already mature in years, why one should be so
called that he follows Him that calleth, while the other is either not
called at all, or is not called in such a manner,—are unsearchable
judgments of God.”(573)
b) What is meant by “predestination of the elect”? In view of the many
errors that have arisen with regard to this important dogma, it is
necessary to start with clearly defined terms.
Predestination may mean one of three different things. A man may be simply
predestined to receive certain graces (_praedestinatio ad gratiam
tantum_); or he may be predestined to enjoy eternal happiness without
regard to any merits of his own (_praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_); or,
again, he may be predestined to both grace and glory, glory as the end,
grace as a means to that end—vocation, justification, and final
perseverance. When the concepts of grace and glory are considered
separately, and each is made the object of a special predestination, we
have what is called incomplete or inadequate predestination
(_praedestinatio incompleta sive inadaequata_). It is this incomplete
predestination that St. Paul(574) and St. Augustine(575) have in mind when
they apply the term to the vocation of men to grace, faith, and
justification. Theologians speak of _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_,
that is, _ante praevisa merita_, as a true predestination, but disagree as
to its existence.(576)
The dogma of predestination, which mainly concerns us here, has for its
sole object predestination in the complete or adequate sense of the term,
which is explained by St. Augustine as follows: “Predestination is nothing
else than the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of God
whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered [_i.e._
saved].”(577) St. Thomas expresses himself more succinctly:
“Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory
in the future.”(578)
2. THE DOGMA.—Complete predestination involves: (a) the first grace of
vocation (_gratia prima praeveniens_), especially faith as the beginning,
foundation, and root of justification; (b) a number of additional actual
graces for the successful accomplishment of the process; (c) justification
itself as the beginning of the state of grace; (d) the grace of final
perseverance; (e) eternal happiness in Heaven.
The question arises; Do men really seek and find their eternal salvation
with infallible certainty by passing through these successive stages—not
merely in the foreknowledge of God (_praescientia futurorum_), but by
virtue of an eternal decree (_decretum praedestinationis_)?
The Pelagians asserted that man works out his eternal salvation of his own
free will, and that consequently God merely foreknows but does not
fore-ordain who shall be saved. The Semipelagians held that the beginning
of faith (_initium fidei_) and final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_)
are not pure graces but may be obtained by natural means, without special
aid from above. Against these heretics the Catholic Church has always
taught the eternal predestination of the elect as an article of
faith.(579)
a) St. Paul says explicitly: “We know that to them that love God, all
things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are
called to be saints. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be
made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn
amongst many brethren. And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And
whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he
also glorified.”(580) Here we have all the elements of complete
predestination: God’s eternal foreknowledge (_praescivit_, προέγνω), an
eternal decree of the divine will (_praedestinavit_, προώρισε), and the
various stages of justification, beginning with vocation (_vocavit_,
ἐκάλησε) up to justification proper (_iustificavit_, ἐδικαίωσε), and
eternal beatitude (_glorificavit_, ἐδόξασεν).(581)
b) The Fathers of the fifth century undoubtedly taught the predestination
of the elect as an article of faith. Thus St. Augustine says: “There never
was a time when the Church of Christ did not hold this faith in
predestination, which is now defended with fresh solicitude against the
new heretics.”(582) His faithful disciple St. Prosper writes: “No Catholic
denies predestination by God.”(583) And again: “It would be as impious to
deny predestination as to oppose grace itself.”(584)
c) Several important theological corollaries follow from the dogma of
predestination.
α) The first is the immutability of the divine decree of predestination.
This immutability is based on God’s infallible foreknowledge that certain
individuals will die in the state of grace, and on His unchangeable will
to reward them with eternal happiness.
St. Augustine says: “If any one of these [the predestined] perishes, God
is mistaken; but none of them perish because God is not mistaken.”(585)
God’s unerring foreknowledge is symbolized by the “Book of Life.”(586)
Christ Himself said to His Apostles: “Rejoice in this, that your names are
written in heaven.”(587) The “Book of Life” admits neither addition nor
erasure. This does not, however, mean that a man is unable to change God’s
hypothetical decree of predestination with regard to himself into an
absolute one. He can do this by prayer, good works, and faithful
co-operation with grace.(588) Whatever promotes our salvation is included
in the infallible foreknowledge of God, and consequently also in the scope
of predestination. In this sense, but in no other, can we accept the
somewhat paradoxical maxim: “If you are not predestined, conduct yourself
so that you may be predestined.” Sacred Scripture occasionally refers to
another “Book of Life,” which contains the names of all the faithful,
irrespective of their predestination. This “book,” of course, is capable
of alterations. Cfr. Apoc. III, 5: “I will not blot out his name out of
the book of life.”(589) Finally, there is the “Book of Reprobation,” which
records the wicked deeds of men and by which the unrepentant sinners will
be judged. This is the “_liber scriptus_” of the “_Dies Irae_”:
“_Liber scriptus proferetur._
_In quo totum continetur._”(590)
β) If the divine decree of predestination is immutable, the number of the
elect must be definitively fixed. “The number [of those who are
predestined to the kingdom of God] is so certain,” says St. Augustine,
“that no one can either be added to or taken from them.”(591) We must
distinguish between the absolute and the relative number of the
predestined.
God, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract number of the elect,
but every individual predestined to Heaven. To us the number of the elect
is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: “Some say
that as many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell,
added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to
say that ‘God alone knows the number for whom is reserved eternal
happiness,’ as the prayer for the living and the dead expresses it.”(592)
Whether God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly
precipitating the end of the world or by a sort of “natural selection,” is
an open question. To assume the latter could hardly be reconciled with the
dogma of the universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to favor
the former.(593)
As regards the relative number of the elect, some writers (_e.g._
Massillon) represent it as so infinitesimally small that it would almost
drive a saint to despair,—“as if the Church had been established for the
express purpose of populating hell.”(594) Even St. Thomas held that
relatively few are saved.(595) But the arguments adduced in support of
this contention are by no means convincing.(596) Recently, the Jesuit
Father Castelein(597) impugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments.
He was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,(598) who marshalled a
great number of authorities in favor of the sterner view. The controversy
cannot be decided either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our
pessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to assume that the
majority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved.(599) If we
add to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is
probably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to
that of the reprobates. Were it smaller, “it could be said to the shame
and offense of the divine majesty and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of
Satan is larger than the kingdom of Christ.”(600)
3. THE MOTIVE OF PREDESTINATION.—The efficient cause of predestination is
God; its instrumental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine glory; its
primary meritorious cause, the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ. On these points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to the
motive that induced God to predestine certain individuals to the exclusion
of others. The question narrows itself down to this: What influence, if
any, do the merits of a man exert on the eternal decree of
predestination?—and may be formulated in three different ways.
a) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to
the initial grace of vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute
gratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. For whatever merits one may
have acquired before he receives the initial grace of vocation, must be
purely natural, and consequently worthless in the eyes of God for
supernatural predestination. “To assume,” says St. Thomas, “that there is
on our part some merit, the foreknowledge of which [on the part of God]
would be the cause [motive] of our predestination, would be to assume that
grace is given to us [as a reward] of our [natural] merits.”(601)
b) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to
grace and glory? Catholic theologians are unanimous in holding that, since
grace is absolutely gratuitous and inseparably connected with glory as its
effect, the union of both can no more be based upon _natural_ merit than
the initial grace of vocation itself, which transmits the quality of
gratuitousness to each and every one of the graces that follow in its
wake, up to and including justification and eternal beatitude. Those among
the Fathers who defended the gratuity of predestination against the
Pelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at safeguarding the gratuity of
initial grace, in order not to be constrained to say with Pelagius that
“the grace of God is given as a reward of merit.”(602) “What compelled me
in this work of mine [_De Dono Perseverantiae_] to defend more abundantly
and clearly those passages of Scripture in which predestination is
commended,” says St. Augustine, “if not the Pelagian assertion that God’s
grace is given according to our [natural] merits?”(603) Obviously these
Fathers did not have in view the _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_, as
the champions of the _praedestinatio ante praevisa merita_ mistakenly
assert, but what they meant was that complete predestination which
comprises grace and glory as one whole. Similarly, the early Schoolmen,
when they speak of the “gratuity of predestination,” usually mean complete
predestination.(604) D’Argentré’s researches show how necessary it is to
draw sharp distinctions and carefully to establish the real state of the
question before claiming the common teaching of the Scholastics in favor
of any particular theory of predestination.
c) What influence do the _supernatural_ merits of a man exert on his
predestination to glory as such? Here the controversy begins.
Predestination may be considered either as the cause of supernatural merit
or as its effect. If it is considered as the cause, the problem takes this
shape: Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any regard to their
future supernatural merits, eternally predestine certain men to the glory
of heaven, and only subsequently decide to give them the efficacious
graces necessary to reach that end, particularly final perseverance? If,
on the other hand, predestination be considered as an effect of
supernatural merit, the question will be: Did God predestine certain men
to the glory of Heaven by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will to
save them dependent on His infallible foreknowledge of their supernatural
merits? The lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on this
subject has led to a division of Catholic opinion, some theologians
favoring absolute predestination _ante praevisa merita_, others
hypothetical predestination _post praevisa merita_. Without concealing our
conviction that absolute predestination is untenable, we shall set forth
both theories impartially and examine the arguments on which they rely.
4. ORTHODOX PREDESTINATIONISM, OR THE THEORY OF PREDESTINATION ANTE
PRAEVISA MERITA.—Some theologians conceive the divine scheme of salvation
in this wise: (a) _In ordine intentionis_, God, by an absolute decree,
first predestines certain men to eternal salvation, and then, in
consequence of this decree, decides to give them all the graces necessary
to be saved; (b) in time, however, or _in ordine executionis_, He observes
the reverse order, that is to say, He first bestows the pre-appointed
graces and subsequently the glory of heaven as a reward of supernatural
merit acquired by the aid of those graces.
This theory reverses the relation of grace and glory. While it
correctly(605) represents glory as the fruit and reward of supernatural
merit in the order of execution, it wrongly represents it in the order of
intention as the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an
effect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,(606) some
Augustinians,(607) and a few Molinists.(608) Their arguments may be
sketched as follows:
a) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scripture predestination to eternal
happiness is represented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an
arbitrary act of God. Take, _e.g._, Matth. XXIV, 22 sqq.: “And unless
those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake
of the elect those days shall be shortened.... For there shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders,
insomuch as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.”(609) Here, it is
claimed, the elect are represented as so thoroughly confirmed in faith and
in good works as to be proof against error.
This conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase “those days” manifestly refers
either to the destruction of Jerusalem or to the end of the world. If it
refers to the destruction of Jerusalem, the “elect,” according to Biblical
usage,(610) are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy City, for
whose sake God promises to shorten the terrible siege. If it referred to
the end of the world, _electi_ would indeed stand for _praedestinati_, but
the context would not forbid us to interpret their predestination
hypothetically, as merely indicating the immutability of the divine
decree, which is not denied by the opponents of the theory.
Another text quoted in favor of absolute predestination _ante praevisa
merita_, is Acts XIII, 48: “As many as were ordained (_praeordinati_,
τεταγμένοι) to life everlasting, believed.” Here, we are told,
predestination to eternal life is given as the motive why many believed.
But the text really says nothing at all about predestination. Τεταγμένοι
is not synonymous with προτεταγμένοι or προωρισμένοι. The more probable
explanation is the following: As many believed as were disposed to receive
the faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all who received the
faith at that time were predestined, while those that refused to be
converted were without exception reprobates. But even if _praeordinati_
were synonymous with _praedestinati_, the text would merely say that
certain predestined souls embraced the faith, without affording any clue
as to the relation between conversion and predestination.
The ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans is the main reliance
of the advocates of absolute predestinationism, though the passage is
unfit to serve as a _locus classicus_ because of its obscurity. Let us
examine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. IX, 13: “Jacob I
have loved, but Esau I have hated,” is alleged to prove the absolute
predestination of Jacob and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many
theologians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the Apostle is not
dealing with predestination to glory, but with Jacob’s vocation to be the
progenitor of the Messias. Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean,
was simply passed over in this choice (_odio habere __ minus diligere_;
cfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is interpreted typically, it should be
done in harmony with the context, that is to say, as referring to the
gratuity of grace, not to predestination.
The same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: “It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.... He
hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.”(611)
The strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute predestination is
Rom. IX, 20 sq.: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the
thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or
hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one
vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?” Here the Apostle really
seems to have thought of predestination. But the simile must not be
pressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy that God positively
predestined some men to heaven and others to hell. The _tertium
comparationis_ is not the act of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness
of man to yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter.
Nor is it admissible to read into the Apostle’s thought even a _negative_
reprobation of certain men. For the primary intention of the Epistle to
the Romans is to insist on the gratuity of man’s vocation to Christianity
and to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and their bodily descent
from Abraham gave the Jews preference over the heathens. The Epistle to
the Romans has no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether or
not the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of eternal
predestination to glory.(612)
b) Among the Fathers the only one to whom the advocates of absolute
predestinationism can appeal with some show of justice is St. Augustine,
who, with the possible exception of Prosper and Fulgentius, was the most
rigorous among early ecclesiastical writers,—so rigorous, in fact, that
Oswald does not hesitate to call him “the head and front of all rigorists
in the Church.”(613)
However, this is saying too much. Augustine’s genuine teaching is still in
dispute among our ablest theologians. Some(614) deny that he broke with
the almost unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others think that
in the treatises _De Dono Perseverantiae_ and _De Praedestinatione
Sanctorum_, and in several of his letters, the Saint frankly taught
absolute predestinationism. The latter group of writers is split into two
classes. A number of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert that
Augustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly adopt his supposed
teaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, Cercià, Oswald, and others censure this
view. Franzelin(615) undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: “If
there were a manifest discrepancy between Augustine’s teaching and that of
the other Fathers, I should not hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus,
Osorius, Camerarius, Maldonatus,(616) Toletus,(617) and Petavius(618) in
reverently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we should be
dealing merely with a private opinion.”(619) Under these circumstances the
Patristic argument for the theory of absolute predestination evidently
lacks convincingness.(620)
c) It was probably because they felt its weakness that some of the later
champions of the theory attempted to prove absolute predestination _ante
praevisa merita_ by philosophical arguments. Gonet reasons as follows: “He
who proceeds in an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the means
necessary to attain it. But God proceeds in an orderly way. Therefore he
wills the end before the means. Now, glory is an end, and merits are means
to attain that end. Consequently, God wills glory before He wills merits,
and a man’s preëlection to glory cannot be based on foreknowledge of his
merits.”(621) This argument, if it proved anything, would prove the
logical impossibility of conditional predestination. But it overshoots the
mark and consequently proves nothing at all. _Qui nimium probat, nihil
probat._
Gonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, namely, that God
_voluntate antecedente_ decreed the glory of certain men to the exclusion
of others. This _petitio principii_ vitiates the entire polysyllogism.
God’s will to save is universal. He wills the eternal happiness of all men
_antecedenter_, and the reprobation of some only _consequenter_; hence
eternal predestination is not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it
depends on merit. That the divine scheme of grace can take a different
course _in ordine intentionis_ from that _in ordine executionis_ is a mere
fiction. If eternal salvation in the order of temporal execution is given
only as a reward of merit, it must be a reward of merit also in the order
of intention. In both cases predestination depends upon a future
condition.
Perhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute predestination is the
fact that it involves the absolute reprobation of those not predestined to
glory. “If it could be validly argued,” says Gutberlet, “that, since the
end must be willed before the means, salvation must be decreed before the
means to its attainment (_i.e._ merits), the argument would be applicable
also to the damned. If God _voluntate antecedente_ wills to lead only a
few to salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, then He
must likewise _voluntate antecedente_ have in view the end of the
reprobates, which is His own glorification through the manifestation of
His justice and mercy. Hence He must also decree the means necessary to
obtain this end, _i.e._ He must cause these unfortunate creatures to sin,
in order that they may reach the end for which He has predestined them; in
other words, He must pre-ordain them to sin and eternal damnation,”(622)
which is what Calvin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink
from adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall back upon the theory
of _negative_ reprobation, which, however, amounts practically to the same
thing.(623)
5. THE THEORY OF HYPOTHETICAL PREDESTINATION POST PRAEVISA
MERITA.—Predestination, like God’s will to save all men, is based on a
hypothetical decree. Those only are predestined to eternal happiness who
shall merit it as a reward. It is solely by reason of His infallible
foreknowledge of these merits that God’s hypothetical decree of
predestination becomes absolute. Or, as Becanus puts it, “God first
prepared the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life those whose
good use of the gifts He foresaw.”(624)
This view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason that it sets aside
the cruel theory of “negative reprobation,” was defended by such earlier
Scholastics as Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent
later writers, _e.g._ Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, Tournely, and
is held to-day by nearly all theologians outside the Thomist school. What
gave it special authority in modern times was the recommendation of St.
Francis de Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) described
the theory of conditional predestination _post praevisa merita_ as “more
in harmony with the mercy and grace of God, truer and more
attractive.”(625) This view has a solid basis both in Scripture and
Tradition.
a) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of God’s saving will.
Now if God _voluntate antecedente_ wills the eternal salvation of all men
without exception,(626) He cannot possibly intend that only some shall be
saved.
It is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only the temporal
realization but likewise the eternal promise of glory dependent on the
performance of good works. St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited
as a _locus classicus_ by the advocates of the theory,(627) wrote towards
the end of his life to Timothy: “I have fought a good fight, I have
finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid
up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to
me in that day.”(628) In writing these lines the Apostle no doubt had in
mind the sentence of the Universal Judge: “Come, ye blessed of my Father,
possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the
world,”(629)—which may with far greater reason be termed a “classical”
text than the obscure ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To
prepare for men the kingdom of heaven from the foundation (_i.e._
beginning) of the world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now,
God has “prepared” the kingdom of heaven for men in view of their foreseen
merits, that is to say, conditionally. The causal conjunction _enim_ in
the sentence following the one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): “_Esurivi
enim et dedistis mihi manducare_, etc.,” refers to the entire preceding
sentence, not only to the _possidete_ in time, but also to the _paratum_
in eternity. Consequently, the eternal decree of predestination itself,
like its temporal execution, depends on good works or merit. This
interpretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the sentence
pronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, 41 sqq.: “Depart from me, you
cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his
angels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc.” The
“everlasting fire” is manifestly decreed from all eternity in the same
sense in which it is inflicted in time, namely, _propter et post praevisa
merita_. Billuart’s contention(630) that hell has been prepared solely for
“the devil and his angels” is untenable, because in several other
Scriptural passages(631) the reprobates are expressly classed among the
followers of Satan. If we add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling
the last judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as not
only to show its absolute justice but likewise to intimate that, had they
so willed, the damned might have had their place on the right hand of the
Great Judge, we must admit that the theory of predestination _post
praevisa merita_ has a solid foundation in Scripture.(632)
b) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hypothetical predestination, which
fact has caused the theory to be commonly referred to as “_sententia
Graecorum_.”(633)
Thus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the Son of Man as follows:
“Possess ye the kingdom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal
heritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was prepared and arranged for
you before you came into existence, because I knew beforehand that you
would be what you are.”(634) Theodoret says: “He did not simply predestine
[men], but He predestined them because He foreknew [their merits].”(635)
The Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all without exception taught
hypothetical predestination. St. Hilary says: “Many are called, but few
are chosen.... Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice,
but a selection based on merit.”(636) And St. Ambrose: “Therefore the
Apostle says: ‘Whom he foreknew he also predestined’ (Rom. VIII, 29); for
He did not predestine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward to
those whose merits He foresaw.”(637)
The question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,(638) be decided on the sole
authority of St. Augustine, because he is claimed by both parties to the
controversy.(639)
On account of the existing differences of opinion it is impossible to
establish the theory of hypothetical predestination on the basis of
Scholastic teaching.(640) The opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute;(641)
likewise that of St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry of
Ghent shows a disposition to favor absolute predestination, but leaves the
question open. “Let every one,” he says,(642) “choose whichever opinion
suits him best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be
safeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths that are to be held
in respect of God.”(643)
6. A COMPROMISE THEORY.—For the sake of completeness we will add a few
words on a theory which takes middle ground between the two just reviewed,
holding that, while the common run of humanity is predestined
hypothetically, a few exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of
absolute predestination.
Among the champions of this “eclectic” theory may be mentioned:
Ockam,(644) Gabriel Biel,(645) Ysambert,(646) and Ambrosius
Catharinus.(647) The Saints regarded by these writers as absolutely
predestined to eternal glory are: the Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets
and Apostles, St. Joseph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all
infants dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,(648) Dominicus Soto, and
certain other divines attack this theory on the ground that it makes the
salvation of the great majority of the elect a matter of chance and
thereby imperils the dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is
unfounded. For though the “eclectic” theory has little or no support
either in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently safeguards the dogma of
predestination by admitting that _voluntate consequente_ none but the
predestined can attain to eternal beatitude.
Only with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we inclined to make an
exception. It is probable that she was predestined to eternal glory _ante
praevisa merita_, because, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she
enjoyed “exceed all measure and must not be extended to any other human
being.”(649)
Article 4. The Reprobation Of The Damned
The reprobation of the damned is sometimes called _praedestinatio ad
gehennam_, though, as we have remarked, the term “predestination” should
properly be restricted to the blessed.
There can be no absolute and positive predestination to eternal
punishment, and the pains of hell can be threatened only in view of mortal
sin. Hence reprobation may be defined, in the words of Peter Lombard, as
“God’s foreknowledge of the wickedness of some creatures and the
preparation of their damnation.”(650)
A distinction must, however, be made (at least in theory), between
_positive_ and _negative_ reprobation. To teach positive reprobation would
be heretical. Negative reprobation, on the other hand, is defended by all
those Catholic theologians who advocate the theory of absolute
predestination _ante praevisa merita_.(651)
1. HERETICAL PREDESTINARIANISM OR THE THEORY OF THE POSITIVE REPROBATION
OF THE DAMNED.—Heretical Predestinarianism was taught by Lucidus,
Gottschalk, Wiclif, Hus, the younger Jansenius, and especially by Calvin.
The latter asserted that the salvation of the elect and the damnation of
the reprobate are the effects of an unconditional divine decree.(652)
According to this abominable heresy, the sin of Adam and the spiritual
ruin which it entailed upon his descendants are attributable solely to the
will of God. God produces in the reprobate a “semblance of faith,” only to
make them all the more deserving of damnation. In the beginning of the
seventeenth century Arminius and a few other theologians of the Dutch
Reformed Church, repelled by Calvin’s _decretum horribile_, ascribed the
positive reprobation of the damned to original sin (_lapsus_). These
writers, called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians, were opposed by the
strict school of Calvinist divines under the leadership of Gomarus. The
great Calvinist Synod of Dordrecht (1618-1619) condemned the principles of
Arminius, and subsequently his adherents were driven from Holland.
The Catholic Church condemned Predestinarianism as early as 529 at the
Second Council of Orange, which among other things declared: “We not only
refuse to believe that some men are by divine power predestined to evil,
but if there be any who hold such a wicked thing, we condemn them with
utter detestation.”(653)
The Tridentine Council defined against Calvin: “If any one saith that the
grace of justification is attained to only by those who are predestined
unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but
receive not grace, as being by divine power predestined unto evil; let him
be anathema.”(654)
Calvinism, both supra- and infra-lapsarian, is easily refuted from
Revelation and Tradition.
a) It runs counter to all those texts of the Bible which assert the
universality of God’s saving will,(655) the bestowal of sufficient grace
on all sinners,(656) and the divine attribute of holiness.(657)
Calvin endeavored to prove his blasphemous doctrine chiefly from the ninth
chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.(658) His disciple Beza relied
mainly on 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: “But to them that believe not, the stone which
the builders rejected, the same is made the head of the corner: and a
stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, to them who stumble at the
word, neither do believe, whereunto also they are set,”(659) _i.e._,
according to Beza, predestined not to believe.(660) But this
interpretation is obviously wrong. For we know from Is. VIII, 14(661) and
Matth. XXI, 44,(662) that those who fall on this stone are ground to
powder as a punishment for the sin of unbelief.(663)
b) The Fathers, especially those of the East, are unanimous in upholding
the orthodox teaching of the Church. The only one whom adherents of
Predestinarianism have dared to claim is St. Augustine.
Yet the “Doctor of Grace” expressly teaches: “God is good, God is just. He
can deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any
one without demerits, because He is just.”(664) St. Prosper re-echoes this
teaching when he says of the reprobates: “Of their own will they went out;
of their own will they fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they
were not predestined. They would, however, be predestined if they were to
return and persevere in holiness; hence God’s predestination is for many
the cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away.”(665) St.
Fulgentius expresses himself in similar language.(666)
2. THE THEORY OF “NEGATIVE REPROBATION.”—Negative reprobation is defined
by its defenders as an eternal decree by which God excludes from Heaven
those not absolutely predestined, in other words, determines not to save
them.
a) Gonet explains the difference between negative and positive reprobation
in Scholastic terminology as follows: “_... quod haec [i.e. positiva]
habet non solum terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam
terminum ad quem, scil. poenam sive damni sive sensus; illa vero [i.e.
negativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria ut
beneficio indebito, non vero terminum ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut
sic praecise et ut habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur
reprobus esse damnandus aut ulli poenae sive damni sive sensus
deputandus._”(667)
The general principle laid down in this quotation is variously developed
by Thomist theologians.
The rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Sylvius) assign as the
motive of reprobation the sovereign will of God. God, they say, without
taking into account possible sins and demerits, determined _a priori_ to
exclude from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, Gotti, Gonet,
Gazzaniga, and others condemn this view as incompatible with the teaching
of St. Thomas, and, appealing to St. Augustine’s doctrine of the _massa
damnata_, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the reprobates
from heaven in original sin, in which God, without being unjust, could
leave as many as He saw fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others assume
that the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory but
merely from “effective election” thereunto, God simply having decreed
_ante praevisa merita_ to leave them to their weakness.(668)
While the Thomists found no difficulty in harmonizing this view with their
theory of physical premotion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard
put in trying to square it with the _scientia media_.(669) On the whole
these Molinists endorse the third and mildest of the above-quoted
opinions, which differs only theoretically from the rigoristic view
described in the first place. Practically it makes no difference whether
God directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give him the graces
necessary to attain it.
Surveying all three of the theories under consideration we cannot but
regard the first and third as heartless and cruel, because they attribute
eternal reprobation to a positive decree that takes effect independently
of sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original sin), is open
to the serious dogmatic objection that it contradicts the teaching of St.
Paul and the Tridentine declaration that “there is no condemnation (_nihil
damnationis_) in those who are truly buried together with Christ by
baptism into death.”(670)
b) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as the logical counterpart of
absolute predestination.(671) If Almighty God, by an absolute decree,
without regard to any possible merits, merely to reveal His divine
attributes and to “embellish the universe,” had determined that only those
could enter the “Heavenly Jerusalem” who were antecedently predestined
thereto, it would inevitably follow that the unfortunate remainder of
humanity by the very same decree were “passed over,” “omitted,”
“overlooked,” “not elected,” or, as Gonet honestly admits, “excluded from
Heaven,” which is the same thing as being negatively condemned to hell.
The logical distinction between positive and negative reprobation,
therefore, consists mainly in this, that the former signifies absolute
damnation to hell, the latter (equally absolute) non-election to Heaven.
To protect the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against unjust
aspersions, however, it is necessary to point out certain fundamental
differences between their theory and the heresy of Calvin.
Calvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality both of God’s
saving will and of the atonement; they refuse to admit the actual bestowal
of sufficient grace upon those fore-ordained to eternal damnation; and
claim that the human will loses its freedom under the predominance of
efficacious grace or concupiscence. The Catholic defenders of negative
reprobation indignantly reject the charge that their position logically
leads to any such heretical implications.
c) The theory of negative reprobation can be sufficiently refuted by
showing that it is incompatible with the universality of God’s will to
save all men. For if God willed absolutely and antecedently to “exclude
some men from Heaven,” as Gonet asserts, or “not to elect them to eternal
glory,” as Suarez contends, then it would be His absolute will that they
perish.
α) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphysically impossible to
attain eternal salvation. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
assuming that an essentially absolute decree of God can be frustrated.
This consideration led certain Thomists(672) to describe the divine
_voluntas salvifica_ as rather an ineffectual _velleitas_.(673) But this
conflicts with the obvious teaching of Revelation.(674) Suarez labors in
vain to reconcile the sincerity of God’s salvific will with the theory of
negative reprobation. The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could God
sincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as Suarez says,
that “it is not in man’s power to work out his eternal salvation in case
he falls under non-election, non-predestination, or, which amounts to the
same thing, negative reprobation”?(675)
β) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative reprobation becomes fully
apparent when we consider the attitude it ascribes to God. Gonet writes:
“Foreseeing that the whole human race would be depraved by original sin,
God, in view of the merits of Christ who was to come, elected some men to
glory and, in punishment of original sin and to show His justice towards
them and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted others to miss the
attainment of beatitude, in other words, He positively willed that they
should not attain it.... In virtue of this efficacious intention He
devised appropriate means for the attainment of His purpose, and seeing
that some would miss beatitude by simply being left in the state of
original sin, and others by being permitted to fall into actual sins and
to persevere therein, He formally decreed this permission, and finally ...
by a command of His intellect ordained these means towards the attainment
of the aforesaid end.”(676) Translated into plain every-day language this
can only mean that God tries with all His might to prevent the reprobate
from attaining eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the state
of sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing Gonet’s teaching as
“incompatible with sound doctrine.”(677) But his own teaching is equally
unsound and cruel. For he, too, is compelled to assert: “Predestination to
glory is the motive for which efficacious or infallible means towards
attaining that end are bestowed. Hence to refuse to predestine a man for
glory is to deny him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to
attain that end.”(678)
Holy Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. It describes God
as a loving Father, who “wills not that any should perish, but that all
should return to penance.”(679)
γ) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is positively
condemned to eternal damnation, as Calvin and the Jansenists assert, or
negatively excluded from Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom
we have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive and negative
reprobation is “a distinction without a difference.” For an adult to be
excluded from Heaven simply means that he is damned. There is no such
thing as a middle state or a purely natural beatitude. Lessius justly says
that to one reprobated by God it would be all the same whether his
reprobation was positive or negative, because in either case he would be
inevitably lost.(680)
READINGS:—*Ruiz, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, Lyons
1628.—Ramirez, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, 2 vols.,
Alcalá 1702.—*Lessius, _De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis_,
XIV, 2.—*IDEM, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_ (_Opusc._,
Vol. II, Paris 1878).—Tournely, _De Deo_, qu. 22 sqq.—Schrader,
_Commentarii_, I-II, _De Praedestinatione_, Vienna 1865.—J. P.
Baltzer, _Des hl. Augustinus Lehre über Prädestination und
Reprobation_, Vienna 1871.—Mannens, _De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et
Praedestinatione_, Louvain 1883.—O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der
Augustinismus_, München 1892.—O. Pfülf, S. J., “_Zur
Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_,” in the Innsbruck
_Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.—B. J. Otten,
S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis
1917, pp. 281, 378, 382 sqq.
Chapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will
When we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious
grace; merely sufficient grace, as such, does not involve consent.
The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the
human will under the influence of efficacious grace.
Catholic theologians have always staunchly upheld both the freedom of the
will and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual
relations between grace and free-will.
Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists
1. THE HERETICAL ERRORS OF LUTHER, CALVIN, AND JANSENIUS CONTRASTED WITH
THE ORTHODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Luther and Calvin asserted that the
freedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius
taught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same
way as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against
both these heresies the Church has always maintained that the will remains
free under the influence of efficacious grace.
a) Luther taught(681) that original sin has so completely annihilated
man’s free-will that he resembles a horse compelled to go in whatever
direction it is driven (according as “God or the devil rides him”),(682)
and that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man’s liberty, compels
him to act with intestine necessity.
Calvin(683) carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by asserting:
(1) that the will of our first parents was free in Paradise, but lost its
freedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery
of Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore
liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will
under the influence of grace is passive, and must needs follow the impulse
to which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous.(684)
Against these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of
free-will both in the state of original sin(685) and under the influence
of efficacious grace: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and
excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, ... cannot
refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive: let him be anathema.”(686)
b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper
distinction between freedom from external constraint (_libertas a
coactione_) and freedom from internal compulsion (_libertas a
necessitate_), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of
grace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from interior
compulsion, and that the _libertas a coactione_ is entirely sufficient to
gain merit or demerit in the fallen state.(687)
The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows:
(1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in
Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation—_delectatio coelestis
victrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two
delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger
always defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance,
is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4)
In each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the
_delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it
is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes
_efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_
sin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the
_delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is
called by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two
delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a
definite decision.
This false teaching inspired the famous “five propositions” of Jansenius,
to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God’s commandments for want of
grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior
grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is
sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian
heresy consisted in assuming the existence of a grace which man may either
obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the
predestined.
These propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his
dogmatic Bull “_Cum occasione_,” of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly
contained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever
resists interior grace. “If it is true that fallen man never resists
interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who
violates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he
therefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first
proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is
clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of
demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative,
merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the
just whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is
therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to
every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a
further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the
universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth
proposition).”(689)
2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED FROM REVELATION.—Far from favoring
the determinism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition
positively contradict the contention that free-will is overpowered by
grace.
a) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in
Sacred Scripture as mutually exclusive, but invariably as coöperating
factors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other,
according to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view.
The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this:(690) “When it is
said in the sacred writings, ‘Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,’(691)
we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: ‘Convert us, O God,
to thee, and we shall be converted,’(692) we confess that we are
forestalled by the grace of God.”
St. Paul, it is true, asks: “Who resisteth his [God’s] will?”(693) But he
also admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: “Exercise thyself unto
godliness.”(694) St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost
does not compel the will. “You always resist the Holy Ghost,” he tells the
Jews; “as your fathers did, so do you also.”(695) Our Lord Himself teaches
that grace exerts no interior compulsion but invites free coöperation: “If
thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”(696) The exhortations,
promises, and threats uttered in various portions of Holy Writ would be
meaningless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.(697)
b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine
defended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were
subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian and Semipelagian errors.(698)
Calvin himself admits that with but one exception the Fathers are
unanimously opposed to his teaching.(699)
The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and
Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that
the point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with
the Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace,
not its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the
latter, he shows by the manner in which he formulates his sentences that
he regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he
does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in which Alexander the
Great cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything,
free-will is nothing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the
human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.(700) Possibly St.
Augustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in
language open to misinterpretation, as when he said: “Therefore aid was
brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be
unchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace.”(701) But this and
similar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the
context shows, Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of grace in
all things pertaining to salvation, and to emphasize the fact that
free-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous
temptations.(702) At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom
of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of
many available passages in proof of this statement. “To yield consent or
to withhold it, whenever God calls, is the function of one’s own
will.”(703) “For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will
is aided; but it is aided precisely for the reason that it remains
free.”(704) St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own
ingenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: “Take away
free will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and
there will be no means left of salvation.”(705)
READINGS:—*Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_ (_Opera
Omnia_, ed. Fèvre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873).—*Dechamps, S. J.,
_De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.—F. Wörter, _Die christliche
Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf
Augustinus_, Freiburg 1856.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,
thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.—S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.
357 sqq., 377 sqq., Freiburg 1901.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual
of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 sqq.
Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of Grace
And Free-Will
The relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of
view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action
on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to
ascertain how free-will is affected by grace.
The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related
theological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism
and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.
Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two
extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.
That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an
article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It
is in trying to explain how grace and free-will coöperate, that the
above-mentioned schools differ.
In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it
our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind
him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all
tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at
stake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient
controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.
Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism
Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab
intrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even
the existence of such a grace.
1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.—The true founder of the Thomistic system
is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the
learned Dominican theologian Bañez (1528-1604). His teaching may be
summarized as follows:
a) God is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_)
of all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_)
derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any
creature could act independently of God, God would cease to be _causa
prima_ and _motor primus_.(706)
The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces
all creatural acts without exception,—necessary and free, good and
bad,—because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in
motion by the _motor primus_.
In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar
nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the
free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode
of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His
determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not
moved.
b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His
rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute
and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills
infallibly happens.(708)
Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform
an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of
sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)
c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s
concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be
conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only
makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from
potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which
the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a
_praemotio_,—and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio
physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient
influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to
their assent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines
itself.(713)
d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are
created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and
execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio
physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called
_praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a
temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the
terms are often used synonymously.(714)
Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal
predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to
determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and
conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination
without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical
predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow
their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia
media_. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free
determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very
foundation of His foreknowledge.(715)
This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its
champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as
follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the
supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)
e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there
corresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which
predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts
freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate
consequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say
that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may
co-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The
will freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved
thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its
efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and
intrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)
It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio
ad unum_.(719)
f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature
inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ
essentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which
confers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu
operari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free
consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent,
because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become
efficacious.(720)
Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can
sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this
question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers
the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for
the deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely
sufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist,
God would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)
CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.—The Thomistic system
undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine
grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently
works out the concept of God as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in
the natural and the supernatural order.
But Thomism also has its weak points.
A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious
theological difficulties.
(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious
and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.
(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the
dogma of free-will.
Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the
freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their
attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their
system.
a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient
to enable a man to perform a salutary act, because _ex vi notionis_ it
confers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a
substantially new grace (_gratia efficax_). A grace which requires to be
entitatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform
a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act.
“To be truly sufficient for something” and “to require to be complemented
by something else” are mutually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient
grace” as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.
Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty.
Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has
received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied
the _gratia efficax_, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the
will.(724) But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic
teaching that together with the _gratia sufficiens_ there co-exists in the
soul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable _praemotio physica_ to
the entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound
up.(725) If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so
long as God denies him the _gratia ab intrinseco efficax_?
Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct
attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it
may remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a
predetermining _gratia efficax_, to merit which is beyond its power. If it
withstands, it _eo ipso_ renders itself unworthy of the _gratia efficax_.
If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and
awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?
To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does
the right use of liberty come in? If coöperation with sufficient grace
moves God to bestow the _gratia per se efficax_, as the Thomists contend,
then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the _gratia
sufficiens_ and the _gratia efficax per se_. But there is absolutely no
place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the
purpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or
to unaided nature. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would
lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving
in a vicious circle, thus: “Because the will offers no resistance, it is
efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful
resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform
a salutary act.”(726)
It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty
which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the
Thomistic system rests, viz.: “_Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi
sit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad
actum]_,” that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be
efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the
latter to the former as of potency to act.
b) The Thomistic _gratia efficax_, conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad
unum_, inevitably destroys free-will.
α) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion
as such,(727) but the implied connotation of _praevia determinatio ad
unum_, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the
will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely
passive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to
will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical
predetermination, in so far as it is a _determinatio ad unum_, must
necessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical
predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the
Thomists hold that the _gratia per se efficax_ operates in the manner of a
supernatural _praedeterminatio ad unum_. If this were true, the will under
the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.
To perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in
mind the Thomistic definition of _praemotio physica_ as “_actio Dei, quâ
voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet
insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa
praemotione coniungere_.”(728) That is to say: As the non-performance of
an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the
respective _praemotio physica_, so conversely, the performance of an act
is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion;
the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because
this would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the
divine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by
God, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.
-------------------------------------
β) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a
distinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really
necessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does
not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion,
but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a
_determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of
the will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_—it is a _necessitas
consequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as
a created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with
free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is
able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The
obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by
an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do
what is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a
_determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a
square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction.
Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to
perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio
physica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so,
replies Alvarez; “for the will remains free so long as the intellect
represents to it an object as indifferent.”(731) That is to say: Liberty
remains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present.
But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the
question. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the
intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless
it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This
_indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is
absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would
it avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit
to compulsion from some other quarter?
γ) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous
distinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The
Molinists argue: “_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non
potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._” The Thomists reply:
“_Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest
dissentire in sensu composito, concedo._” They explain this distinction by
certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says:
“_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod
possit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub
sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum
sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis,
sensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._”(732) As one who sits cannot
at the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise
(_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious
grace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will
retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and
this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.
Is the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_
correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence
of the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and
as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby
demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733)
describes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can
never under any circumstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is
really no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand;
his natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint.
Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia
efficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia
resistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.