[_Mr. Wright._ If the honorable senator will permit me, I will
tell him what I said. I said that the course of his friends had
forced the consideration of this measure on us _in advance_.]
Forced it on _them_ in advance! How? Projects to squander the public
domain are brought forward by friends of the administration, in the
form of a graduation bill, by which fifty millions in value of a
portion of it would have been suddenly annihilated; preëmption bills;
cessions to a few of the states of the whole within their limits. Under
these circumstances, my colleague presents a conservative measure,
and proposes, in lieu of one of these wasteful projects, by way of
amendment, an equitable distribution among all the states of the avails
of the public lands. With what propriety, then, can it be said, that we,
who are acting solely on the defensive, have _forced_ the measure upon
our opponents? Let them withdraw their bill, and I will answer for it
that my colleague will withdraw his amendment, and will not, at this
session, press any measure of distribution. No, sir, no. The policy
of gentlemen on the other side, the clearly defined and distinctly
marked policy is, to condemn in advance those measures which their own
sagacity enables them to perceive that the new administration, faithful
to their own principles and to the best interests of the country,
must bring forward to build up once more the public prosperity. How,
otherwise, are we to account for opposition, from leading friends of
the administration, to the imposition of duties on the merest luxuries
in the world? It is absolutely necessary to increase the public revenue.
That is incontestable. It can only be done by the imposition of duties
on the protected articles, or on the free articles, including those
of luxury; for no one, I believe, in the senate, dreams of laying a
direct tax. Well; if duties were proposed on the protected articles,
the proposition would instantly be denounced as reviving a high tariff.
And when they are proposed on silks and wines, senators on the other
side raise their voices in opposition to duties, on these articles
of incontestable luxury. These, moreover, are objects of consumption
chiefly with the rich, and they, of course, would pay the principal
part of the duty. But the exemption of the poor from the burden
does not commend the measure to the acceptance of the friends of
this expiring administration. And yet they, sometimes, assume to be
guardians of the interests of the poor. Guardians of the poor! Their
friendship was demonstrated at a former session by espousing a measure
which was to have the tendency of reducing wages, and now they put
themselves in opposition to a tax which would benefit the poor, and
fall almost exclusively on the rich.
I will not detain the senate now by dwelling on the ruinous state of
the trade with France, in silks and wines, especially, as it is now
carried on. But I cannot forbear observing, that we import from France
and her dependencies thirty-three millions of dollars annually, whilst
we export in return only about nineteen millions, leaving a balance
against us, in the whole trade, of fourteen millions of dollars; and,
excluding the French dependencies, the balance against us in the direct
trade, with France, is seventeen millions. Yet, gentlemen say we must
not touch this trade! We must not touch a trade with such a heavy and
ruinous balance against us; a balance, a large part, if not the whole,
of which is paid in specie. I have been informed, and believe, that
the greater part of the gold which was obtained from France under the
treaty of indemnity, and which, during general Jackson’s administration,
was with so much care and parade introduced into the United States,
perhaps under the vain hope that it would remain here, in less than
eighteen months was reëxported to France in the very boxes in which it
was brought, to liquidate our commercial debt. Yet we must not supply
the indispensable wants of the treasury by taxing any of the articles
of this disadvantageous commerce! And some gentlemen, assuming not
merely the guardianship of the poor, but of the south also, (with
about as much fidelity in the one case as in the other,) object to the
imposition of duties upon these luxuries, because they might affect
somewhat the trade with France in a southern staple. But duties upon
any foreign imports may affect, in some small degree, our exports.
If the objection, therefore, be sustained, we must forbear to lay
any imposts, and rely, as some gentlemen are understood to desire, on
direct taxes. But to this neither the country nor congress will ever
consent. We have hitherto resorted mainly, and I have no doubt always
will resort, to our foreign imports for revenue. And can any objects
be selected, with more propriety, than those which enter so largely
into the consumption of the opulent? It is of more consequence to the
community, in the consideration of duties, who consumes the articles
charged with them, and consequently, who pays them, than how the dutied
articles are purchased abroad. The south is the last place from which
an objection should come on the score of disproportionate consumption.
I venture to assert that there is more champagne wine consumed in the
Astor House, in the city of New York, in one year, than in any state
south of the Potomac. [A laugh.] Our total amount of imports last
year was one hundred and four millions of dollars. Deducting the free
articles, the amount of goods subject to duty was probably not more
than between fifty and sixty millions. Now, if we are to adhere to the
compromise of the tariff, which it is my wish to be able to do, but
concerning which I have remarked lately a portentous silence on the
part of some of its professing friends on the other side, it will be
recollected, that the maximum of any duty to be imposed is twenty per
centum, after June, 1842. It would not be safe to assume our imports
in future of articles that would remain for consumption, and not be
reëxported, higher than one hundred millions, twenty per centum on
which would yield a gross revenue annually of twenty millions. But
I think that we ought not to estimate our imports at more than ninety
millions; for, besides other causes that must tend to diminish them,
some ten or twelve millions of our exports will be applied annually
to the payment of interest or principal of our state debts held abroad,
and will not return in the form of imports. Twenty per centum upon
ninety millions would yield a gross revenue of eighteen millions only.
Thus it is manifest, that there must be additional duties. And I think
it quite certain, that the amount of necessary revenue cannot be raised
without going up to the limit of the compromise upon all articles
whatever, which, by its terms, are liable to duty. And these additional
duties ought to be laid now, forthwith, clearly before the close of the
session. The revenue is now deficient, compelling the administration
to resort to the questionable and dangerous use of treasury notes.
Of this deficient revenue, there will go off five millions during the
next session of congress, according to the estimate of the secretary of
the treasury, two and a half millions on the thirty-first of December,
1841, and two and a half millions more on the thirtieth June, 1842.
This reduction takes place under that provision of the compromise act,
by which one half the excess of all duties beyond twenty per centum
is repealed on the last day of this year, and the other moiety of that
excess on the last day of June, 1842. Now, if congress does not provide
for this great deficiency in the revenue prior to the close of the
present session, how is it possible to provide for it in season at the
session which begins on the first Monday in December next? No great
change in the customs ought to be made without reasonable notice to
the merchant, to enable him to adapt his operations to the change. How
is it possible to give this notice, if nothing is done until the next
regular meeting of congress? Waiving all notice to the merchant, and
adverting merely to the habits of congress, is it not manifest, that
no revenue bill can be passed by the last day of December, at a session
commencing on the first Monday of that month? How, then, can gentlemen
who have, at least, the temporary possession of the government,
reconcile it to duty and to patriotism, to go home and leave it in this
condition? I heard the senator from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Buchanan,) at
the last session, express himself in favor of a duty on wines and silks.
Why is he now silent? Has he, too, changed his opinion?
[_Mr. Buchanan._ I have changed none of my opinions on the
subject.]
I am glad, most happy, to hear it. Then the senator ought to unite
with us in the imposition of duties sufficient to produce an adequate
revenue. Yet his friends denounce, in advance, the idea of imposing
duties on articles of luxury! They denounce distribution! They denounce
an extra session, after creating an absolute necessity for it! They
denounce all measures to give us a sound currency, but the sub-treasury,
denounced by the people! They denounce the administration of president
Harrison before it has commenced! Parting from the power, of which
the people have stripped them, with regret and reluctance, and looking
all around them with sullenness, they refuse to his administration
that fair trial, which the laws allow to every arraigned culprit.
I hope that gentlemen will reconsider this course, and that, out of
deference to the choice of the people, if not from feelings of justice
and propriety, they will forbear to condemn before they have heard
president Harrison’s administration. If gentlemen are for peace and
harmony, we are prepared to meet them in a spirit of peace and harmony,
to unite with them in healing the wounds and building up the prosperity
of the country. But if they are for war, as it seems they are, I say,
‘lay on, Macduff.’ (Sensation, and a general murmuring sound throughout
the chamber and galleries.)
One argument of the honorable senator, who has just taken his seat,
(Mr. Wright,) I wish to detach from the residue of his speech, that
I may, at once, put it to sleep for ever. With all his well known
ability, and without meaning to be disrespectful, I may add, with all
his characteristic ingenuity and subtlety, he has urged, that if you
distribute the proceeds of the public lands, you arrogate to yourselves
the power of taxing the people to raise money for distribution among
the states; that there is no difference between revenue proceeding
from the public lands and revenue from the customs; and that there is
nothing in the constitution which allows you to lay duties on imports
for the purpose of making up a deficiency produced by distributing the
proceeds of the public lands.
I deny the position, utterly deny it, and I will refute it from
the express language of the constitution. From the first, I have
been of those who protested against the existence of any power in
this government to tax the people for the purpose of a subsequent
distribution of the money among the states. I still protest against
it. There exists no such power. We invoke the aid of no such power
in maintenance of the principle of distribution, as applied to the
proceeds of the sales of the public domain. But if such a power clearly
existed, there would not be the slightest ground for the apprehension
of its exercise. The imposition of taxes is always an unpleasant,
sometimes a painful duty. What government will ever voluntarily incur
the odium and consent to lay taxes, and become a tax-gatherer, not to
have the satisfaction of expending the money itself, but to distribute
it among other governments, to be expended by them? But to the
constitution. Let us see whether the taxing power and the land power
are, as the argument of the senator assumes, identical and the same.
What is the language of the constitution? ‘The congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, _to pay
the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States_; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.’ Here is ample power to impose taxes; but
the _object_ for which the money is to be raised is specified. There
is no authority whatever conveyed to raise money by taxation, for the
purpose of subsequent distribution among the states, unless the phrase
‘general welfare’ includes such a power. The doctrine, once held by
a party upon whose principles the senator and his friends now act, in
relation to the executive department, that those phrases included a
grant of power, has been long since exploded and abandoned. They are
now, by common consent, understood to indicate a purpose, and not to
vest a power. The clause of the constitution, fairly construed and
understood, means that the taxing power is to be exerted to raise money
to enable congress to pay the debts and provide for the common defence
and general welfare. And it is to provide for the general welfare,
in any exigency, by a fair exercise of the powers granted in the
constitution. The republican party of 1798, in whose school I was
brought up, and to whose rules of interpreting the constitution I have
ever adhered, maintained that this was a limited government; that it
had no powers but granted powers, or powers necessary and proper to
carry into effect the granted powers; and that, in any given instance
of the exercise of power, it was necessary to show the specific grant
of it, or that the proposed measure was necessary and proper to carry
into effect a specifically granted power or powers.
There is, then, I repeat, no power or authority in the general
government to lay and collect taxes in order to distribute the proceeds
among the states. Such a financial project, if any administration were
mad enough to adopt it, would be a flagrant usurpation. But how stands
the case as to the land power? There is not, in the whole constitution,
a single line or word that indicates an intention that the proceeds
of the public lands should come into the public treasury, to be used
as a portion of the revenue of the government. On the contrary, the
unlimited grant of power to raise revenue in all the forms of taxation,
would seem to manifest that that was to be the source of supply, and
not the public lands. But the grant of power to congress over the
public lands in the constitution is ample and comprehensive. ‘The
congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States.’ This is a broad, unlimited, and plenary
power, subject to no restriction other than a sound, practical, and
statesmanlike discretion, to be exercised by congress. It applies to
all the territory and property of the United States, whether acquired
by treaty with foreign powers, or by cessions of particular states,
or however obtained. It cannot be denied, that the right to dispose
of the territory and property of the United States, includes a right
to dispose of the proceeds of their territory and property, and
consequently a right to distribute those proceeds among the states.
If the general clause in the constitution allows and authorizes, as
I think it clearly does, distribution among the several states, I will
hereafter show that the conditions on which the states ceded to the
United States can only now receive their just and equitable fulfilment
by distribution.
The senator from New York argued, that if the power contended for,
to dispose of the territory and property of the United States, or
their proceeds, existed, it would embrace the national ships, public
buildings, magazines, dock-yards, and whatever else belonged to the
government. And so it would. There is not a doubt of it; but when will
congress ever perpetrate such a folly as to distribute this national
property. It annually distributes arms, according to a fixed rule,
among the states, with great propriety. Are they not property belonging
to the United States? To whose authority is the use of them assigned?
To that of the states. And we may safely conclude, that when it is
expedient to distribute, congress will make distribution, and when it
is best to retain any national property, under the common authority, it
will remain subject to it. I challenge the senator, or any other person,
to show any limitation on the power of congress to dispose of the
territory or property of the United States or their proceeds, but that
which may be found in the terms of the deeds of cession, or in a sound
and just discretion. Come on; who can show it? Has it not been shown,
that the taxing power, by a specification of the objects for which it
is to be exercised, excludes all idea of raising money for the purpose
of distribution? And that the land power places distribution on a
totally different footing? That no part of the proceeds of the public
domain compose necessarily, or perhaps properly, a portion of the
public revenue? What is the language of the constitution? That to
pay the debts, provide for the common defence and general welfare of
the United States, you may take the proceeds of the public lands? No,
no. It says, for these ends, in other words, for the conduct of the
government of the union, you shall have power, unlimited as to amount
and objects, to lay taxes. That is what it says; and if you go to the
constitution, this is its answer. You have no right to go for power any
where else.
Hereafter, I shall endeavor further to show, that, by adopting the
distribution principle, you do not exercise or affect the taxing power;
that you will be setting no dangerous precedent, as is alleged; and
that you will, in fact, only pay an honest debt to the states, too long
withheld from them, and of which some of them now stand in the greatest
need.
In the opposition to distribution, we find associated together the
friends of preëmption, the friends of graduation, and the friends of
a cession of the whole of the public lands to a few of the states.
Instead of reproaching us with a want of constitutional power to make
an equitable and just distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the
public lands among all the states, they would do well to point to the
constitutional authority, or to the page in the code of justice, by
which their projects are to be maintained. But it is not my purpose
now to dwell on these matters. My present object is with the argument
of the senator from New York, and his friends, founded on financial
considerations.
All at once these gentlemen seem to be deeply interested in the
revenue derivable from the public lands. Listen to them now, and you
would suppose that heretofore they had always been, and hereafter would
continue to be, decidedly and warmly in favor of carefully husbanding
the public domain, and obtaining from it the greatest practicable
amount of revenue, for the exclusive use of the general government.
You would imagine that none of them had ever espoused or sanctioned any
scheme for wasting or squandering the public lands; that they regarded
them as a sacred and inviolable fund, to be preserved for the benefit
of posterity, as well as this generation.
It is my intention now to unmask these gentlemen, and to show that
their real system for the administration of the public lands embraces
no object of revenue, either in the general government or the states;
that their purpose is otherwise to dispose of them; that the fever
for revenue is an intermittent, which appears only when a bill to
distribute the proceeds equally among all the states is pending; and
that, as soon as that bill is got rid of, gentlemen relapse into their
old projects of throwing away the public lands, and denouncing all
objects of revenue from the public lands as unwise, illiberal, and
unjust towards the new states. I will make all this good by the most
incontrovertible testimony. I will go to the very highest authority in
the dominant party, during the last twelve years, and from that I will
come down to the honorable senator from New York, and other members of
the party. (I should not say come down; it is certainly not descending
from the late president of the United States, to approach the senator
from New York. If intellect is the standard by which to measure
elevation, he would certainly stand far above the measure of the
hermitage.) I will show, by the most authentic documents, that the
opponents of distribution, upon the principle now so urgently pressed,
of revenue, are no _bonâ fide_ friends of revenue from the public
lands. I am afraid I shall weary the senate, but I entreat it to bear
patiently with me, whilst I retrace the history of this measure of
distribution.
You will recollect, sir, that some nine or ten years ago, the subject
of the public lands, by one of the most singular associations that
was ever witnessed, was referred to the committee on manufactures, by
one of the strangest parliamentary manœuvres that was ever practiced,
for no other purpose than to embarrass the individual who now has the
honor to address you, and who happened at that time to be a member of
that committee. It was in vain that I protested against the reference,
showed the total incongruity between the manufactures of the country
and the public lands, and entreated gentlemen to spare us, and to spare
themselves the reproaches which such a forced and unnatural connection
would bring upon them. It was all to no purpose; the subject was thrown
upon the committee on manufactures, in other words, it was thrown upon
me; for it was well known, that although among my colleagues of the
committee, there might be those who were my superiors in other respects,
owing to my local position, it was supposed that I possessed a more
familiar knowledge with the public lands than any of them, when, in
truth, mine was not considerable. There was another more weighty motive
with the majority of the senate, for devolving the business on me. The
zeal, and, perhaps, too great partiality of my friends, had, about that
time, presented my name for a high office. And it was supposed that
no measure, for permanently settling the question of the public lands,
could emanate from me, that would not affect injuriously my popularity,
either with the new or the old states, or with both. I felt the
embarrassment of the position in which I was placed; but I resolved
not to sink under it. I pulled off my coat, and went hard to work.
I manufactured the measure for distributing equitably, in just
proportions, the proceeds of the public lands among the several states.
When reported from the committee, its reception in the senate, in
congress, and in the country, was triumphant. I had every reason to be
satisfied with the result of my labors, and my political opponents had
abundant cause for bitter regrets at their indiscretion, in wantonly
throwing the subject on me. The bill passed the senate, but was not
acted upon in the house at that session. At the succeeding session,
it passed both houses. In spite of all those party connections, which
are, perhaps, the strongest ties that bind the human race, Jackson
men, breaking loose from party thraldom, united with anti-Jackson men,
and voted the bill by overwhelming majorities, in both houses. If it
had been returned by the president, it would have passed both houses
by constitutional majorities, his veto notwithstanding. But it was
a measure suggested, although not voluntarily, by an individual who
shared no part in the president’s counsels, or his affections; and
although he had himself, in his annual message, recommended a similar
measure, he did not hesitate to change his ground, in order to thwart
my views. He knew, as I have always believed and have understood, that
if he returned the bill, as by the constitution he was bound to do, it
would become a law, by the sanction of the requisite majorities in the
two houses. He resolved, therefore, upon an arbitrary course, and to
defeat, by an irregular and unprecedented proceeding, what he could not
prevent by reason, and the legitimate action of the constitution. He
resolved not to return the bill, and did not return it to congress, but
pocketed it!
I proceed now to the documentary proof which I promised. In his annual
message of December fourth, 1832, president Jackson says:
‘Previously to the formation of our present constitution, it was
recommended by congress that a portion of the waste lands owned
by the states, should be ceded to the United States, for the
purposes of general harmony, and as a fund to meet the expenses
of the war. The recommendation was adopted, and, at different
periods of time, the states of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia,
North and South Carolina, and Georgia, granted their vacant soil
for the uses for which they had been asked. As the lands may
now be considered as relieved from this pledge, the object for
which they were ceded having been accomplished, it is in the
discretion of congress to dispose of them in such way as best
to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of
the American people,’ and so forth. ‘It seems to me to be our
true policy, that the public lands shall cease, as soon as
practicable, to be a source of revenue,’ and so forth.
Thus, in December, 1832, president Jackson was of opinion, first,
that the public lands were released from the pledge of them to the
expenses of the revolutionary war; secondly, that it was in the power
of congress to dispose of them according to its discretion, in such way
as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the
American people; and, thirdly, that the public lands should cease, as
soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue.
So far from concurring in the argument now insisted upon by his friends,
for the sole purpose of defeating distribution, that the public lands
should be regarded and cherished as a source of revenue, he was clearly
of opinion that they should altogether cease to be considered as a
source of revenue.
The measure of distribution was reported by me from the committee
on manufactures, in April, 1832, and what was done with it? The same
majority of the senate which had so strangely discovered a congeniality
between American manufactures and the public lands, instead of acting
on the report, resolved to refer it to the committee on public lands,
of which the senator from Alabama, (Mr. King,) was chairman; thus
exhibiting the curious parliamentary anomaly of referring the report
of one standing committee to another standing committee.
The chairman, on the eighteenth of May, made a report from which many
pertinent extracts might be made, but I shall content myself with one.
‘This committee turn with confidence from the land-offices to
the custom-houses, and say, here are the true sources of federal
revenue! Give lands to the cultivator. And tell him to keep his
money, and lay it out in their cultivation!’
Now, Mr. President, bear in mind, that this report, made by the senator
from Alabama, embodies the sentiments of his party; that the measure of
distribution which came from the committee on manufactures, exhibited
one system for the administration of the public lands, and that it was
referred to the committee on public lands, to enable that committee to
make an argumentative report against it, and to present their system――a
counter or antagonist system. Well, this counter-system is exhibited,
and what is it? Does it propose to retain and husband the public
lands as a source of revenue? Do we hear any thing from that committee
about the wants of the exchequer, and the expediency of economizing
and preserving the public lands to supply them? No such thing. No
such recommendation. On the contrary, we are deliberately told to
avert our eyes from the land-offices, and to fix them exclusively
on the custom-houses, as the true sources of federal revenue! Give
away the public lands, was the doctrine of that report. Give it to
the cultivator, and tell him to keep his money! And the party of the
senator from New York, from that day to this, have adhered to that
doctrine, except at occasional short periods, when the revenue fit has
come upon them, and they have found it convenient, in order to defeat
distribution, to profess great solicitude for the interests of the
revenue.
Some of them, indeed, are too frank to make any such profession. I
should be glad to know from the senator from Alabama if he adheres
to the sentiments of his report of 1832, and still thinks that the
custom-houses, and not the land-offices, are the true sources of
federal revenue. (Mr. King here nodded assent.)
I expected it. This reavowal is honorable to the candor and
independence of the senator. He does not go, then, with the revenue
arguers. He does not go with the senator from New York, who speaks
strongly in favor of the revenue from the public lands, and votes for
every proposition to throw away the public lands.
During the whole progress of the bill of distribution through the
senate, as far as their sentiments were to be inferred from their votes,
or were to be known by the positive declarations of some of them, the
party dominant then and now acted in conformity with the doctrines
contained in the report of their organ, (Mr. King.) Nevertheless, the
bill passed both houses of congress by decisive majorities.
Smothered, as already stated, by president Jackson, he did not return
it to the senate, until the fourth of December, 1833. With it came his
memorable veto message――one of the most singular omnibusses that was
ever beheld――a strange vehicle, that seemed to challenge wonder and
admiration, on account of the multitude of hands evidently employed in
its construction, the impress of some of them smeared and soiled, as if
they were fresh from the kitchen. Hear how president Jackson lays down
the law in this message.
‘On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my
annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the
public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source
of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges
which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey,
and sale.’ ‘I do not doubt that it is the real interest of
each and all the states in the union, and particularly of the
new states, that the price of these lands shall be reduced
and graduated; and that, after they have been offered for a
certain number of years, the refuse, remaining unsold, shall be
abandoned to the states, and the machinery of our land system
entirely withdrawn.’
These are the conclusions of the head of that party which has been
dominant in this country for twelve years past. I say twelve, for
the last four have been but as a codicil to the will, evincing a mere
continuation of the same policy, purposes, and designs, with that which
preceded it. During that long and dismal period, we all know too well,
that the commands of no major-general were ever executed with more
implicit obedience, than were the orders of president Jackson, or,
if you please, the public policy as indicated by him. Now, in this
message, he repeats, that the public lands should cease to be a source
of revenue, with a slight limitation as to the reimbursement of the
charges of their administration, and adds, that their price should be
reduced and graduated, and what he terms the refuse land, should be
ceded to the states within which it is situated. By the bye, these
refuse lands, according to statements which I have recently seen from
the land office, have been the source of nearly one half――upwards of
forty millions of dollars――of all the receipts from the public lands,
and that, too, principally since the date of that veto message!
It is perfectly manifest, that the consideration of revenue, now
so earnestly pressed upon us by the friends of general Jackson, was
no object with him in the administration of the public lands, and
that it was his policy, by reduction of the price, by graduation, by
preëmptions, and by ultimate cessions, to get rid of them as soon as
practicable. We have seen that the committee on the public lands and
his party coincided with him. Of this, further testimony is furnished
in the debates, in the early part of the year 1833, which took place
on the distribution bill.
Mr. Kane, of Illinois, (a prominent administration senator,) in that
debate, said:
“Should any further excuse be demanded for renewing again this
discussion, I refer to the message of the president of the
United States, at the commencement of the present session, which,
upon a comprehensive view of the general substantial interests
of the confederacy, has, for the first time on the part of any
executive magistrate of this country, declared: ‘it seems to me,
(says the president,) _to be our true policy, that the public
lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of
revenue_, and that they should be sold to settlers in limited
parcels, at a price barely sufficient to reimburse the United
States the expense of the present system, and the cost arising
under our Indian treaties,’” and so forth.
Mr. Buckner, (an administration senator from Missouri,) also refers
to the same message of president Jackson, with approbation and
commendation.
His colleague, (Mr. Benton,) in alluding, on that occasion, to the same
message, says:
‘The president was right. His views were wise, patriotic, and
statesmanlike.’ ‘He had made it clear, as he hoped and believed,
that the president’s plan was right; that all idea of profit
from the lands ought to be given up,’ and so forth.
I might multiply these proofs, but there is no necessity for it. Why
go back eight or nine years? We need only trust to our own ears, and
rely upon what we almost now daily hear. Senators from the new states
frequently express their determination to wrest from this government
the whole of the public lands, denounce its alleged illiberality, and
point exultingly to the strength which the next census is to bring
to their policy. It was but the other day we heard the senator from
Arkansas, (Mr. Sevier,) express some of these sentiments. What were we
told by that senator? ‘We will have the public lands. We must have them,
and we will _take_ them in a few years.’
[_Mr. Sevier._ So we will.]
Hear him! Hear him! He repeats it. Utters it in the ears of the
revenue-pleading senator, (Mr. Wright,) on my left. And yet he will
vote against distribution.
I will come now to a document of more recent origin. Here it is――the
work, nominally, of the senator from Michigan, (Mr. Norvell,) but I
take it, from the internal evidence it bears, to be the production
of the senator from South Carolina, over the way, (Mr. Calhoun.) This
report, in favor of cession, proposes to cede, to the states within
which the public lands are situated, one third, retaining, nominally,
two thirds to the union. Now, if this precedent of cession be once
established, it is manifest that it will be applied to all new states,
as they are hereafter successively admitted into the union. We begin
with ceding one third; we shall end in granting the whole.
[Mr. Calhoun asked Mr. Clay to read the portions of the report
to which he alluded.]
I should be very glad to accommodate the senator, but I should have
to read the whole of _his_ report, and I am too much indisposed and
exhausted for that. But I will read one or two paragraphs.
‘It belongs to the nature of things, that the old and new states
should take different views, have different feelings, and favor
a different course of policy, in reference to the lands within
their limits. It is natural for the one to regard them chiefly
as a source of revenue, and to estimate them according to the
amount of income annually derived from them; while the other
as naturally regards them, almost exclusively, as a portion of
their domain, and as the foundation of their population, wealth,
power, and importance. They have more emphatically the feelings
of ownership, accompanied by the impression that they ought to
have the principal control, and the greater share of benefits
derived from them.’ ‘To sum up the whole in a few words: of all
subjects of legislation, land is that which more emphatically
requires a local superintendence and administration; and,
therefore, ought preëminently to belong, under our system, to
state legislation, to which this bill proposes to subject it
exclusively, in the new states, as it has always been in the old.’
It must be acknowledged, that the new states will find some good
reading in this report. What is the reasoning? That it is natural for
the old states to regard the public lands as a source of revenue, and
as natural for the new states to take a different view of the matter;
ergo, let us give the lands to the new states, making them, of course,
cease any longer to be a source of revenue. It is discovered too, that
land is a subject which emphatically requires a local superintendence
and administration. It therefore proposes to subject it exclusively
to the new states, as (according to the assertion of the report,) it
always has been in the old. The public lands of the United States,
theoretically, have been subject to the joint authority of the two
classes of states, in congress assembled, but, practically, have been
more under the control of the members from the new states, than those
from the old. I do not think that the history of the administration of
public domain in this country, sustains the assertion that the states
have exhibited more competency and wisdom for the management of it,
than the general government.
I stated that I would come down, (I should have said, go up,) from the
late president of the United States, to the senator from New York. Let
us see what sort of notions he had on this matter of revenue from the
public lands, when acting in his character of chairman of the committee
of finance, during this very session, on another bill. There has been,
as you are aware, sir, before the senate, at times, during the last
twelve or fifteen years, a proposition for the reduction of the price
of the public lands, under the imposing guise of ‘graduation.’ A bill,
according to custom, has been introduced during the present session,
for that object. To give it eclat, and as a matter of form and dignity,
it was referred to the committee of finance, of which the honorable
senator from New York is the distinguished chairman; the same gentleman
who, for these two days, has been defending these lands from waste and
spoliation, according to the scheme of distributing their proceeds, in
order to preserve them as a fruitful source of revenue for the general
government. Here was a fine occasion for the display of the financial
abilities of the senator. He and his friends had exhausted the most
ample treasures that any administration ever succeeded to. They were
about retiring from office, leaving the public coffers perfectly empty.
Gentlemanly conduct towards their successors, to say nothing of the
duties of office or of patriotism, required of them to do all in their
power――to pick up and gather together, whenever they could, any means,
however scattered or little the bits might be――to supply the urgent
wants of the treasury. At all events, if the financial skill of the
honorable senator was incompetent to suggest any plan for augmenting
the public revenue, he was, under actual circumstances, bound, by
every consideration of honor and of duty, to refrain from espousing or
sanctioning any measure that would diminish the national income.
Well; what did the honorable senator do with the graduation bill?――a
bill which, I assert, with a single stroke of the pen by a short
process consummated in April, 1842, annihilates fifty millions of
dollars of the avails of the public lands! What did the senator do with
this bill, which takes off fifty cents from the very moderate price of
one dollar and a quarter per acre, at which the public lands are now
sold? The bill was in the hands of the able chairman of the committee
of finance some time. He examined it, no doubt, carefully, deliberated
upon it attentively and anxiously. What report did he make upon it? If
uninformed upon the subject, Mr. President, after witnessing, during
these two days, the patriotic solicitude of the senator in respect to
the revenue derivable from the public lands, you would surely conclude
that he had made a decisive, if not indignant report, against the
wanton waste of the public lands by the graduation bill. I am sorry
to say that he made no such report. Neither did he make an elaborate
report to prove that, by taking off fifty cents per acre on one hundred
millions of acres, reducing two fifths of their entire value, the
revenue would be increased. Oh, no; that was a work he was not prepared
to commit, even to his logic. He did not attempt to prove that. But
what did he do? Why, simply presented a verbal compendious report,
recommending that the bill do pass! [A general laugh.] And yet that
senator can rise here, in the light of day, in the face of this senate,
in the face of his country, and in the presence of his God, and argue
for retaining and husbanding the public lands, to raise revenue from
them!
But let us follow these revenue gentlemen a little further. By one
of the strangest phenomena in legislation and logic that was ever
witnessed, these very senators, who are so utterly opposed to the
distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among all the
states, because it is distribution, are themselves for all other
sorts of distribution――for cessions, for preëmptions, for grants to
the new states to aid them in education and improvement, and even
for distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among particular
states. They are for distribution in all conceivable forms and shapes,
so long as the lands are to be gotten rid of, to particular persons
or particular states. But when an equal, general, broad, and just
distribution is proposed, embracing _all_ the states, they are
electrified and horror-struck. You may distribute, and distribute among
states, too, as long as you please, and as much as you please, but not
among _all_ the states.
And here, sir, allow me to examine more minutely, the project of
cession, brought forward as the rival of the plan of distribution.
There are upwards of one billion of acres of public land belonging
to the United States, situated within and without the limits of the
states and territories, stretching from the Atlantic ocean and the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific; they have been ceded by seven of the
old thirteen states to the United States, or acquired by treaties
with foreign powers. The senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,)
proposes by his bill to cede one hundred and sixty million of acres of
this land to the nine states wherein they lie, granting to those states
thirty-five per centum, and reserving to the United States sixty-five
per centum of the proceeds of those lands.
Now what I wish to say in the first place, is, that, if you commence
by applying the principle of cession to the nine land states now in
the union, you must extend it to other new states, as they shall be,
hereafter, from time to time, admitted into the union, until the whole
public land is exhausted. You will have to make similar cessions to
Wisconsin, to Iowa, to Florida, (in two states, perhaps, at least in
one,) and so to every new state, as it shall be organized and received?
How could you refuse? When other states to the north and to the west
of Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, and Wisconsin, to the very shores of
the Pacific, shall be admitted into the confederacy, will you not be
bound, by all the principles of equality and justice, to make them
respectively similar cessions of the public land, situated within their
limits, to those which you will have made to the nine states? Thus
your present grant, although extending nominally to but one hundred
and sixty million of acres, virtually, and by inevitable consequence,
embraces the whole of the public domain. And you bestow a gratuity of
thirty-five per centum of the proceeds of this vast national property
upon a portion of the states, to the exclusion and to the prejudice
of the revolutionary states, by whose valor a large part of it was
achieved.
Will the senator state whence he derives the power to do this? Will
he pretend that it is to cover the expenses and charges of managing
and administering the public lands? On much the greater part, nearly
the whole of the one hundred and sixty millions of acres, the Indian
title has been extinguished, and they have been surveyed. Nothing but
a trifling expense is to be incurred on either of those objects; and
nothing remains but to sell the land. I understand, that the total
expense of sale and collection is only about two per centum. Why,
what are the charges? There is one per centum allowed by law to the
receivers, and the salaries of the registers and receivers in each
land district, with some other inconsiderable incidental charges.
Put all together, and they will not amount to three per centum on
the aggregate of sales. Thus the senator is prepared to part from the
title and control of the whole public domain upon these terms! To give
thirty-five per centum to cover an expenditure not exceeding three!
Where does he get a power to make this cession to particular states,
which would not authorize distribution among all the states? And when
he has found the power, will he tell me why, in virtue of it, and in
the same spirit of wasteful extravagance or boundless generosity, he
may not give to the new states, instead of thirty-five per centum,
fifty, eighty, or a hundred? Surrender at once the whole public domain
to the new states? The per centage, proposed to be allowed, seems
to be founded on no just basis, the result of no official data or
calculation, but fixed by mere arbitrary discretion. I should be
exceedingly amused to see the senator from South Carolina rising in
his place, and maintaining before the senate an authority in congress
to cede the public lands to particular states, on the terms proposed,
and at the same time denying its power to distribute the proceeds
equally and equitably among all the states.
Now, in the second place, although there is a nominal reservation
of sixty-five per centum of the proceeds to the United States, in
the sequel, I venture to predict, we should part with the whole. You
vest in the nine states the title. They are to sell the land and grant
titles to the purchasers. Now what security have you for the faithful
collection and payment into the common treasury of the reserved
sixty-five per centum? In what medium would the payment be made? Can
there be a doubt that there would be delinquency, collisions, ultimate
surrender of the whole debt? It is proposed, indeed, to retain a sort
of mortgage upon the lands, in the possession of purchasers from the
state, to secure the payment to the United States of their sixty-five
per centum. But how could you enforce such a mortgage? Could you expel
from their homes some, perhaps one hundred thousand settlers, under
state authority, because the state, possibly without any fault of
theirs, had neglected to pay over to the United States the sixty-five
per centum? The remedy of expulsion would be far worse than the
relinquishment of the debt, and you would relinquish it.
There is no novelty in this idea of cession to the new states. The form
of it is somewhat varied, by the proposal of the senator to divide the
proceeds between the new states and the United States, but it is still
substantially the same thing; a present cession of thirty-five per
centum, and an ultimate cession of the whole! When the subject of the
public lands was before the committee on manufactures, it considered
the scheme of cession among the other various projects then afloat.
The report made in April, 1832, presents the views entertained by the
committee on that topic; and, although I am not in the habit of quoting
from my own productions, I trust the senate will excuse me on this
occasion for availing myself of what was then said, as it will at least
enable me to economize my breath and strength. I ask some friend to
read the following passages: [which were accordingly read by another
senator.]
‘Whether the question of a transfer of the public lands be
considered in a limited or more extensive view of it which has
been stated, it is one of the highest importance, and demanding
the most deliberate consideration. From the statements founded
on official reports, made in the preceding part of this report,
it has been seen, that the quantity of unsold and unappropriated
lands lying within the limits of the new states and territories,
is three hundred and forty million eight hundred and seventy-one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-three acres, and the quantity
beyond those limits, is seven hundred and fifty millions,
presenting an aggregate of one billion ninety million eight
hundred and seventy-one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three
acres. It is difficult to conceive a question of greater
magnitude than that of relinquishing this immense amount of
national property. Estimating its value according to the minimum
price, it presents the enormous sum of one billion three hundred
and sixty-three million five hundred and eighty-nine thousand
six hundred and ninety-one dollars. If it be said, that a
large portion of it will never command that price, it is to be
observed, on the other hand, that, as fresh lands are brought
into market and exposed to sale at public auction, many of them
sell at prices exceeding one dollar and a quarter per acre.
Supposing the public lands to be worth, on the average, one
half of the minimum price, they would still present the immense
sum of six hundred and eighty-one million seven hundred and
ninety-four thousand eight hundred and forty-five dollars. The
least favorable view which can be taken of them is, that of
considering them a capital, yielding, at present, an income
of three millions of dollars annually. Assuming the ordinary
rate of six per centum interest per annum as the standard, to
ascertain the amount of that capital, it would be fifty millions
of dollars. But this income has been progressively increasing.
The average increase during the six last years has been at
the rate of twenty-three per centum per annum. Supposing it to
continue in the same ratio, at the end of a little more than
four years the income would be double, and make the capital
one hundred millions of dollars. Whilst the population of the
United States increases only three per centum per annum, the
increase of the demand for the public lands is at the rate of
twenty-three per centum, furnishing another evidence that the
progress of emigration and the activity of sales have not been
checked by the price demanded by government.
‘In whatever light, therefore, this great subject is viewed,
the transfer of the public lands from the whole people of
the United States, for whose benefit they are now held, to
the people inhabiting the new states, must be regarded as the
most momentous measure ever presented to the consideration
of congress. If such a measure could find any justification,
it must arise out of some radical and incurable defect in the
construction of the general government properly to administer
the public domain. But the existence of any such defect is
contradicted by the most successful experience. No branch of
the public service has evinced more system, uniformity, and
wisdom, or given more general satisfaction, than that of the
administration of the public lands.
‘If the proposed cession to the new states were to be made at
a fair price, such as the general government could obtain from
individual purchasers under the present system, there would be
no motive for it, unless the new states are more competent to
dispose of the public lands than the common government. They
are now sold under one uniform plan, regulated and controlled by
a single legislative authority, and the practical operation is
perfectly understood. If they were transferred to the new states,
the subsequent disposition would be according to laws emanating
from various legislative sources. Competition would probably
arise between the new states, in the terms which they would
offer to purchasers. Each state would be desirous of inviting
the greatest number of emigrants, not only for the laudable
purpose of populating rapidly its own territories, but with
the view to the acquisition of funds to enable it to fulfil its
engagements with the general government. Collisions between the
states would probably arise, and their injurious consequences
may be imagined. A spirit of hazardous speculation would be
engendered. Various schemes in the new states would be put
afloat to sell or divide the public lands. Companies and
combinations would be formed in this country, if not in foreign
countries, presenting gigantic and tempting but delusive
projects; and the history of legislation, in some of the states
of the union, admonishes us that a too ready ear is sometimes
given by a majority, in a legislative assembly, to such projects.
‘A decisive objection to such a transfer, for a fair equivalent,
is, that it would establish a new and dangerous relation between
the general government and the new states. In abolishing the
credit which had been allowed to purchasers of the public lands
prior to the year 1820, congress was principally governed by
the consideration of the expediency and hazard of accumulating
a large amount of debt in the new states all bordering on each
other. Such an accumulation was deemed unwise and unsafe. It
presented a new bond of interest, of sympathy, and of union,
partially operating to the possible prejudice of the common
bond of the whole union. But that debt was a debt due from
individuals, and it was attended with this encouraging security,
that purchasers, as they successively completed the payments for
their lands, would naturally be disposed to aid the government
in enforcing payment from delinquents. The project which the
committee are now considering, is, to sell to the states, in
their sovereign character, and consequently, to render them
public debtors to the general government to an immense amount.
This would inevitably create between the debtor states a common
feeling and a common interest, distinct from the rest of the
union. These states are all in the western and southwestern
quarter of the union, remotest from the centre of federal
power. The debt would be felt as a load from which they would
constantly be desirous to relieve themselves; and it would
operate as a strong temptation, weakening, if not dangerous, to
the existing confederacy. The committee have the most animating
hopes and the greatest confidence in the strength, and power,
and durability of our happy union; and the attachment and warm
affection of every member of the confederacy cannot be doubted;
but we have authority, higher than human, for the instruction,
that it is wise to avoid all temptation.
‘In the state of Illinois, with a population at the last
census of one hundred and fifty-seven thousand four hundred
and forty-five, there are thirty-one million three hundred and
ninety-five thousand six hundred and sixty-nine acres of public
land, including that part on which the Indian title remains to be
extinguished. If we suppose it to be worth only half the minimum
price, it would amount to nineteen million six hundred and
twenty-two thousand four hundred and eighty dollars. How would
that state be able to pay such an enormous debt? How could it
pay even the annual interest upon it?
‘Supposing the debtor states to fail to comply with their
engagements, in what mode could they be enforced by the general
government? In treaties between independent nations, the
ultimate remedy is well known. The apprehension of an appeal to
that remedy, seconding the sense of justice and the regard for
character, which prevail among christian and civilized nations,
constitutes, generally, adequate security for the performance
of national compacts. But this last remedy would be totally
inadmissible in case of a delinquency on the part of the
debtor states. The relations between the general government
and the members of the confederacy are happily those of peace,
friendship, and fraternity, and exclude all idea of force and
war. Could the judiciary coerce the debtor states? On what
could their process operate? Could the property of innocent
citizens, residing within the limits of those states, be justly
seized by the general government, and held responsible for
debts contracted by the states themselves in their sovereign
character? If a mortgage upon the lands ceded, were retained,
that mortgage would prevent or retard subsequent sales by the
states; and if individuals bought, subject to the incumbrance, a
parental government could never resort to the painful measure of
disturbing them in their possessions.
‘Delinquency, on the part of the debtor states, would be
inevitable, and there would be no effectual remedy for the
delinquency. They would come again and again to congress,
soliciting time and indulgence, until, finding the weight of the
debt intolerable, congress, wearied by reiterated applications
for relief, would finally resolve to spunge the debt; or, if
congress attempted to enforce its payment, another and a worse
alternative would be embraced.
‘If the proposed cession be made for a price merely nominal,
it would be contrary to the express conditions of the original
cessions from primitive states to congress, and contrary to the
obligations which the general government stands under to the
whole people of these United States, arising out of the fact,
that the acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida, and from Georgia,
were obtained at a great expense, borne from the common treasure,
and incurred for the common benefit. Such a gratuitous cession
could not be made without a positive violation of a solemn
trust, and without manifest injustice to the old states. And
its inequality among the new states would be as marked as its
injustice to the old would be indefensible. Thus Missouri, with
a population of one hundred and forty thousand four hundred and
fifty-five, would acquire thirty-eight million two hundred and
ninety-two thousand one hundred and fifty-one acres; and the
state of Ohio, with a population of nine hundred and thirty-five
thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, would obtain only five
million five hundred and eighty-six thousand eight hundred and
thirty-four acres. Supposing a division of the land among the
citizens of those two states respectively; the citizen of Ohio
would obtain less than six acres for his share, and the citizen
of Missouri upwards of two hundred and seventy-two acres as his
proportion.
‘Upon full and thorough consideration, the committee have come
to the conclusion, that it is inexpedient either to reduce the
price of the public lands, or to cede them to the new states.
They believe, on the contrary, that sound policy coincides with
the duty which has devolved on the general government to the
whole of the states, and the whole of the people of the union,
and enjoins the preservation of the existing system, as having
been tried and approved, after a long and triumphant experience.
But, in consequence of the extraordinary financial prosperity
which the United States enjoys, the question merits examination,
whether, whilst the general government steadily retains the
control of this great national resource in its own hands, after
the payment of the public debt, the proceeds of the sales of the
public lands, no longer needed to meet the ordinary expenses of
government, may not be beneficially appropriated to some other
objects for a limited time.’
The senator from New York has adverted, for another purpose, to the
twenty-eight millions of surplus divided a few years ago among the
states. He has said, truly, that it arose from the public lands. Was
not that, in effect, distribution? Was it not so understood at the
time? Was it not voted for, by senators, as practical distribution?
The senator from North Carolina, (Mr. Mangum,) has stated that he did.
I did. Other senators did; and no one, not the boldest, will have the
temerity to rise here and propose to require or compel the states to
refund that money. If, in form, it was a deposit with the states, in
fact, and in truth, it was distribution. So it was then regarded. So
it will ever remain.
Let us now see, Mr. President, how this plan of cession will operate
among the new states themselves. And I appeal more especially to
the senators from Ohio. That state has about a million and a half of
inhabitants. The United States have (as will probably be shown when
the returns are published of the late census[25]) a population of about
fifteen millions. Ohio, then, has within her limits one tenth part of
the population of the United States. Now, let us see what sort of a
bargain the proposed cession makes for Ohio.
[Mr. Allen here interposed, to explain, that the vote he gave
for Mr. Calhoun’s plan of cession to the new states, was on
the ground of substituting that in preference to the plan of
distribution among all the states.]
Oh! ho!――ah! is that the ground of the senator’s vote?
[Mr. Allen said, he had had a choice between two evils; the
amendment of the senator from South Carolina, and the amendment
of the senator from Kentucky; and it was well known on this side
of the house, that he took the first only as a less evil than
the last.]
Well; all I will say is, that the side of the house kept the secret
remarkably well. [Loud laughter.] And no one better than the senator
himself. There were seventeen votes given in favor of the plan of the
senator from South Carolina, to my utter astonishment at the time. I
had not expected any other vote for it but that of the senator from
South Carolina himself, and the senator from Michigan, (Mr. Norvell.)
No other did, or I suppose would rise and vote to cede away, without
any just or certain equivalent, more than a billion of acres of public
land of the people of the United States. If the vote of the other
fifteen senators was also misunderstood, in the same way as the
senator’s from Ohio, I shall be very glad of it.
But I was going to show what sort of a bargain for Ohio her two
senators, by their votes, appeared to be assenting to. There are eight
hundred thousand acres of public land remaining in Ohio, after being
culled for near half a century, thirty-five per centum of the proceeds
of which are to be assigned to that state, by the plan of cession.
For this trifling consideration, she is to surrender her interest in
one hundred and sixty millions of acres; in other words, she is to
give sixteen millions, (that being her tenth,) for the small interest
secured to her in the eight hundred thousand acres. If, as I believe
and have contended, the principle of cession, being once established,
would be finally extended to the whole public domain, then Ohio would
give one hundred millions of acres of land, (that being her tenth part
of the whole of the public lands,) for the comparatively contemptible
consideration that she would acquire in the eight hundred thousand
acres. A capital bargain this, to which I supposed the two senators
had assented, by which, in behalf of their state, they exchanged one
hundred millions of acres of land against eight hundred thousand!
[A laugh.]
I do not think that the senator’s explanation mends the matter much.
According to that, he did not vote for cession because he liked cession.
No! that is very bad; but, bad as it may be, it is not so great an evil
as distribution, and he preferred it to distribution. Let us see what
Ohio would get by distribution. Assuming that the public lands will
yield only five millions of dollars annually, her proportion, being
one tenth, would be half a million of dollars. But I entertain no
doubt that, under proper management, in a few years the public lands
will produce a much larger sum, perhaps ten or fifteen millions of
dollars; so that the honorable senator prefers giving away for a
song the interests of his state, presently, in one hundred and sixty
millions of acres, and eventually in a billion, to receiving annually,
in perpetuity, half a million of dollars, with an encouraging prospect
of a large augmentation of that sum. That is the notion which the
two senators from Ohio entertain of her interest! Go home, Messieurs
Senators from Ohio, and tell your constituents of your votes. Tell
them of your preference of a cession of all their interest in the
public lands, with the exception of that inconsiderable portion
remaining in Ohio, to the reception of Ohio’s fair distributive share
of the proceeds of all the public lands of the United States, now and
hereafter. I do not seek to interfere in the delicate relation between
senators and their constituents; but I think I know something of the
feelings and views of my neighbors, the people of Ohio. I have recently
read an exposition of her true interests and views, in the message
of her enlightened governor, directly contrary to those which appear
to be entertained by her two senators; and I am greatly deceived if a
large majority of the people of that state do not coincide with their
governor.
The unequal operation of the plan of cession among the nine new states,
has been, perhaps, sufficiently exposed by others. The states with the
smallest population get the most land. Thus Arkansas, with only about
one fifteenth part of the population of Ohio, will receive upwards of
twenty-eight times as much land as Ohio. The scheme proceeds upon the
idea of reversing the maxim of the greatest good to the greatest number,
and of substituting the greatest good to the smallest number.
There can be every species of partial distribution of public land or
its proceeds, but an honest, impartial, straight-forward distribution
among all the states. Can the senator from New York, with his profound
knowledge of the constitution, tell me on what constitutional authority
it is that lands are granted to the Indians beyond the Mississippi?
[Mr. Wright said, that there was no property acquired, and
therefore no constitutional obligation applied.]
And that is the amount of the senator’s information of our Indian
relations! Why, sir, we send them across the Mississippi, and put
them upon our lands, from which all Indian title had been removed.
We promise them even the fee simple; but, if we did not, they are at
least to retain the possession and enjoy the use of the lands, until
they choose to sell them; and the whole amount of our right would be
a preëmption privilege of purchase, to the exclusion of all private
persons or public authorities, foreign or domestic. This is the
doctrine coeval with the colonization of this continent, proclaimed by
the king of Great Britain, in his proclamation of 1763, asserted in the
conferences at Ghent, and sustained by the supreme court of the United
States. Now, such an allotment of public lands to the Indians, whether
they acquire the fee or a right of possession, indefinite as to time,
is equivalent to any distribution.
Thus, sir, we perceive, that all kinds of distribution of the
public lands or their proceeds may be made――to particular states,
to preëmptioners, to charities, to objects of education or internal
improvement, to foreigners, to Indians, to black, red, white, and gray,
to every body, but among all the states of the union. There is an old
adage, according to which, charity should begin at home; but, according
to the doctrines of the opponents of distribution, it neither begins
nor ends at home.
[Here Mr. Clay gave way to an adjournment.]
It is not my intention to inflict upon the senate even a
recapitulation of the heads of argument which I had the honor to
address to it yesterday. On one collateral point I desire to supply
an omission, as to the trade between this country and France. I stated
the fact that, according to the returns of imports and exports, there
existed an unfavorable balance against the United States, amounting,
exclusively of what is reëxported, to seventeen millions of dollars;
but I omitted another important fact, namely, that, by the laws of
France, there is imposed on the raw material imported into that kingdom
a duty of twenty francs on every hundred kilogrammes, equal to about
two cents per pound on American cotton, at the present market price.
Now what is the fact as to the comparative rate of duties in the
two countries? France imposes on the raw product, (which is the mere
commencement of value in articles which, when wrought and finally
touched, will be worth two or three hundred fold,) a duty of nearly
twenty-five per centum; while we admit, free of duty, or with nominal
duties, costly luxuries, the product of French industry and taste,
wholly unsusceptible of any additional value by any exertion of
American skill or industry. In any thing I have said on this occasion,
nothing is further from my intention than to utter one word unfriendly
to France. On the contrary, it has been always my desire to see our
trade with France increased and extended upon terms of reciprocal
benefit. With that view, I was in favor of an arrangement in the tariff
of 1832, by which silks imported into the United States from beyond the
cape of Good Hope, were charged with a duty of ten per centum higher
than those brought from France, and countries this side the cape,
especially to encourage the commerce with France.
While speaking of France, allow me to make an observation, although
it has no immediate or legitimate connexion with any thing before
the senate. It is to embrace the opportunity of expressing my deep
regret at a sentiment attributed by the public journals, to a highly
distinguished and estimable countryman of ours, in another part of the
capitol, which implied a doubt as to the validity of the title of Louis
Philippe to the throne of France, inasmuch as it was neither acquired
by conquest nor descent, and raising a question as to his being the
lawful monarch of the French people. It appears to me, that, after the
memorable revolution of July, in which our illustrious and lamented
friend, Lafayette, bore a part so eminent and effectual, and the
subsequent hearty acquiescence of all France, in the establishment of
the Orleans branch of the house of Bourbon upon the throne, the present
king has as good a title to his crown as any of the other sovereigns
of Europe have to theirs, and quite as good as any which force, or
the mere circumstance of birth, could confer. And if an individual
so humble and at such a distance as I am, might be allowed to express
an opinion on the public concerns of another country and another
hemisphere, I would add, that no chief magistrate of any nation,
amidst difficulties, public and personal, the most complicated and
appalling, could have governed with more ability, wisdom, and firmness,
than have been displayed by Louis Philippe. All christendom owes him an
acknowledgment for his recent successful efforts to prevent a war which
would have been disgraceful to christian Europe――a war arising from the
inordinate pretensions of an upstart Mahometan pacha, a rebel against
his lawful sovereign, and a usurper of his rights――a war which, if once
lighted up must have involved all Europe, and have led to consequences
which it is impossible to foresee.