In tracing the history of that portion of our public domain which was
acquired by the war of the revolution, we should always recollect the
danger to the peace and harmony among the members of the confederacy
with which it was pregnant. It prevented for a long time, the
ratification of the articles of confederation, by all the states, some
of them refusing their assent until a just and equitable settlement
was made of the question of the crown lands. The argument they urged
as to these lands, in a waste and unappropriated state, was, that they
had been conquered by the common valor, the common exertions, and the
common sacrifices of all the states; that their ought therefore to be
the common property of all the states, and that it would be manifestly
wrong and unjust that the states within whose limits these crown lands
happened to lie, should exclusively enjoy the benefit of them. Virginia,
within whose boundaries by far the greater part of these crown lands
were situated, and by whose separate and unaided exertions on the
bloody theatre of Kentucky, and beyond the Ohio, under the direction
of the renowned George Rogers Clarke, the conquest of most of them was
achieved, was, to her immortal honor, among the first to yield to these
just and patriotic views, and, by her magnificent grant to the union,
powerfully contributed to restore harmony, and quiet all apprehensions
among the several states.
Among the objects to be attained by the cession from the states to the
confederation of these crown lands, a very important one was to provide
a fund to pay the debts of the revolution. The senator from New York,
(Mr. Wright,) made it the object of a large part of the argument which
he addressed to the senate, to show the contrary; and so far as the
mere terms of the deeds of cession are concerned, I admit the argument
was sustained. No such purpose appears on the face of the deeds, as far
as I have examined them.
[Mr. Wright here interposed, and said, that he had not
undertaken to argue that the cessions made by the states to the
union, were not for the purpose of extinguishing the public debt,
but that they were not exclusively for that purpose.]
It is not material whether they were made for the sole purpose of
extinguishing the revolutionary debt or not. I think I shall be able
to show, in the progress of my argument, that, from the moment of the
adoption of the federal constitution, the proceeds of the public lands
ought to have been divided among the states.
But that the payment of the revolutionary debt was one of the objects
of the cession, is a matter of incontestable history. We should have
an imperfect idea of the intentions of the parties, if we confined our
attention to the mere language of the deeds. In order to ascertain
their views, we must examine contemporaneous acts, resolutions, and
proceedings. One of these resolutions, clearly manifesting the purpose
I have stated, has probably escaped the notice of the senator from
New York. It was a resolution of the old congress, adopted in April,
1783, preceding the final cession from Virginia, which was in March,
1784. There had been an attempt to make the cession as early as 1781,
but, owing to the conditions with which it was embarrassed, and other
difficulties, the cession was not consummated until March, 1784. The
resolution I refer to, bears a date prior to that of the cession, and
must be taken with it, as indicative of the motives which probably
operated on Virginia to make, and the confederation to accept, that
memorable grant. I will read it.
‘Resolved, that as a further mean, as well of hastening the
extinguishment of the debts, as of establishing the harmony
of the United States, it be recommended to the states which
have passed no acts towards complying with the resolutions of
congress of the sixth of September and tenth of October, 1780,
relative to the cession of territorial claims, to make the
liberal cessions therein recommended, and to the states which
may have passed acts complying with the said resolutions in part
only, to revise and complete such compliance.’
That was one of the great objects of the cession. Seven of the old
thirteen states had waste crown lands within their limits; the other
six had none. These complained that what ought to be regarded as
property common to them all, would accrue exclusively to the seven
states, by the operation of the articles of confederation; and,
therefore, for the double purpose of extinguishing the revolutionary
debt, and of establishing harmony among the states of the union, the
cession of those lands to the United States was recommended by congress.
And here let us pause for a moment, and contemplate the proposition of
the senator from South Carolina, and its possible consequences. We have
seen that the possession by seven states of these public lands, won by
the valor of the whole thirteen, was cause of so much dissatisfaction
to the other six as to have occasioned a serious impediment to the
formation of the confederacy; and we have seen that, to remove all
jealousy and disquietude on that account, in conformity with the
recommendation of congress, the seven states, Virginia taking the
lead, animated by a noble spirit of justice and patriotism, ceded the
waste lands to the United States, for the benefit of all the states.
Now what is the measure of the senator from South Carolina? It is in
effect to restore the discordant and menacing state of things, which
existed in 1783, prior to any cession from the states. It is worse than
that. For it proposes that seventeen states shall give up immediately
or eventually all their interest in the public lands, lying in nine
states, to those nine states. Now if the seven states had refused to
cede at all, they could at least have asserted that they fought Great
Britain for these lands, as hard as the six. They would have had,
therefore, the apparent right of conquest, although it was a common
conquest. But the senator’s proposition is, to cede these public lands
from the states which fought for them in the revolutionary war, to
states that neither fought for them nor had existence daring that
war. If the apprehension of an appropriation of these lands, to the
exclusive advantage of the seven states, was nigh preventing the
establishment of the union, can it be supposed that its security and
harmony will be unaffected by a transfer of them from seventeen to nine
states? But the senator’s proposition goes yet further. It has been
shown that it will establish a precedent, which must lead to a cession
from the United States of all the public domain, whether won by the
sword or acquired by treaties with foreign powers, to new states, as
they shall be admitted into the union.
In the second volume of the laws of the United States, will be found
the act, known as the funding act, which passed in the year 1790. By
the last section of that act, the public lands are pledged, and pledged
exclusively, to the payment of the revolutionary debt, until it should
be satisfied. Thus, we find, prior to the cession, an invitation from
congress, to the states, to cede the waste lands, among other objects,
for the purpose of paying the public debt; and, after the cessions were
made, one of the earliest acts of congress pledged them to that object.
So the matter stood whilst that debt hung over us. During all that time,
there was a general acquiescence in the dedication of the public lands
to that just object. No one thought of disturbing the arrangement.
But when the debt was discharged, or rather when, from the rapidity
of the process of its extinction, it was evident that it would soon
be discharged, attention was directed to a proper disposition of the
public lands. No one doubted the power of congress to dispose of them
according to its sound discretion. Such was the view of president
Jackson, distinctly communicated to congress, in the message which
I have already cited.
‘As the lands may now be considered as relieved from this pledge,
the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished,
it is in the discretion of congress to dispose of them in such
way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general
interest of the American people.’
Can the power of congress, to dispose of the public domain be more
broadly asserted? What was then said about revenue? That it should
cease to be a source of revenue! We never hear of the revenue argument,
but when the proposition is up to make an equal and just distribution
of the proceeds. When the favorable, but, as I regard them, wild and
squandering projects of gentlemen, are under consideration, they are
profoundly silent as to that argument.
I come now to an examination of the terms on which the cession was
made by the states, as contained in the deeds of cession. And I shall
take that from Virginia, because it was, in some measure, the model
deed, and because it conveyed by far the most important part of the
public lands, acquired from the ceding states. I will first dispose
of a preliminary difficulty, raised by the senator from New York.
That senator imagined a case, and then combated it, with great force.
The case he supposed was, that the senator from Massachusetts and I
had maintained, that, under that deed, there was a reversion to the
states; and much of his argument was directed to prove that there is
no reversion, but that, if there were, it could only be to the ceding
states. Now, neither the senator from Massachusetts, nor I, attempted
to erect any such windmill, as the senator from New York has imagined;
and he might have spared himself the heavy blows, which, like another
famed hero, not less valorous than himself, he dealt upon it. What I
really maintain, and have always maintained, is, that, according to the
terms themselves, of the deed of cession, although there is conveyed
a common property, to be held for the common benefit, there is,
nevertheless, an assignment of a separate use. The ceded land, I admit,
is to remain a common fund for all the states, to be administered by a
common authority; but the proceeds, or profits, were to be appropriated
to the states in severalty, according to a certain prescribed rule.
I contend this is manifestly true, from the words of the deed. What
are they? ‘That all the lands within the territory so ceded to the
United States, and not reserved for or appropriated to any of the
before-mentioned purposes, or disposed of in bounties to the officers
and soldiers of the American army, shall be considered a common fund,
for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or
shall become members of the confederation, or federal alliance of the
said states, Virginia inclusive, according to their usual respective
proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be
faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other
use or purpose whatsoever.’
The territory conveyed was to be regarded as an inviolable fund,
for the use and benefit of such states as were admitted, or might be
admitted into the union, Virginia inclusive, according to their usual
respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure. It was to
be faithfully and bona fide administered for that sole purpose, and for
no other purpose whatever.
Where, then, is the authority for all those wild, extravagant, and
unjust projects, by which, instead of administration of the ceded
territory for all the states, and all the people of the union, it is
to be granted to particular states, wasted in schemes of graduation
and preëmption, for the benefit of the trespasser, the alien, and the
speculator?
The senator from New York, pressed by the argument as to the
application of the fund to the separate use of the states, deducible
from the phrases in the deed, ‘Virginia inclusive,’ said, that they
were necessary, because, without them, Virginia would have been
entitled to no part of the ceded lands. No? Were they not ceded to the
United States? was she not one of those states? and did not the grant
to them include her? Why, then, were the words inserted? Can any other
purpose be imagined, than that of securing to Virginia her separate or
‘respective’ proportion? The whole paragraph, cautiously and carefully
composed, clearly demonstrates, that, although the fund was to be
common, the title common, the administration common, the use and
benefit were to be separate among the several states, in the defined
proportions.
The grant was for the benefit of the states, ‘according to their usual
respective proportions in the common charge and expenditure.’ Bear in
mind the date of the deed; it was in 1784――before the adoption of the
present constitution, and whilst the articles of confederation were in
force. What, according to them, was the mode of assessing the quotas
of the different states towards the common charge and expenditure? It
was made upon the basis of the value of all the surveyed land, and the
improvements in each state. Each state was assessed according to the
aggregate value of surveyed land, and improvements within its limits.
After that was ascertained, the process of assessment was this; suppose
there were five millions of dollars required to be raised, for the
use of the general government, and one million of that five were the
proportion of Virginia; there would be an account stated on the books
of the general government with the state of Virginia, in which she
would be charged with that million. Then there would be an account
kept for the proceeds of the sales of the public lands; and, if these
amounted to five millions of dollars also, Virginia would be credited
with one million, being her fair proportion; and thus the account
would be balanced. It is unnecessary to pursue the process with all the
other states; this is enough to show that, according to the original
contemplation of the grant, the common fund was for the separate
benefit of the states; and that, if there had been no change in the
form of government, each would have been credited with its share of the
proceeds of the public lands in its account with the general government.
Is not this indisputable? But let me suppose that Virginia, or any
other state, had said to the general government, ‘I choose to receive
my share of the proceeds of the public lands into my separate treasury;
pay it to me, and I will provide in some other mode more agreeable to
me, for the payment of my assessed quota of the expenses of the general
government;’ can it be doubted that such a demand would have been
legitimate, and perfectly compatible with the deed of cession? Even
under our present system, you will recollect, sir, that, during the
last war, any state was allowed to assume the payment of its share
of the direct tax, and raise it, according to its own pleasure or
convenience, from its own people, instead of the general government’s
collecting of it.
From the period of the adoption of the present constitution of the
United States, the mode of raising revenue, for the expenses of the
general government, has been changed. Instead of acting upon the states,
and through them upon the people of the several states, in the form
of assessed quotas or contributions, the general government now acts
directly upon the people themselves, in the form of taxes, duties, or
excises. Now, as the chief source of revenue raised by this government
is from foreign imports, and as the consumer pays the duty, it is
entirely impracticable to ascertain how much of the common charge and
general expenditure is contributed by any one state to the union.
By the deed of cession, a great and a sacred trust was created. The
general government was the trustee, and the states were the _cestui
que_ trust. According to the trust, the measure of benefit accruing to
each state from the ceded lands, was to be the measure of burden which
it bore in the general charge and expenditure. But, by the substitution
of a new rule of raising revenue to that which was in contemplation
at the time of the execution of the deed of cession, it has become
impossible to adjust the exact proportion of burden and benefit with
each other. The measure of burden is lost, although the subject remains,
which was to be apportioned according to that measure. Who can now
ascertain, whether any one of the states has received, or is receiving
a benefit from the ceded lands, proportionate to its burden in the
general government? Who can know that we are not daily violating the
rule of apportionment prescribed by the deed of cession? To me, it
appears clear, that, either from the epoch of the establishment of
the present constitution, or certainly from that of the payment of the
revolutionary debt, the proceeds of the public lands being no longer
applied by the general government, according to that rule, they ought
to have been transferred to the states, upon some equitable principle
of division, conforming as nearly as possible to the spirit of the
cessions. The trustee not being able, by the change of government, to
execute the trust agreeably to the terms of the trust, ought to have
done, and ought yet to do, that which a chancellor would decree, if he
had jurisdiction of the case――make a division of the proceeds among the
states, upon some rule, approximating as nearly as practicable to that
of the trust. And what rule can so well fulfil this condition, as that
which was introduced in the bill which I presented to the senate, and
which is contained in my colleague’s amendment? That rule is founded
on federal numbers, which are made up of all the inhabitants of the
United States other than the slaves, and three fifths of them. The
south, surely, should be the last section to object to a distribution
founded on that rule. And yet, if I rightly understood one of the dark
allusions of the senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) he has
attempted to excite the jealousy of the north on that very ground.
Be that as it may, I can conceive of no rule more equitable than that
compound one, and I think that will be the judgment of all parts of the
country, the objection of that senator notwithstanding. Although slaves
are, in a limited proportion, one of the elements that enter into the
rule, it will be recollected that they are both consumers and the
objects of taxation.
It has been argued that since the fund was to be a common one,
and its administration was to be by the general government, the fund
ought to be used also by that government to the exclusion of the states
separately. But that is a _non sequitur_. It may be a common fund,
a common title, and a common or single administration; but is there
any thing, in all that, incompatible with a periodical distribution of
the profits of the fund among the parties for whose benefit the trust
was created? What is the ordinary case of tenants in common? There the
estate is common, the title is common, the defence against all attacks
is common; but the profits of the estate go to the separate use of, and
are enjoyed by, each tenant. Does it therefore cease to be an estate in
common?
Again. There is another view. It has been argued, from the fact that
the ceded lands in the hands of the trustee were for the common benefit,
that that object could be no otherwise accomplished, than to use
them in the disbursements of the general government; that the general
government only must expend them. Now, I do not admit that. In point of
fact, the general government would continue to collect and receive the
fund, and as a trustee, would pay over to each state its distributive
share.
The public domain would still remain in common. Then, as to the
expenditure, there may be different modes of expenditure. One is, for
the general government itself to disperse it, in payments to the civil
list, the army, the navy, and so forth. Another is, by distributing it
among the states, to constitute them so many agencies, through which
the expenditure is effected. If the general government and the state
governments were in two different countries, if they had entirely
distinct and distant theatres of action, and operated upon different
races of men, it would be another case; but here the two systems of
government, although for different purposes, are among the same people,
and the constituency of both of them is the same. The expenditure,
whether made by the one government directly, or through the state
governments as agencies, is all for the happiness and prosperity, the
honor and the glory, of one and the same people.
The subject is susceptible of other illustrations, of which I will
add one or two. Here is a fountain of water held in common by several
neighbors living around it. It is a perennial fountain; deep, pure,
copious, and salubrious. Does it cease to be common because some equal
division is made by which the members of each adjacent family dip their
vessels into it, and take out as much as they want? A tract of land
is held in common by the inhabitants of a neighboring village. Does
it cease to be a common property because each villager uses it for
his particular beasts? A river is the common highroad of navigation to
conterminous powers or states. Does it cease to be common because on
its bosom are borne vessels bearing the stripes and the stars, or the
British cross? These, and other examples which might be given, prove
that the argument, on which so much reliance has been placed, is not
well founded, that, because the public domain is held for the common
benefit of the states, there can be no other just application of its
proceeds than through the direct expenditures of the general government.
I might have avoided most of this consumption of time by following the
bad example of quoting from my own productions; and I ask the senate to
excuse one or two citations from the report I made in 1834, in answer
to the veto message of president Jackson, as they present a condensed
view of the argument which I have been urging. Speaking of the cession
from Virginia, the report says:
‘This deed created a trust in the United States which they are
not at liberty to violate. But the deed does not require that
the fund should be disbursed in the payment of the expenses of
the general government. It makes no such provision in express
terms, nor is such a duty on the part of the trustee fairly
deducible from the language of the deed. On the contrary, the
language of the deed seems to contemplate a separate use and
enjoyment of the fund by the states individually, rather than
a preservation of it for common expenditure. The fund itself
is to be a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the
United States as have become, or shall become members of the
confederation or federal alliance, Virginia inclusive. The grant
is not for the benefit of the confederation, but for that of
the several states which compose the confederation. The fund is
to be under the management of the confederation collectively,
and is so far a common fund; but it is to be managed for the
use and benefit of the states individually, and is so far a
separate fund under a joint management. Whilst there was a heavy
debt existing, created by the war of the revolution, and by a
subsequent war, there was a fitness in applying the proceeds
of a common fund to the discharge of a common debt, which
reconciled all; but the debt being now discharged, and the
general government no longer standing in need of the fund,
there is evident propriety in a division of it among those for
whose use and benefit it was originally designed, and whose
wants require it. And the committee cannot conceive how this
appropriation of it, upon principles of equality and justice
among the several states, can be regarded as contrary to either
the letter or spirit of the deed.’
The senator from New York, assuming that the whole debt of the
revolution has not yet been paid by the proceeds of the public lands,
insists that we should continue to retain the avails of them until a
reimbursement shall have been effected of all that has been applied to
that object. But the public lands were never set apart or relied upon
as the exclusive resource for the payment of the revolutionary debt.
To give confidence to public creditors, and credit to the government,
they were pledged to that object, along with other means applicable to
its discharge. The debt is paid, and the pledge of the public lands has
performed its office. And who paid what the lands did not? Was it not
the people of the United States?――those very people to whose use, under
the guardianship of their states, it is now proposed to dedicate the
proceeds of the public lands? If the money had been paid by a foreign
government, the proceeds of the public lands, in honor and good faith,
would have been bound to reimburse it. But our revolutionary debt, if
not wholly paid by the public lands, was otherwise paid out of the
pockets of the people who own the lands; and if money has been drawn
from their pockets for a purpose to which these lands were destined,
it creates an additional obligation upon congress to replace the amount
so abstracted, by distributing the proceeds among the states for the
benefit and the reimbursement of the people.
But the senator from New York has exhibited a most formidable account
against the public domain, tending to show, if it be correct, that what
has been heretofore regarded, at home and abroad, as a source of great
national wealth, has been a constant charge upon the treasury, and a
great loss to the country. The credit side, according to his statement,
was, I believe, one hundred and twenty millions, but the debit side was
much larger.
It is scarcely necessary to remark, that it is easy to state an account
presenting a balance on the one side or the other, as may suit the
taste or views of the person making it up. This may be done by making
charges that have no foundation, or omitting credits that ought to be
allowed, or by both. The most certain operation is the latter, and the
senator, who is a pretty thoroughgoing gentleman, has adopted it.
The first item that I shall notice, with which, I think, he improperly
debits the public lands, is a charge of eighty odd millions of dollars
for the expense of conducting our Indian relations. Now, if this single
item can be satisfactorily expunged, no more need be done to turn a
large balance in favor of the public lands. I ask, then, with what
color of propriety can the public lands be charged with the entire
expense incident to our Indian relations? If the government did not
own an acre of public lands, this expense would have been incurred. The
aborigines are here; our fathers found them in possession of this land,
these woods, and these waters. The preservation of peace with them; the
fulfilment of the duties of humanity towards them; their civilization,
education, conversion to christianity, friendly and commercial
intercourse; these are the causes of the chief expenditure on their
account, and they are quite distinct from the fact of our possessing
the public domain. When every acre of that domain has gone from you,
the Indian tribes, if not in the mean time extinct, may yet remain,
imploring you, for charity’s sake, to assist them, and to share with
them those blessings, of which, by the weakness of their nature, or
the cruelty of your policy, they have been stripped. Why, especially,
should the public lands be chargeable with that large portion of the
eighty odd millions of dollars, arising from the removal of the Indians
from the east to the west side of the Mississippi? They protested
against it. They entreated you to allow them to remain at the homes
and by the sides of the graves of their ancestors; but your stern and
rigorous policy would not allow you to listen to their supplication.
The public domain, instead of being justly chargeable with the
expense of their removal, is entitled to a large credit for the vast
territorial districts beyond the Mississippi, which it furnished for
the settlement of the emigrant Indians.
I feel that I have not strength to go through all the items of the
senator’s account, nor need I. The deduction of this single item will
leave a net balance in favor of the public lands of between sixty and
seventy millions of dollars.
What, after all, is the senator’s mode of stating the account with
the public lands? Has he taken any other than a mere counting-house
view of them? Has he exhibited any thing more than any sub-accountant
or clerk might make out in any of the departments, as probably it was
prepared, cut and dry, to the senator’s hands? Are there no higher or
more statesman-like views to be taken of the public lands, and of the
acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida, than the account of dollars and
cents which the senator has presented? I have said that the senator,
by the double process of erroneous insertion, and unjust suppression
of items, has shaped an account to suit his argument, which presents
any thing but a full and fair statement of the case. And is it not so?
Louisiana cost fifteen millions of dollars. And if you had the power
of selling, how many hundred millions of dollars would you now ask
for the states of Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas――people, land,
and all? Is the sovereignty which you acquired of the two provinces of
Louisiana and Florida nothing? Are the public buildings, and works, the
fortifications, cannon, and other arms, independent of the public lands,
nothing? Is the navigation of the great father of waters, which you
secured from the head to the mouth, on both sides of the river, by the
purchase of Louisiana, to the total exclusion of all foreign powers,
not worthy of being taken into the senator’s estimate of the advantages
of the acquisition? Who, at all acquainted with the history and
geography of this continent, does not know that the Mississippi could
not have remained in the hands, and its navigation continued subject
to the control, of a foreign power, without imminent danger to the
stability of the union? Is the cost of the public domain undeserving
of any credit on account of the vast sums which, during the greater
part of this century, you have been receiving into the public treasury
from the custom-houses of New Orleans and Mobile? Or on account of the
augmentation of the revenue of the government, from the consumption
of dutiable articles by the population within the boundaries of the
two former provinces? The national benefits and advantages accruing
from their possession have been so various and immense, that it would
be impossible to make any mere pecuniary estimate of them. In any
aspect of the subject, the senator’s petty items of Indian annuities
must appear contemptible in comparison with these splendid national
acquisitions.
But the public lands are redeemed. They have long been redeemed.
President Jackson announced, more than eight years ago, an
incontestable truth, when he stated, that they might be considered
as relieved from the pledge which had been made of them, the object
having been accomplished for which they were ceded, and that it
was in the discretion of congress to dispose of them in such way as
best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the
American people. That which congress has the power to do, by an
express grant of authority in the constitution, it is, in my humble
opinion, imperatively bound to do by the terms of the deed of cession.
Distribution, and only distribution, of the proceeds of the public
lands, among the states, upon the principles proposed, will conform
to the spirit, and execute the trust, created in the deeds of cession.
Each state, upon grounds of strict justice, as well as equity, has a
right to demand its distributive share of those proceeds. It is a debt
which this government owes to every state――a debt, payment of which
might be enforced by process of law, if there were any forum, before
which the United States could be brought.
And are there not, sir, existing at this moment the most urgent and
powerful motives for this dispensation of justice to the states at the
hands of the general government? A stranger listening to the argument
of the senator from New York, would conclude that we were not one
united people, but that there were two separate and distinct nations;
one acted upon by the general government, and the other by the state
governments. But is that a fair representation of the case? Are we not
one and the same people, acted upon, it is true, by two systems of
government, two sets of public agents; the one established for general,
and the other for local purposes? The constituency is identical,
although it is doubly governed. It is the bounden duty of those who
are charged with the administration of each system, so to administer it
as to do as much good and as little harm as possible, within the scope
of their respective powers. They should also each take into view the
defects in the powers, or defects in the administration of the powers,
of the other, and endeavor to supply them, as far as its legitimate
authority extends, and the wants or necessities of the people require.
For, if distress, adversity, and ruin come upon our constituents from
any quarter, should they not have our active exertions to relieve them,
as well as all our sympathies and our deepest regrets? It would be but
a poor consolation to the general government, if such were the fact,
that this unhappy state of things was produced by the measures and
operation of the state governments, and not by its own. And if the
general government, by a seasonable and legitimate exercise of its
authority, could relieve the people, and would not relieve them, the
reproaches due to it would be quite as great as if that government
itself, and not the state governments, had brought these distresses
upon the people.
The powers of taxation possessed by the general government are
unlimited. The most fruitful and the least burdensome modes of taxation
are confided to this government exclusive of the states. The power of
laying duties on foreign imports is entirely monopolized by the federal
government. The states have only the power of direct or internal
taxation. They have none to impose duties on imports, not even luxuries;
we have. And what is their condition at this moment? Some of them are
greatly in debt, at a loss even to raise means to pay the interest upon
their bonds. These debts were contracted under the joint encouragement
of the recommendation of this government and prosperous times, in the
prosecution of the laudable object of internal improvements. They may
have pushed, in some instances, their schemes too far; but it was in a
good cause, and it is easy to make reproaches when things turn out ill.
And here let me say, that, looking to the patriotic object of these
state debts, and the circumstances under which they were contracted,
I saw with astonished and indignant feelings a resolution submitted to
the senate, at the last session, declaring that the general government
would not assume the payment of them. A more wicked, malignant,
Danton-like proposition was never offered to the consideration of any
deliberative assembly. It was a _negative_ proposition, not a negative
of any affirmative resolution presented to the senate; for no such
affirmative resolution was offered by any one, nor do I believe was
ever thought or dreamed of by any one. When, where, by whom, was the
extravagant idea ever entertained, of an assumption of the state debts
by the general government? There was not a solitary voice raised in
favor of such a measure in this senate. Would it not have been time
enough to have denounced assumption when it was seriously proposed?
Yet, at a moment when the states were greatly embarrassed, when their
credit was sinking, at this critical moment, was a measure brought
forward, unnecessarily, wantonly, and gratuitously, made the subject of
an elaborate report, and exciting a protracted debate, the inevitable
effect of all which must have been to create abroad distrust in
the ability and good faith of the debtor states. Can it be doubted,
that a serious injury was inflicted upon them by this unprecedented
proceeding? Nothing is more delicate than credit or character. Their
credit cannot fail to have suffered in the only place where capital
could be obtained, and where at that very time some of the agents of
the states were negotiating with foreign bankers. About that period,
one of the senators of this body had in person gone abroad for the
purpose of obtaining advances of money on Illinois stock.
The senator from New York said, that the European capitalists had fixed
the value of the state bonds of this country at fifty per centum; and
therefore it was a matter of no consequence what might be said about
the credit of the states here. But the senator is mistaken, or I have
been entirely misinformed. I understand that some bankers have limited
their advances upon the amount of state bonds, prior to their actual
sale, to fifty per centum, in like manner as commission merchants will
advance on the goods consigned to them, prior to their sale. But in
such an operation it is manifestly for the interest of the states, as
well as the bankers, that the bonds should command in the market as
much as possible above the fifty per centum; and any proceeding which
impairs the value of the bonds must be injurious to both. In any event,
the loss would fall upon the states; and that this loss was aggravated
by what occurred here, on the resolution to which I have referred,
no one, at all acquainted with the sensitiveness of credit and of
capitalists, can hesitate to believe. My friends and I made the most
strenuous opposition to the resolution, but it was all unavailing, and
a majority of the senate adopted the report of the committee, to which
the resolution had been referred. We urged the impolicy and injustice
of the proceeding; that no man in his senses would ever propose the
assumption of the state debts; that no such proposal had, in fact, been
made; that the debts of the states were unequal in amount, contracted
by states of unequal population, and that some states were not in debt
at all. How, then, was it possible to think of a general assumption of
state debts? Who could conceive of such a proposal? But there is a vast
difference between our paying _their_ debts _for_ them, and paying _our
own_ debts _to_ them, in conformity with the trusts arising out of the
public domain, which the general government is bound to execute.
Language has been held in this chamber, which would lead any one who
heard it to believe, that some gentlemen would take delight in seeing
states dishonored, and unable to pay their bonds. If such a feeling
does really exist, I trust it will find no sympathy with the people
of this country, as it can have none in the breast of any honest man.
When the honorable senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) the other
day uttered, in such thrilling language, the sentiment, that honor and
probity bound the states to the faithful payment of all their debts,
and that they would do it, I felt my bosom swelling with patriotic
pride; pride, on account of the just and manly sentiment itself; and
pride, on account of the beautiful and eloquent language, in which that
noble sentiment was clothed. Dishonor American credit! Dishonor the
American name! Dishonor the whole country! Why, sir, what is national
character, national credit, national honor, national glory, but the
aggregate of the character, the credit, the honor, the glory, of the
parts of the nation? Can the parts be dishonored, and the whole remain
unsullied? Or can the whole be blemished, and the parts stand pure and
untainted? Can a younger sister be disgraced, without bringing blushes
and shame upon the whole family? Can our young sister, Illinois, (I
mention her only for illustration, but with all feelings and sentiments
of fraternal regard,) can she degrade her character as a state, without
bringing reproach and obloquy upon all of us? What has made England,
our country’s glorious parent――although she has taught us the duty
of eternal watchfulness, to repel aggression, and maintain our rights
against even her――what has made England the wonder of the world?
What has raised her to such preëminence in wealth, power, empire, and
greatness, at once the awe and the admiration of nations? Undoubtedly,
among the prominent causes, have been the preservation of her credit,
the maintenance of her honor, and the scrupulous fidelity with which
she has fulfilled her pecuniary engagements, foreign as well as
domestic. An opposite example of a disregard of national faith and
character presents itself in the pages of ancient history. Every
schoolboy is familiar with the phrase, ‘Punic faith,’ which at Rome
became a by-word and a reproach against Carthage, in consequence of
her notorious violations of her public engagements. The stigma has
been transmitted down to the present time, and will remain for ever
uneffaced. Who would not lament that a similar stigma should be affixed
to any member of our confederacy? If there be anyone so thoroughly
imbued with party spirit, so destitute of honor and morality, so
regardless of just feelings of national dignity and character, as to
desire to see any of the states of this glorious union dishonored, by
violating their engagements to foreigners, and refusing to pay their
just debts, I repel and repudiate him and his sentiments as unworthy of
the American name, as sentiments dishonest in themselves, and neither
entertained nor approved by the people of the United States.
Let us not be misunderstood, or our feelings and opinions be perverted.
What is it that we ask? That this government shall assume the debts of
the states? Oh! no, no. The debts of Pennsylvania, for example? (which
is, I believe, the most indebted of all the states.) No, no; far from
it. But, seeing that this government has the power, and, as I think,
is under a duty, to distribute the proceeds of the public lands; and
that it has the power, which the states have not, to lay duties on
foreign luxuries; we propose to make that distribution, pay _our_
debt to the states, and save the states, to that extent at least, from
the necessity of resorting to direct taxation, the most onerous of
all modes of levying money upon the people. We propose to supply the
deficiency produced from the withdrawal of the land fund by duties on
luxuries, which the wealthy only will pay, and so far save the states
from the necessity of burdening the poor. We propose, that, by a just
exercise of incontestable powers possessed by this government, we shall
go to the succor of all the states, and, by a fair distribution of
the proceeds of the public lands among them, avert, as far as that
may avert, the ruin and dishonor with which some of them are menaced.
We propose, in short, such an administration of the powers of this
government as shall protect and relieve our common constituents from
the embarrassments to which they may be exposed from the defects in the
powers or in the administration of the state governments.
Let us look a little more minutely at consequences. The distributive
share of the state of Illinois in the land proceeds would be, according
to the present receipts from the public lands, about one hundred
thousand dollars. We make distribution, and she receives it. To that
extent it would, then, relieve her from direct taxation, to meet
the debt which she has contracted, or it would form the basis of new
loans to an amount equal to about two millions. We refuse to make
distribution. She must levy the hundred thousand dollars upon her
population, in the form of direct taxation. And, if I am rightly
informed, her chief source of revenue is a land tax, the most
burdensome of all taxes. If I am misinformed, the senators from
Illinois can correct me.
[Here Messrs. Robinson and Young explained, stating that there
was an additional source in a tax on the stock in the state bank.]
Still the land tax is, as I had understood, the principal source of the
revenue of Illinois.
We make distribution, and, if necessary, we supply the deficiency
which it produces by an imposition of duties on luxuries, which
Illinois cannot tax. We refuse it, and, having no power herself to lay
a duty on any foreign imports, she is compelled to resort to the most
inconvenient and oppressive of all the modes of taxation. Every vote,
therefore, which is given against distribution, is a vote, in effect,
given to lay a land tax on the people of Illinois. Worse than that,
it is a vote, in effect, refusing to tax the luxuries of the rich,
and rendering inevitable the taxation of the poor――that poor in whose
behalf we hear, from the other side of the chamber, professions of such
deep sympathy, interest, and devotion! In what attitude do gentlemen
place themselves who oppose this measure――gentlemen who taunt us as
the aristocracy, as the friends of the banks, and so forth――gentlemen
who claim to be the peculiar guardians of the democracy? How do they
treat the poor? We have seen, at former sessions, a measure warmly
espoused, and finally carried by them, which they represented would
reduce the wages of labor. At this session, a tax, which would be
borne exclusively by the rich, encounters their opposition. And now we
have proposed another mode of benefiting the poor, by distribution of
the land proceeds, to prevent their being borne down and oppressed by
direct taxation; and this, too, is opposed from the same quarter! These
gentlemen will not consent to lay a tax on the luxuries of the affluent,
and, by their votes, insist upon leaving the states under the necessity
of imposing direct taxes on the farmer, the laboring man, the poor,
and all the while set up to be the exclusive friends of the poor! [A
general laugh.] Really, sir, the best friends appear to be the worst
enemies of the poor, and their greatest enemies their best friends.
The gentlemen opposed to us have frightened themselves, and have sought
to alarm others, by imaginary dangers to spring from this measure of
distribution. Corruption, it seems, is to be the order of the day! If
I did not misunderstand the senator from South Carolina, he apprised us
of the precise sum――one million of dollars――which was adequate to the
corruption of his own state. He knows best about that; but I should
be sorry to think that fifty millions of dollars could corrupt my
state. What may be the condition of South Carolina at this time I know
not; there is so much fog enveloping the dominant party, that it is
difficult to discern her present latitude and longitude. What she was
in her better days――in the days of her Rutledges, Pinckneys, Sumpters,
Lowndeses, Cheveses――we all well know, and I will not inflict pain on
the senator by dwelling on it. It is not for me to vindicate her from
a charge so degrading and humiliating. She has another senator here,
far more able and eloquent than I am to defend her. Certainly I do not
believe, and should be most unwilling to think, that her senator had
made a correct estimate of her moral power.
It has been, indeed, said, that our whole country is corrupt; that the
results of recent elections were brought about by fraudulent means; and
that a foreign influence has produced the great political revolution
which has just taken place. I pronounce that charge a gross, atrocious,
treasonable libel on the people of this country, on the institutions
of this country, and on liberty itself. I do not attribute this calumny
to any member of this body. I hope there is none who would give it the
slightest countenance. But I do charge it upon some of the newspapers
in the support of the other party. And it is remarkable, that the very
press which originates and propagates this foul calumny of foreign
influence has indicated the right of unnaturalized foreigners to mingle,
at the polls, in our elections; and maintained the expediency of their
owning portions of the soil of our country, before they have renounced
their allegiance to foreign sovereigns.
I will not consume the time of the senate in dwelling long upon the
idle and ridiculous story about the correspondence between the London
bankers and some Missouri bankers――a correspondence which was kept
safely until after the presidential election, in the custody of the
directors of what is vaunted as a genuine locofoco bank in that state,
when it was dragged out by a resolution of the legislature, authorizing
the sending for persons and papers. It was then blazed forth as
conclusive and damning evidence of the existence of a foreign influence
in our presidential election. And what did it all amount to? These
British bankers are really strange fellows. They are foolish enough to
look to the safety of their money advanced to foreigners! If they see
a man going to ruin, they will not lend him; and if they see a nation
pursuing the same road, they are so unreasonable as to decline vesting
their funds in its bonds. If they find war threatened, they will
speculate on the consequences; and they will indulge in conjectures
about the future condition of a country in given contingencies! Very
strange! They have seen――all the world is too familiar with――these
embarrassments and distresses brought upon the people of the
United States, by the measures of Mr. Van Buren and his illustrious
predecessor. They conclude, that, if he be reëlected, there will be
no change of those measures, and no better times in the United States.
On the contrary, if general Harrison be elected, they argue that a
sound currency may be restored, confidence return, and business once
more be active and prosperous. They therefore tell their Missouri
banking correspondents, that American bonds and stocks will continue to
depreciate if Mr. Van Buren be reëlected; but that, if his competitor
should succeed, they will rise in value, and sell more readily in the
market. And these opinions and speculations of the English bankers,
carefully concealed from the vulgar gaze of the people, and locked up
in the vaults of a locofoco bank, (what wonders they may have wrought
there, have not been disclosed,) are dragged out and paraded, as full
proof of the corrupt exercise of a foreign influence in the election
of general Harrison, as president of the United States. Why, sir, the
amount of the whole of it is, that the gentlemen, calling themselves,
most erroneously, the democratic party, have administered the
government so badly, that they have lost all credit and confidence
at home and abroad, and because the people of the United States
have refused to trust them any longer, and foreign bankers will
not trust them either, they utter a whining cry that their recent
signal defeat has been the work of foreign influence! [Loud laughter
in the galleries.]
Democratic party! They have not the slightest pretension to this
denomination. In the school of 1798, in which I was taught, and
to which I have ever faithfully adhered, we were instructed to be
watchful and jealous of executive power, enjoined to practice economy
in the public disbursements, and urged to rally around the people,
and not attach ourselves to the presidential car. This was Jefferson’s
democracy. But the modern democrats, who have assumed the name, have
reversed all these wholesome maxims, and have given to democracy
a totally different version. They have run it down, as they have
run down, or at least endangered, state rights, the right of
instruction――admirable in their proper sphere――and all other rights,
by perversion and extravagance. But, thank God, true democracy and
true democrats have not been run down. Thousands of those who have been
deceived and deluded by false colors, will now eagerly return to their
ancient faith, and unite, under Harrison’s banner, with their old and
genuine friends and principles, as they were held at the epoch of 1798.
We shall, I trust, be all once more united as a fraternal band, ready
to defend liberty against all dangers that may threaten it at home, and
the country against all that shall menace it from abroad.
But to return from this digression to the patriotic apprehension,
entertained by senators, of corruption, if the proceeds of the public
lands should be distributed among the states. If, in the hands of the
general government, the land fund does not lead to corruption, why
should it in the hands of the state governments? Is there less danger
from the fund if it remain undivided and concentrated, than if it
be distributed? Are the stale governments more prone to corruption
than the federal government? Are they more wasteful and extravagant
in the expenditure of the money of the people? I think that if we
are to consult purity and economy, we shall find fresh motives for
distribution.
Mr. President, two plans of disposing of the vast public domain
belonging to the United States, have been, from time to time, submitted
to the consideration of congress and the public. According to one of
them, it should not be regarded as a source of revenue, either to the
general or to the state government. That, I have, I think, clearly
demonstrated, although the supporters of that plan do press the
argument of revenue whenever the rival plan is brought forward. They
contend that the general government, being unfit, or less competent
than the state governments, to manage the public lands, it ought
to hasten to get rid of them, either by reduction of the price, by
donation, by preëmptions, or by cessions to certain states, or by all
these methods together.
Now, sir, it is manifest that the public lands cannot be all settled
in a century or centuries to come. The progress of their settlement
is indicated by the growth of the population of the United States.
There have not been, on an average, five millions of acres per annum
sold, daring the last half century. Larger quantities will be probably
hereafter, although not immediately, annually sold. Now, when we
recollect that we have at least a billion of acres to dispose of, some
idea may be entertained, judging from the past, of the probable length
of time before the whole is sold. Prior to their sale and settlement,
the unoccupied portion of the public domain must remain either in
the hands of the general government, or in the hands of the state
governments, or pass into the hands of speculators. In the hands of
the general government, if that government shall perform its duty, we
know that the public lands will be distributed on liberal, equal, and
moderate terms. The worst fate that can befall them, would be for them
to be acquired by speculators. The emigrant and settler would always
prefer purchasing from government, at fixed and known rates, rather
than from the speculator, at unknown rates, fixed by his cupidity or
caprice. But, if they are transferred from the general government, the
best of them will be engrossed by speculators. That is the inevitable
tendency of reduction of the price by graduation, and of cession to the
states within which they lie.
The rival plan is, for the general government to retain the public
domain, and make distribution of the proceeds, in time of peace, among
the several states, upon equal and just principles, according to the
rule of federal numbers, and, in time of war, to resume the proceeds
for its vigorous prosecution. We think that the administration of
the public lands had better remain with the common government, to be
regulated by uniform principles, than confided to the states, to be
administered according to various, and, perhaps, conflicting views.
As to that important part of them which was ceded by certain states to
the United States, for the common benefit of all the states, a trust
was thereby created, which has been voluntarily accepted by the United
States, and which they are not at liberty now to decline or transfer.
The history of public lands held in the United States, demonstrates
that they have been wasted or thrown away by most of the states that
owned any, and that the general government has displayed more judgment
and wisdom in the administration of them than any of the states. Whilst
it is readily admitted that revenue should not be regarded as the sole
or exclusive object, the pecuniary advantages which may be derived from
this great national property, to both the states and the union, ought
not to be altogether overlooked.
The measure which I have had the honor to propose, settles this great
and agitating question for ever. It is founded upon no partial and
unequal basis, aggrandizing a few of the states to the prejudice of
the rest. It stands on a just, broad, and liberal foundation. It is
a measure applicable not only to the states now in being, but to the
territories, as states shall hereafter be formed out of them, and to
all new states, as they shall rise, tier behind tier, to the Pacific
ocean. It is a system operating upon a space almost boundless, and
adapted to all future time. It was a noble spirit of harmony and union
that prompted the revolutionary states originally to cede to the United
States. How admirably does this measure conform to that spirit, and
tend to the perpetuity of our glorious union! The imagination can
hardly conceive one fraught with more harmony and union among the
states. If to the other ties that bind us together as one people be
superadded the powerful interest springing out of a just administration
of our exhaustless public domain, by which, for a long succession of
ages, in seasons of peace, the states will enjoy the benefit of the
great and growing revenue which it produces, and in periods of war
that revenue will be applied to the prosecution of the war, we shall
be for ever linked together with the strength of adamantine chains. No
section, no state, would ever be mad enough to break off from the union,
and deprive itself of the inestimable advantages which it secures.
Although thirty or forty more new states should be admitted into this
union, this measure would cement them all fast together. The honorable
senator from Missouri, near me, (Mr. Linn,) is very anxious to have a
settlement formed at the mouth of the Oregon, and he will probably be
gratified at no very distant day. Then will be seen members of congress
from the Pacific states scaling the Rocky mountains, passing through
the country of the grizzly bear, descending the turbid Missouri,
entering the father of rivers, ascending the beautiful Ohio, and coming
to this capitol, to take their seats in its spacious and magnificent
halls. Proud of the commission they bear, and happy to find themselves
here in council with friends, and brothers, and countrymen, enjoying
the incalculable benefits of this great confederacy, and, among them,
their annual distributive share of the issues of a nation’s inheritance,
would even they, the remote people of the Pacific, ever desire to
separate themselves from such a high and glorious destiny? The fund
which is to be dedicated to these great and salutary purposes, does not
proceed from a few thousand acres of land, soon to be disposed of; but
of more than ten hundred millions of acres; and age after age may roll
away, state after state arise, generation succeed generation, and still
the fund will remain not only unexhausted, but improved and increasing,
for the benefit of our children’s children, to the remotest posterity.
The measure is not one pregnant with jealousy, discord, or division,
but it is a far-reaching, comprehensive, healing measure of compromise
and composure, having for its patriotic object the harmony, the
stability, and the prosperity of the states and of the union.