Agreement between Great Britain and Germany—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Soon after the opening of negotiations for the re-establishment of
friendly relations with China the Governments of Great Britain and
Germany concluded an Agreement of a self-denying character which
confirmed, though in different words and with special application to the
situation then existing in China, the principle of the “open door and
equal opportunity,” as set forth by the United States, and accepted by
the Powers consulted, in the autumn of 1899 and the spring of the year
following. By this Agreement, signed in London on October 16th, 1900,
the two Powers bound themselves to support the principle above
mentioned; to abstain from making use of the existing troubles in China
to “obtain for themselves any territorial advantages”; and to co-operate
for the protection of their interests in the event of any attempt on the
part of another Power to obtain such advantages under existing
conditions. The Agreement was, as prearranged, communicated to other
interested Powers, who were invited “to accept the principles recorded
in it.” Replies more or less favourable were received from the Powers
addressed. The French Government referred to its prompt adhesion to the
proposals of the United States in the previous year as a proof of its
long-entertained wishes in the direction indicated; while the Russian
reply, which, like the French, took the form of a Memorandum, went so
far as to say that Russia had been “the first to lay down the
maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental
principle of her policy in China.” The Japanese Government, in its
answer, stated that, in view of the assurance received that in adhering
to the Agreement Japan would be placed in the same position as she would
have occupied had she been a signatory instead of an adhering State, it
had no hesitation in adhering to the Agreement, and accepting the
principles embodied therein.
Subsequently, when it became apparent that Russia had no idea of
evacuating the territory she occupied in Manchuria, the German
Government explained that the Agreement was never intended to apply to
that territory.
The course pursued by Russia from the outset of the negotiations in
Peking was in marked contrast to the attitude adopted by the other
Powers concerned, and in direct contradiction to the principles embodied
in the Anglo-German Agreement in which she professed to acquiesce. From
some of the demands made by the other Powers conjointly she dissociated
herself, while her conduct in keeping her troops stationed in the
furthest positions to which they had penetrated during the Boxer
outbreak indicated an intention to give a permanent character to her
occupation of Manchuria. Her attitude in this latter respect was
doubtless encouraged by the fact that, whereas the Final Protocol
provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops, under certain conditions,
from Peking, and the province of Chihli, it contained no reference to
the evacuation of Manchuria. Further proof of her designs was furnished
by the conclusion in January, 1901 (subject to confirmation by the
Peking Government), of an Agreement between Admiral Alexeieff and the
Tartar General at Moukden, placing the province of Fêng-t’ien (Shenking)
under Russian control, and by the subsequent opening of negotiations at
St. Petersburg for a formal Convention, which would have established a
Russian Protectorate over the whole of Manchuria, besides giving her
exclusive, or preferential, rights in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.
These attempts to obtain China’s consent to her occupation of Manchuria,
and to secure for herself a position of exceptional advantage elsewhere,
were frustrated by the vigilance of Great Britain, the United States and
Japan, and by the general indignation they aroused in China. The
Government at Peking, yielding to the pressure thus brought to bear upon
it, withheld its confirmation of the Moukden Agreement; the Chinese
Minister at the Russian capital was forbidden to sign the Convention
under negotiation; and eventually, in August, 1901, the Russian
Government issued an official _communiqué_ announcing the shelving of
the proposed Convention owing, as it was explained, to the
misrepresentation of Russia’s intentions. Russian troops, nevertheless,
remained in Manchuria, and it was not until after the conclusion of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance that Russia at length made an Agreement with
China for the evacuation of the territory she had occupied, an Agreement
which, as M. Witte afterwards explained to the British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, she never intended to observe.
On the 30th January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was
signed in London by the Marquess of Lansdowne and the Japanese Minister
there, the late Count (then Baron) Hayashi, who was afterwards Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Treaty related to affairs in “the
Extreme East,” and came into effect immediately after signature. It was
terminable after five years’ duration, at one year’s notice on either
side, subject to the condition that should either of the contracting
parties be at war when the period of the Treaty came to an end it should
remain in force until peace was concluded. By this Agreement the
contracting parties recognized the independence of China and Korea, and
the special interests therein of Great Britain and Japan respectively.
They bound themselves to maintain strict neutrality in the event of
either of them being involved in war, and to come to one another’s
assistance in the event of either being confronted by the opposition of
more than one hostile Power. The Treaty also, as we have seen, affirmed
the principle of “equal opportunity.”
In his despatch to the British Minister in Tōkiō notifying the signature
of the Agreement the Marquess of Lansdowne observed that it might be
regarded as the outcome of the events which had taken place during the
last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain
and Japan in dealing with them. Count Hayashi, in his _Secret Memoirs_,
published in London in 1915 after his death, confirms this statement,
but puts the date at which tendencies began to take shape in this
direction somewhat further back. The idea of an alliance between the two
countries first came, he says, into the minds of Japanese statesmen soon
after the triple intervention of 1895, and was favoured by Count Mutsu,
who was at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs. The effect of that
intervention, he explains, was to cause a regrouping of Powers in the
Far East: France, Russia and Germany forming one group, while Great
Britain, Japan and the United States represented another. Having this
regrouping in view, he himself, in the summer of that year, suggested
the desirability of such an alliance, should the unfriendly attitude of
certain Powers towards Japan be continued. The suggestion was made in
articles contributed to a leading Tōkiō journal after he had ceased to
be Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the eve of his appointment
as Japanese Minister to China.
The following extracts from a summary of these articles, which is given
in the Memoirs, show how, undismayed by the retrocession of the Liaotung
peninsula, Japanese statesmen still held firmly to their settled policy
of attaining for the nation a footing of equality with Western Powers,
realizing perhaps more clearly than before that the increase of Japan’s
naval and military strength was the only means of attaining their
object.
“We must,” the writer of the articles says, “continue to study according
to Western methods, for the application of science is the most important
item of warlike preparations that civilized nations regard. If new ships
of war are considered necessary, we must build them at any cost. If the
organization of the army is found to be wrong ... the whole military
system must be entirely changed. We must build docks to be able to
repair our ships. We must establish a steel factory to supply guns and
ammunition. Our railways must be extended so that we can mobilize our
troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping must be developed so that we can
provide transports to carry our armies abroad. This is the programme
that we have to keep always in view.... What Japan has now to do is to
keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against
her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her
national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one
day surely come in the Orient. When that day comes, she will be able to
follow her own course.”
How sedulously all the steps indicated were subsequently carried out is
now common knowledge. Preparations on a scale so extended could mean
only one thing—provision against the possible eventuality of war with
the Power that might stand in the way of Japan’s “following her own
course.”
[Illustration:
MARQUIS SAIONJI.
Descended from an ancient family of Court Nobles. A prominent figure
in diplomacy and parliamentary life. He was chief delegate for Japan
at the Versailles Conference.
]
[Illustration:
GENERAL PRINCE KATSURA.
Rendered distinguished services in the war with China and Russia; he
was conspicuous both as soldier and statesman.
]
The idea of an alliance, or some sort of understanding, between the two
countries thus put forward in 1895 seems to have gradually made way both
in Japan and in Great Britain. We learn from the same Memoirs that in
1898 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Minister, expressed to
Viscount (then Mr.) Kato, who was at that time Japanese Minister in
London, the readiness of Great Britain to enter into an agreement with
Japan for the settlement of affairs in the Far East, and that the
latter, in reporting the conversation to the Foreign Minister in Tōkiō,
strongly supported the suggestion. The subject, it appears, was again
discussed in the course of a conversation which Count Hayashi had with
the late Marquis Itō and with Marquis (then Count) Inouyé in Tōkiō in
1899, prior to his (Count Hayashi’s) appointment as Minister in London.
His account of what passed on this occasion shows that the Japanese
Government was at that time hesitating between two opposite courses—an
agreement, or alliance, with Great Britain, and an understanding with
Russia; and it seems to have been thought that the latter Power was in a
position to offer better terms. Soon after his arrival, early in
January, 1900, to take up his post in London the new Minister met the
late Dr. Morrison, then _Times_ correspondent in Peking, with whom he
discussed the question of an alliance between the two countries. He
seems then to have formed the impression that most British journalists
were in favour of an Anglo-Japanese alliance.
It was not, however, until the following year that the question began to
assume a practical aspect. The first move came from an unexpected
quarter, the German Embassy in London. In March, 1901, Freiherr von
Eckhardstein, who was then, owing to the illness of the German
Ambassador, in the position of Chargé d’Affaires, called on Count
Hayashi and expressed the opinion that a triple alliance between
Germany, Great Britain and Japan was the best means of maintaining peace
in the Far East. He suggested that he (Count Hayashi) should take the
initiative in proposing this alliance. The latter, who had, as we know,
been one of the first to advocate an Anglo-Japanese alliance, reported
the suggestion to his Government, and was instructed to sound the
British Government unofficially on the subject. Much light is thrown on
the subsequent course of negotiations by the Memoirs already mentioned,
and Freiherr von Eckhardstein’s “Reminiscences” (_Lebens Erinnerungen
und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten_), published in Leipzig in 1920. The
ball thus set rolling, the question was, we learn, discussed informally
from time to time, on the one hand between the Japanese Minister and
Lord Lansdowne, and, on the other, between the latter and the German
Chargé d’Affaires; but it was never reopened by the German Embassy with
the Japanese Minister.
There seems to have been little enthusiasm for the project of a triple
alliance on the part of any of the foreign Ministries concerned. Great
Britain appears to have shown more inclination in this direction than
the other two Powers, for until a late stage in the negotiations with
Japan the point would seem to have been kept in view by the British
Cabinet. If the German Government ever seriously entertained the
idea—which is very doubtful—it was merely for the reasons mentioned by
the Foreign Office in Berlin, that the inclusion of Japan might be
acceptable to her on general grounds, since she would “find herself in
good company,” and might make negotiations with Great Britain easier,
“as Japan was popular in Germany.” The alliance with Great Britain was
regarded as the main consideration; and even in this matter there is no
reason to think that the German overtures were sincere, for Berlin’s
insistence on Austria’s being brought into the business, though not as a
contracting party, added to the difficulties already in existence. Nor,
on the side of Japan, where the part played by Germany in the Liaotung
incident was not forgotten, does there seem to have been any marked
desire for the inclusion of that Power in any understanding between
herself and Great Britain. This explains the separate character of the
negotiations carried on in London. As between Great Britain and Germany,
they lasted no longer than a few weeks, during which time they appear to
have been kept alive only by the efforts of the German Chargé
d’Affaires, to whose initiative the project was due. After the
resumption of his duties by the German Ambassador the negotiations were
transferred to Berlin, where they soon came to an end. Their failure is
described by the author of the Reminiscences as “the starting-point of
the encirclement [_Einkreisung_] of Germany, and of the world-war which
was the mathematical consequence.”
The parallel negotiations between Great Britain and Japan were not
interrupted by the inability of the British and German Governments to
arrive at an understanding. No obstacles of the kind that stood in the
way of an agreement between the two other Powers existed. The cordial
relations which had been established as a result of the settlement of
the long-pending question of Treaty revision had been improved by the
close co-operation of the two countries in the international measures in
which both had joined at the time of the Boxer outbreak, and by the
harmony of views that was developed during the Peking negotiations. The
only difficulty which presented itself lay in the fact, already referred
to, that the Japanese Government was hesitating between two opposite
courses—an understanding with Russia and an agreement with Great
Britain. The decision rested with the leading statesmen, who on this
point were divided into two parties, one led by the late Prince Itō and
the late Marquis Inouyé, the other by Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata and
the late Prince Katsura. Itō, whose pro-German tendencies were well
known, was in favour of coming to an understanding, if possible, with
Russia, and his opinion was shared by Inouyé. Yamagata and Katsura, on
the other hand, were inclined towards an alliance with Great Britain.
Fortunately for the London negotiations, the cleavage of opinion did not
follow clan lines. The Chōshiū party, to which the four statesmen in
question all belonged, was itself divided. Fortunately, also, Katsura
was then Premier. His and Yamagata’s policy was adopted by the Cabinet,
and finally prevailed. In his opposition to the Cabinet’s policy Itō
went so far as to arrange that a visit he was about to make to America
in connection with celebrations at the University of Yale should be
extended to Russia, where he seems to have exchanged views with Russian
statesmen. His action threatened at one moment to imperil the success of
the London negotiations, and it became necessary for the Japanese
Government to explain that his visit to Russia had no official
character. In the face of this disavowal he could do little. Whatever
plans he and those who supported him may have formed came to nothing,
and in the end he was forced to content himself with criticizing
unfavourably the draft of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which embodied the
final amendments proposed by Japan. The strength of his position in the
country at the time, as well as his influence with the late Japanese
Emperor, may be gathered from the fact that these last amendments were
transmitted by the Government to him in Russia by special messenger,
with a request for his opinion.
It is unnecessary to emphasize the importance of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance. Count Hayashi, in speaking of it as “an epoch-making event,”
does not overstate the case. For both countries it was a new and grave
departure in policy, ending an isolation which was a source of weakness
to each in the quarter of the world to which it applied. For Japan it
had a treble value. It practically assured her against a repetition of
the Liaotung incident, while the mere fact of her becoming the ally of
one of the leading Powers of the world added greatly to her prestige,
and it facilitated the floating of loans on the London market. If the
benefit accruing to Great Britain may seem to have been less, the
alliance was nevertheless opportune in view of the close understanding
between Russia and France in the Far East, the open menace to her
interests offered by Russian designs in Manchuria and the danger to be
apprehended from their further extension. The fact that the alliance was
renewed in an extended form three years later, was again renewed in
1911, and is still in force, shows that both Governments have reason to
be satisfied with its results.
The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance drew from the Russian and
French Governments a Declaration, signed in St. Petersburg on March 3rd,
1902, which left no doubt as to the interpretation placed on it in St.
Petersburg and Paris. In this Declaration the two Governments, while
approving of the fundamental principles affirmed in the Anglo-Japanese
Agreement, reserved to themselves the right to consult each other, if
necessary, regarding the protection of their interests. The comment of
the author of _Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise_ on this
counter-move was that “it had almost no value as an answer to the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty.”
The action of Russia in prolonging indefinitely her occupation of
Manchuria, in spite of the protests of other Powers, and her attempts to
strengthen her position there by secret arrangements with China, in
defiance of the principle of “the open door and equal opportunity” which
she had united with other Powers in accepting, caused fresh uneasiness
in Washington. On February 1st, 1901, almost simultaneously with the
signature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the American Secretary of State,
to whose initiative in 1899 the acceptance of this principle had been
due, addressed Circular Notes to the Governments of China, Russia and
nine other Powers on the subject of the situation created in Manchuria
by the Russian occupation. Any agreement, he pointed out, by which China
ceded to corporations, or companies, exclusive industrial rights and
privileges in connection with the development of Manchuria constituted a
monopoly, and, being a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties
between China and foreign Powers, seriously affected the rights of
American citizens. Such concessions would be followed by demands from
other Powers for similar exclusive advantages in other parts of the
Chinese Empire, and would result in “the complete wreck of the policy of
absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to trade,
navigation and commerce within the confines of the Empire.”
Influenced, perhaps, by the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the written
protest of the United States, Russia at length, on the 8th April, 1902,
concluded at Peking an Agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria. The
Agreement was to come into force from the date of signature, and was to
be ratified within a period of three months, but this latter stipulation
was never observed. It provided for the evacuation to be conducted in
three stages, and to be completed in eighteen months—that is to say, by
October, 1903. The evacuation was, however, made dependent on two
conditions: the absence, meanwhile, of disturbances in the province, and
the abstention of other Powers from any action prejudicial to Russian
interests therein. The first stage fixed by the Agreement, the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the south-western portion of the
province of Moukden (Fêng-t’ien), was duly carried out by the date
agreed upon, the 8th October, 1902. Before, however, the date fixed for
the completion of the next stage of evacuation (March, 1903), the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the remainder of the province of
Moukden and from the province of Kirin, other and quite new conditions
were formulated by the Russian Government, one being that no “treaty
ports” should be opened in the evacuated territory. In the face of the
well-known fact that the fresh commercial treaties which America and
Japan were negotiating with China contemplated the opening of additional
places for foreign trade in Manchuria, these sudden demands indicated no
intention on Russia’s part to abide by the Agreement. If any doubt in
this respect existed, it was removed by her action in reoccupying early
in 1903 districts she had already evacuated, this step being followed by
the issue in July of the same year of an Imperial Ukase appointing
Admiral Alexeieff Viceroy of the Amur and Kwantung territories—the
latter being, as already mentioned, the name of the small peninsula in
which Port Arthur is situated.