War with Russia—Success of Japan—President Roosevelt’s Mediation—Treaty
of Portsmouth—Peace Terms.
The threatening attitude of Russia, who no longer made any pretence of
masking her designs in China, was regarded with increasing anxiety in
Japan, where the necessity of preparing to meet force with force had
already been foreseen. But the high-handed proceedings of the Russians
in Manchuria were not the only cause of the tension that from this
moment began to appear in the relations between the two countries.
Mischief of a kind which had already led to war between China and Japan
was also brewing in Korea. By the Treaty of Shimonoséki, which ended the
war, the independence of that country was recognized. China in
relinquishing her claim to suzerainty no longer maintained Chinese
guards for her Legation in Seoul, and ceased from all political activity
in the peninsula, where the influence of Japan for a time became
predominant. But history was about to repeat itself. Into the place
vacated by China, Russia at once stepped, and Japan found herself
confronted by another and far more dangerous competitor. The positions
of the two new rivals in Korea were very different. The alliance forced
by Japan on the Korean Government at the outset of the war with China
had enabled her to strengthen her political influence, while the energy
she threw into the development of business projects of various kinds had
increased her material interests in the peninsula. The lion’s share of
Korea’s foreign trade and maritime transport was in the hands of Japan.
She had also constructed and was in charge of the working of telegraphic
communications in that country; she had secured a concession for the
construction of railways; and she had her own postal service. Russia, on
the other hand, took no part in business enterprise, and her trade with
Korea was insignificant. She could not, like China, point to traditions
of old-established intercourse, nor had she the latter’s plea of
suzerainty to justify interference in Korean affairs. Her position in
the peninsula was, nevertheless, not without some advantages. As in the
case of China, her territory was co-terminous for a considerable
distance with that of Korea. This supplied a reason for regarding with
disfavour the extension of Japanese influence on the mainland, as well
as a pretext for the activity she soon began to display in political
matters. Moreover, having gained the ear of the formerly pro-Chinese
Court party and—which was more important—the favour of the masterful
Queen, she acquired valuable support in the campaign of political
intrigue upon which both Powers embarked.
The situation in Korea thus became in many ways similar to what it had
been before, when China and Japan were contending for supremacy in the
peninsula. We have seen in the former instance the attempts that were
made from time to time by the Chinese and Japanese Governments to arrive
at an understanding with regard to their respective interests which
should introduce more stable conditions into Korean administration, and
put an end to the dangerous outbreaks which disturbed the country and
threatened at any moment to produce a collision between the two Powers
concerned. The process was now repeated, Russia occupying the position
held by China before. In 1896 an arrangement was effected between the
Russian and Japanese representatives in Korea. This tided over the first
difficulties that had arisen, and later in the same year was confirmed
by a Convention signed at St. Petersburg by Prince Lobanoff, the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata, who
had gone to the Russian capital to attend the late Tsar’s coronation.
Count de Witte, in his recently published Memoirs, referring to this
Convention, says that Prince Lobanoff “knew no more about the Far East
than the average schoolboy.” Two years later a more detailed Agreement
in the form of a Protocol was concluded at Tōkiō between Viscount (then
Baron) Nishi, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Russian
Minister to Japan, Baron Rosen. This Agreement resembled closely the
Convention negotiated at Tientsin in 1889 between China and Japan.
The conclusion of the above mentioned Agreements did not prevent the
occurrence of disputes between the two rival Powers. These differences
were aggravated by the mischievous influence of Korean political
factions, which lost no opportunity of fomenting trouble between the two
Powers whose protection was sought. The harmony of relations was also
impaired by the presence of Russian and Japanese guards in the capital;
by the Russian efforts to obtain control of the Korean army and
finances; by the unfortunate implication of the Japanese Minister in
Seoul in the murder of the Queen; by the virtual imprisonment of the
King in one of the royal palaces; and by his subsequent escape from
confinement to the Russian Legation, where he remained for some time
under Russian protection. Matters were at length brought to a crisis by
the refusal of Russia in the spring of 1903 to evacuate Manchuria in
pursuance of her Agreement with China concluded in the previous October.
This refusal was followed by the appointment of Admiral Alexeieff as
Viceroy of the Russian Far Eastern Territories, and an increase of
activity in Korea, where large timber concessions were obtained, and
other Russian enterprises set on foot. For this renewal of aggressive
action on the part of Russia the way had been prepared by the
construction of railways in Siberia and Manchuria—a work of many years;
and it is significant that Russia should have timed her refusal to carry
out the Agreement for evacuation so as to coincide with the completion
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which practically established direct
railway communication between Moscow and Port Arthur. There could no
longer be any doubt that the Russian Government had not abandoned the
far-reaching designs which her lease of Port Arthur had heralded, and
was bent on pursuing a provocative policy. Count de Witte, in the
Memoirs already quoted, holds the late Tsar directly responsible for the
course adopted, which he describes as “the Far Eastern adventure.” The
Tsar, he says, had no definite programme of conquest, but was anxious to
spread Russian influence in the Far East by acquiring fresh territory,
and he speaks of him as having a thirst for military glory and
conquests. He further explains that the Tsar at this time came under the
influence of Bezobrazov, Plehve and other unscrupulous officials, who
encouraged him to defy Japan. Had Russia at this stage of affairs been
content to limit her activity to Manchuria, leaving Japan a clear field
in Korea, the Russo-Japanese war would probably not have taken place, or
it might, at least, have been postponed. A proposal to this effect was,
indeed, made by Japan in the course of the negotiations between the two
Powers, which were commenced at the Russian capital about the time of
Alexeieff’s appointment, and continued until early in the following
year. Russia, however, refused to entertain it. The uncompromising and
obdurate attitude she displayed was in marked contrast to the
conciliatory disposition evinced by Japan. For the deadlock thus created
Russia alone was responsible. The Japanese Government, recognizing the
futility of any further attempt to arrive at a satisfactory
understanding with her, decided to take the bull by the horns, and
terminate negotiations. Accordingly, in two Notes addressed to the
Russian Government on the 5th February, 1904, it announced its intention
to break oil diplomatic relations, reserving to itself the right to take
what independent action might be necessary to defend its threatened
interests. At the same time the Japanese Government sent a circular
despatch to the same effect to its diplomatic representatives abroad for
the information of the Governments to which they were accredited.
Hostilities were commenced by Japan at Port Arthur and Chemulpo two days
before her formal declaration of war, which was not made until the 10th
February. This action on her part evoked some unfavourable criticism,
though many precedents for this step existed. Her declaration of war was
followed a fortnight later by the signature at Seoul of a Protocol by
which Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of
Korea, who in return granted to her all facilities in the peninsula
which might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. It will be
remembered that a similar step was taken by Japan at the outset of her
war with China.
When the latter conflict took place the world in general, for the most
part ignorant of the conditions existing in the two countries,
anticipated the defeat of Japan, an opinion governed to a great extent
by considerations of geography, population and visible resources. On the
same grounds a similar view, adverse to Japan’s chances of success in a
struggle with Russia, prevailed in most quarters. For a nation far
inferior in extent of territory, population, military organization, and
resources, to challenge a leading European Power seemed, on the face of
things, a proceeding which could only invite disaster. The two countries
were, nevertheless, not so unevenly matched as was supposed to be the
case. Without doubt Russia was an adversary with whom the strongest
military state would have preferred to keep on good terms. Her extensive
territories and large population, her apparently inexhaustible
resources, gave her great advantages over Japan. These advantages were,
however, counterbalanced by certain patent weaknesses. The war was
unpopular. The policy of adventure which provoked it was condemned by
her own wisest statesmen. There was much political unrest. She was
fighting not in Europe, but on a remote fringe of her vast empire. The
Amur Railway, projected with a view to consolidate her widely separated
dominions, was not completed east of Lake Baikal; nor had the railway
authorities yet finished the portion round the southern end of that
lake, communication across which was still maintained by specially built
steamers. It was doubtful, therefore, if the recently built Chinese
Eastern Railway, which served as a temporary substitute, would prove to
be a reliable line of communications for war purposes. In Japan, on the
other hand, the war was not only popular, but eagerly welcomed. The
efficiency of the army, no less than the fighting capacity and endurance
of the Japanese soldier, had been tested in the war with China, and in
the course of the eight years that had since elapsed the Government had
spared no effort to bring it to the level of European standards. Though
Japanese statesmen, conscious of Russia’s strength, might share the
apprehensions felt abroad as to the issue of the struggle, they derived
encouragement from the whole-hearted support given to the Government by
the people. All classes realized that the stake at issue for Russia was
very different from what it was for Japan. The former was fighting to
acquire fresh territory; the latter was fighting for her life. Under
these circumstances a warlike nation, fighting at its own doors, might
conceivably accomplish great things against a foe whose heart was not in
the struggle. The spirit which animated her people and her army was one
of the factors in Japan’s success.
No time was lost by the Japanese in the conduct of military
operations. On the 8th February a Japanese squadron, escorting
transports, arrived off Chemulpo, where two Russian vessels were lying
at anchor unprepared for hostilities. Given the choice of being
attacked in the harbour or fighting outside, the Russian commander
chose the latter alternative. His two vessels were no match for the
squadron they encountered. Driven back into port badly damaged, one
was sunk and the other blown up by its crew. The same night Admiral
Tōgō, the Japanese naval Commander-in-Chief, delivered a torpedo
attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. In this action two Russian
battleships and a cruiser sustained severe damage. On the following
day the Japanese troops (some four battalions) which had arrived under
naval escort at Chemulpo landed, and occupied the Korean capital. The
first actions of the war thus resulted in favour of Japan.
At this early stage it became apparent that Russia’s superiority at sea
was greatly nullified by the faulty disposition of her squadrons. While
her main fleet in Far Eastern waters was stationed at Port Arthur, a
powerful squadron remained isolated at Vladivostok. A large portion of
her navy, moreover, was kept at home, whence it only emerged late in the
war to be destroyed in the battle of Tsushima. Two other obstacles the
Russian commanders had to contend with: the ice-bound condition of
Vladivostok for several months in the year, and the almost
insurmountable difficulty of repairing vessels owing to the absence of
adequate dockyard facilities. In all these respects Japan had an
advantage. Her harbours were free from ice. She was well provided with
naval arsenals, and with dockyards for the repair of her ships. On the
outbreak of war, too, her fleet was at once concentrated at Sasébo, the
naval arsenal near Nagasaki, a detached squadron being posted in the
Korean straits, whence it could watch Vladivostok. From the first,
therefore, the Russian naval forces in the Far East were separated, nor
throughout the war were they ever able to effect a junction. Moreover,
whereas the Russian home fleet took no part in the war until it was
drawing to a close, the Japanese navy early in the struggle received a
welcome reinforcement in the shape of two new battleships acquired in
Europe from a neutral Power.
In the naval operations which ensued at Port Arthur the Japanese,
besides resorting to vigorous bombardments, delivered repeated torpedo
attacks, and attempted on several occasions to seal up the harbour by
sinking vessels at the entrance. Neither of these courses was attended
with the success hoped for; nor had they the effect of inducing the
Russian fleet to come out and fight. Greater success resulted from the
laying of mines in front of Port Arthur. In April the Russian flagship
_Petropavlosk_ struck one of these mines and was blown up, the new
Russian admiral, Makharoff, who had just taken over command of the
fleet, being killed in the explosion. Another battleship was at the same
time seriously damaged. A little later the Japanese also laid mines at
the entrance of Vladivostok, thus restricting the movements of the
Russian squadron at that port, which had previously shown mischievous
activity in attacks on Japanese transports. When the Russians, copying
the methods of the enemy, took to laying mines themselves, the results
were disastrous for the Japanese, two of their best battleships and a
despatchboat being destroyed by this means in the month of May. These
losses were, however, so carefully concealed that the Russians knew
nothing of their occurrence till it was too late to take advantage of
them.
The excessive caution displayed by the Russian naval commanders in the
opening stages of the war was no effective answer to the bold tactics of
their opponents. The inaction of the main fleet at Port Arthur, its
refusal for several months to accept the risks of a general engagement,
gave the Japanese navy thus early in the struggle a moral superiority
that was never lost. Furthermore, it enabled Japan to gain practically
the command of the sea, so essential to the prosecution of military
operations on the mainland.
The Japanese operations on land began with the disembarkation of the 1st
Army of three divisions under General Kuroki at the mouth of the Ta-tong
river and the occupation of the important town of Ping-yang, where the
Chinese army had made its first stand in the war of 1894–5. The few
Russian troops in the neighbourhood fell back on the Yalu river, the
boundary at this point between Korea and China. Here in a strong
position on the Chinese side of that river, and at its junction with a
tributary stream, the Ai-ho, a Russian army of some 20,000 men under
General Zasulich awaited attack. This was delivered by the Japanese
after some preliminary skirmishing on the 30th April, and resulted in
the defeat of the Russians with the loss of over twenty guns, their
casualties being far greater than those of the victors. A few days later
the 2nd Japanese army under General Oku landed at Pitzuwo, a place on
the east coast of the Liaotung peninsula some sixty miles from Port
Arthur, and cut the railway line connecting that fortress with
Liao-yang, the town chosen by General Kuropatkin, the Russian
Commander-in-Chief, for the concentration of his forces. The
disembarkation of this army was covered by the Japanese fleet, which had
made the Elliot islands its advanced base. In the middle of May another
Japanese force, which afterwards formed part of the 4th Army led by
General Nodzu, landed at Takushan, midway between Pitzuwo and the mouth
of the Yalu. At the end of that month the 2nd Army, after a severe
struggle, defeated a Russian force entrenched in a formidable position
at Nanshan, on the isthmus of Chinchou, which connects the two
peninsulas of Liaotung and Kawn-tung. The position captured was of
importance, as guarding the approaches to Port Arthur. On this occasion
the Japanese took many siege guns, but their casualties were much
heavier than those of the Russians. The landing of Oku’s army was
followed early in June by that of the 3rd Army under General Nogi, to
whom was assigned the rôle of besieging Port Arthur. Soon afterwards the
repulse by General Oku of a Russian force sent to relieve the fortress
enabled the 3rd Army to begin the execution of its task. Meanwhile
further Japanese reinforcements had reached Takushan, and in July
General Nodzu arrived and took command of the 4th Army, the formation of
which was by this time complete. This, and the 1st Army under Kuroki,
then moved westwards on parallel lines through the mountain passes of
Southern Manchuria, driving before them the Russian forces which they
encountered; while General Oku with the 2nd Army moving from the
south-west struck northwards, the objective in each case being
Liao-yang, where General Kuropatkin had established his headquarters. At
this stage the campaign in Manchuria divided itself into two distinct
and independent operations: the advance north and west of the three
Japanese armies under Generals Oku, Kuroki and Nodzu in a converging
movement towards Liao-yang; and the investment of Port Arthur by the 3rd
Army under General Nogi.
As the result of the converging movement of the northern armies, in the
course of which the treaty port of Newchwang was occupied, their total
length of front had in the beginning of August been reduced from 150 to
45 miles. This success was not gained without severe fighting at
different points, in which, however, the Japanese losses compared, on
the whole, favourably with those of the enemy. On the 10th of the same
month the Russian fleet at Port Arthur made its first and only sortie in
full strength, its object being to join forces with the squadron at
Vladivostok. The attempt failed. In the general engagement that ensued
four Russian ships succeeded in running the gauntlet of the Japanese
fleet and reaching neutral ports, but the other vessels were driven back
into harbour severely damaged. Of those which escaped, three were
interned at the ports where they arrived; while the fourth, the _Novik_,
which had put into Kiaochow, was subsequently intercepted and sunk on
her way to Vladivostok. A similar sortie made about the same time by the
Vladivostok squadron was equally unsuccessful. These two engagements put
an end to the activity of the Russian naval forces in the Far East.
The battle of Liao-yang, the first big battle of the war, was fought
under the immediate direction of Marshal Ōyama, the Japanese
Commander-in-Chief, who had accompanied the 2nd Army on its march north.
There was little disparity in point of numbers between the forces
engaged on each side, but the Russians had an advantage in cavalry over
the Japanese, and were also much stronger in artillery. Beginning on the
23rd of August, it lasted until the morning of the 3rd September, when
Kuropatkin gave orders for the retirement of the whole army towards
Mukden. The losses on each side were about equal, a fact which,
considering the strength of the Russian position, was very creditable to
the Japanese. In the beginning of October the second big battle, that of
the Shaho, so called from the name of a river in the vicinity, took
place. On this occasion it was Kuropatkin who took the offensive. Again
the Japanese were successful, the Russians being driven back with twice
the loss sustained by their opponents.
On the 2nd January Port Arthur fell. After the investment of the
fortress had become complete, three successive general assaults made in
August, October and November had failed. Eventually, on the 5th of
December, the Japanese succeeded in storming the position known as 203
Metre Hill, which commanded the remaining defences, as well as the
harbour in which was contained what was left of the Russian main fleet.
A month later the commander of the fortress, General Stoessel,
surrendered. The siege had cost the Japanese between thirty and forty
thousand casualties, but the prize was well worth this cost. The Russian
main fleet had ceased to exist, and Nogi’s troops were free to march
north to reinforce the Japanese armies threatening Mukden. During the
short interval separating the fall of Port Arthur from the final battle
of the war Kuropatkin again assumed the offensive. But the attack was
not pushed vigorously, and after a few days of fighting the Russians at
the end of January retired, having sustained heavy losses. It was now
midwinter, but, in spite of the intense cold, the Japanese
Commander-in-Chief decided to continue his advance on Mukden. In this
decision he was influenced by the successful working of the single line
of railway by which the communications of the Russian armies were
maintained. The utility of this line had exceeded all expectations. By
this means constant reinforcements were reaching Kuropatkin. Delay until
spring, moreover, would help the Russians in several ways: it would give
time for the arrival of fresh troops; it would enable them to strengthen
their entrenchments at Mukden; and the break-up of winter would render
military operations difficult. A further consideration, which doubtless
had some weight in the resolution formed by Ōyama, lay in the fact that
his armies would shortly be strengthened by the addition of Nogi’s
troops from Port Arthur.
The battle of Mukden resolved itself into a series of engagements
lasting from the last day of February until the 16th of March, when
Kuropatkin, acknowledging defeat, retreated up the railway to Tiehling
with an estimated loss of 140,000 men and a vast quantity of war
material. The Japanese losses were well under 50,000 killed and wounded.
The final episode of the war took place at sea some two months later.
The fierce assaults delivered by the Japanese army besieging Port Arthur
in the previous autumn had been hastened by the news that the Russian
Baltic fleet was on its way to the Far East, having sailed on the 15th
October, 1904. Delayed by coaling difficulties and the necessity of
maintaining a uniform rate of progress, this fleet did not reach
Japanese waters until May, 1905. On the 27th of that month it was met in
the Tsushima straits by a Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō and
completely defeated, only two vessels escaping to tell the tale of
disaster.
The exhaustion of both combatants in the long and arduous struggle
prepared the way for the termination of hostilities. Though she had been
successful on land as well as at sea, the military reserves at the
disposal of Japan were seriously depleted, and the people were tired of
war. Russia, on the other hand, though free from anxiety on this score,
was beset by internal difficulties of a kind which threatened grave
trouble were the war to be prolonged. In these circumstances the
overtures set on foot in the following June by President Roosevelt,
acting of his own accord as peacemaker, were welcomed by both Powers.
The negotiations, conducted at Portsmouth in the United States, resulted
in the conclusion of peace on the 5th day of September, 1905. By the
Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia acknowledged the preponderating interests
of Japan in Korea, ceded to Japan the southern half of Saghalien, which
the latter had exchanged in 1875 for the Kurile islands, and transferred
to her the larger and more valuable portion of the rights in Manchuria
acquired from China in connection with the lease of Port Arthur in 1898.
No war indemnity, however, was paid by Russia, though she undertook to
reimburse Japan for the cost of maintenance of the large number of
Russian prisoners taken during the war. The absence of any provision for
an indemnity caused considerable dissatisfaction in Japan, some slight
disturbances occurring in the Capital. Japan had, indeed, no reason to
be dissatisfied with the results of her success in the war, for it
placed her at once in the position of a first-class Power in the Far
East.
The conclusion of peace was followed by the signature in the Korean
capital on the 17th of November of a Convention establishing a Japanese
protectorate over Korea. The formal consent of China to the provisions
of the Treaty of Portsmouth, ceding to Japan the lease of Port Arthur,
and transferring to her the southern portion of the Manchurian Railway,
was also obtained by a Treaty between China and Japan, which was signed
in Peking on the 22nd of December. And in the following June a Japanese
Imperial Ordinance was issued establishing the South Manchurian Railway
Company, by which, thenceforth, the administration of the line, and of
the strip of territory through which it passed, was conducted.