American Protest against Foreign Aggression in China—Principle of “Open
Door and Equal Opportunity”—Financial Reform—Operation of Revised
Treaties—The Boxer Outbreak—Russia and Manchuria.
In addition to the various Agreements for the occupation of Chinese
territory mentioned in the preceding chapter, negotiations were
conducted with the Chinese Government about the same time by the
European Powers concerned, and also by Japan, for the purpose of
obtaining Declarations regarding the non-alienation by China of certain
territories which were regarded by them as coming, respectively, within
their special spheres of interest. As a result of these negotiations the
French Minister at Peking received in March, 1897, a verbal assurance,
confirmed later in writing, that the Chinese Government would “in no
case, nor under any form, alienate to another Power the island of Hainan
off the coast of the province of Kwantung.” In February, 1898, a similar
Declaration concerning the riverain provinces of the Yangtse was made to
Great Britain. In the following April the assurance previously given to
France was extended so as to include the three southern provinces of
Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwantung bordering on Tonkin; while Japan in the
same month received an assurance of a corresponding nature regarding the
province of Fukien, the Chinese Government signifying its intention
“never to cede or lease it to any Power whatsoever.” In thus obtaining
from China a Declaration of non-alienation respecting the province of
Fukien, similar to those given to Great Britain and France regarding
other portions of Chinese territory, Japan established her claim to rank
as one of the leading Powers in the Far East, a position which, as will
be seen, received further recognition in the following year. Her success
in this respect—due to her victory in the war with China, and to the
alteration in her status as a nation which resulted from the conclusion
of revised treaties with several foreign Powers—was rendered the more
noticeable by the failure of Italy, after prolonged negotiations, to
gain China’s consent to a territorial concession similar to those
granted to other European Powers.
The years 1898 and 1899 witnessed the negotiation by European Powers
with each other of two other arrangements relating to China of a
somewhat different character. One of these was the Declaration made by
Great Britain to Germany on April 19th, 1898, binding herself not to
construct any railway connecting Weihaiwei, and the adjoining leased
territory, with the interior of the province of Shantung. The other was
the Agreement, effected through an exchange of Notes at St. Petersburg
on April 28th, 1899, by which the British and Russian Governments
recorded their intention to regard, for the purpose of railway
concessions, the basin of the Yangtse and the region north of the Great
Wall as the special spheres of interest of the two Powers, respectively,
confirming, at the same time, the understanding arrived at between them
in regard to the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang.
The outbreak of war between the United States and Spain in the spring of
1898 led to the introduction of a new factor into the situation created
in the Far East by the events above described. One of the results of the
war was the cession of the Philippine Islands to America, who had
already, by annexing Hawaii, secured a stepping-stone across the
Pacific. By the acquisition of these former Spanish possessions, which
provided her with a naval base in the Eastern Pacific for the protection
of her commerce in Far Eastern waters, America’s attitude towards Far
Eastern questions was at once affected. Hitherto in her relations with
the Far East—with China, Japan and Korea—she had maintained a detached
attitude in keeping with her traditional policy of non-interference in
foreign questions. In China, where she came late into the field, she had
been content to follow, at a distance, in the wake of other Powers;
sharing in whatever commercial or extra-territorial privileges might be
obtained, but never breaking the ice for herself, nor—to her credit, be
it said—betraying any aggressive tendencies. As the pioneer of Western
nations in putting an end to the seclusion of Japan and Korea, she had
opportunities for exercising a powerful influence, of which her
traditional policy forbade her to make full use. Regarding both
countries somewhat in the light of protégés, her policy in respect to
each soon settled down into one of benevolent inaction, varied only by
occasional half-hearted opposition to the less complaisant policy of
other Governments, whenever the duty of a patron, so to speak, seemed to
call for her interposition. We have seen how she was thus led on two
occasions in the matter of Treaty revision into a premature
encouragement of Japanese ambitions, which was the cause of
embarrassment both to herself, and to the nation whose wishes she was
willing to further. The course thus pursued by America, which precluded
concerted action with other Powers, was in some respects simply an
extension to the Far East of the policy she had previously adopted in
regard to European questions. Well as the traditional principle of
holding aloof from affairs outside of the American continent, through
fear of political entanglements, may have suited the conditions of her
earlier existence as a nation, a too rigid adherence to this principle,
when those conditions were fast disappearing, might lead to consequences
more unpleasant than those she sought to avoid. An attitude of
detachment carried too far might result in her exclusion from a voice in
the regulation of matters of international interest. Towards some such
position America appeared to be drifting, when, to borrow the phrase
used by Mr. Hornbeck in _Contemporary Politics of the Far East_, she
suddenly “stumbled into World Politics” through her occupation of the
Philippines. From that moment her political isolation was ended. She
began to take a more active and intelligent interest in Far Eastern
questions, though the reluctance to abandon her traditional policy,
which was still noticeable in her action when she did move, was liable
to be mistaken for timidity.
The territorial concessions obtained, one after the other, by Germany,
Russia, France and Great Britain, and the ear-marking of other Chinese
territory by arrangements made either by the Powers concerned, as well
as by Japan, with China, or by certain of those European Powers between
themselves, caused uneasiness in Washington. There was a fear lest the
new activity displayed by various Governments might result in the
closure, or restriction, of Chinese markets hitherto open to all
countries, in which case serious injury might accrue to American
commerce and enterprise. The apprehension was not unfounded, even so far
as the Declarations regarding the non-alienation of Chinese territory
were concerned. Although the actual wording of these Declarations did
not of itself justify an inference of this nature, from the fact that
they were made at all it was generally held that their effect was to
establish, in each instance, a sort of priority of right—a position of
exceptional advantage in favour of the Power to whom the Declaration was
made. The inference derived support from the vagueness of the term
“spheres of interest” applied to the regions affected by the
Declarations in question, and was also strengthened by the common
impression formed at the time that this ear-marking of Chinese territory
portended an eventual partition of China. This seems to have been the
view taken by the United States Government.
In September, 1899, the American Secretary of State addressed Circular
Notes to the British, French, German and Russian Governments, expressing
the hope that they would “make a formal declaration of an ‘open door’
policy in the territories held by them in China.” An assurance was
sought from each Power: that it would “in no way interfere with any
treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of
interest, or leased territory, it might have in China”; “that the
Chinese Treaty tariff of the time being should apply to all merchandise
landed or shipped to all such ports as are within the said ‘sphere of
interest’” ... and “that duties so leviable should be collected by the
Chinese Government”; and that it “would levy no higher harbour dues on
vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such ‘sphere’
than should be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher
railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its
‘sphere’ on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other
nationalities transported through such ‘sphere’ than should be levied on
similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over like
distances.” In the following November similar, though not identical,
Notes were addressed to the Governments of France, Italy and Japan,
asking them to join in these formal declarations of policy.
The reason for the distinction thus made both in the dates and tenor of
the two series of communications may, perhaps, be found in the fact that
the territories leased by the three first-named Powers, besides their
greater strategic importance, were situated in a part of China where
American interests were more closely concerned than in the region
further south affected by French action, and that Japan, though
interested in the Declaration regarding Fukien, had neither sought nor
obtained any cession of territory; while Italy had failed in her
endeavour to emulate the example of her nearest continental neighbours.
The assurance received from China by Japan regarding the non-alienation
of the province of Fukien was, as we have seen, in effect, an admission
of the position of power and influence she had by this time acquired.
Her inclusion in the list of States consulted by America on this
occasion was indirectly an endorsement of this admission, and is the
first public recognition of her new status as a leading Power in the Far
East.
Favourable replies were received from all the Powers consulted; each,
however, with the exception of Italy, making the reservation that assent
to the proposals was subject to the condition that all the Powers
interested should participate in the Declarations. Thereupon, in March,
1900, the American Secretary of State sent instructions to the American
representative at each of the capitals of the Powers consulted to inform
the Government to which he was accredited that, in his opinion, the six
Powers in question and the United States were mutually pledged to the
policy of maintaining the commercial _status quo_ in China, and of
refraining, each within what might be considered its sphere of
influence, “from measures calculated to destroy equality of
opportunity.”
The Notes thus exchanged between the United States and the six other
Powers above mentioned explain the origin, as they also constitute “the
formal basis” (to use Mr. Hornbeck’s words) of what has ever since been
known as the policy of the “Open door and equal opportunity” in China.
The latter part of the phrase was afterwards used in the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty of Alliance to designate the policy of Great Britain and Japan in
Korea as well as in China. To the former country, now annexed to Japan,
it no longer applies; but the policy has theoretically, if not always
practically, been in force as regards China, for the last twenty-one
years, and there is reason to think that more may yet be heard both of
the phrase, and of the policy it represents, in connection with affairs
in China, and possibly in other parts of Eastern Asia.
In touching on the subject of financial reform in a previous chapter
attention was called to the monetary confusion which existed after the
abolition of the feudal system, when the new Government which had come
into power found itself saddled with clan debts and with clan paper
money, mostly depreciated and of many different kinds. It was pointed
out how, as a natural consequence of this monetary confusion and of
financial embarrassments due to other causes, the monetary transactions
of the country were for many years conducted on the basis of an
inconvertible paper currency; and how by successive steps, taken as
opportunity offered, to remedy this state of things, specie resumption
on a silver basis was at length effected in 1886.
It was not till eleven years later, in 1897, that Japan adopted her
present gold standard. The reasons for this step are given in the
chapter on Finance contributed to Marquis Ōkuma’s book, already
mentioned, by Marquis Matsugata, who also explains the means by which it
was accomplished.
“When,” says this authority on Japanese financial matters, “the
Government opened places for the redemption of paper money in 1886,
silver coins only were offered in exchange. Such being the case, the
currency of Japan at that time was based practically on a silver
standard, although legally the system was bimetallic. The price of
silver, however, owing to various reasons, gradually fell, and
artificial checks to its fall were effective only for a short time.
Fluctuation after fluctuation in foreign exchange seemed to follow each
other in endless succession. In the meantime Western countries commenced
to adopt gold monometallism. Our authorities knew very well that, to
insure a healthy growth of finance, Japan must adopt, sooner or later, a
monometallic gold standard, and this was impressed on the minds of
financiers so keenly that the Government determined to effect the reform
as soon as possible. The desired opportunity came with the Peace Treaty
of 1895, when China began to pay to our country an indemnity of
200,000,000 taels” [_sic_ the amount was really 230,000,000 taels].
“Further negotiations between our Government and the Chinese authorities
resulted in the payment of the indemnity, not in Chinese money, but in
pounds sterling. This was important, since a large gold reserve was
indispensable for the establishment of gold monometallism.”
The experience of 1886, referred to by Marquis Matsugata, proved that
confidence in the Government’s ability to meet its obligations in paper
money was all that was needed. This confidence once established, no
further difficulty presented itself in the passage from an inconvertible
to a convertible paper currency. Prepared for heavy calls on the specie
resources of the Treasury, the Government had on that occasion
accumulated a reserve of £5,000,000. When, at the end of a few days
after the date fixed for the resumption of specie payments, the demand
for specie ceased, it was found that the total value of notes presented
for conversion did not exceed £30,000. The change from a silver to a
gold standard in 1897 was conducted with equal facility, a large portion
of the Chinese indemnity being transferred abroad. There it served a
useful purpose in maintaining Japan’s financial credit, and, as a
natural consequence, the market price of the Bonds of her numerous
foreign loans, which for several years, to the surprise of private
investors, were quoted at higher rates abroad than at home.
The year 1899, when the revised treaties came into operation, marked a
fresh stage in the progress of Japan towards attaining a footing of
equality with Western Powers—the aim which her statesmen had set before
themselves ever since the Restoration, and which had in so many ways
been the guiding principle of both domestic and foreign policy. With the
object of allowing time for the negotiation of similar treaties with
other foreign Powers, the revised British Treaty, signed in London in
1894, had, as already mentioned, provided that it should not come into
force until five years after the date of signature. Before the
expiration of the period named similar treaties had been concluded with
all the other Powers concerned, those with France and Germany containing
a few modifications of minor importance. In the meantime, moreover, the
conditions specified in the Treaty regarding the new Japanese Codes and
Japan’s adhesion to the International Conventions concerning Copyright
and Industrial Property had been fulfilled. The way was thus cleared for
the operation of the new revised treaties, which, accordingly, came into
force on the 17th July, 1899, the earliest date possible. Though in
these new treaties, recognizing the territorial jurisdiction of Japan,
the stipulation of previous conventions which chiefly offended Japanese
susceptibilities found no place, she still remained bound for a further
period of twelve years—the term of the revised treaties—by a tariff of a
unilateral character. Only when that period expired would she recover
full tariff autonomy and be free to negotiate reciprocal treaties with
the various Powers concerned on a footing of complete equality. This
opportunity came to her in 1911, and she at once availed herself of it.
In the spring of the following year (1900) what is known as the Boxer
Rising took place. In its inception it was a protest against missionary
enterprise. As it developed, it became the expression of a feeling of
exasperation among the official and lettered classes of Northern China
engendered by the action of European Powers in occupying under the guise
of leases various portions of Chinese territory in that region. During
the previous autumn a society called I-Ho-C’uan (Patriot Harmony Fists)
had been formed in the province of Shantung. Its formation was
encouraged by the reactionary tendencies which made their appearance
about this time at Peking, where the Empress Dowager, after the
successful _coup d’état_ by which she had crushed the ill-conducted
reform movement in 1898, was again in power. The magical powers claimed
by its members produced on the ignorant masses an impression that was
heightened by the incantations they performed. As the movement grew, it
attracted the attention of the Governor of the province, who supported
it with, apparently, the twofold idea of utilizing it against foreign
aggression, and gaining favour at Court. As a result of his outspoken
sympathy the Boxer movement assumed formidable dimensions. Though
eventually, through the energy of Yuan Shih-k’ai, who was at one time,
as we have seen, Chinese Resident in Korea, order was restored in
Shantung, the movement spread northwards towards Peking. There, as Mr.
Campbell explains in the China Handbook prepared under the direction of
the Foreign Office, it gained the powerful support of the ignorant and
reactionary statesman Prince Tuan, the selection of whose son as
Heir-Apparent to the Throne gave him a commanding influence in the
councils of the Empire. In April, 1900, bands of Boxers were drilling in
the outskirts of the Capital, their appearance in every district they
invaded being accompanied by murders of missionaries and massacres of
native converts. Some weeks later the situation became so threatening
that arrangements were made for bringing up to Peking small contingents
of foreign troops for the protection of the Legations and such portion
of the foreign community as still remained. These guards arrived
opportunely at the end of May, by which time swarms of Boxers infested
the Capital, and the Legations were practically isolated. Prince Tuan
chose this moment for openly espousing the Boxer cause. This step on his
part was followed by the murders of the Chancellor of the Japanese
Legation and the German Minister, the two outrages occurring within a
few days of each other. The subsequent course of events is well known:
the storming of the Taku forts (June 16th); the siege of the Legations
by Chinese troops and Boxers; the failure of Admiral Seymour’s attempt
to re-establish communications with the Capital; the equipment of
foreign expeditionary forces to operate against Peking; the issue of an
Imperial Decree ordering a general massacre of foreigners in the Chinese
dominions; the attack on the foreign settlements at Tientsin; the
arrival of Russian and British reinforcements, and the taking of
Tientsin city (July 14th); the relief of the Legations, and occupation
of the Chinese capital on the 13th and 14th August by the allied forces;
and the flight of the Chinese Court to Sian-fu, the ancient capital in
the province of Shensi. With the flight of the Court from the capital
Chinese resistance collapsed, and when Count Waldersee arrived in
September with several thousand German troops to take supreme command of
the allied expeditionary forces, there was no enemy to fight.
Hostilities gave place to negotiations between the foreign Governments
concerned and China for the settlement of the various issues raised by
the Boxer outbreak. The negotiations resulted in two preliminary
exchanges of Notes, dated, respectively, December 22nd, 1900, and
January 16th, 1901, embodying the conditions for the re-establishment of
normal relations with China, and in the signature of a final Protocol on
September 7th, 1901. Three days before its signature Prince Ch’un, who
had proceeded on a mission to Berlin to apologize for the murder of the
German Minister, was received in audience by the Kaiser.
The chief conditions imposed on China by these arrangements were the
payment of an indemnity of 450,000,000 Haikwan taels (equivalent at the
rate fixed—3s. per tael—to £67,500,000); the permanent occupation of
certain places, including Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, for the purpose of
preserving free communications between Peking and the sea; the razing of
the Taku and other forts which threatened those communications; and the
construction of a separate fortified quarter in the Capital for the
foreign Legations, for the further protection of which permanent foreign
guards were to be retained. Other terms included special reparation for
the murders of the German Minister and the Chancellor of the Japanese
Legation and the desecration of cemeteries; the punishment of Prince
Tuan, as well as other personages and officials responsible for the
attacks on foreigners; and the prohibition of the import of arms.
Thanks, as we learn from the Handbook already quoted, to the good sense
of the leading provincial authorities, such as the Viceroys of Nanking
and Wuchang and the new Governor of Shantung, who had the courage to
disobey the Imperial Decree, the Boxer movement was stifled in the
central and southern regions of China. There, in spite of considerable
unrest, order was preserved. But further north in Manchuria the
Governors were not so judicious. In obedience to instructions from the
Court they declared war on the Russians. The sudden attacks made by
Chinese forces created a panic on the Amur, and brought about the savage
reprisals which occurred at Blagovestchensk on that river, and the
occupation of the whole of Manchuria by Russian troops. The folly of the
Empress Dowager and of the ignorant clique by whose counsels she was
guided gave Russia the opportunity she desired for pursuing her designs
of aggression in the Far East. Her subsequent conduct throughout the
negotiations, and after their conclusion, destroyed the good effect
produced by her valuable co-operation in the fighting at Tientsin, where
the Russian reinforcements were, undoubtedly, the chief factor in saving
the foreign settlements from destruction.
In the military operations against Peking, and in the protracted
negotiations which succeeded them, Japan played a conspicuous part. She
had suffered injury similar to that sustained by other foreign Powers in
connection with the Boxer Rising, and she had a common interest with
them in adopting whatever measures might be necessary in the
international emergency which had arisen. Her proximity to China and her
military resources enabled her to strike quickly, and with effect. To
the invitation to take part in the expeditionary force in process of
organization, which was addressed to her by the other interested Powers,
with the exception of Russia, she responded with alacrity; and in a
short space of time a well-equipped Japanese force took its place with
the troops of other Powers, and joined in the march on Peking for the
relief of the besieged Legations. The discipline and efficiency of the
Japanese contingent won well-deserved praise from those best qualified
to judge. In the subsequent negotiations the readiness shown by Japan to
act in harmony with other Powers, whose attitude was influenced by
consideration for the general interests of all concerned, facilitated
the solution of many difficulties; and, when the question of claims for
indemnity came to be discussed, the moderation of her demands was
equalled only by that of Great Britain and the United States.