Being of God only as a thing of faith for the practical pure Reason,
maintains among the other arguments in philosophy, it is easy to set
aside the whole achievement of this last; by which it appears that
there is no choice, but that our theoretical faculty must give up all
its pretensions before an impartial criticism.
All belief must in the first place be grounded upon facts, if it is
not to be completely groundless; and therefore the only distinction
in proofs that there can be is that belief in the consequence derived
therefrom can either be grounded on this fact as _knowledge_ for
theoretical cognition, or merely as _faith_ for practical. All facts
belong either to the _natural concept_ which proves its reality in the
objects of sense, given (or which may possibly be given) before all
natural concepts; or to the _concept of freedom_, which sufficiently
establishes its reality through the causality of Reason in regard of
certain effects in the world of sense, possible through it, which it
incontrovertibly postulates in the moral law. The natural concept
(merely belonging to theoretical cognition) is now either metaphysical
and thinkable completely _a priori_, or physical, _i.e._ thinkable
_a posteriori_ and as necessary only through determinate experience.
The metaphysical natural concept (which presupposes no determinate
experience) is therefore ontological.
The _ontological_ proof of the being of God from the concept of an
original Being is either that which from ontological predicates,
by which alone it can be thought as completely determined, infers
absolutely necessary being; or that which, from the absolute necessity
of the being somewhere of some thing, whatever it be, infers the
predicates of the original Being. For there belongs to the concept of
an original Being, inasmuch as it is not derived from anything, the
unconditioned necessity of its presence, and (in order to represent
this) its complete determination by its [mere][155] concept. It was
believed that both requirements were found in the concept of the
ontological Idea of a _Being the most real of all_; and thus two
metaphysical proofs originated.
The proof (properly called ontological) resting upon a merely
metaphysical natural concept concludes from the concept of the
Being the most real of all, its absolutely necessary existence;
for (it is said), if it did not exist, a reality would be wanting
to it, viz. existence.--The other (which is also called the
metaphysico-_cosmological_ proof) concludes from the necessity of the
existence somewhere of a thing (which must be conceded, for a being
is given to us in self-consciousness), its complete determination as
that of a Being the most real of all; for everything existing must be
completely determined, but the absolutely necessary (_i.e._ that which
_we_ ought to cognise as such and consequently _a priori_) must be
completely determined _by means of its own concept_. But this is only
the case with the concept of a thing the most real of all. It is not
needful to expose here the sophistry in both arguments, which has been
already done elsewhere;[156] it is only needful to remark that neither
proof, even if they could be defended by all manner of dialectical
subtlety, could ever pass from the schools into the world, or have the
slightest influence on the mere sound Understanding.
The proof, which rests on a natural concept that can only be empirical
and yet is to lead us beyond the bounds of nature regarded as the
complex of the objects of sense, can be no other than that derived from
the _purposes_ of nature. The concept of these cannot, it is true,
be given _a priori_ but only through experience; but yet it promises
such a concept of the original ground of nature as alone, among all
those which we can conceive, is suited to the supersensible, viz. that
of a highest Understanding as Cause of the world. This, in fact, it
completely performs in accordance with principles of the reflective
Judgement, _i.e._ in accordance with the constitution of our (human)
faculty of cognition.--But whether or not it is in a position to supply
from the same data this concept of a _supreme_, _i.e._ independent
intelligent Being, in short of a God or Author of a world under moral
laws, and consequently as sufficiently determined for the Idea of a
final purpose of the being of the world--this is the question upon
which everything depends, whether we desire a theoretically adequate
concept of the Original Being on behalf of our whole knowledge of
nature, or a practical concept for religion.
This argument derived from physical Teleology is worthy of respect. It
produces a similar effect in the way of conviction upon the common
Understanding as upon the subtlest thinker; and a _Reimarus_[157] has
acquired immortal honour in his work (not yet superseded), in which he
abundantly develops this ground of proof with his peculiar thoroughness
and lucidity.--But how does this proof acquire such mighty influence
upon the mind? How does a judgement by cold reason (for we might
refer to persuasion the emotion and elevation of reason produced by
the wonders of nature) issue thus in a calm and unreserved assent? It
is not the physical purposes, which all indicate in the World Cause
an unfathomable intelligence; these are inadequate thereto, because
they do not satisfy the need of the inquiring Reason. For, wherefore
(it asks) are all those natural things that exhibit art? Wherefore is
man himself, whom we must regard as the ultimate purpose of nature
thinkable by us? Wherefore is this collective Nature here, and what
is the final purpose of such great and manifold art? Reason cannot
be contented with enjoyment or with contemplation, observation, and
admiration (which, if it stops there, is only enjoyment of a particular
kind) as the ultimate final purpose for the creation of the world and
of man himself; for this presupposes a personal worth, which man alone
can give himself, as the condition under which alone he and his being
can be the final purpose. Failing this (which alone is susceptible
of a definite concept), the purposes of nature do not satisfactorily
answer our questions; especially because they cannot furnish any
_determinate_ concept of the highest Being as an all-sufficient (and
therefore unique and so properly called _highest_) being, and of the
laws according to which an Understanding is Cause of the world.
Hence that the physico-teleological proof convinces, just as if it were
a theological proof, does not arise from our availing ourselves of the
Ideas of purposes of nature as so many empirical grounds of proof of
a _highest_ Understanding. But it mingles itself unnoticed with that
moral ground of proof, which dwells in every man and influences him
secretly, in the conclusion by which we ascribe to the Being, which
manifests itself with such incomprehensible art in the purposes of
nature, a final purpose and consequently wisdom (without however being
justified in doing so by the perception of the former); and by which
therefore we arbitrarily fill up the lacunas of the [design] argument.
In fact it is only the moral ground of proof which produces conviction,
and that only in a moral reference with which every man feels inwardly
his agreement. But the physico-teleological proof has only the merit
of leading the mind, in its consideration of the world, by the way of
purposes and through them to an _intelligent_ Author of the world. The
moral reference to purposes and the Idea of a moral legislator and
Author of the world, as a theological concept, seem to be developed of
themselves out of that ground of proof, although they are in truth pure
additions.
Henceforward we may allow the customary statement to stand. For it
is generally difficult (if the distinction requires much reflection)
for ordinary sound Understanding to distinguish from one another as
heterogeneous the different principles which it confuses, and from
one of which alone it actually draws conclusions with correctness. The
moral ground of proof of the Being of God, properly speaking, does
not merely _complete_ and render perfect the physico-teleological
proof; but it is a special proof that _supplies_ the conviction which
is wanting in the latter. This latter in fact can do nothing more
than guide Reason, in its judgements upon the ground of nature and
that contingent but admirable order of nature only known to us by
experience, to the causality of a Cause containing the ground of the
same in accordance with purposes (which we by the constitution of our
cognitive faculties must think as an intelligent cause); and thus by
arresting the attention of Reason it makes it more susceptible of
the moral proof. For what is requisite to the latter concept is so
essentially different from everything which natural concepts contain
and can teach, that there is need of a particular ground of proof
quite independent of the former, in order to supply the concept of the
original Being adequately for Theology and to infer its existence.--The
moral proof (which it is true only proves the Being of God in a
practical though indispensable aspect of Reason) would preserve all
its force, if we found in the world no material, or only that which
is doubtful, for physical Teleology. It is possible to conceive
rational beings surrounded by a nature which displayed no clear trace
of organisation but only the effects of a mere mechanism of crude
matter; on behalf of which and amid the changeability of some merely
contingent purposive forms and relations there would appear to be no
ground for inferring an intelligent Author. In such case there would
be no occasion for a physical Teleology; and yet Reason, which here
gets no guidance from natural concepts, would find in the concept of
freedom and in the moral Ideas founded thereon a practically sufficient
ground for postulating the concept of the original Being in conformity
with these, _i.e._ as a Deity, and for postulating nature (even the
nature of our own being) as a final purpose in accordance with freedom
and its laws--and all this in reference to the indispensable command of
practical Reason.--However the fact that there is in the actual world
for the rational beings in it abundant material for physical Teleology
(even though this is not necessary) serves as a desirable confirmation
of the moral argument, as far as nature can exhibit anything analogous
to the (moral) rational Ideas. For the concept of a supreme Cause
possessing intelligence (though not reaching far enough for a Theology)
thus acquires sufficient reality for the reflective Judgement, but it
is not required as the basis of the moral proof; nor does this latter
serve to complete as a proof the former, which does not by itself point
to morality at all, by means of an argument developed according to
a single principle. Two such heterogeneous principles as nature and
freedom can only furnish two different kinds of proof; and the attempt
to derive one from the other is found unavailing as regards that which
is to be proved.
If the physico-teleological ground of proof sufficed for the proof
which is sought, it would be very satisfactory for the speculative
Reason; for it would furnish the hope of founding a Theosophy (for
so we must call the theoretical cognition of the divine nature and
its existence which would suffice at once for the explanation of the
constitution of the world and for the determination of moral laws).
In the same way if Psychology enabled us to arrive at a cognition
of the immortality of the soul it would make Pneumatology possible,
which would be just as welcome to the speculative Reason. But neither,
agreeable as they would be to the arrogance of our curiosity, would
satisfy the wish of Reason in respect of a theory which must be based
on a cognition of the nature of things. Whether the first, as Theology,
and the second, as Anthropology, when founded on the moral principle,
_i.e._ the principle of freedom, and consequently in accordance with
the practical use [of Reason] do not better fulfil their objective
final design, is another question which we need not here pursue.
The physico-teleological ground of proof does not reach to Theology,
because it does not and cannot give any determinate concept, sufficient
for this design, of the original Being; but we must derive this from
quite another quarter, or must supply its lacuna by an arbitrary
addition. You infer, from the great purposiveness of natural forms and
their relations, a world-cause endowed with Understanding; but what is
the degree of this Understanding? Without doubt you cannot assume that
it is the highest possible Understanding; because for that it would be
requisite that you should see that a greater Understanding than that
of which you perceive proofs in the world, is not thinkable; and this
would be to ascribe Omniscience to yourself.[158] In the same way,
if you infer from the magnitude of the world the very great might of
its Author, you must be content with this having only a comparative
significance for your faculty of comprehension; for since you do not
know all that is possible, so as to compare it with the magnitude of
the world as far as you know it, you cannot infer the Almightiness
of its Author from so small a standard, and so on. Now you arrive in
this way at no definite concept of an original Being available for a
Theology; for this can only be found in the concept of the totality of
perfections compatible with intelligence, and you cannot help yourself
to this by merely _empirical_ data. But without such a definite concept
you cannot infer a _unique_ intelligent original Being; you can only
assume it (with whatever motive).--Now it may certainly be conceded
that you should arbitrarily add (for Reason has nothing fundamental to
say to the contrary): Where so much perfection is found, we may well
assume that all perfection is united in a unique Cause of the world,
because Reason succeeds better both theoretically and practically with
a principle thus definite. But then you cannot regard this concept
of the original Being as proved by you, for you have only assumed it
on behalf of a better employment of Reason. Hence all lamentation or
impotent anger on account of the alleged mischief of rendering doubtful
the coherency of your chain of reasoning, is vain pretentiousness,
which would fain have us believe that the doubt here freely expressed
as to your argument is a doubting of sacred truth, in order that under
this cover the shallowness of your argument may pass unnoticed.
Moral Teleology, on the other hand, which is not less firmly based
than physical,--which, indeed, rather deserves the preference because
it rests _a priori_ on principles inseparable from our Reason--leads
to that which is requisite for the possibility of a Theology, viz. to
a determinate _concept_ of the supreme Cause, as Cause of the world
according to moral laws, and, consequently, to the concept of such a
cause as satisfies our moral final purpose. For this are required, as
natural properties belonging to it, nothing less than Omniscience,
Omnipotence, Omnipresence, and the like, which must be thought as
bound up with the moral final purpose which is infinite and thus as
adequate to it. Hence moral Teleology alone can furnish the concept of
a _unique_ Author of the world, which is available for a Theology.
In this way Theology leads immediately to _Religion_, _i.e._ _the
recognition of our duties as divine commands_[159]; because it is only
the recognition of our duty and of the final purpose enjoined upon us
by Reason which brings out with definiteness the concept of God. This
concept, therefore, is inseparable in its origin from obligation to
that Being. On the other hand, even if the concept of the original
Being could be also found determinately by the merely theoretical path
(viz. the concept of it as mere Cause of nature), it would afterwards
be very difficult--perhaps impossible without arbitrary interpolation
[of elements]--to ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs a
causality in accordance with moral laws; and yet without this that
quasi-theological concept could furnish no foundation for religion.
Even if a religion could be established by this theoretical path, it
would actually, as regards sentiment (wherein its essence lies) be
different from that in which the concept of God and the (practical)
conviction of His Being originate from the fundamental Ideas of
morality. For if we must suppose the Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., of
an Author of the world as concepts given to us from another quarter,
in order afterwards only to apply our concepts of duties to our
relation to Him, then these latter concepts must bear very markedly
the appearance of compulsion and forced submission. If, instead of
this, the respect for the moral law, quite freely, in virtue of the
precept of our own Reason, represents to us the final purpose of our
destination, we admit among our moral views a Cause harmonising with
this and with its accomplishment, with the sincerest reverence, which
is quite distinct from pathological fear; and we willingly submit
ourselves thereto.[160]
If it be asked why it is incumbent upon us to have any Theology at all,
it appears clear that it is not needed for the extension or correction
of our cognition of nature or in general for any theory, but simply
in a subjective point of view for Religion, _i.e._ the practical or
moral use of our Reason. If it is found that the only argument which
leads to a definite concept of the object of Theology is itself moral,
it is not only not strange, but we miss nothing in respect of its
final purpose as regards the sufficiency of belief from this ground
of proof, provided that it be admitted that such an argument only
establishes the Being of God sufficiently for our moral destination,
_i.e._ in a practical point of view, and that here speculation neither
shows its strength in any way, nor extends by means of it the sphere
of its domain. Our surprise and the alleged contradiction between the
possibility of a Theology asserted here and that which the Critique
of speculative Reason said of the Categories--viz. that they can only
produce knowledge when applied to objects of sense, but in no way when
applied to the supersensible--vanish, if we see that they are here
used for a cognition of God not in a theoretical point of view (in
accordance with what His own nature, inscrutable to us, may be) but
simply in a practical.--In order then at this opportunity to make an
end of the misinterpretation of that very necessary doctrine of the
Critique, which, to the chagrin of the blind dogmatist, refers Reason
to its bounds, I add here the following elucidation.