immediate empirical presentation (as in the proof from observation of
the object or from experiment) of that which is to be proved, or by
Reason _a priori_ from principles, is this. It should not _persuade_,
but _convince_,[138] or at least should tend to conviction. _I.e._ the
ground of proof or the conclusion should not be merely a subjective
(aesthetical) determining ground of assent (mere illusion), but
objectively valid and a logical ground of cognition; for otherwise
the Understanding is ensnared, but not convinced. Such an illusory
proof is that which, perhaps with good intent but yet with wilful
concealment of its weaknesses, is adduced in Natural Theology. In this
we bring in the great number of indications of the origin of natural
things according to the principle of purposes, and take advantage
of the merely subjective basis of human Reason, viz. its special
propensity to think only one principle instead of several, whenever
this can be done without contradiction; and, when in this principle
only one or more requisites for determining a concept are furnished, to
add in our thought these additional [features] so as to complete the
concept of the thing by arbitrarily supplementing it. For, in truth,
when we meet with so many products in nature which are to us marks of
an intelligent cause, why should we not think One cause rather than
many; and in this One, not merely great intelligence, power, etc.,
but rather Omniscience, and Omnipotence--in a word, think it as a
Cause that contains the sufficient ground of such properties in all
possible things? Further, why should we not ascribe to this unique,
all-powerful, original Being not only intelligence for natural laws
and products, but also, as to a moral Cause of the world, supreme,
ethical, practical Reason? For by this completion of the concept a
sufficient principle is furnished both for insight into nature and
for moral wisdom; and no objection grounded in any way can be made
against the possibility of such an Idea. If now at the same time
the moral motives of the mind are aroused, and a lively interest in
the latter is added by the force of eloquence (of which they are
indeed very worthy), then there arises therefrom a persuasion of the
objective adequacy of the proof; and also (in most cases of its use)
a wholesome illusion which quite dispenses with all examination of
its logical strictness, and even on the contrary regards this with
abhorrence and dislike as if an impious doubt lay at its basis.--Now
against this there is indeed nothing to say, so long as we only have
regard to its popular usefulness. But then the division of the proof
into the two dissimilar parts involved in the argument--belonging to
physical and moral Teleology respectively--cannot and must not be
prevented. For the blending of these makes it impossible to discern
where the proper force of the proof lies, and in what part and how it
must be elaborated in order that its validity may be able to stand the
strictest examination (even if we should be compelled to admit in one
part the weakness of our rational insight). Thus it is the duty of
the philosopher (supposing even that he counts as nothing the claims
of sincerity) to expose the above illusion, however wholesome it is,
which such a confusion can produce; and to distinguish what merely
belongs to persuasion from that which leads to conviction (for these
are determinations of assent which differ not merely in degree but in
kind), in order to present plainly the state of the mind in this proof
in its whole clearness, and to be able to subject it frankly to the
closest examination.
But a proof which is intended to convince, can again be of two kinds;
either deciding what the object is _in itself_, or what it is _for us_
(for men in general) according to our necessary rational principles of
judgement (proof κατ’ ἀλήθειαν or κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, the last word being
taken in its universal signification of man in general). In the first
case it is based on adequate principles for the determinant Judgement,
in the second for the reflective Judgement. In the latter case it
can never, when resting on merely theoretical principles, tend to
conviction; but if a practical principle of Reason (which is therefore
universally and necessarily valid) lies at its basis, it may certainly
lay claim to conviction adequate in a pure practical point of view,
_i.e._ to moral conviction. But a proof _tends to conviction_, though
without convincing, if it is [merely][139] brought on the way thereto;
_i.e._ if it contains in itself only objective grounds, which although
not attaining to certainty are yet of such a kind that they do not
serve merely for persuasion as subjective grounds of the judgement.[140]
All theoretical grounds of proof resolve themselves either into: (1)
Proofs by logically strict _Syllogisms of Reason_; or where this is not
the case, (2) _Conclusions_ according to _analogy_; or where this also
has no place, (3) _Probable opinion_; or finally, which has the least
weight, (4) Assumption of a merely possible ground of explanation,
_i.e._ _Hypothesis_.--Now I say that all grounds of proof in general,
which aim at theoretical conviction, can bring about no belief of this
kind from the highest to the lowest degree, if there is to be proved
the proposition of the _existence_ of an original Being, as a God, in
the signification adequate to the whole content of this concept; viz. a
_moral_ Author of the world, by whom the final purpose of creation is
at the same time supplied.
(1.) As to the _logically accurate_ proof proceeding from universal
to particular, we have sufficiently established in the Critique
the following: Since no intuition possible for us corresponds to
the concept of a Being that is to be sought beyond nature--whose
concept therefore, so far as it is to be theoretically determined by
synthetical predicates, remains always problematical for us--there
is absolutely no cognition of it to be had (by which the extent of
our theoretical knowledge is in the least enlarged). The particular
concept of a supersensible Being cannot be subsumed under the universal
principles of the nature of things, in order to conclude from them to
it, because those principles are valid simply for nature, as an object
of sense.
(2.) We can indeed _think_ one of two dissimilar things, even in
the very point of their dissimilarity, in accordance with the
_analogy_[141] of the other; but we cannot, from that wherein they are
dissimilar, _conclude_ from the one to the other by analogy, _i.e._
transfer from the one to the other this sign of specific distinction.
Thus I can, according to the analogy of the law of the equality of
action and reaction in the mutual attraction and repulsion of bodies,
also conceive of the association of the members of a commonwealth
according to rules of right; but I cannot transfer to it those specific
determinations (material attraction or repulsion), and ascribe them
to the citizens in order to constitute a system called a state.--Just
so we can indeed conceive of the causality of the original Being in
respect of the things of the world, as natural purposes, according to
the analogy of an Understanding, as ground of the forms of certain
products which we call works of art (for this only takes place on
behalf of the theoretical or practical use that we have to make by our
cognitive faculty of this concept in respect of the natural things
in the world according to a certain principle). But we can in no way
conclude according to analogy, because in the case of beings of the
world Understanding must be ascribed to the cause of an effect which
is judged artificial, that in respect of nature the same causality
which we perceive in men attaches also to the Being which is quite
distinct from nature. For this concerns the very point of dissimilarity
which is thought between a cause sensibly conditioned in respect of its
effects and the supersensible original Being itself in our concept of
it, and which therefore cannot be transferred from one to the other.--
In the very fact that I must conceive the divine causality only
according to the analogy of an Understanding (which faculty we know in
no other being than in sensibly-conditioned man) lies the prohibition
to ascribe to it this Understanding in its peculiar signification.[142]
(3.) _Opinion_ finds in _a priori_ judgements no place whatever, for
by them we either cognise something as quite certain or else cognise
nothing at all. But if the given grounds of proof from which we start
(as here from the purposes in the world) are empirical, then we cannot
even with their aid form any opinion as to anything beyond the world of
sense, nor can we concede to such venturesome judgements the smallest
claim to probability. For probability is part of a certainty possible
in a certain series of grounds (its grounds compare with the sufficient
ground as parts with a whole), the insufficient ground of which must
be susceptible of completion. But since, as determining grounds of one
and the same judgement, they must be of the same kind, for otherwise
they would not together constitute a whole (such as certainty is), one
part of them cannot lie within the bounds of possible experience and
another outside all possible experience. Consequently, since merely
empirical grounds of proof lead to nothing supersensible, and since
what is lacking in the series of them cannot in any way be completed,
we do not approach in the least nearer in our attempt to attain by
their means to the supersensible and to a cognition thereof. Thus in
any judgement about the latter by means of arguments derived from
experience, probability has no place.
(4.) If an _hypothesis_ is to serve for the explanation of the
possibility of a given phenomenon, at least its possibility must
be completely certain.[143] It is sufficient that in an hypothesis
I disclaim any cognition of actuality (which is claimed in an
opinion given out as probable); more than this I cannot give up. The
possibility of that which I place at the basis of my explanation,
must at least be exposed to no doubt; otherwise there would be no end
of empty chimeras. But to assume the possibility of a supersensible
Being determined according to certain concepts would be a completely
groundless supposition. For here none of the conditions requisite
for cognition, as regards that in it which rests upon intuition, is
given, and so the sole criterion of possibility remaining is the mere
principle of Contradiction (which can only prove the possibility of the
thought, not of the object thought).
The result then is this. For the existence [Dasein] of the original
Being, as a Godhead, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, absolutely
no proof in a theoretical point of view is possible for the human
Reason, which can bring about even the least degree of belief. The
ground of this is quite easy to comprehend. For determining our
Ideas of the supersensible we have no material whatever, and we
must derive this latter from things in the world of sense, which is
absolutely inadequate for such an Object. Thus, in the absence of all
determination of it, nothing remains but the concept of a non-sensible
something which contains the ultimate ground of the world of sense, but
which does not furnish any knowledge (any amplification of the concept)
of its inner constitution.
§ 91. _Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith_
If we look merely to the way in which anything can be _for us_
(according to the subjective constitution of our representative powers)
an Object of knowledge (_res cognoscibilis_), then our concepts will
not cohere with Objects, but merely with our cognitive faculties and
the use which they can make of a given representation (in a theoretical
or practical point of view). Thus the question whether anything is or
is not a cognisable being is not a question concerning the possibility
of things but of our knowledge of them.
_Cognisable_ things are of three kinds: _things of opinion_
(_opinabile_); _things of fact_ (_scibile_); and _things of faith_
(_mere credibile_).
(1.) Objects of mere rational Ideas, which for theoretical knowledge
cannot be presented in any possible experience, are so far not
_cognisable_ things, and consequently in respect of them we can form
no _opinion_; for to form an opinion _a priori_ is absurd in itself
and the straight road to mere chimeras. Either then our proposition
is certain _a priori_ or it contains nothing for belief. Therefore
_things of opinion_ are always Objects of an empirical cognition at
least possible in itself (objects of the world of sense); but, which,
on account merely of the [low] degree of this faculty that we possess,
is _for us_ impossible. Thus the ether of the new physicists,[144]
an elastic fluid pervading all other matter (mingled intimately with
it) is a mere thing of opinion, yet is such that, if our external
senses were sharpened to the highest degree, it could be perceived;
though it can never be presented in any observation or experiment.
To assume [the existence of] rational inhabitants of other planets
is a thing of opinion; for if we could come closer to them, which is
in itself possible, we should decide by experience whether they did
or did not exist; but as we shall never come so near, it remains in
the region of opinion. But to hold the opinion that there are in the
material universe pure thinking spirits without bodies (viz. if we
dismiss as unworthy of our notice certain phenomena which have been
published as actual[145]) is to be called poetic fiction. This is no
thing of opinion, but a mere Idea which remains over, when we remove
from a thinking being everything material, and only leave thought
to it. Whether then the latter (which we know only in man, that is,
in combination with a body) does survive, we cannot decide. Such a
thing is a _sophistical being_ (_ens rationis ratiocinantis_), not a
_rational being_ (_ens rationis ratiocinatae_)[146]; of which latter it
is possible to show conclusively, the objective reality of its concept;
at least for the practical use of Reason, because this which has its
peculiar and apodictically certain principles _a priori_, demands
(postulates) it.
(2.) Objects for concepts, whose objective reality can be proved
(whether through pure Reason or through experience, and, in the first
case, from its theoretical or practical data, in all cases by means of
a corresponding intuition) are _things of fact_ (_res facti_).[147] Of
this kind are the mathematical properties of magnitudes (in geometry),
because they are susceptible of a _presentation a priori_ for the
theoretical use of Reason. Further, things or their characteristics,
which can be exhibited in experience (either our own or that of others
through the medium of testimony) are likewise things of fact.--And,
what is very remarkable, there is one rational Idea (susceptible in
itself of no presentation in intuition, and consequently, of no
theoretical proof of its possibility) which also comes under things of
fact. This is the Idea of _freedom_, whose reality, regarded as that
of a particular kind of causality (of which the concept, theoretically
considered, would be transcendent), may be exhibited by means of
practical laws of pure Reason, and conformably to this, in actual
actions, and, consequently, in experience.--This is the only one of all
the Ideas of pure Reason, whose object is a thing of fact, and to be
reckoned under the _scibilia_.
(3.) Objects, which in reference to the use of pure practical Reason
that is in conformity with duty must be thought _a priori_ (whether
as consequences or as grounds), but which are transcendent for its
theoretical use, are mere _things of faith_. Of this kind is the
_highest good_ in the world, to be brought about by freedom.[148]
The concept of this cannot be established as regards its objective
reality in any experience possible for us and thus adequately for
the theoretical use of Reason; but its use is commanded by practical
pure Reason [in reference to the best possible working out of that
purpose],[149] and it consequently must be assumed possible. This
commanded effect, _together with the only conditions of its possibility
thinkable by us_, viz. the Being of God and the immortality of the
soul, are _things of faith_ (_res fidei_), and of all objects are the
only ones which can be so called.[150] For though what we learn by
_testimony_ from the experience of others must be believed by us, yet
it is not therefore a thing of faith; for it was the proper experience
of some _one_ witness and so a thing of fact, or is presupposed as
such. Again it must be possible by this path (that of historical faith)
to arrive at knowledge; and the Objects of history and geography,
like everything in general which it is at least possible to know by
the constitution of our cognitive faculties, belong not to things of
faith but to things of fact. It is only objects of pure Reason which
can be things of faith at all, though not as objects of the mere pure
speculative Reason: for then they could not be reckoned with certainty
among things, _i.e._ Objects of that cognition which is possible for
us. They are Ideas, _i.e._ concepts of the objective reality of which
we cannot theoretically be certain. On the other hand, the highest
final purpose to be worked out by us, by which alone we can become
worthy of being ourselves the final purpose of creation, is an Idea
which has in a practical reference objective reality for us, and is
also a thing. But because we cannot furnish such reality to this
concept in a theoretical point of view, it is a mere thing of faith
of the pure Reason, along with God and Immortality, as the conditions
under which alone we, in accordance with the constitution of our
(human) Reason, can conceive the possibility of that effect of the use
of our freedom in conformity with law. But belief in things of faith is
a belief in a pure practical point of view, _i.e._ a moral faith, which
proves nothing for theoretical pure rational cognition, but only for
that which is practical and directed to the fulfilment of its duties;
it in no way extends speculation or the practical rules of prudence in
accordance with the principle of self-love. If the supreme principle
of all moral laws is a postulate, so is also the possibility of its
highest Object; and consequently, too, the condition under which we
can think this possibility is postulated along with it and by it.
Thus the cognition of the latter is neither knowledge nor opinion of
the being and character of these conditions, regarded as theoretical
cognition; but is a mere assumption in a reference which is practical
and commanded for the moral use of our Reason.
If we were able also plausibly to base upon the purposes of nature,
which physical Teleology presents to us in such rich abundance, a
_determinate_ concept of an intelligent World-Cause, then the existence
[Dasein] of this Being would not be a thing of faith. For since this
would not be assumed on behalf of the performance of my duty, but
only in reference to the explanation of nature, it would be merely
the opinion and hypothesis most conformable to our Reason. Now such
Teleology leads in no way to a determinate concept of God; on the
contrary, this can only be found in the concept of a moral Author of
the World, because this alone furnishes the final purpose to which
we can only reckon ourselves [as attached] if we behave conformably
to what the moral law prescribes as final purpose and consequently
obliges us [to do]. Hence it is only by its reference to the Object of
our duty, as the condition of the possibility of attaining the final
purpose of the same, that the concept of God attains the privilege
of counting as a thing of faith, in our belief; but on the other
hand, this same concept cannot make its Object valid as a thing of
fact. For, although the necessity of duty is very plain for practical
Reason, yet the attainment of its final purpose, so far as it is not
altogether in our own power, is only assumed on behalf of the practical
use of Reason, and therefore is not so practically necessary as duty
itself.[151]
_Faith_ (as _habitus_, not as _actus_) is the moral attitude of Reason
as to belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition.
It is therefore the constant principle of the mind, to assume as true,
on account of the obligation in reference to it, that which it is
necessary to presuppose as condition of the possibility of the highest
moral final purpose[152]; although its possibility or impossibility
be alike impossible for us to see into. Faith (absolutely so called)
is trust in the attainment of a design, the promotion of which is a
duty, but the possibility of the fulfilment of which (and consequently
also that of the only conditions of it thinkable by us) is not to be
_comprehended_ by us. Faith, then, that refers to particular objects,
which are not objects of possible knowledge or opinion (in which latter
case it ought to be called, especially in historical matters, credulity
and not faith), is quite moral. It is a free belief, not in that for
which dogmatical proofs for the theoretically determinant Judgement
are to be found, or in that to which we hold ourselves bound, but in
that which we assume on behalf of a design in accordance with laws of
freedom. This, however, is not, like opinion, without any adequate
ground; but, is grounded as in Reason (although only in respect of its
practical employment), and _adequately for its design_. For without
this, the moral attitude of thought in its repudiation of the claim of
the theoretical Reason for proofs (of the possibility of the Objects
of morality) has no permanence; but wavers between practical commands
and theoretical doubts. To be _incredulous_ means to cling to maxims,
and not to believe testimony in general; but he is _unbelieving_,
who denies all validity to rational Ideas, because there is wanting
a _theoretical_ ground of their reality.[154] He judges therefore
dogmatically. A dogmatical _unbelief_ cannot subsist together with a
moral maxim dominant in the mental attitude (for Reason cannot command
one to follow a purpose, which is cognised as nothing more than a
chimera); but a _doubtful faith_ can. To this the absence of conviction
by grounds of speculative Reason is only a hindrance, the influence of
which upon conduct a critical insight into the limits of this faculty
can remove, while it substitutes by way of compensation a paramount
practical belief.
* * * * *
If, in place of certain mistaken attempts, we wish to introduce a
different principle into philosophy and to promote its influence, it
makes us highly contented to see how and why those attempts must have
disappointed us.
_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_, are the problems at the solution
of which all the equipments of Metaphysic aim, as their ultimate and
unique purpose. Now it was believed that the doctrine of freedom is
needed for practical philosophy only as its negative condition; but
that on the other hand the doctrine of God and of the constitution of
the soul, as belonging to theoretical philosophy, must be established
for themselves and separately, in order afterwards to unite both
with that which the moral law (possible only under the condition of
freedom) commands, and so to constitute a religion. But we can easily
see that these attempts must fail. For from mere ontological concepts
of things in general, or of the existence of a necessary Being, it
is possible to form absolutely no determinate concept of an original
Being by means of predicates which can be given in experience and can
therefore serve for cognition. Again a concept based on experience of
the physical purposiveness of nature could furnish no adequate proof
for morality, or consequently for cognition of a Deity. Just as little
could the cognition of the soul by means of experience (which we only
apply in this life) supply us with a concept of its spiritual immortal
nature, a concept which would be adequate for morality. _Theology_ and
_Pneumatology_, regarded as problems of the sciences of a speculative
Reason, can be established by no empirical data and predicates,
because the concept of them is transcendent for our whole cognitive
faculty.--The determination of both concepts, God and the soul (in
respect of its immortality) alike, can only take place by means of
predicates, which, although they are only possible from a supersensible
ground, must yet prove their reality in experience; for thus alone can
they make possible a cognition of a quite supersensible Being.--The
only concept of this kind to be met with in human Reason is that of the
freedom of men under moral laws, along with the final purpose which
Reason prescribes by these laws. Of these two [the moral laws and the
final purpose] the first are useful for ascribing to the Author of
Nature, the second for ascribing to man, those properties which contain
the necessary condition of the possibility of both [God and the soul];
so that from this Idea a conclusion can be drawn as to the existence
and constitution of these beings which are otherwise quite hidden from
us.
Thus the ground of the failure of the attempt to prove God and
immortality by the merely theoretical path lies in this, that no
cognition whatever is possible of the supersensible in this way (of
natural concepts). The ground of its success by the moral way (of the
concept of freedom) is as follows. Here the supersensible (freedom),
which in this case is fundamental, by a determinate law of causality
that springs from it, not only supplies material for cognition of other
supersensibles (the moral final purpose and the conditions of its
attainability), but also establishes its reality in actions as a fact;
though at the same time it can furnish a valid ground of proof in no
other than a practical point of view (the only one, however, of which
Religion has need).
It is thus very remarkable that of the three pure rational Ideas,
_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_, that of freedom is the only
concept of the supersensible which (by means of the causality that is
thought in it) proves its objective reality in nature by means of the
effects it can produce there; and thus renders possible the connexion
of both the others with nature, and of all three together with
Religion. We have therefore in us a principle capable of determining
the Idea of the supersensible within us, and thus also that of the
supersensible without us, for knowledge, although only in a practical
point of view; a principle this of which mere speculative philosophy
(which could give a merely negative concept of freedom) must despair.
Consequently the concept of freedom (as fundamental concept of all
unconditioned practical laws) can extend Reason beyond those bounds,
within which every natural (theoretical) concept must remain hopelessly
limited.
_General remark on Teleology_