the category of _causality_, then I at the same time _cognise_ it
by that [category]; _i.e._ I determine the concept of it, as of an
Object in general, by means of what belongs to it by itself (as the
condition of the possibility of that relation) as an object of sense.
If the motive force ascribed to it is repulsive, then there belongs to
it (although I do not place near it any other body upon which it may
exert force) a place in space, and moreover extension, _i.e._ space
in itself, besides the filling up of this by means of the repulsive
forces of its parts. In addition there is the law of this filling up
(that the ground of the repulsion of the parts must decrease in the
same proportion as the extension of the body increases, and as the
space, which it fills with the same parts by means of this force, is
augmented).--On the contrary, if I think a supersensible Being as the
first _mover_, and thus by the category of causality as regards its
determination of the world (motion of matter), I must not think it as
existing in any place in space nor as extended; I must not even think
it as existing in time or simultaneously with other beings. Hence I
have no determinations whatever, which could make intelligible to me
the condition of the possibility of motion by means of this Being as
its ground. Consequently, I do not in the very least cognise it by
means of the predicate of Cause (as first mover), for itself; but I
have only the representation of a something containing the ground
of the motions in the world; and the relation of the latter to it
as their cause, since it does not besides furnish me with anything
belonging to the constitution of the thing which is cause, leaves its
concept quite empty. The reason of this is, that by predicates which
only find their Object in the world of sense I can indeed proceed
to the being of something which must contain their ground, but not
to the determination of its concept as a supersensible being, which
excludes all these predicates. By the category of causality, then,
if I determine it by the concept of a _first mover_, I do not in the
very least cognise what God is. Perhaps, however, I shall have better
success if I start from the order of the world, not merely to _think_
its causality as that of a supreme _Understanding_, but to _cognise_
it by means of this determination of the said concept; because here
the troublesome condition of space and of extension disappears.--At
all events the great purposiveness in the world compels us to _think_
a supreme cause of it, and to _think_ its causality as that of an
Understanding; but we are not therefore entitled to _ascribe_ this to
it. (_E.g._ we think of the eternity of God as presence in all time,
because we can form no other concept of mere being as a quantum, _i.e._
as duration; or we think of the divine Omnipresence as presence in
all places in order to make comprehensible to ourselves His immediate
presence in things which are external to one another; without daring
to ascribe to God any of these determinations, as something cognised
in Him.) If I determine the causality of a man, in respect of certain
products which are only explicable by designed purposiveness, by
thinking it as that of Understanding, I need not stop here, but I can
ascribe to him this predicate as a well-known property and cognise him
accordingly. For I know that intuitions are given to the senses of men
and are brought by the Understanding under a concept and thus under a
rule; that this concept only contains the common characteristic (with
omission of the particular ones) and is thus discursive; and that the
rules for bringing given representations under a consciousness in
general are given by Understanding before those intuitions, etc. I
therefore ascribe this property to man as a property by means of which
I _cognise_ him. However, if I wish to _think_ a supersensible Being
(God) as an intelligence, this is not only permissible in a certain
aspect of my employment of Reason--it is unavoidable; but to ascribe
to Him Understanding and to flatter ourselves that we can _cognise_
Him by means of it as a property of His, is in no way permissible.
For I must omit all those conditions under which alone I know an
Understanding, and thus the predicate which only serves for determining
man cannot be applied at all to a supersensible Object; and therefore
by a causality thus determined, I cannot cognise what God is. And so it
is with all Categories, which can have no significance for cognition in
a theoretical aspect, if they are not applied to objects of possible
experience.--However, according to the analogy of an Understanding I
can in a certain other aspect think a supersensible being, without at
the same time meaning thereby to cognise it theoretically; viz. if this
determination of its causality concerns an effect in the world, which
contains a design morally necessary but unattainable by a sensible
being. For then a cognition of God and of His Being (Theology) is
possible by means of properties and determinations of His causality
merely thought in Him according to analogy, which has all requisite
reality in a practical reference though _only in respect of this_
(as moral).--An Ethical Theology is therefore possible; for though
morality can subsist without theology as regards its rule, it cannot
do so as regards the final design which this proposes, unless Reason
in respect of it is to be renounced. But a Theological Ethic (of pure
Reason) is impossible; for laws which Reason itself does not give and
whose observance it does not bring about as a pure practical faculty,
can not be moral. In the same way a Theological Physic would be a
nonentity, for it would propose no laws of nature but ordinances of a
Highest Will; while on the other hand a physical (properly speaking a
physico-teleological) Theology can serve at least as a propaedeutic
to Theology proper, by giving occasion for the Idea of a final purpose
which nature cannot present by the observation of natural purposes of
which it offers abundant material. It thus makes felt the need of a
Theology which shall determine the concept of God adequately for the
highest practical use of Reason, but it cannot develop this and base it
satisfactorily on its proofs.
THE END
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Dr. Caird (_Critical Philosophy of Kant_, vol. ii. p. 406) has
given an instructive account of the gradual development in Kant’s mind
of the main idea of the Critique of Judgement.
[2] _Natural Theology and Modern Thought_, p. 158.
[3] I reproduce here in part a paper read before the Victoria Institute
in April 1892.
[4] _Critique of Pure Reason._ Dialectic, Bk. ii. chap. i. near the end.
[5] Cf. Kuno Fischer, _A Critique of Kant_, p. 142.
[6] Quoted by Caird, _Critical Philosophy of Kant_, vol. ii. p. 507,
who reiterates this criticism all through his account of Kant’s
teaching.
[7] _Natural Theology and Modern Thought_, p. 241.
[8] [Reading, with Windelband, _in sicheren alleinigen Besitz_.]
[9] If we have cause for supposing that concepts which we use as
empirical principles stand in relationship with the pure cognitive
faculty _a priori_, it is profitable, because of this reference,
to seek for them a transcendental definition; _i.e._ a definition
through pure categories, so far as these by themselves adequately
furnish the distinction of the concept in question from others. We
here follow the example of the mathematician who leaves undetermined
the empirical data of his problem, and only brings their relation in
their pure synthesis under the concepts of pure Arithmetic, and thus
generalises the solution. Objection has been brought against a similar
procedure of mine (cf. the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason,
_Abbott’s Translation_, p. 94), and my definition of the faculty
of desire has been found fault with, viz. that it is [the being’s]
_faculty of becoming by means of its representations the cause of the
actuality of the objects of these representations_; for the desires
might be mere _cravings_, and by means of these alone every one is
convinced the Object cannot be produced.--But this proves nothing more
than that there are desires in man, by which he is in contradiction
with himself. For here he strives for the production of the Object
by means of the representation _alone_, from which he can expect no
result, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may
so call those which are not psychological) which must be determined
by that representation to bring about the Object (mediately) are
either not competent, or even tend towards what is impossible; e.g.
to reverse the past (_O mihi praeteritos_ ... etc.), or to annihilate
in the impatience of expectation the interval before the wished for
moment.--Although in such fantastic desires we are conscious of the
inadequacy (or even the unsuitability) of our representations for
being _causes_ of their objects, yet their reference as causes, and
consequently the representation of their _causality_, is contained in
every _wish_; and this is specially evident if the wish is an affection
or _longing_. For these [longings] by their dilatation and contraction
of the heart and consequent exhaustion of its powers, prove that these
powers are continually kept on the stretch by representations, but that
they perpetually let the mind, having regard to the impossibility [of
the desire], fall back in exhaustion. Even prayers for the aversion
of great and (as far as one can see) unavoidable evils, and many
superstitious means for attaining in a natural way impossible purposes,
point to the causal reference of representations to their Objects; a
reference which cannot at all be checked by the consciousness of the
inadequacy of the effort to produce the effect.--As to why there should
be in our nature this propensity to desires which are consciously vain,
that is an anthropologico-teleological problem. It seems that if we
were not determined to the application of our powers before we were
assured of the adequacy of our faculties to produce an Object, these
powers would remain in great part unused. For we commonly learn to
know our powers only by first making trial of them. This deception in
the case of vain wishes is then only the consequence of a benevolent
ordinance in our nature. [This note was added by Kant in the Second
Edition.]
[10] One of the various pretended contradictions in this whole
distinction of the causality of nature from that of freedom is
this. It is objected that if I speak of _obstacles_ which nature
opposes to causality according to (moral) laws of freedom or of the
_assistance_ it affords, I am admitting an _influence_ of the former
upon the latter. But if we try to understand what has been said, this
misinterpretation is very easy to avoid. The opposition or assistance
is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon
and the _effects_ of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense.
The causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical Reason) is
the causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom (_i.e._
of the subject considered as man and therefore as phenomenon). The
intelligible, which is thought under freedom, contains the ground of
the _determination_ of this [natural cause] in a way not explicable
any further (just as that intelligible does which constitutes the
supersensible substrate of nature).
[11] It has been thought a doubtful point that my divisions in pure
Philosophy should always be threefold. But that lies in the nature of
the thing. If there is to be an _a priori_ division it must be either
_analytical_, according to the law of contradiction, which is always
twofold (_quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A_); or it is _synthetical_.
And if in this latter case it is to be derived from _a priori concepts_
(not as in Mathematic from the intuition corresponding to the concept),
the division must necessarily be trichotomy. For according to what
is requisite for synthetical unity in general there must be (1) a
condition, (2) a conditioned, and (3) the concept which arises from the
union of the conditioned with its condition.
[12] The definition of taste which is laid down here is that it is the
faculty of judging of the beautiful. But the analysis of judgements of
taste must show what is required in order to call an object beautiful.
The moments, to which this Judgement has regard in its reflection, I
have sought in accordance with the guidance of the logical functions of
judgement (for in a judgement of taste a reference to the Understanding
is always involved). I have considered the moment of quality first,
because the aesthetical judgement upon the beautiful first pays
attention to it.
[13] A judgement upon an object of satisfaction may be quite
_disinterested_, but yet very _interesting_, _i.e._ not based upon an
interest, but bringing an interest with it; of this kind are all pure
moral judgements. Judgements of taste, however, do not in themselves
establish any interest. Only in society is it _interesting_ to have
taste: the reason of this will be shown in the sequel.
[14] [Second Edition.]
[15] An obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity. Thus the
obligation to all actions which have merely enjoyment for their aim can
only be a pretended one; however spiritually it may be conceived (or
decked out), even if it is a mystical, or so-called heavenly, enjoyment.
[16] [Second Edition.]
[17] [Second Edition.]
[18] [Ueberweg points out (_Hist. of Phil._, ii. 528, Eng. Trans.)
that Mendelssohn had already called attention to the disinterestedness
of our satisfaction in the Beautiful. “It appears,” says Mendelssohn,
“to be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated
with quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our
possession, and even though we be never so far removed from the desire
to put it to our use.” But, of course, as Ueberweg remarks, Kant’s
conception of disinterestedness extends far beyond the absence of a
desire to possess the object.]
[19] [Reading _besondere_ with Windelband; Hartenstein reads
_bestimmte_.]
[20] [_I.e._ _The Critique of Pure Reason_, Analytic, bk. ii. c. i.]
[21] [Second Edition. Spencer expresses much more concisely what Kant
has in his mind here. “Pleasure ... is a feeling which we seek to
bring into consciousness and retain there; pain is ... a feeling which
we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out.” _Principles of
Psychology_, § 125.]
[22] [The editions of Hartenstein and Kirchmann omit _ohne_ before
_zweck_, which makes havoc of the sentence. It is correctly printed by
Rosenkranz and Windelband.]
[23] [First Edition.]
[24] [Cf. _Metaphysic of Morals_, Introd. I. “The pleasure which
is necessarily bound up with the desire (of the object whose
representation affects feeling) may be called _practical_ pleasure,
whether it be cause or effect of the desire. On the contrary, the
pleasure which is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the
object, and which, therefore, is at bottom not a pleasure in the
existence of the Object of the representation, but clings to the
representation only, may be called mere contemplative pleasure or
_passive satisfaction_. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we
call _taste_.”]
[25] [Second Edition.]
[26] [First Edition has _gleiche_; Second Edition has _solche_.]
[27] [First and Second Editions have _sehr zweifle_; but this was
corrected to _nicht zweifle_ in the Third Edition of 1799.]
[28] [_Belebt machen_; First Edition had _beliebt_.]
[29] [Second Edition.]
[30] [Kant probably alludes here to Baumgarten (1714-1762), who was the
first writer to give the name of Aesthetics to the Philosophy of Taste.
He defined beauty as “perfection apprehended through the senses.” Kant
is said to have used as a text-book at lectures a work by Meier, a
pupil of Baumgarten’s, on this subject.]
[31] [Cf. Preface to the _Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, v.: “The
word _perfection_ is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes
understood as a concept belonging to Transcendental Philosophy; viz.
the concept of the _totality_ of the manifold, which, taken together,
constitutes a Thing; sometimes, again, it is understood as belonging to
_Teleology_, so that it signifies the agreement of the characteristics
of a thing with a _purpose_. Perfection in the former sense might be
called _quantitative_ (material), in the latter _qualitative_ (formal)
perfection.”]
[32] [The words _even if ... general_ were added in the Second Edition.]
[33] [Second Edition.]
[34] Models of taste as regards the arts of speech must be composed
in a dead and learned language. The first, in order that they may not
suffer that change which inevitably comes over living languages, in
which noble expressions become flat, common ones antiquated, and newly
created ones have only a short currency. The second, because learned
languages have a grammar which is subject to no wanton change of
fashion, but the rules of which are preserved unchanged.
[35] [This distinction between an _Idea_ and an _Ideal_, as also
the further contrast between Ideals of the Reason and Ideals of the
Imagination, had already been given by Kant in the _Critique of Pure
Reason_, Dialectic, bk. ii. c. iii. § 1.]
[36] [Polycletus of Argos flourished about 430 B.C. His statue of the
_Spearbearer_ (_Doryphorus_), afterwards became known as the _Canon_;
because in it the artist was supposed to have embodied a perfect
representation of the ideal of the human figure.]
[37] [This was a celebrated statue executed by Myron, a Greek sculptor,
contemporary with Polycletus. It is frequently mentioned in the Greek
Anthology.]
[38] It will be found that a perfectly regular countenance, such
as a painter might wish to have for a model, ordinarily tells us
nothing; because it contains nothing characteristic, and therefore
rather expresses the Idea of the race than the specific [traits] of
a person. The exaggeration of a characteristic of this kind, _i.e._
such as does violence to the normal Idea (the purposiveness of the
race) is called _caricature_. Experience also shows that these quite
regular countenances commonly indicate internally only a mediocre man;
presumably (if it may be assumed that external nature expresses the
proportions of internal) because, if no mental disposition exceeds that
proportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free from
faults, nothing can be expected of what is called _genius_, in which
nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the mental powers
on behalf of some special one.
[39] It might be objected to this explanation that there are things, in
which we see a purposive form without cognising any [definite] purpose
in them, like the stone implements often got from old sepulchral
tumuli with a hole in them as if for a handle. These, although they
plainly indicate by their shape a purposiveness of which we do not
know the purpose, are nevertheless not described as beautiful. But if
we regard a thing as a work of art, that is enough to make us admit
that its shape has reference to some design and definite purpose. And
hence there is no immediate satisfaction in the contemplation of it.
On the other hand a flower, _e.g._ a tulip, is regarded as beautiful;
because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness which, in our
judgement, is referred to no purpose at all.
[40] [Cp. p. 170, _infra_.]
[41] [See _The History of Sumatra_, by W. Marsden (London, 1783), p.
113.]
[42] [Cf. § 42, _infra_.]
[43] [Second Edition.]
[44] [Second Edition.]
[45] [_Lettres sur l’Égypte_, par M. Savary, Amsterdam, 1787.]
[46] [Second Edition.]
[47] [With this should be compared the similar discussion in the
_Critique of Pure Reason_, Dialectic, bk. ii. c. ii. § 1, _On the
System of Cosmological Ideas_.]
[48] [Second Edition.]
[49] [Cf. § 83, _infra_.]
[50] [In the _Philosophical Theory of Religion_, pt. i. _sub fin._
(Abbott’s Translation, p. 360), Kant, as here, divides “all religions
into two classes--_favour-seeking_ religion (mere worship) and _moral_
religion, that is, the religion _of a good life_;” and he concludes
that “amongst all the public religions that have ever existed the
Christian alone is moral.”]
[51] [_Voyages dans les Alpes_, par H. B. de Saussure; vol. i. was
published at Neuchatel in 1779; vol. ii. at Geneva in 1786.]
[52] [Second Edition.]
[53] [_Als Vermögen der Independenz der absoluten Totalität_, a curious
phrase.]
[54] [Second Edition.]
[55] _Affections_ are specifically different from _passions_. The
former are related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty
of desire, and are inclinations which render difficult or impossible
all determination of the [elective] will by principles. The former are
stormy and unpremeditated; the latter are steady and deliberate; thus
indignation in the form of wrath is an affection, but in the form of
hatred (revenge) is a passion. The latter can never and in no reference
be called sublime; because while in an affection the freedom of the
mind is _hindered_, in a passion it is abolished. [Cf. Preface to the
_Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, § xvi., where this distinction is
more fully drawn out. Affection is described as _hasty_; and passion is
defined as the sensible _appetite_ grown into a permanent inclination.]
[56] [In the Preface to the _Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, § xvii.,
Kant gives the term _moral apathy_ to that freedom from the sway of the
affections, which is distinguished from indifference to them.]
[57] [Reading _weiche_ with Rosenkranz and Windelband; Hartenstein and
Kirchmann have _weise_, which yields no sense.]
[58] [Cf. p. 129, _supra_.]
[59] [Kirchmann has _positiv_; but this is probably a mere misprint.]
[60] [L.c. vol. ii. p. 181.]
[61] [See Burke, _On the Sublime and Beautiful_, Part IV., Sect.
vii. “If the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually
noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is
not conversant about the present destruction of the person, as these
emotions clear the parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and
troublesome incumbrance, they are capable of producing delight; not
pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity
tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one
of the strongest of all the passions.” Kant quotes from the German
version published at Riga in 1773. This was a free translation made
from Burke’s fifth edition.]
[62] [See Burke, l.c., Part IV., Sect. xix. “Beauty acts by relaxing
the solids of the whole system. There are all the appearances of such
a relaxation; and a relaxation somewhat below the natural tone seems
to me to be the cause of all positive pleasure. Who is a stranger to
that manner of expression so common in all times and in all countries,
of being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved, melted away by
pleasure?”]
[63] [Reading _Gebot_; Kirchmann has _Gesetz_.]
[64] [Second Edition.]
[65] [Second Edition.]
[66] [Cf. _Critique of Pure Reason_, Methodology, c. 1, § 1. “The
construction of a concept is the _a priori_ presentation of the
corresponding intuition.”]
[67] [Charles Batteux (1713-1780), author of _Les Beaux Arts reduits à
un même principe_.]
[68] [Essay XVIII, _The Sceptic_. “Critics can reason and dispute
more plausibly than cooks or perfumers. We may observe, however, that
this uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a
considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and that
education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary
our taste of this kind.... Beauty and worth are merely of a relative
nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in
a particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution
of that mind.”]
[69] [For the distinction, an important one in Kant, between judgements
of experience and judgements of perception, see his _Prolegomena_, §
18. Cf. _Kant’s Critical Philosophy for English Readers_, vol. i. p.
116.]
[70] [First Edition has “limited.”]
[71] In order to be justified in claiming universal assent for an
aesthetical judgement that rests merely on subjective grounds, it
is sufficient to assume, (1) that the subjective conditions of the
Judgement, as regards the relation of the cognitive powers thus put
into activity to a cognition in general, are the same in all men. This
must be true, because otherwise men would not be able to communicate
their representations or even their knowledge. (2) The judgement must
merely have reference to this relation (consequently to the _formal
condition_ of the Judgement) and be pure, _i.e._ not mingled either
with concepts of the Object or with sensations, as determining grounds.
If there has been any mistake as regards this latter condition, then
there is only an inaccurate application of the privilege, which a law
gives us, to a particular case; but that does not destroy the privilege
itself in general.
[72] [Kant lays down these three maxims in his _Introduction to Logic_,
§ vii., as “general rules and conditions of the avoidance of error.”]
[73] We soon see that although enlightenment is easy _in thesi_, yet
_in hypothesi_ it is difficult and slow of accomplishment. For not to
be passive as regards Reason, but to be always self-legislative, is
indeed quite easy for the man who wishes only to be in accordance with
his essential purpose, and does not desire to know what is beyond his
Understanding. But since we can hardly avoid seeking this, and there
are never wanting others who promise with much confidence that they
are able to satisfy our curiosity, it must be very hard to maintain in
or restore to the mind (especially the mind of the public) that bare
negative which properly constitutes enlightenment.
[74] We may designate Taste as _sensus communis aestheticus_, common
Understanding as _sensus communis logicus_.
[75] [Peter Camper (1722-1789), a celebrated naturalist and comparative
anatomist; for some years professor at Groningen.]