who holds himself firmly persuaded that there is no God, and also
(because in respect of the Object of morality a similar consequence
results) no future life; how is he to judge of his own inner purposive
destination, by means of the moral law, which he reveres in practice?
He desires no advantage to himself from following it, either in this
or another world; he wishes, rather, disinterestedly to establish
the good to which that holy law directs all his powers. But his
effort is bounded; and from nature, although he may expect here and
there a contingent accordance, he can never expect a regular harmony
agreeing according to constant rules (such as his maxims are and must
be, internally), with the purpose that he yet feels himself obliged
and impelled to accomplish. Deceit, violence, and envy will always
surround him, although he himself be honest, peaceable, and kindly; and
the righteous men with whom he meets will, notwithstanding all their
worthiness of happiness, be yet subjected by nature which regards not
this, to all the evils of want, disease, and untimely death, just like
the beasts of the earth. So it will be until one wide grave engulfs
them together (honest or not, it makes no difference), and throws
them back--who were able to believe themselves the final purpose of
creation--into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which
they were drawn.-- The purpose, then, which this well-intentioned
person had and ought to have before him in his pursuit of moral laws,
he must certainly give up as impossible. Or else, if he wishes to
remain dependent upon the call of his moral internal destination,
and not to weaken the respect with which the moral law immediately
inspires him, by assuming the nothingness of the single, ideal, final
purpose adequate to its high demand (which cannot be brought about
without a violation of moral sentiment), he must, as he well can--since
there is at least no contradiction from a practical point of view in
forming a concept of the possibility of a morally prescribed final
purpose--assume the being of a _moral_ author of the world, that is, a
God.
§ 88. _Limitation of the validity of the moral proof_
Pure Reason, as a practical faculty, _i.e._ as the faculty of
determining the free use of our causality by Ideas (pure rational
concepts), not only comprises in the moral law a regulative principle
of our actions, but supplies us at the same time with a subjective
constitutive principle in the concept of an Object which Reason
alone can think, and which is to be actualised by our actions in
the world according to that law. The Idea of a final purpose in the
employment of freedom according to moral laws has therefore subjective
_practical_ reality. We are _a priori_ determined by Reason to promote
with all our powers the _summum bonum_ [Weltbeste] which consists in
the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the
highest condition of the good in itself, _i.e._ in universal happiness
conjoined with morality most accordant to law. In this final purpose
the possibility of one part, happiness, is empirically conditioned,
_i.e._ dependent on the constitution of nature (which may or may not
agree with this purpose) and is in a theoretical aspect problematical;
whilst the other part, morality, in respect of which we are free from
the effects of nature, stands fast _a priori_ as to its possibility,
and is dogmatically certain. It is then requisite for the objective
theoretical reality of the concept of the final purpose of rational
beings, that we should not only have _a priori_ presupposed a final
purpose for ourselves, but also that the creation, _i.e._ the world
itself, should have as regards its existence a final purpose, which if
it could be proved _a priori_ would add objectivity to the subjective
reality of the final purpose [of rational beings]. For if the creation
has on the whole a final purpose, we cannot think it otherwise than as
harmonising with the moral purpose (which alone makes the concept of a
purpose possible). Now we find without doubt purposes in the world, and
physical Teleology exhibits them in such abundance, that if we judge
in accordance with Reason, we have ground for assuming as a principle
in the investigation of nature that nothing in nature is without a
purpose; but the final purpose of nature we seek there in vain. This
can and must therefore, as its Idea only lies in Reason, be sought as
regards its objective possibility only in rational beings. And the
practical Reason of these latter not only supplies this final purpose;
it also determines this concept in respect of the conditions under
which alone a final purpose of creation can be thought by us.
The question is now, whether the objective reality of the concept
of a final purpose of creation cannot be exhibited adequately to the
theoretical requirements of pure Reason--if not apodictically for the
determinant Judgement yet adequately for the maxims of the theoretical
reflective Judgement? This is the least one could expect from
theoretical philosophy, which undertakes to combine the moral purpose
with natural purposes by means of the Idea of one single purpose; but
yet this little is far more than it can accomplish.
According to the principle of the theoretical reflective Judgement we
should say: if we have ground for assuming for the purposive products
of nature a supreme Cause of nature--whose causality in respect of the
actuality of creation is of a different kind from that required for
the mechanism of nature, _i.e._ must be thought as the causality of
an Understanding--we have also sufficient ground for thinking in this
original Being not merely the purposes everywhere in nature but also
a final purpose. This is not indeed a final purpose by which we can
explain the presence of such a Being, but one of which we may at least
convince ourselves (as was the case in physical Teleology) that we can
make the possibility of such a world conceivable, not merely according
to purposes, but only through the fact that we ascribe to its existence
a final purpose.
But a final purpose is merely a concept of our practical Reason,
and can be inferred from no data of experience for the theoretical
judging of nature, nor can it be applied to the cognition of nature.
No use of this concept is possible except its use for practical Reason
according to moral laws; and the final purpose of creation is that
constitution of the world which harmonises with that which alone we
can put forward definitely according to laws, viz. the final purpose of
our pure practical Reason, in so far as it is to be practical.-- Now
we have in the moral law, which enjoins on us in a practical point of
view the application of our powers to the accomplishment of this final
purpose, a ground for assuming its possibility and practicability, and
consequently too (because without the concurrence of nature with a
condition not in our power, its accomplishment would be impossible) a
nature of things harmonious with it. Hence we have a moral ground for
thinking in a world also a final purpose of creation.
We have not yet advanced from moral Teleology to a Theology, _i.e._ to
the being of a moral Author of the world, but only to a final purpose
of creation which is determined in this way. But in order to account
for this creation, _i.e._ the existence of things, in accordance with
a _final purpose_, we must assume not only first an intelligent Being
(for the possibility of things of nature which we are compelled to
judge of as _purposes_), but also a _moral_ Being, as author of the
world, _i.e._ a _God_. This second conclusion is of such a character
that we see it holds merely for the Judgement according to concepts
of practical Reason, and as such for the reflective and not the
determinant Judgement. It is true that in us morally practical Reason
is essentially different in its principles from technically practical
Reason. But we cannot assume that it must be so likewise in the supreme
World-Cause, regarded as Intelligence, and that a peculiar mode of
its causality is requisite for the final purpose, different from that
which is requisite merely for purposes of nature. We cannot therefore
assume that in our final purpose we have not merely a _moral ground_
for admitting a final purpose of creation (as an effect), but also
for admitting a _moral Being_ as the original ground of creation. But
we may well say, that, _according to the constitution of our rational
faculty_, we cannot comprehend the possibility of such a purposiveness
_in respect of the moral law_, and its Object, as there is in this
final purpose, apart from an Author and Governor of the world, who is
at the same time its moral Lawgiver.
The actuality of a highest morally-legislating Author is therefore
sufficiently established merely _for the practical use_ of our Reason,
without determining anything theoretically as regards its being. For
Reason requires, in respect of the possibility of its purpose, which
is given to us independently by its own legislation, an Idea through
which the inability to follow up this purpose, according to the mere
natural concepts of the world, is removed (sufficiently for the
reflective Judgement). Thus this Idea gains practical reality, although
all means of creating such for it in a theoretical point of view, for
the explanation of nature and determination of the supreme Cause,
are entirely wanting for speculative cognition. For the theoretical
reflective Judgement physical Teleology sufficiently proves from the
purposes of nature an intelligent World-Cause; for the practical
Judgement moral Teleology establishes it by the concept of a final
purpose, which it is forced to ascribe to creation in a practical
point of view. The objective reality of the Idea of God, as moral
Author of the world, cannot, it is true, be established by physical
purposes _alone_. But nevertheless, if the cognition of these purposes
is combined with that of the moral purpose, they are, by virtue of the
maxim of pure Reason which bids us seek unity of principles so far as
is possible, of great importance for the practical reality of that
Idea, by bringing in the reality which it has for the Judgement in a
theoretical point of view.
To prevent a misunderstanding which may easily arise, it is in the
highest degree needful to remark that, in the first place, we can
_think_ these properties of the highest Being only according to
analogy. How indeed could we explore the nature of that, to which
experience can show us nothing similar? Secondly, in this way we only
think the supreme Being; we cannot thereby _cognise_ Him and ascribe
anything theoretically to Him. It would be needful for the determinant
Judgement in the speculative aspect of our Reason, to consider what
the supreme World-Cause is in Himself. But here we are only concerned
with the question what concept we can form of Him, according to the
constitution of our cognitive faculties; and whether we have to assume
His existence in order merely to furnish practical reality to a
purpose, which pure Reason without any such presupposition enjoins upon
us _a priori_ to bring about with all our powers, _i.e._ in order to
be able to think as possible a designed effect. Although that concept
may be transcendent for the speculative Reason, and the properties
which we ascribe to the Being thereby thought may, objectively used,
conceal an anthropomorphism in themselves; yet the design of its use
is not to determine the nature of that Being which is unattainable by
us, but to determine ourselves and our will accordingly. We may call
a cause after the concept which we have of its effect (though only
in reference to this relation), without thereby meaning to determine
internally its inner constitution, by means of the properties which
can be made known to us solely by similar causes and must be given in
experience. For example, amongst other properties we ascribe to the
soul a _vis locomotiva_ because bodily movements actually arise whose
cause lies in the representation of them; without therefore meaning
to ascribe to it the only mode [of action] that we know in moving
forces (viz. by attraction, pressure, impulse, and consequently motion,
which always presuppose an extended being). Just so we must assume
_something_, which contains the ground of the possibility and practical
reality, _i.e._ the practicability, of a necessary moral final purpose;
but we can think of this, in accordance with the character of the
effect expected of it, as a wise Being governing the world according
to moral laws, and, conformably to the constitution of our cognitive
faculties, as a cause of things distinct from nature, only in order
to express the _relation_ of this Being (which transcends all our
cognitive faculties) to the Objects of _our_ practical Reason. We do
not pretend thus to ascribe to it theoretically the only causality of
this kind known to us, viz. an Understanding and a Will: we do not
even pretend to distinguish objectively the causality thought in this
Being, as regards what is _for us_ final purpose, from the causality
thought in it as regards nature (and its purposive determinations in
general). We can only assume this distinction as subjectively necessary
by the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and as valid for the
reflective, not for the objectively determinant Judgement. But if we
come to practice, then such a _regulative_ principle (of prudence or
wisdom) [commanding us] to act conformably to that as purpose, which
by the constitution of our cognitive faculties can only be thought
as possible in a certain way, is at the same _constitutive_, _i.e._
practically determinant. Nevertheless, as a principle for judging
of the objective possibility of things, it is no way theoretically
determinant (_i.e._ it does not say that the only kind of possibility
which belongs to the Object is that which belongs to our thinking
faculty), but is a mere _regulative_ principle for the reflective
Judgement.
_Remark_
This moral proof is not one newly discovered, although perhaps its
basis is newly set forth; since it has lain in man’s rational faculty
from its earliest germ, and is only continually developed with its
advancing cultivation. So soon as men begin to reflect upon right and
wrong--at a time when, quite indifferent as to the purposiveness of
nature, they avail themselves of it without thinking anything more of
it than that it is the accustomed course of nature--this judgement is
inevitable, viz. that the issue cannot be the same, whether a man has
behaved candidly or falsely, fairly or violently, even though up to his
life’s end, as far as can be seen, he has met with no happiness for
his virtues, no punishment for his vices. It is as if they perceived a
voice within [saying] that the issue must be different. And so there
must lie hidden in them a representation, however obscure, of something
after which they feel themselves bound to strive; with which such a
result would not agree,--with which, if they looked upon the course of
the world as the only order of things, they could not harmonise that
inner purposive determination of their minds. Now they might represent
in various rude fashions the way in which such an irregularity could
be adjusted (an irregularity which must be far more revolting to the
human mind than the blind chance that we are sometimes willing to use
as a principle for judging of nature). But they could never think
any other principle of the possibility of the unification of nature
with its inner ethical laws, than a supreme Cause governing the world
according to moral laws; because a final purpose in them proposed as
duty, and a nature without any final purpose beyond them in which that
purpose might be actualised, would involve a contradiction. As to the
[inner][136] constitution of that World-Cause they could contrive much
nonsense. But that moral relation in the government of the world would
remain always the same, which by the uncultivated Reason, considered
as practical, is universally comprehensible, but with which the
speculative Reason can make far from the like advance.--And in all
probability attention would be directed first by this moral interest to
the beauty and the purposes in nature, which would serve excellently
to strengthen this Idea though they could not be the foundation of it.
Still less could that moral interest be dispensed with, because it is
only in reference to the final purpose that the investigation of the
purposes of nature acquires that immediate interest which displays
itself in such a great degree in the admiration of them without any
reference to the advantage to be derived from them.
§ 89. _Of the use of the moral argument_
The limitation of Reason in respect of all our Ideas of the
supersensible to the conditions of its practical employment has, as
far as the Idea of God is concerned, undeniable uses. For it prevents
_Theology_ from rising into THEOSOPHY (into transcendent concepts which
confound Reason), or from sinking into DEMONOLOGY (an anthropomorphic
way of representing the highest Being). And it also prevents _Religion_
from turning into _Theurgy_ (a fanatical belief that we can have a
feeling of other supersensible beings and can reciprocally influence
them), or into _Idolatry_ (a superstitious belief that we can please
the Supreme Being by other means than by a moral sentiment).[137]
For if we permit the vanity or the presumption of sophistry to
determine the least thing theoretically (in a way that extends our
knowledge) in respect of what lies beyond the world of sense, or
if we allow any pretence to be made of insight into the being and
constitution of the nature of God, of His Understanding and Will, of
the laws of both and of His properties which thus affect the world,
I should like to know where and at what point we will bound these
assumptions of Reason. For wherever such insight can be derived, there
may yet more be expected (if we only strain our reflection, as we have
a mind to do). Bounds must then be put to such claims according to a
certain principle, and not merely because we find that all attempts
of the sort have hitherto failed, for that proves nothing against the
possibility of a better result. But here no principle is possible,
except either to assume that in respect of the supersensible absolutely
nothing can be theoretically determined (except mere negations);
or else that our Reason contains in itself a yet unused mine of
cognitions, reaching no one knows how far, stored up for ourselves and
our posterity.--But as concerns Religion, _i.e._ morals in reference
to God as legislator, if the theoretical cognition of Him is to come
first, morals must be adjusted in accordance with Theology; and not
only is an external arbitrary legislation of a Supreme Being introduced
in place of an internal necessary legislation of Reason, but also
whatever is defective in our insight into the nature of this Being
must extend to ethical precepts, and thus make Religion immoral and
perverted.
As regards the hope of a future life, if instead of the final purpose
we have to accomplish in conformity with the precept of the moral law,
we ask of our theoretical faculty of cognition a clue for the judgement
of Reason upon our destination (which clue is only considered as
necessary or worthy of acceptance in a practical reference), then in
this aspect Psychology, like Theology, gives no more than a negative
concept of our thinking being. That is, none of its actions or of the
phenomena of the internal sense can be explained materialistically; and
hence of its separate nature and of the continuance or non-continuance
of its personality after death absolutely no ampliative determinant
judgement is possible on speculative grounds by means of our whole
theoretical cognitive faculty. Here then everything is handed over to
the teleological judging of our existence in a practically necessary
aspect, and to the assumption of our continuance as a condition
requisite for the final purpose absolutely furnished by Reason. And so
this advantage (which indeed at first glance seems to be a loss) is
apparent; that, as Theology for us can never be Theosophy, or rational
_Psychology_ become _Pneumatology_--an ampliative science--so on the
other hand this latter is assured of never falling into _Materialism_.
Psychology, rather, is a mere anthropology of the internal sense,
_i.e._ is the knowledge of our thinking self _in life_; and, as
theoretical cognition, remains merely empirical. On the other hand,
rational Psychology, as far as it is concerned with questions as to
our eternal existence, is not a theoretical science at all, but rests
on a single conclusion of moral Teleology; as also its whole use is
necessary merely on account of the latter, _i.e._ on account of our
practical destination.
§ 90. _Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of
God_