great creation of organised natures, in order to see whether there may
not be in it something similar to a system and also in accordance with
the principle of production. For otherwise we should have to be content
with the mere principle of judgement (which gives no insight into
their production) and, discouraged, to give up all claim to _natural
insight_ in this field. The agreement of so many genera of animals
in a certain common schema, which appears to be fundamental not only
in the structure of their bones but also in the disposition of their
remaining parts,--so that with an admirable simplicity of original
outline, a great variety of species has been produced by the shortening
of one member and the lengthening of another, the involution of this
part and the evolution of that,--allows a ray of hope, however faint,
to penetrate into our minds, that here something may be accomplished
by the aid of the principle of the mechanism of nature (without
which there can be no natural science in general). This analogy of
forms, which with all their differences seem to have been produced
according to a common original type, strengthens our suspicions of an
actual relationship between them in their production from a common
parent, through the gradual approximation of one animal-genus to
another--from those in which the principle of purposes seems to be
best authenticated, _i.e._ from man, down to the polype, and again from
this down to mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest stage of
nature noticeable by us, viz. to crude matter. And so the whole Technic
of nature, which is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings that
we believe ourselves compelled to think a different principle for it,
seems to be derived from matter and its powers according to mechanical
laws (like those by which it works in the formation of crystals).
Here it is permissible for the _archaeologist_ of nature to derive
from the surviving traces of its oldest revolutions, according to all
its mechanism known or supposed by him, that great family of creatures
(for so we must represent them if the said thoroughgoing relationship
is to have any ground). He can suppose the bosom of mother earth, as
she passed out of her chaotic state (like a great animal), to have
given birth in the beginning to creatures of less purposive form, that
these again gave birth to others which formed themselves with greater
adaptation to their place of birth and their relations to each other;
until this womb becoming torpid and ossified, limited its births to
definite species not further modifiable, and the manifoldness remained
as it was at the end of the operation of that fruitful formative
power.--Only he must still in the end ascribe to this universal mother
an organisation purposive in respect of all these creatures; otherwise
it would not be possible to think the possibility of the purposive form
of the products of the animal and vegetable kingdoms.[120] He has then
only pushed further back the ground of explanation and cannot pretend
to have made the development of those two kingdoms independent of the
condition of final causes.
Even as concerns the variation to which certain individuals of
organised genera are accidentally subjected, if we find that the
character so changed is hereditary and is taken up into the generative
power, then we cannot pertinently judge the variation to be anything
else than an occasional development of purposive capacities originally
present in the species with a view to the preservation of the race.
For in the complete inner purposiveness of an organised being, the
generation of its like is closely bound up with the condition of taking
nothing up into the generative power which does not belong, in such
a system of purposes, to one of its undeveloped original capacities.
Indeed, if we depart from this principle, we cannot know with certainty
whether several parts of the form which is now apparent in a species
have not a contingent and unpurposive origin; and the principle of
Teleology, to judge nothing in an organised being as unpurposive
which maintains it in its propagation, would be very unreliable in its
application and would be valid solely for the original stock (of which
we have no further knowledge).
_Hume_[121] takes exception to those who find it requisite to
assume for all such natural purposes a teleological principle of
judgement, _i.e._ an architectonic Understanding. He says that it may
fairly be asked: how is such an Understanding possible? How can the
manifold faculties and properties that constitute the possibility
of an Understanding, which has at the same time executive force,
be found so purposively together in one Being? But this objection
is without weight. For the whole difficulty which surrounds the
question concerning the first production of a thing containing in
itself purposes and only comprehensible by means of them, rests on
the further question as to the unity of the ground of the combination
in this product of the various elements [des Mannichfaltigen] which
are _external to one another_. For if this ground be placed in the
Understanding of a producing cause as simple substance, the question,
so far as it is teleological, is sufficiently answered; but if the
cause be sought merely in matter as an aggregate of many substances
external to one another, the unity of the principle is quite
wanting for the internally purposive form of its formation, and the
_autocracy_ of matter in productions which can only be conceived by our
Understanding as purposes is a word without meaning.
Hence it comes to pass that those who seek a supreme ground of
possibility for the objectively-purposive forms of matter, without
attributing to it Understanding, either make the world-whole into
a single all-embracing substance (Pantheism), or (which is only a
more determinate explanation of the former) into a complex of many
determinations inhering in a single _simple substance_ (Spinozism);
merely in order to satisfy that condition of all purposiveness--the
_unity_ of ground. Thus they do justice indeed to _one_ condition of
the problem, viz. the unity in the purposive combination, by means
of the mere ontological concept of a simple substance; but they
adduce nothing for the _other_ condition, viz. the relation of this
substance to its result as _purpose_, through which relation that
ontological ground is to be more closely determined in respect of
the question at issue. Hence they answer _the whole_ question in no
way. It remains absolutely unanswerable (for our Reason) if we do
not represent that original ground of things, as simple _substance_;
its property which has reference to the specific constitution of the
forms of nature grounded thereon, viz. its purposive unity, as the
property of an intelligent substance; and the relation of these forms
to this intelligence (on account of the contingency which we ascribe
to everything that we think possible only as a purpose) as that of
_causality_.
§ 81. _Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle
in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product_
According to the preceding paragraphs the mechanism of nature alone
does not enable us to think the possibility of an organised being;
but (at least according to the constitution of our cognitive faculty)
it must be originally subordinated to a cause working designedly.
But, just as little is the mere teleological ground of such a being
sufficient for considering it and judging it as a product of nature,
if the mechanism of the latter be not associated with the former,
like the instrument of a cause working designedly, to whose purposes
nature is subordinated in its mechanical laws. The possibility of such
a unification of two quite different kinds of causality,--of nature
in its universal conformity to law with an Idea which limits it to a
particular form, for which it contains no ground in itself--is not
comprehended by our Reason. It lies in the supersensible substrate
of nature, of which we can determine nothing positively, except that
it is the being in itself of which we merely know the phenomenon.
But the principle, “all that we assume as belonging to this nature
(_phenomenon_) and as its product, must be thought as connected
therewith according to mechanical laws,” has none the less force,
because without this kind of causality organised beings (as purposes of
nature) would not be natural products.
Now if the teleological principle of the production of these beings
be assumed (as is inevitable), we can place at the basis of the
cause of their internally purposive form either _Occasionalism_ or
_Pre-established Harmony_. According to the former the Supreme Cause
of the world would, conformably to its Idea, furnish immediately the
organic formation on the occasion of every union of intermingling
materials. According to the latter it would, in the original products
of its wisdom, only have supplied the capacity by means of which
an organic being produces another of like kind, and the species
perpetually maintains itself; whilst the loss of individuals is
continually replaced by that nature which at the same time works
towards their destruction. If we assume the Occasionalism of the
production of organised beings, all nature is quite lost, and with
it all employment of Reason in judging of the possibility of such
products; hence we may suppose that no one will adopt this system, who
has anything to do with philosophy.
[The theory of] _Pre-established Harmony_ may proceed in two different
ways. It regards every organised being as generated by one of like
kind, either as an _educt_ or a _product_. The system which regards
generations as mere educts is called the theory of _individual
preformation_ or the theory of _evolution_: that which regards them
as products is entitled the system of _epigenesis_. This latter may
also be entitled the system of _generic preformation_, because the
productive faculty of the generator and consequently the specific
form would be _virtually_ performed according to the inner purposive
capacities which are part of its stock. In correspondence with this the
opposite theory of individual preformations would be better entitled
the _theory of involution_.
The advocates of the _theory of evolution_, who remove every
individual from the formative power of nature, in order to make
it come immediately from the hand of the Creator, would, however,
not venture to regard this as happening according to the hypothesis
of Occasionalism. For according to this the copulation is a mere
formality, _à propos_ of which a supreme intelligent Cause of the
world has concluded to form a fruit immediately by his hand, and only
to leave to the mother its development and nourishment. They declare
themselves for preformation; as if it were not all the same, whether
a supernatural origin is assigned to these forms in the beginning
or in the course of the world. On the contrary, a great number of
supernatural arrangements would be spared by occasional creation,
which would be requisite, in order that the embryo formed in the
beginning of the world might not be injured throughout the long period
of its development by the destructive powers of nature, and might keep
itself unharmed; and there would also be requisite an incalculably
greater number of such preformed beings than would ever be developed,
and with them many creations would be made without need and without
purpose. They would, however, be willing to leave at least something
to nature, so as not to fall into a complete Hyperphysic which can
dispense with all natural explanations. It is true, they hold so
fast by their Hyperphysic that they find even in abortions (which
it is quite impossible to take for purposes of nature) an admirable
purposiveness; though it be only directed to the fact that an anatomist
would take exception to it as a purposeless purposiveness, and would
feel a disheartened wonder thereat. But the production of hybrids
could absolutely not be accommodated with the system of preformation;
and to the seeds of the male creature, to which they had attributed
nothing but the mechanical property of serving as the first means of
nourishment for the embryo, they must attribute in addition a purposive
formative power, which in the case of the product of two creatures of
the same genus they would concede to neither parent.
On the other hand, even if we do not recognise the great superiority
which the theory of _Epigenesis_ has over the former as regards the
empirical grounds of its proof, still prior to proof Reason views this
way of explanation with peculiar favour. For in respect of the things
which we can only represent as possible originally according to the
causality of purposes, at least as concerns their propagation, this
theory regards nature as self-producing, not merely as self-evolving:
and so with the least expenditure of the supernatural leaves to nature
all that follows after the first beginning (though without determining
anything about this first beginning by which Physic generally is
thwarted, however it may essay its explanation by a chain of causes).
As regards this theory of Epigenesis, no one has contributed more
either to its proof or to the establishment of the legitimate
principles of its application,--partly by the limitation of a too
presumptuous employment of it,--than Herr Hofr. _Blumenbach_.[122]
In all physical explanations of these formations he starts from
organised matter. That crude matter should have originally formed
itself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from
the nature of what is lifeless, that matter should have been able to
dispose itself into the form of a self-maintaining purposiveness--this
he rightly declares to be contradictory to Reason. But at the same
time he leaves to natural mechanism under this to us indispensable
_principle_ of an original _organisation_, an undeterminable but yet
unmistakeable element, in reference to which the faculty of matter in
an organised body is called by him a _formative impulse_ (in contrast
to, and yet standing under the higher guidance and direction of, that
merely mechanical _formative power_ universally resident in matter).
§ 82. _Of the teleological system in the external relations of
organised beings_
By external purposiveness I mean that by which one thing of nature
serves another as means to a purpose. Now things which have no internal
purposiveness and which presuppose none for their possibility, _e.g._
earth, air, water, etc., may at the same time be very purposive
externally, _i.e._ in relation to other beings. But these latter
must be organised beings, _i.e._ natural purposes, for otherwise the
former could not be judged as means to them. Thus water, air, and
earth cannot be regarded as means to the raising of mountains, because
mountains contain nothing in themselves that requires a ground of their
possibility according to purposes, in reference to which therefore
their cause can never be represented under the predicate of a means (as
useful therefor).
External purposiveness is a quite different concept from that of
internal purposiveness, which is bound up with the possibility of an
object irrespective of its actuality being itself a purpose. We can ask
about an organised being the question: What is it for? But we cannot
easily ask this about things in which we recognise merely the working
of nature’s mechanism. For in the former, as regards their internal
possibility, we represent a causality according to purposes, a creative
Understanding, and we refer this active faculty to its determining
ground, viz. design. There is only one external purposiveness which
is connected with the internal purposiveness of organisation, and yet
serves in the external relation of a means to a purpose, without the
question necessarily arising, as to what end this being so organised
must have existed for. This is the organisation of both sexes in their
mutual relation for the propagation of their kind; since here we can
always ask, as in the case of an individual, why must such a pair
exist? The answer is: This pair first constitutes an _organising_
whole, though not an organised whole in a single body.
If we now ask, wherefore anything is, the answer is either: Its
presence and its production have no reference at all to a cause working
according to design, and so we always refer its origin to the mechanism
of nature, or: There is somewhere a designed ground of its presence
(as a contingent natural being). This thought we can hardly separate
from the concept of an organised thing; for, since we must place at
the basis of its internal possibility a causality of final causes and
an Idea lying at the ground of this, we cannot think the existence
of this product except as a purpose. For the represented effect, the
representation of which is at the same time the determining ground
of the intelligent cause working towards its production, is called a
_purpose_. In this case therefore we can either say: The purpose of
the existence of such a natural being is in itself; _i.e._ it is not
merely a purpose but a _final purpose_, or: This is external to it in
another natural being, _i.e._ it exists purposively not as a final
purpose, but necessarily as a means.
But if we go through the whole of nature we find in it, as nature,
no being which could make claim to the eminence of being the final
purpose of creation; and we can even prove _a priori_ that what might
be for nature an _ultimate purpose_, according to all the thinkable
determinations and properties wherewith one could endow it, could yet
as a natural thing never be a _final purpose_.
If we consider the vegetable kingdom we might at first sight, on
account of the immeasurable fertility with which it spreads itself
almost on every soil, be led to take it for a mere product of that
mechanism which nature displays in the formations of the mineral
kingdom. But a more intimate knowledge of its indescribably wise
organisation does not permit us to hold to this thought, but prompts
the question: What are these things created for? If it is answered:
For the animal kingdom, which is thereby nourished and has thus been
able to spread over the earth in genera so various, then the further
question comes: What are these plant-devouring animals for? The answer
would be something like this: For beasts of prey, which can only be
nourished by that which has life. Finally we have the question: What
are these last, as well as the first-mentioned natural kingdoms, good
for? For man, in reference to the manifold use which his Understanding
teaches him to make of all these creatures. He is the ultimate purpose
of creation here on earth, because he is the only being upon it who
can form a concept of purposes, and who can by his Reason make out of
an aggregate of purposively formed things a system of purposes.
We might also with the chevalier _Linnaeus_[123] go the apparently
opposite way and say: The herbivorous animals are there to moderate
the luxurious growth of the vegetable kingdom, by which many of its
species are choked. The carnivora are to set bounds to the voracity of
the herbivora. Finally man, by his pursuit of these and his diminution
of their numbers, preserves a certain equilibrium between the producing
and the destructive powers of nature. And so man, although in a certain
reference he might be esteemed a purpose, yet in another has only the
rank of a means.
If an objective purposiveness in the variety of the genera of creatures
and their external relations to one another, as purposively constructed
beings, be made a principle, then it is conformable to Reason to
conceive in these relations a certain organisation and a system of all
natural kingdoms according to final causes. Only here experience seems
flatly to contradict the maxims of Reason, especially as concerns an
ultimate purpose of nature, which is indispensable for the possibility
of such a system and which we can put nowhere else but in man. For
regarding him as one of the many animal genera, nature has not in the
least excepted him from its destructive or its productive powers, but
has subjected everything to a mechanism thereof without any purpose.
The first thing that must be designedly prepared in an arrangement
for a purposive complex of natural beings on the earth would be their
place of habitation, the soil and the element on and in which they
are to thrive. But a more exact knowledge of the constitution of
this basis of all organic production indicates no other causes than
those working quite undesignedly, causes which rather destroy than
favour production, order, and purposes. Land and sea not only contain
in themselves memorials of ancient mighty desolations which have
confounded them and all creatures that are in them; but their whole
structure, the strata of the one and the boundaries of the other, have
quite the appearance of being the product of the wild and violent
forces of a nature working in a state of chaos. Although the figure,
the structure, and the slope of the land might seem to be purposively
ordered for the reception of water from the air, for the welling
up of streams between strata of different kinds (for many kinds of
products), and for the course of rivers--yet a closer investigation
shows that they are merely the effects of volcanic eruptions or of
inundations of the ocean, as regards not only the first production of
this figure, but, above all, its subsequent transformation, as well as
the disappearance of its first organic productions.[124] Now if the
place of habitation of all these creatures, the soil (of the land)
or the bosom (of the sea), indicates nothing but a quite undesigned
mechanism of its production, how and with what right can we demand and
maintain a different origin for these latter products? The closest
examination, indeed (in _Camper’s_[125] judgement), of the remains
of the aforesaid devastations of nature seems to show that man was
not comprehended in these revolutions; but yet he is so dependent on
the remaining creatures that, if a universally directing mechanism of
nature be admitted in the case of the others, he must also be regarded
as comprehended under it; even though his Understanding (for the most
part at least) has been able to deliver him from these devastations.
But this argument seems to prove more than was intended by it. It seems
to prove not merely that man cannot be the ultimate purpose of nature,
and that on the same grounds the aggregate of the organised things of
nature on the earth cannot be a system of purposes; but also that the
natural products formerly held to be natural purposes have no other
origin than the mechanism of nature.
But in the solution given above of the Antinomy of the principles
of the mechanical and teleological methods of production of organic
beings of nature, we have seen that they are merely principles of
the reflective Judgement in respect of nature as it produces forms
in accordance with particular laws (for the systematic connexion of
which we have no key). They do not determine the origin of these
beings in themselves; but only say that we, by the constitution of
our Understanding and our Reason, cannot conceive it in this kind of
being except according to final causes. The greatest possible effort,
even audacity, in the attempt to explain them mechanically is not only
permitted, but we are invited to it by Reason; notwithstanding that
we know from the subjective grounds of the particular species and
limitations of our Understanding (not _e.g._ because the mechanism
of production would contradict in itself an origin according to
purposes) that we can never attain thereto. Finally, the compatibility
of both ways of representing the possibility of nature may lie in
the supersensible principle of nature (external to us, as well as in
us); whilst the method of representation according to final causes
may be only a subjective condition of the use of our Reason, when it
not merely wishes to form a judgement upon objects as phenomena, but
desires to refer these phenomena together with their principles to
their supersensible substrate, in order to find certain laws of their
unity possible, which it cannot represent to itself except through
purposes (of which the Reason also has such as are supersensible).
§ 83. _Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system_