its cognition, _e.g._ of the cause of a product, from the
_analytical-universal_ (concepts) to the particular (the given
empirical intuition). Thus as regards the manifold of the latter it
determines nothing, but must await this determination by the Judgement,
which subsumes the empirical intuition (if the object is a natural
product) under the concept. We can however think an Understanding
which, being, not like ours, discursive, but intuitive, proceeds from
the _synthetical-universal_ (the intuition of a whole as such) to the
particular, _i.e._ from the whole to the parts. The _contingency_
of the combination of the parts, in order that a definite form of
the whole shall be possible, is not implied by such an Understanding
and its representation of the whole. Our Understanding requires this
because it must proceed from the parts as universally conceived
grounds to different forms possible to be subsumed under them, as
consequences. According to the constitution of our Understanding a
real whole of nature is regarded only as the effect of the concurrent
motive powers of the parts. Suppose then that we wish not to represent
the possibility of the whole as dependent on that of the parts (after
the manner of our discursive Understanding), but according to the
standard of the intuitive (original) Understanding to represent
the possibility of the parts (according to their constitution and
combination) as dependent on that of the whole. In accordance with the
above peculiarity of our Understanding it cannot happen that the whole
shall contain the ground of the possibility of the connexion of the
parts (which would be a contradiction in discursive cognition), but
only that the _representation_ of a whole may contain the ground of the
possibility of its form and the connexion of the parts belonging to it.
Now such a whole would be an effect (_product_) the _representation_ of
which is regarded as the _cause_ of its possibility; but the product
of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of
its effect is called a purpose. Hence it is merely a consequence of
the particular constitution of our Understanding, that it represents
products of nature as possible, according to a different kind of
causality from that of the natural laws of matter, namely, that of
purposes and final causes. Hence also this principle has not to do
with the possibility of such things themselves (even when considered
as phenomena) according to the manner of their production, but merely
with the judgement upon them which is possible to our Understanding.
Here we see at once why it is that in natural science we are not
long contented with an explanation of the products of nature by a
causality according to purposes. For there we desire to judge of
natural production merely in a manner conformable to our faculty of
judging, _i.e._ to the reflective Judgement, and not in reference to
things themselves on behalf of the determinant Judgement. It is here
not at all requisite to prove that such an _intellectus archetypus_ is
possible, but only that we are led to the Idea of it,--which contains
no contradiction,--in contrast to our discursive Understanding which
has need of images (_intellectus ectypus_) and to the contingency of
its constitution.
If we consider a material whole, according to its form, as a product
of the parts with their powers and faculties of combining with one
another (as well as of bringing in foreign materials), we represent to
ourselves a mechanical mode of producing it. But in this way no concept
emerges of a whole as purpose, whose internal possibility presupposes
throughout the Idea of a whole on which depend the constitution and
mode of action of the parts, as we must represent to ourselves an
organised body. It does not follow indeed, as has been shown, that
the mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for to say so
would be to say that it would be impossible (contradictory) for _any
Understanding_ to represent to itself such a unity in the connexion of
the manifold, without the Idea of the unity being at the same time its
producing cause, _i.e._ without designed production. This, however,
would follow in fact if we were justified in regarding material beings
as things in themselves. For then the unity that constitutes the
ground of the possibility of natural formations would be simply the
unity of space. But space is no real ground of the products, but only
their formal condition, although it has this similarity to the real
ground which we seek that in it no part can be determined except in
relation to the whole (the representation of which therefore lies at
the ground of the possibility of the parts). But now it is at least
possible to consider the material world as mere phenomenon, and to
think as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is
not phenomenon), and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual
intuition (even though it is not ours). Thus there would be, although
incognisable by us, a supersensible real ground for nature, to which
we ourselves belong. In this we consider according to mechanical laws
what is necessary in nature regarded as an object of Sense; but we
consider according to teleological laws the agreement and unity of its
particular laws and its forms--which in regard to mechanism we must
judge contingent--regarded as objects of Reason (in fact the whole
of nature as a system). Thus we should judge nature according to two
different kinds of principles without the mechanical way of explanation
being shut out by the teleological, as if they contradicted one another.
From this we are enabled to see what otherwise, though we could easily
surmise it, could with difficulty be maintained with certainty and
proved, viz. that the principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive
natural products is consistent with the teleological, but in no way
enables us to dispense with it. In a thing that we must judge as a
natural purpose (an organised being) we can no doubt try all the known
and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and even hope
to make good progress therewith; but we can never get rid of the call
for a quite different ground of production for the possibility of such
a product, viz. causality by means of purposes. Absolutely no human
Reason (in fact no finite Reason like ours in quality, however much it
may surpass it in degree) can hope to understand the production of even
a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes. As regards the possibility
of such an object, the teleological connexion of causes and effects
is quite indispensable for the Judgement, even for studying it by the
clue of experience. For external objects as phenomena an adequate
ground related to purposes cannot be met with; this, although it lies
in nature, must only be sought in the supersensible substrate of
nature, from all possible insight into which we are cut off. Hence it
is absolutely impossible for us to produce from nature itself grounds
of explanation for purposive combinations; and it is necessary by the
constitution of the human cognitive faculties to seek the supreme
ground of these purposive combinations in an original Understanding as
the cause of the world.
§ 78. _Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of
matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature_
It is infinitely important for Reason not to let slip the mechanism
of nature in its products, and in their explanation not to pass it
by, because without it no insight into the nature of things can be
attained. Suppose it admitted that a supreme Architect immediately
created the forms of nature as they have been from the beginning, or
that He predetermined those which in the course of nature continually
form themselves on the same model. Our knowledge of nature is not thus
in the least furthered, because we cannot know the mode of action of
that Being and the Ideas which are to contain the principles of the
possibility of natural beings, and we cannot by them explain nature
as from above downwards (_a priori_). And if, starting from the forms
of the objects of experience, from below upwards (_a posteriori_),
we wish to explain the purposiveness, which we believe is met with
in experience, by appealing to a cause working in accordance with
purposes, then is our explanation quite tautological and we are only
mocking Reason with words. Indeed when we lose ourselves with this way
of explanation in the transcendent, whither natural knowledge cannot
follow, Reason is seduced into poetical extravagance, which it is its
peculiar destination to avoid.
On the other hand, it is just as necessary a maxim of Reason not
to pass by the principle of purposes in the products of nature.
For, although it does not make their mode of origination any more
comprehensible, yet it is a heuristic principle for investigating the
particular laws of nature; supposing even that we wish to make no use
of it for explaining nature itself,--in which we still always speak
only of natural purposes, although it apparently exhibits a designed
unity of purpose,--_i.e._ without seeking beyond nature the ground of
the possibility of these particular laws. But since we must come in
the end to this latter question, it is just as necessary to think for
nature a particular kind of causality which does not present itself in
it, as the mechanism of natural causes which does. To the receptivity
of several forms, different from those of which matter is susceptible
by mechanism, must be added a spontaneity of a cause (which therefore
cannot be matter), without which no ground can be assigned for those
forms. No doubt Reason, before it takes this step, must proceed with
caution, and not try to explain teleologically every Technic of nature,
_i.e._ every productive faculty of nature which displays in itself (as
in regular bodies) purposiveness of figure to our mere apprehension;
but must always regard such as so far mechanically possible. But on
that account to wish entirely to exclude the teleological principle,
and to follow simple mechanism only--in cases where, in the rational
investigation of the possibility of natural forms through their causes,
purposiveness shows itself quite undeniably as the reference to a
different kind of causality--to do this must make Reason fantastic, and
send it wandering among chimeras of unthinkable natural faculties; just
as a mere teleological mode of explanation which takes no account of
natural mechanism makes it visionary.
In the same natural thing both principles cannot be connected as
fundamental propositions of explanation (deduction) of one by the
other, _i.e._ they do not unite for the determinant Judgement as
dogmatical and constitutive principles of insight into nature. If I
choose, _e.g._ to regard a maggot as the product of the mere mechanism
of nature (of the new formation that it produces of itself, when
its elements are set free by corruption), I cannot derive the same
product from the same matter as from a causality that acts according
to purposes. Conversely, if I regard the same product as a natural
purpose, I cannot count on any mechanical mode of its production and
regard this as the constitutive principle of my judgement upon its
possibility, and so unite both principles. One method of explanation
excludes the other; even supposing that objectively both grounds of
the possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, to which
we did not pay attention. The principle which should render possible
the compatibility of both in judging of nature must be placed in
that which lies outside both (and consequently outside the possible
empirical representation of nature), but yet contains their ground,
_i.e._ in the supersensible; and each of the two methods of explanation
must be referred thereto. Now of this we can have no concept but the
indeterminate concept of a ground, which makes the judging of nature
by empirical laws possible, but which we cannot determine more nearly
by any predicate. Hence the union of both principles cannot rest upon
a ground of _explanation_ of the possibility of a product according to
given laws, for the _determinant_ Judgement, but only upon a ground
of its _exposition_ for the _reflective_ Judgement.--To explain is to
derive from a principle, which therefore we must clearly know and of
which we can give an account. No doubt the principle of the mechanism
of nature and that of its causality in one and the same natural product
must coalesce in a single higher principle, which is their common
source, because otherwise they could not subsist side by side in the
observation of nature. But if this principle, objectively common to
the two, which therefore warrants the association of the maxims of
natural investigation depending on both, be such that, though it
can be pointed to, it cannot be determinately known nor clearly put
forward for use in cases which arise, then from such a principle we
can draw no explanation, _i.e._ no clear and determinate derivation
of the possibility of a natural product in accordance with those
two heterogeneous principles. But now the principle common to the
mechanical and teleological derivations is the _supersensible_, which
we must place at the basis of nature, regarded as phenomenon. And of
this, in a theoretical point of view, we cannot form the smallest
positive determinate concept. It cannot, therefore, in any way be
explained how, according to it as principle, nature (in its particular
laws) constitutes for us one system, which can be cognised as possible
either by the principle of physical development or by that of final
causes. If it happens that objects of nature present themselves which
cannot be thought by us, as regards their possibility, according to
the principle of mechanism (which always has a claim on a natural
being), without relying on teleological propositions, we can only make
an hypothesis. Namely, we suppose that we may hopefully investigate
natural laws with reference to both (according as the possibility of
its product is cognisable by our Understanding by one or the other
principle), without stumbling at the apparent contradiction which comes
into view between the principles by which they are judged. For at least
the possibility is assured that both may be united objectively in one
principle, since they concern phenomena that presuppose a supersensible
ground.
Mechanism, then, and the teleological (designed) Technic of nature,
in respect of the same product and its possibility, may stand under
a common supreme principle of nature in particular laws. But since
this principle is _transcendent_ we cannot, because of the limitation
of our Understanding, unite both principles _in the explanation_ of
the same production of nature even if the inner possibility of this
product is only _intelligible_ [verständlich] through a causality
according to purposes (as is the case with organised matter). We
revert then to the above fundamental proposition of Teleology.
According to the constitution of the human Understanding, no other
than designedly-working causes can be assumed for the possibility of
organised beings in nature; and the mere mechanism of nature cannot
be adequate to the explanation of these its products. But we do not
attempt to decide anything by this fundamental proposition as to the
possibility of such things themselves.
This is only a maxim of the reflective, not of the determinant
Judgement; consequently only subjectively valid for us, not objectively
for the possibility of things themselves of this kind (in which both
kinds of production may well cohere in one and the same ground).
Further, without any concept,--besides the teleologically conceived
method of production,--of a simultaneously presented mechanism of
nature, no judgement can be passed on this kind of production as a
natural product. Hence the above maxim leads to the necessity of
an unification of both principles in judging of things as natural
purposes in themselves, but does not lead us to substitute one for
the other either altogether or in certain parts. For in the place of
what is thought (at least by us) as possible only by design we cannot
set mechanism, and in the place of what is cognised as mechanically
necessary we cannot set contingency, which would need a purpose as its
determining ground; but we can only subordinate the one (Mechanism)
to the other (designed Technic), which may quite well be the case
according to the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of
nature.
For where purposes are thought as grounds of the possibility of certain
things, we must assume also means, whose law of working requires _for
itself_ nothing presupposing a purpose,--a mechanical law--and yet
can be a subordinate cause of designed effects. Thus--in the organic
products of nature, and specially when prompted by their infinite
number, we assume (at least as a permissible hypothesis) design in
the combination of natural causes by particular laws as a _universal
principle_ of the reflective Judgement for the whole of nature (the
world),--we can think a great and indeed universal combination of
mechanical with teleological laws in the productions of nature, without
interchanging the principles by which they are judged or putting one
in the place of the other. For, in a teleological judgement, the
matter, even if the form that it assumes be judged possible only by
design, can also, conformably to the mechanical laws of its nature,
be subordinated as a means to the represented purpose. But, since the
ground of this compatibility lies in that which is neither one nor
the other (neither mechanism nor purposive combination), but is the
supersensible substrate of nature of which we know nothing, the two
ways of representing the possibility of such Objects are not to be
blended together by our (human) Reason. However, we cannot judge of
their possibility otherwise than by judging them as ultimately resting
on a supreme Understanding by the connexion of final causes; and thus
the teleological method of explanation is not eliminated.
Now it is quite indeterminate, and for our Understanding always
indeterminable, how much the mechanism of nature does as a means
towards each final design in nature. However, on account of the
above-mentioned intelligible principle of the possibility of a nature
in general, it may be assumed that it is possible throughout according
to the two kinds of universally accordant laws (the physical and
those of final causes), although we cannot see into the way how this
takes place. Hence we do not know how far the mechanical method of
explanation which is possible for us may extend. So much only is
certain that, so far as we can go in this direction, it must always
be inadequate for things that we once recognise as natural purposes;
and therefore we must, by the constitution of our Understanding,
subordinate these grounds collectively to a teleological principle.
Hereon is based a privilege, and on account of the importance which the
study of nature by the principle of mechanism has for the theoretical
use of our Reason, also an appeal. We should explain all products
and occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as
far as is in our power (the limits of which we cannot specify in
this kind of investigation). But at the same time we are not to lose
sight of the fact that those things which we cannot even state for
investigation except under the concept of a purpose of Reason, must, in
conformity with the essential constitution of our Reason, mechanical
causes notwithstanding, be subordinated by us finally to causality in
accordance with purposes.
METHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT.[119]
§ 79. _Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the
doctrine of nature_
Every science must have its definite position in the encyclopaedia of
all the sciences. If it is a philosophical science its position must be
either in the theoretical or practical part. If again it has its place
in the former of these, it must be either in the doctrine of nature, so
far as it concerns that which can be an object of experience (in the
doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of the soul, or the universal science
of the world), or in the doctrine of God (the original ground of the
world as the complex of all objects of experience).
Now the question is, what place is due to Teleology? Does it belong
to Natural Science (properly so called) or to Theology? One of the
two it must be; for no science belongs to the transition from one to
the other, because this transition only marks the articulation or
organisation of the system, and not a place in it.
That it does not belong to Theology as a part thereof, although it may
be made of the most important use therein, is self-evident. For it has
as its objects, natural productions, and their cause, and although it
refers at the same time to the latter as to a ground lying outside of
and beyond nature (a Divine Author), yet it does not do this for the
determinant but only for the reflective Judgement in the consideration
of nature (in order to guide our judgement on things in the world by
means of such an Idea as a regulative principle, in conformity with the
human Understanding).
But it appears to belong just as little to Natural Science, which needs
determinant and not merely reflective principles in order to supply
objective grounds for natural effects. In fact, nothing is gained for
the theory of nature or the mechanical explanation of its phenomena
by means of its effective causes, by considering them as connected
according to the relation of purposes. The exhibition of the purposes
of nature in its products, so far as they constitute a system according
to teleological concepts, properly belongs only to a description of
nature which is drawn up in accordance with a particular guiding
thread. Here Reason, no doubt, accomplishes a noble work, instructive
and practically purposive in many points of view; but it gives no
information as to the origin and the inner possibility of these
forms, which is the special business of theoretical Natural Science.
Teleology, therefore, as science, belongs to no Doctrine, but only to
Criticism; and to the criticism of a special cognitive faculty, viz.
Judgement. But so far as it contains principles _a priori_, it can and
must furnish the method by which nature must be judged according to the
principle of final causes. Hence its Methodology has at least negative
influence upon the procedure in theoretical Natural Science, and also
upon the relation which this can have in Metaphysic to Theology as its
propaedeutic.
§ 80. _Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the
teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural
purpose_
The _privilege of aiming at_ a merely mechanical method of explanation
of all natural products is in itself quite unlimited; but the _faculty
of attaining_ thereto is by the constitution of our Understanding, so
far as it has to do with things as natural purposes, not only very much
limited but also clearly bounded. For, according to a principle of the
Judgement, by this process alone nothing can be accomplished towards
an explanation of these things; and consequently the judgement upon
such products must always be at the same time subordinated by us to a
teleological principle.
It is therefore rational, even meritorious, to pursue natural
mechanism, in respect of the explanation of natural products, so far
as can be done with probability; and if we give up the attempt it is
not because it is impossible _in itself_ to meet in this path with the
purposiveness of nature, but only because it is impossible _for us_
as men. For there would be required for that an intuition other than
sensuous, and a determinate knowledge of the intelligible substrate
of nature from which a ground could be assigned for the mechanism of
phenomena according to particular laws, which quite surpasses our
faculties.
Hence if the naturalist would not waste his labour he must in judging
of things, the concept of any of which is indubitably established
as a natural purpose (organised beings), always lay down as basis an
original organisation, which uses that very mechanism in order to
produce fresh organised forms or to develop the existing ones into new
shapes (which, however, always result from that purpose and conformably
to it).