of desire; and they bring with them--the former a satisfaction
pathologically conditioned (by impulses, _stimuli_)--the latter a
pure practical satisfaction, which is determined not merely by the
representation of the object, but also by the represented connexion
of the subject with the existence of the object. [It is not merely
the object that pleases, but also its existence.[16]] On the other
hand, the judgement of taste is merely _contemplative_; _i.e._ it is
a judgement which, indifferent as regards the being of an object,
compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and pain. But this
contemplation itself is not directed to concepts; for the judgement of
taste is not a cognitive judgement (either theoretical or practical),
and thus is not _based_ on concepts, nor has it concepts as its
_purpose_.
The Pleasant, the Beautiful, and the Good, designate then, three
different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and
pain, in reference to which we distinguish from each other objects or
methods of representing them. And the expressions corresponding to
each, by which we mark our complacency in them, are not the same. That
which GRATIFIES a man is called _pleasant_; that which merely PLEASES
him is _beautiful_; that which is ESTEEMED [or _approved_[17]] by
him, _i.e._ that to which he accords an objective worth, is _good_.
Pleasantness concerns irrational animals also; but Beauty only
concerns men, _i.e._ animal, but still rational, beings--not merely
_quâ_ rational (_e.g._ spirits), but _quâ_ animal also; and the Good
concerns every rational being in general. This is a proposition which
can only be completely established and explained in the sequel. We may
say that of all these three kinds of satisfaction, that of taste in
the Beautiful is alone a disinterested and _free_ satisfaction; for no
interest, either of Sense or of Reason, here forces our assent. Hence
we may say of satisfaction that it is related in the three aforesaid
cases to _inclination_, to _favour_, or to _respect_. Now _favour_ is
the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that
is proposed to our desire by a law of Reason, leave us no freedom in
forming for ourselves anywhere an object of pleasure. All interest
presupposes or generates a want; and, as the determining ground of
assent, it leaves the judgement about the object no longer free.
As regards the interest of inclination in the case of the Pleasant,
every one says that hunger is the best sauce, and everything that is
eatable is relished by people with a healthy appetite; and thus a
satisfaction of this sort does not indicate choice directed by taste.
It is only when the want is appeased that we can distinguish which of
many men has or has not taste. In the same way there may be manners
(conduct) without virtue, politeness without goodwill, decorum without
modesty, etc. For where the moral law speaks there is no longer,
objectively, a free choice as regards what is to be done; and to
display taste in its fulfilment (or in judging of another’s fulfilment
of it) is something quite different from manifesting the moral attitude
of thought. For this involves a command and generates a want, whilst
moral taste only plays with the objects of satisfaction, without
attaching itself to one of them.
EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FIRST MOMENT
_Taste_ is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of
representing it by an _entirely disinterested_ satisfaction
or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called
_beautiful_.[18]
SECOND MOMENT
OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, VIZ. ACCORDING TO QUANTITY
§ 6. _The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as
the object of a universal satisfaction_
This explanation of the beautiful can be derived from the preceding
explanation of it as the object of an entirely disinterested
satisfaction. For the fact of which every one is conscious, that the
satisfaction is for him quite disinterested, implies in his judgement a
ground of satisfaction for every one. For since it does not rest on any
inclination of the subject (nor upon any other premeditated interest),
but since he who judges feels himself quite _free_ as regards the
satisfaction which he attaches to the object, he cannot find the ground
of this satisfaction in any private conditions connected with his own
subject; and hence it must be regarded as grounded on what he can
presuppose in every other man. Consequently he must believe that he has
reason for attributing a similar satisfaction to every one. He will
therefore speak of the beautiful, as if beauty were a characteristic
of the object and the judgement logical (constituting a cognition of
the Object by means of concepts of it); although it is only aesthetical
and involves merely a reference of the representation of the object to
the subject. For it has this similarity to a logical judgement that we
can presuppose its validity for every one. But this universality cannot
arise from concepts; for from concepts there is no transition to the
feeling of pleasure or pain (except in pure practical laws, which bring
an interest with them such as is not bound up with the pure judgement
of taste). Consequently the judgement of taste, accompanied with the
consciousness of separation from all interest, must claim validity for
every one, without this universality depending on Objects. That is,
there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality.
§ 7. _Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by
means of the above characteristic_
As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which
he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that
it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person. Thus he
is quite contented that if he says “Canary wine is pleasant,” another
man may correct his expression and remind him that he ought to say “It
is pleasant _to me_.” And this is the case not only as regards the
taste of the tongue, the palate, and the throat, but for whatever is
pleasant to any one’s eyes and ears. To one violet colour is soft and
lovely, to another it is faded and dead. One man likes the tone of wind
instruments, another that of strings. To strive here with the design of
reproving as incorrect another man’s judgement which is different from
our own, as if the judgements were logically opposed, would be folly.
As regards the pleasant therefore the fundamental proposition is valid,
_every one has his own taste_ (the taste of Sense).
The case is quite different with the Beautiful. It would (on the
contrary) be laughable if a man who imagined anything to his own taste,
thought to justify himself by saying: “This object (the house we see,
the coat that person wears, the concert we hear, the poem submitted
to our judgement) is beautiful _for me_.” For he must not call it
_beautiful_ if it merely pleases himself. Many things may have for
him charm and pleasantness; no one troubles himself at that; but if
he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same
satisfaction--he judges not merely for himself, but for every one,
and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence he says
“the _thing_ is beautiful”; and he does not count on the agreement of
others with this his judgement of satisfaction, because he has found
this agreement several times before, but he _demands_ it of them. He
blames them if they judge otherwise and he denies them taste, which he
nevertheless requires from them. Here then we cannot say that each man
has his own particular taste. For this would be as much as to say that
there is no taste whatever; _i.e._ no aesthetical judgement, which can
make a rightful claim upon every one’s assent.
At the same time we find as regards the Pleasant that there is an
agreement among men in their judgements upon it, in regard to which
we deny Taste to some and attribute it to others; by this not meaning
one of our organic senses, but a faculty of judging in respect of the
pleasant generally. Thus we say of a man who knows how to entertain
his guests with pleasures (of enjoyment for all the senses), so that
they are all pleased, “he has taste.” But here the universality is only
taken comparatively; and there emerge rules which are only _general_
(like all empirical ones), and not _universal_; which latter the
judgement of Taste upon the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to. It
is a judgement in reference to sociability, so far as this rests on
empirical rules. In respect of the Good it is true that judgements make
rightful claim to validity for every one; but the Good is represented
only _by means of a concept_ as the Object of a universal satisfaction,
which is the case neither with the Pleasant nor with the Beautiful.
§ 8. _The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a
judgement of Taste only as subjective_
This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetical
judgement, which is to be met with in a judgement of taste, is
noteworthy, not indeed for the logician, but for the transcendental
philosopher. It requires no small trouble to discover its origin, but
we thus detect a property of our cognitive faculty which without this
analysis would remain unknown.
First, we must be fully convinced of the fact that in a judgement
of taste (about the Beautiful) the satisfaction in the object is
imputed to _every one_, without being based on a concept (for then
it would be the Good). Further, this claim to universal validity so
essentially belongs to a judgement by which we describe anything as
_beautiful_, that if this were not thought in it, it would never come
into our thoughts to use the expression at all, but everything which
pleases without a concept would be counted as pleasant. In respect
of the latter every one has his own opinion; and no one assumes, in
another, agreement with his judgement of taste, which is always the
case in a judgement of taste about beauty. I may call the first the
taste of Sense, the second the taste of Reflection; so far as the
first lays down mere private judgements, and the second judgements
supposed to be generally valid (public), but in both cases aesthetical
(not practical) judgements about an object merely in respect of the
relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and pain.
Now here is something strange. As regards the taste of Sense not only
does experience show that its judgement (of pleasure or pain connected
with anything) is not valid universally, but every one is content not
to impute agreement with it to others (although actually there is
often found a very extended concurrence in these judgements). On the
other hand, the taste of Reflection has its claim to the universal
validity of its judgements (about the beautiful) rejected often
enough, as experience teaches; although it may find it possible (as it
actually does) to represent judgements which can demand this universal
agreement. In fact for each of its judgements of taste it imputes
this to every one, without the persons that judge disputing as to the
possibility of such a claim; although in particular cases they cannot
agree as to the correct application of this faculty.
Here we must, in the first place, remark that a universality which
does not rest on concepts of Objects (not even on empirical ones) is
not logical but aesthetical, _i.e._ it involves no objective quantity
of the judgement but only that which is subjective. For this I use
the expression _general validity_ which signifies the validity of the
reference of a representation, not to the cognitive faculty but, to the
feeling of pleasure and pain for every subject. (We can avail ourselves
also of the same expression for the logical quantity of the judgement,
if only we prefix _objective_ to “universal validity,” to distinguish
it from that which is merely subjective and aesthetical.)
A judgement with _objective universal validity_ is also always valid
subjectively; _i.e._ if the judgement holds for everything contained
under a given concept, it holds also for every one who represents an
object by means of this concept. But from a _subjective universal
validity_, _i.e._ aesthetical and resting on no concept, we cannot
infer that which is logical; because that kind of judgement does not
extend to the Object. Hence the aesthetical universality which is
ascribed to a judgement must be of a particular kind, because it does
not unite the predicate of beauty with the concept of the _Object_,
considered in its whole logical sphere, and yet extends it to the whole
sphere of judging persons.
In respect of logical quantity all judgements of taste are _singular_
judgements. For because I must refer the object immediately to my
feeling of pleasure and pain, and that not by means of concepts, they
cannot have the quantity of objective generally valid judgements.
Nevertheless if the singular representation of the Object of the
judgement of taste in accordance with the conditions determining the
latter, were transformed by comparison into a concept, a logically
universal judgement could result therefrom. _E.g._ I describe by
a judgement of taste the rose, that I see, as beautiful. But the
judgement which results from the comparison of several singular
judgements, “Roses in general are beautiful” is no longer described
simply as aesthetical, but as a logical judgement based on an
aesthetical one. Again the judgement “The rose is pleasant” (to smell)
is, although aesthetical and singular, not a judgement of Taste but
of Sense. It is distinguished from the former by the fact that the
judgement of Taste carries with it an _aesthetical quantity_ of
universality, _i.e._ of validity for every one; which cannot be found
in a judgement about the Pleasant. It is only judgements about the Good
which--although they also determine satisfaction in an object,--have
logical and not merely aesthetical universality; for they are valid of
the Object, as cognitive of it, and thus are valid for every one.
If we judge Objects merely according to concepts, then all
representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can be no rule according
to which any one is to be forced to recognise anything as beautiful.
We cannot press [upon others] by the aid of any reasons or fundamental
propositions our judgement that a coat, a house, or a flower is
beautiful. We wish to submit the Object to our own eyes, as if the
satisfaction in it depended on sensation; and yet if we then call the
object beautiful, we believe that we speak with a universal voice, and
we claim the assent of every one, although on the contrary all private
sensation can only decide for the observer himself and his satisfaction.
We may see now that in the judgement of taste nothing is postulated but
such a _universal voice_, in respect of the satisfaction without the
intervention of concepts; and thus the _possibility_ of an aesthetical
judgement that can, at the same time, be regarded as valid for every
one. The judgement of taste itself does not _postulate_ the agreement
of every one (for that can only be done by a logically universal
judgement because it can adduce reasons); it only _imputes_ this
agreement to every one, as a case of the rule in respect of which it
expects, not confirmation by concepts, but assent from others. The
universal voice is, therefore, only an Idea (we do not yet inquire
upon what it rests). It may be uncertain whether or not the man, who
believes that he is laying down a judgement of taste, is, as a matter
of fact, judging in conformity with that Idea; but that he refers his
judgement thereto, and, consequently, that it is intended to be a
judgement of taste, he announces by the expression “beauty.” He can
be quite certain of this for himself by the mere consciousness of the
separation of everything belonging to the Pleasant and the Good from
the satisfaction which is left; and this is all for which he promises
himself the agreement of every one--a claim which would be justifiable
under these conditions, provided only he did not often make mistakes,
and thus lay down an erroneous judgement of taste.
§ 9. _Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of taste
the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object_
The solution of this question is the key to the Critique of Taste, and
so is worthy of all attention.
If the pleasure in the given object precedes, and it is only its
universal communicability that is to be acknowledged in the judgement
of taste about the representation of the object, there would be a
contradiction. For such pleasure would be nothing different from the
mere pleasantness in the sensation, and so in accordance with its
nature could have only private validity, because it is immediately
dependent on the representation through which the object _is given_.
Hence, it is the universal capability of communication of the mental
state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of
the judgement of taste, must be fundamental, and must have the pleasure
in the object as its consequent. But nothing can be universally
communicated except cognition and representation, so far as it belongs
to cognition. For it is only thus that this latter can be objective;
and only through this has it a universal point of reference, with
which the representative power of every one is compelled to harmonise.
If the determining ground of our judgement as to this universal
communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective,
_i.e._ is conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can
be nothing else than the state of mind, which is to be met with in the
relation of our representative powers to each other, so far as they
refer a given representation to _cognition in general_.
The cognitive powers, which are involved by this representation,
are here in free play, because no definite concept limits them to a
particular[19] rule of cognition. Hence, the state of mind in this
representation must be a feeling of the free play of the representative
powers in a given representation with reference to a cognition in
general. Now a representation by which an object is given, that is
to become a cognition in general, requires _Imagination_, for the
gathering together the manifold of intuition, and _Understanding_, for
the unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of
_free play_ of the cognitive faculties in a representation by which an
object is given, must be universally communicable; because cognition,
as the determination of the Object with which given representations
(in whatever subject) are to agree, is the only kind of representation
which is valid for every one.
The subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation
in a judgement of taste, since it is to be possible without
presupposing a definite concept, can refer to nothing else than the
state of mind in the free play of the Imagination and the Understanding
(so far as they agree with each other, as is requisite for _cognition
in general_). We are conscious that this subjective relation, suitable
for cognition in general, must be valid for every one, and thus must
be universally communicable, just as if it were a definite cognition,
resting always on that relation as its subjective condition.
This merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or of the
representation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure in it,
and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive
faculties; but on the universality of the subjective conditions for
judging of objects is alone based the universal subjective validity of
the satisfaction bound up by us with the representation of the object
that we call beautiful.
The power of communicating one’s state of mind, even though only in
respect of the cognitive faculties, carries a pleasure with it, as we
can easily show from the natural propension of man towards sociability
(empirical and psychological). But this is not enough for our design.
The pleasure that we feel is, in a judgement of taste, necessarily
imputed by us to every one else; as if, when we call a thing beautiful,
it is to be regarded as a characteristic of the object which is
determined in it according to concepts; though beauty, without a
reference to the feeling of the subject, is nothing by itself. But we
must reserve the examination of this question until we have answered
another, viz. “If and how aesthetical judgements are possible _a
priori_?”
We now occupy ourselves with the easier question, in what way we are
conscious of a mutual subjective harmony of the cognitive powers
with one another in the judgement of taste; is it aesthetically by
mere internal sense and sensation? or is it intellectually by the
consciousness of our designed activity, by which we bring them into
play?
If the given representation, which occasions the judgement of taste,
were a concept uniting Understanding and Imagination in the judging
of the object, into a cognition of the Object, the consciousness of
this relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism
of the Judgement of which the Critique[20] treats). But then the
judgement would not be laid down in reference to pleasure and pain, and
consequently would not be a judgement of taste. But the judgement of
taste, independently of concepts, determines the Object in respect of
satisfaction and of the predicate of beauty. Therefore that subjective
unity of relation can only make itself known by means of sensation.
The excitement of both faculties (Imagination and Understanding) to
indeterminate, but yet, through the stimulus of the given sensation,
harmonious activity, viz. that which belongs to cognition in general,
is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the
judgement of taste. An objective relation can only be thought, but
yet, so far as it is subjective according to its conditions, can be
felt in its effect on the mind; and, of a relation based on no concept
(like the relation of the representative powers to a cognitive faculty
in general), no other consciousness is possible than that through the
sensation of the effect, which consists in the more lively play of both
mental powers (the Imagination and the Understanding) when animated by
mutual agreement. A representation which, as singular and apart from
comparison with others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of
universality which it is the business of the Understanding to supply,
brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which
we require for all cognition, and so regard as holding for every one
who is determined to judge by means of Understanding and Sense in
combination (_i.e._ for every man).
EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE SECOND MOMENT
The _beautiful_ is that which pleases universally, without a concept.
THIRD MOMENT
OF JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH
ARE BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION THEREIN.
§ 10. _Of purposiveness in general_
If we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its transcendental
determinations (without presupposing anything empirical like the
feeling of pleasure) [we say that] the purpose is the object of a
concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the
object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a
_concept_ in respect of its _Object_ is its purposiveness (_forma
finalis_). Where then not merely the cognition of an object, but the
object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only
possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a
purpose. The representation of the effect is here the determining
ground of its cause and precedes it. The consciousness of the causality
of a representation, for _maintaining_ the subject in the same state,
may here generally denote what we call pleasure; while on the other
hand pain is that representation which contains the ground of the
determination of the state of representations into their opposite [of
restraining or removing them[21]].