on a merely subjective ground, as the harmony of its form,--in the
_apprehension_ (_apprehensio_) of it prior to any concept,--with the
cognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition with concepts
for a cognition generally. Or it may be represented objectively as
the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the
thing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains
the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of
purposiveness of the first kind rests on the immediate pleasure
in the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it. But the
representation of purposiveness of the second kind, since it refers
the form of the Object, not to the cognitive faculties of the subject
in the apprehension of it, but to a definite cognition of the object
under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in
things, but only with the Understanding in its judgement upon them.
If the concept of an object is given, the business of the Judgement
in the use of the concept for cognition consists in _presentation_
(_exhibitio_), _i.e._ in setting a corresponding intuition beside the
concept. This may take place either through our own Imagination, as
in Art when we realise a preconceived concept of an object which is
a purpose of ours; or through Nature in its Technic (as in organised
bodies) when we supply to it our concept of its purpose in order
to judge of its products. In the latter case it is not merely the
_purposiveness_ of nature in the form of the thing that is represented,
but this its product is represented as a _natural purpose_.--Although
our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms
according to empirical laws is not a concept of the Object, but only
a principle of the Judgement for furnishing itself with concepts amid
the immense variety of nature (and thus being able to ascertain its
own position), yet we thus ascribe to nature as it were a regard to
our cognitive faculty according to the analogy of purpose. Thus we can
regard _natural beauty_ as the _presentation_ of the concept of the
formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and _natural purposes_ as
the presentation of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness.
The former of these we judge of by Taste (aesthetically, by the medium
of the feeling of pleasure), the latter by Understanding and Reason
(logically, according to concepts).
On this is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into the
Critique of _aesthetical_ and of _teleological_ Judgement. By the
first we understand the faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness
(otherwise called subjective) of Nature by means of the feeling of
pleasure or pain; by the second the faculty of judging its real
(objective) purposiveness by means of Understanding and Reason.
In a Critique of Judgement the part containing the aesthetical
Judgement is essential, because this alone contains a principle
which the Judgement places quite _a priori_ at the basis of its
reflection upon nature; viz., the principle of a formal purposiveness
of nature, according to its particular (empirical) laws, for our
cognitive faculty, without which the Understanding could not find
itself in nature. On the other hand no reason _a priori_ could be
specified,--and even the possibility of a reason would not be apparent
from the concept of nature as an object of experience whether general
or particular,--why there should be objective purposes of nature,
_i.e._ things which are only possible as natural purposes; but the
Judgement, without containing such a principle _a priori_ in itself,
in given cases (of certain products), in order to make use of the
concept of purposes on behalf of Reason, would only contain the rule
according to which that transcendental principle has already prepared
the Understanding to apply to nature the concept of a purpose (at least
as regards its form).
But the transcendental principle which represents a purposiveness of
nature (in subjective reference to our cognitive faculty) in the form
of a thing as a principle by which we judge of nature, leaves it quite
undetermined where and in what cases I have to judge of a product
according to a principle of purposiveness, and not rather according to
universal natural laws. It leaves it to the _aesthetical_ Judgement
to decide by taste the harmony of this product (of its form) with our
cognitive faculty (so far as this decision rests not on any agreement
with concepts but on feeling). On the other hand, the Judgement
teleologically employed furnishes conditions determinately under which
something (_e.g._ an organised body) is to be judged according to
the Idea of a purpose of nature; but it can adduce no fundamental
proposition from the concept of nature as an object of experience
authorising it to ascribe to nature _a priori_ a reference to purposes,
or even indeterminately to assume this of such products in actual
experience. The reason of this is that we must have many particular
experiences, and consider them under the unity of their principle, in
order to be able to cognise, even empirically, objective purposiveness
in a certain object.--The aesthetical Judgement is therefore a special
faculty for judging of things according to a rule, but not according
to concepts. The teleological Judgement is not a special faculty, but
only the reflective Judgement in general, so far as it proceeds, as it
always does in theoretical cognition, according to concepts; but in
respect of certain objects of nature according to special principles,
viz., of a merely reflective Judgement, and not of a Judgement that
determines Objects. Thus as regards its application it belongs to
the theoretical part of Philosophy; and on account of its special
principles which are not determinant, as they must be in Doctrine, it
must constitute a special part of the Critique. On the other hand, the
aesthetical Judgement contributes nothing towards the knowledge of
its objects, and thus must be reckoned as belonging to the criticism
of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, _only_ so far as
they are susceptible of _a priori_ principles, of whatever other use
(theoretical or practical) they may be. This is the propaedeutic of all
Philosophy.
IX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF
REASON BY MEANS OF THE JUDGEMENT
The Understanding legislates _a priori_ for nature as an Object of
sense--for a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience.
Reason legislates _a priori_ for freedom and its peculiar casuality;
as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical
knowledge. The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation
and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed
from all mutual influence which they might have on one another (each
according to its fundamental laws) by the great gulf that separates
the supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines
nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the
natural concept determines nothing in respect of the practical laws of
freedom. So far then it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one
realm to the other. But although the determining grounds of causality
according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rules which it
contains) are not resident in nature, and the sensible cannot determine
the supersensible in the subject, yet this is possible conversely (not,
to be sure, in respect of the cognition of nature, but as regards
the effects of the supersensible upon the sensible). This in fact is
involved in the concept of a causality through freedom, the _effect_
of which is to take place in the world according to its formal laws.
The word _cause_, of course, when used of the supersensible only
signifies the _ground_ which determines the causality of natural
things to an effect in accordance with their proper natural laws,
although harmoniously with the formal principle of the laws of
Reason. Although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, yet
the objection of a contradiction alleged to be found in it can be
sufficiently answered.[10]--The effect in accordance with the concept
of freedom is the final purpose which (or its phenomenon in the world
of sense) ought to exist; and the condition of the possibility of this
is presupposed in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible
being, that is, as man). The Judgement presupposes this _a priori_ and
without reference to the practical; and thus furnishes the mediating
concept between the concepts of nature and that of freedom. It makes
possible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance with
the former to the final purpose in accordance with the latter, and this
by the concept of a _purposiveness_ of nature. For thus is cognised
the possibility of the final purpose which alone can be actualised in
nature in harmony with its laws.
The Understanding by the possibility of its _a priori_ laws for
nature, gives a proof that nature is only cognised by us as phenomenon;
and implies at the same time that it has a supersensible substrate,
though it leaves this quite _undetermined_. The Judgement by its _a
priori_ principle for the judging of nature according to its possible
particular laws, makes the supersensible substrate (both in us and
without us) _determinable by means of the intellectual faculty_. But
the Reason by its practical _a priori_ law _determines_ it; and thus
the Judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the
concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.
As regards the faculties of the soul in general, in their higher
aspect, as containing an autonomy; the Understanding is that which
contains the _constitutive_ principles _a priori_ for the _cognitive
faculty_ (the theoretical cognition of nature). For the _feeling of
pleasure and pain_ there is the Judgement, independently of concepts
and sensations which relate to the determination of the faculty of
desire and can thus be immediately practical. For the _faculty of
desire_ there is the Reason which is practical without the mediation
of any pleasure whatever. It determines for the faculty of desire,
as a superior faculty, the final purpose which carries with it the
pure intellectual satisfaction in the Object.--The concept formed by
Judgement of a purposiveness of nature belongs to natural concepts,
but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although
the aesthetical judgement upon certain objects (of Nature or Art)
which occasions it is, in respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain,
a constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive
faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure,
makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the
mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the
concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes
the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.--The following table may
facilitate the review of all the higher faculties according to their
systematic unity.[11]
_All the faculties of the mind_
Cognitive faculties. Faculties of desire.
Feeling of pleasure and pain.
_Cognitive faculties_
Understanding. Judgement. Reason.
_A priori principles_
Conformity to law. Purposiveness. Final purpose.
_Application to_
Nature. Art. Freedom.
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
PART I
CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
FIRST BOOK
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL
FIRST MOMENT
OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE[12] ACCORDING TO QUALITY
§ 1. _The judgement of taste is aesthetical_
In order to decide whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the
representation, not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition
but, by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the Understanding)
to the subject, and its feeling of pleasure or pain. The judgement of
taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently
not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose
determining ground can be _no other than subjective_. Every reference
of representations, even that of sensations, may be objective (and
then it signifies the real in an empirical representation); save only
the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in
the Object is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the
subject, as it is affected by the representation.
To apprehend a regular, purposive building by means of one’s
cognitive faculty (whether in a clear or a confused way of
representation) is something quite different from being conscious of
this representation as connected with the sensation of satisfaction.
Here the representation is altogether referred to the subject and
to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure
or pain. This establishes a quite separate faculty of distinction
and of judgement, adding nothing to cognition, but only comparing
the given representation in the subject with the whole faculty of
representations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of
its state. Given representations in a judgement can be empirical
(consequently, aesthetical); but the judgement which is formed by means
of them is logical, provided they are referred in the judgement to the
Object. Conversely, if the given representations are rational, but are
referred in a judgement simply to the subject (to its feeling), the
judgement is so far always aesthetical.
§ 2. _The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is
disinterested_
The satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the
existence of an object is called interest. Such satisfaction always
has reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining
ground or as necessarily connected with its determining ground. Now
when the question is if a thing is beautiful, we do not want to know
whether anything depends or can depend on the existence of the thing
either for myself or for any one else, but how we judge it by mere
observation (intuition or reflection). If any one asks me if I find
that palace beautiful which I see before me, I may answer: I do not
like things of that kind which are made merely to be stared at. Or I
can answer like that Iroquois _sachem_ who was pleased in Paris by
nothing more than by the cook-shops. Or again after the manner of
_Rousseau_ I may rebuke the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of
the people on such superfluous things. In fine I could easily convince
myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited island without the
hope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure up just such
a splendid building by my mere wish, I should not even give myself
the trouble if I had a sufficiently comfortable hut. This may all be
admitted and approved; but we are not now talking of this. We wish
only to know if this mere representation of the object is accompanied
in me with satisfaction, however indifferent I may be as regards the
existence of the object of this representation. We easily see that
in saying it is _beautiful_ and in showing that I have taste, I am
concerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the
object, but with that which I make out of this representation in
myself. Every one must admit that a judgement about beauty, in which
the least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgement
of taste. We must not be in the least prejudiced in favour of the
existence of the things, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in
order to play the judge in things of taste.
We cannot, however, better elucidate this proposition, which is of
capital importance, than by contrasting the pure disinterested[13]
satisfaction in judgements of taste, with that which is bound up with
an interest, especially if we can at the same time be certain that
there are no other kinds of interest than those which are now to be
specified.
§ 3. _The satisfaction in the_ PLEASANT _is bound up with interest_
_That which pleases the senses in sensation is_ PLEASANT. Here the
opportunity presents itself of censuring a very common confusion of
the double sense which the word sensation can have, and of calling
attention to it. All satisfaction (it is said or thought) is itself
sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently everything that pleases is
pleasant because it pleases (and according to its different degrees
or its relations to other pleasant sensations it is _agreeable_,
_lovely_, _delightful_, _enjoyable_, etc.). But if this be admitted,
then impressions of Sense which determine the inclination, fundamental
propositions of Reason which determine the Will, mere reflective forms
of intuition which determine the Judgement, are quite the same, as
regards the effect upon the feeling of pleasure. For this would be
pleasantness in the sensation of one’s state, and since in the end all
the operations of our faculties must issue in the practical and unite
in it as their goal, we could suppose no other way of estimating things
and their worth than that which consists in the gratification that
they promise. It is of no consequence at all how this is attained, and
since then the choice of means alone could make a difference, men could
indeed blame one another for stupidity and indiscretion, but never for
baseness and wickedness. For all, each according to his own way of
seeing things, seek one goal, that is, gratification.
If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or pain is called
sensation, this expression signifies something quite different from
what I mean when I call the representation of a thing (by sense, as a
receptivity belonging to the cognitive faculty) sensation. For in the
latter case the representation is referred to the Object, in the former
simply to the subject, and is available for no cognition whatever, not
even for that by which the subject _cognises_ itself.
In the above elucidation we understand by the word sensation,
an objective representation of sense; and in order to avoid
misinterpretation, we shall call that, which must always remain merely
subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an
object, by the ordinary term “feeling.” The green colour of the meadows
belongs to _objective_ sensation, as a perception of an object of
sense; the pleasantness of this belongs to _subjective_ sensation by
which no object is represented, _i.e._ to feeling, by which the object
is considered as an Object of satisfaction (which does not furnish a
cognition of it).
Now that a judgement about an object, by which I describe it as
pleasant, expresses an interest in it, is plain from the fact that by
sensation it excites a desire for objects of that kind; consequently
the satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgement about it, but the
relation of its existence to my state, so far as this is affected
by such an Object. Hence we do not merely say of the pleasant, _it
pleases_; but, _it gratifies_. I give to it no mere approval, but
inclination is aroused by it; and in the case of what is pleasant
in the most lively fashion, there is no judgement at all upon the
character of the Object, for those who always lay themselves out only
for enjoyment (for that is the word describing intense gratification)
would fain dispense with all judgement.
§ 4. _The satisfaction in the_ GOOD _is bound up with interest_
Whatever by means of Reason pleases through the mere concept is GOOD.
That which pleases only as a means we call _good for something_ (the
useful); but that which pleases for itself is _good in itself_. In both
there is always involved the concept of a purpose, and consequently
the relation of Reason to the (at least possible) volition, and thus a
satisfaction in the _presence_ of an Object or an action, _i.e._ some
kind of interest.
In order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of a
thing the object ought to be, _i.e._ I must have a concept of it. But
there is no need of this, to find a thing beautiful. Flowers, free
delineations, outlines intertwined with one another without design
and called foliage, have no meaning, depend on no definite concept,
and yet they please. The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend
on the reflection upon an object, leading to any concept (however
indefinite); and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests
entirely upon sensation.
It is true, the Pleasant seems in many cases to be the same as the
Good. Thus people are accustomed to say that all gratification
(especially if it lasts) is good in itself; which is very much the
same as to say that lasting pleasure and the good are the same. But
we can soon see that this is merely a confusion of words; for the
concepts which properly belong to these expressions can in no way be
interchanged. The pleasant, which, as such, represents the object
simply in relation to Sense, must first be brought by the concept of
a purpose under principles of Reason, in order to call it good, as an
object of the Will. But that there is [involved] a quite different
relation to satisfaction in calling that which gratifies at the same
time _good_, may be seen from the fact that in the case of the good the
question always is, whether it is mediately or immediately good (useful
or good in itself); but on the contrary in the case of the pleasant
there can be no question about this at all, for the word always
signifies something which pleases immediately. (The same is applicable
to what I call beautiful.)
Even in common speech men distinguish the Pleasant from the Good.
Of a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and other condiments
we say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the same
time admitted not to be good; for though it immediately _delights_
the senses, yet mediately, _i.e._ considered by Reason which looks to
the after results, it displeases. Even in the judging of health we
may notice this distinction. It is immediately pleasant to every one
possessing it (at least negatively, _i.e._ as the absence of all bodily
pains). But in order to say that it is good, it must be considered
by Reason with reference to purposes; viz. that it is a state which
makes us fit for all our business. Finally in respect of happiness
every one believes himself entitled to describe the greatest sum of
the pleasantnesses of life (as regards both their number and their
duration) as a true, even as the highest, good. However Reason is
opposed to this. Pleasantness is enjoyment. And if we were concerned
with this alone, it would be foolish to be scrupulous as regards the
means which procure it for us, or [to care] whether it is obtained
passively by the bounty of nature or by our own activity and work.
But Reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who
merely lives for _enjoyment_ (however busy he may be in this point of
view), has a worth in itself; even if he at the same time is conducive
as a means to the best enjoyment of others, and shares in all their
gratifications by sympathy. Only what he does, without reference to
enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature can procure
for him passively, gives an [absolute[14]] worth to his being, as the
existence of a person; and happiness, with the whole abundance of its
pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good.[15]
However, notwithstanding all this difference between the pleasant and
the good, they both agree in this that they are always bound up with an
interest in their object. [This is true] not only of the pleasant(§ 3),
and the mediate good (the useful) which is pleasing as a means towards
pleasantness somewhere, but also of that which is good absolutely and
in every aspect, viz. moral good, which brings with it the highest
interest. For the good is the Object of will (_i.e._ of a faculty of
desire determined by Reason). But to will something, and to have a
satisfaction in its existence, _i.e._ to take an interest in it, are
identical.
§ 5. _Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of
satisfaction_