last chapter we noticed one way of studying the career of traces by
investigating successive comparison. Here we have a second way. A
third one, somewhat similar to the second, is also to be found in
certain observations on animals. I shall treat it as an example of
what new problems _gestalt_ psychology raises in a concrete case. When
Yarbrough[60] investigated delayed reaction in cats he found them
able to react correctly after no more than four seconds if they had to
choose between three objects, whereas in the case of two objects the
delay could be increased to more than four times that amount. Why is
the result so much greater in the second case? An explanation may be
derived from the examination of a human subject in a similar, though
more difficult, task. If I have 25 objects, all of which have the same
properties, before me in a semicircle, they play very different rôles
in the semicircle as a whole; the rôle of two of them is particularly
well defined and characteristic, namely, that of the first to the left
and that of the first to the right side, which are the “ends” of the
whole; in some degree, but much less, a third one will be characterized
as a special member of the group, i.e., the central one. The rest will
be more or less like an indifferent filling. Suppose now that the
experimenter points to one of the objects, and that, after a delay in
which I do not fixate that object carefully, I am told to go toward it;
my reaction will always be correct if one of those three objects had
been pointed to. However, as long as I do not mark the right object
in an indirect way by counting at the first presentation, in order to
find it again by counting after the delay, wrong reactions will occur
rather often when the designated object has an indifferent position.
Thus I may choose the sixteenth instead of the seventeenth, or the
eighth instead of the ninth, rather easily, and, if the delay is
increased or my attitude is slightly dreamy at the first presentation,
such errors may become rather frequent. Of course, this is the same
dependence of delayed reaction upon the more or less specific position
of a member in a group, which was demonstrated by Hertz in certain
birds (cf. pp. 158-162), so that we may apply the same idea to the
case of a cat which must choose between three objects after a delay.
If the cue which the cat has acquired before the delay refers to the
first object (for instance, at the left), the cue will be connected
with a very definite place in the whole group; and the same will be
true if the third object (the first to the right) becomes connected
with the cue. If, however, the second object is connected with the cue
before the delay, this cue will refer to a place which, for the cat,
is much less definitely characterized in the group. At the time when
that object is marked out (by a light, for instance) among the others,
its rôle in the whole may be sufficiently clear for some moments;
but chances are that after some time the cue will lose its rather
unstable localization, the whole becoming just an undifferentiated
stretch, only the ends of which remain well-characterized places.
Consequently, the animal will react correctly less often when, instead
of two objects, the experiment is made with three. The cat might begin
to react more correctly again, perhaps, if the experimenter gave the
three objects another distribution in space so that all of them
would have well-characterized locations. The reader will be inclined
to say that such an explanation appears somewhat artificial to him,
since, with three objects, the probability of error is increased
anyhow and the cue cannot be fixed so easily in a more complicated
situation. This objection should be examined by introducing that
change of conditions to which I have just alluded. From the viewpoint
of organization, “complication” is not simply a matter of number, but
also of distribution in space. If, therefore, the three objects are
distributed in a way which characterizes each one equally well, we may
be able to decide whether or not we should accept the explanation in
terms of mere increase of number. There is one result in Yarbrough’s
experiments which makes me more inclined toward the other hypothesis:
If mere number, as against lack of definite rôle in the group, were
the decisive condition producing failure, the false reactions of the
animals should be distributed in a haphazard manner among the three
objects. But this is not the case. After a long delay (beyond 4
seconds) _some of the cats did not go to the second object at all_. All
their reactions were directed toward the first or the third object!
This is just what we should expect in terms of our explanation, whereas
one cannot understand it at all without taking account of organization.
We may say, then, with some confidence that in cats the traces of past
events undergo a rapid transformation which destroys the minor or less
stable characteristics of groups as wholes, so that subsequent behavior
depends upon a more simplified organization than existed in the traces
at first.
A somewhat similar observation was made by Mr. Tinklepaugh and me when,
using another method, we performed some experiments on delayed reaction
with a monkey. A very large square on the ground was covered with sand
some inches high. Before the animal certain marks were made on the
sand, as, for instance, a hill of the same material or, in another
experiment, a straight line which we drew on the surface with a finger.
After this preparation, food was buried in the sand in a place which,
for the human subject, was characterized at once as having a rather
definite position _near_ the mark. We wished to see whether the animal
would use the mark in fixing the place of the food because, without a
mark in the homogeneous sand, his previous reactions to buried food had
not been very clear. The monkey who had observed those preparations
was not released from his place until some time had elapsed. When
allowed to approach the sand he would go _to the mark_ at once and
search for the food _in it_. As far as I can remember now, he never
searched _near_, i.e., around the mark. Though further observations
would be desirable, one explanation seems probable at once: As in the
last case where delayed reaction was investigated in cats, the reaction
of the animal depends upon a trace and upon the actual organization
of the field. This field is well organized, the hill or the line
forming an outstanding feature in it. The localization of the place
of the hidden food, however, is much less definite. Therefore, we may
assume that a simplification occurs in this case similar to the one
which determines the reactions of the cats in Yarbrough’s experiments
with three objects. The trace which remains in the monkey will be
transformed during the delay to the disadvantage of its less defined
regions and the result will be that the monkey’s cue is absorbed by the
outstanding mark just as, after some delay, the cats react only to the
well-characterized parts of the situation. It may be that the method
used by us in this preliminary way will be developed some day into a
more accurate instrument for investigating the career of traces in
animals.[61]
Traces are not rigid, then; there are definite dynamical tendencies in
them; and in animals the traces may be transformed more easily than
in man. That being the case, the study of delayed reaction in animals
becomes highly important for general psychology because it may show
us the working of those tendencies in a measure which could not be
observed in man.
There can be no doubt that, in principle, we find similar changes in
man also. Koffka and Wulf[62] have observed these changes by making
their subjects draw figures which they had seen previously for a few
seconds, first after a delay of some minutes and then after days or
even weeks. The figures had not simply lost details at the time of
graphic reproduction. The changes were much more interesting since they
showed two opposite directions: In reproduction the figures were either
more regular than the original ones or some traits which might be taken
as characteristic of their organization were considerably exaggerated
in the drawings. The authors give the explanation that, during the
first presentation, the figures could be seen in somewhat different
kinds of organization. If this organization was a rather simple and
regular form, the change of the trace would be in the direction of
increased regularity; if, however, some articulation, irregularity or
lack of symmetry was seen as the main characteristic of the figure,
the transformation would enhance this property. Therefore, in both
cases the change seemed to produce an approach toward something like an
extreme type or the ideal of the first organization.
In all these cases behavior depending upon the actual properties of
the traces is used as an indicator of their changes. Still there
are other cases where the traces can be shown to be practically
unchanged, although reproduction is difficult or even impossible under
the circumstances in question. In the last chapter we mentioned some
examples of this kind. Now we have to treat others which will show us
that the possibilities of reproduction are much more restricted than
one might expect.
If association as a basis for reproduction is just another expression
of the fact that the traces of functional wholes are themselves
detached wholes, one might somewhat rashly deduce from this theory
that, after a trace is formed, any group of stimuli which represents
a considerable fraction of the original constellation of stimuli
will reproduce those parts of the original process the stimuli for
which are not actually given. However, this would mean a complete
misunderstanding of _gestalt_ theory, because from what we have seen
in the sixth chapter, it follows that between the properties of an
organized whole and the actual constellation of stimuli, let us say
on the retina, there does not exist a correspondence as to parts, as
though one region of the organized whole separately depended upon some
definite fraction of that constellation, a second one upon another and
so forth. On the contrary, upon a large group of stimuli and their
“relative properties” depends the organized process as a whole in a
manner which cannot be analyzed into independent local or partial
effects of stimulation. Therefore, in general, if an organized process
has left its trace in the nervous system, some fraction of the original
group of stimuli will not determine a partial process which occurred
in that functional whole, but something different and new, a picture
of which is not contained in the trace of that whole. Consequently
this new process will not be able to reproduce anything on the basis
of that trace; just as some other group of stimuli which we might
choose in an altogether arbitrary manner would determine a new process
and consequently would be foreign to that trace. For instance, Fig.
20 will not reproduce the missing lines of an H normally, though,
geometrically, that figure is the larger part of an H. Neither will
Fig. 21 reproduce the missing lines of an R, and so forth, because,
when we have seen an H or an R, we have never had the given figures
as real experiences. There is nothing in the traces of an H and an
R, which might correspond to the processes of Figs. 20 and 21, and
reproduction does not occur. We shall conclude, then, that reproduction
will be restricted to those cases where the process intended as the
excitant of reproduction is sufficiently similar to a partial process
of the original whole. This will be the case if the process intended
as an excitant corresponds to a natural member or sub-whole of the
original organization, because under these circumstances the trace
of that sub-whole, though not identical with the exciting process,
will be similar to it, at least. If this similarity is marked enough,
reproduction will occur under favorable conditions. So U. S. will
reproduce an A. rather easily, and the stars the rest of the American
flag, because here we give as an excitant what was present in the
original organization as a _relatively_ independent region. This is
the chief requirement. If we draw a profile from the nose downwards
to the chin, this line does not correspond to a complete sub-whole of
a face. Nevertheless, since the influences exerted upon that outline
by the organization of a complete profile are not so very strong, the
process determined by that line will be sufficiently similar to the
corresponding process in the whole profile and to the corresponding
trace, so that reproduction can occur.
[Illustration: Fig. 20]
[Illustration: Fig. 21]
Even so, we find reproduction much more difficult than is supposed in
current empiristic theories. It seems to be restricted to a rather
narrow path between a Scylla and a Charybdis. Association is necessary
for reproduction, and association means a sufficient degree of
organization. Reproduction, however, presupposes a certain degree of
similarity between an actual process as an excitant and some region
of the organized trace. The more a region is absorbed by a larger
organization, the less will corresponding stimulation be able to effect
reproduction. We have already described the narrow path that any
possible reproduction must take between these limiting conditions.
To demonstrate the foregoing contentions I made the following
experiment: The subjects are shown simultaneously pairs of figures
for a short time. After a while parts of those drawings are presented
to them with the instruction to reproduce the missing lines. Now, in
a case like that of Fig. 22, for instance, either the vertical at
the left was presented or Fig. 23, which represents _geometrically
a_ much larger part of the original. With the first as an excitant,
however, we get many more correct reproductions than with the second.
Of course! The “larger part” is something which in the first exposure
did not occur as a real form. Even the first vertical to the left has
now lost its reproducing power, because in the original pair it had
been segregated as something apart, whereas now it has become the left
limiting end of a regular series of parallels.
[Illustration: Fig. 22]
[Illustration: Fig. 23]
If this last point proves that a trace does not respond by reproduction
if the organization of the excitant becomes foreign by being embedded
in a somewhat different environment, reproduction will be even much
more restricted than we should have previously supposed. Evidently,
in problems of memory and habit, not only the organization given at
the time of first “association” will be decisive for reproduction,
but organization existing in the _actual_ field will be equally
important in determining or preventing reproduction. When given in a
certain environment a certain process may be an excellent incentive
to reproduction on the basis of some trace existing in the nervous
system. But it will not occur regularly again in just that environment
which was given when the trace was formed. Hence the chances are that,
quite apart from the rather crude obstacles considered above, even a
slight change of the surrounding field may make an excitant unable to
reproduce what has been “well connected” with it in the past. That
this is true can be deduced from Nagel’s experiments (cf. above p.
283). In a well-learned series of nonsense syllables each member,
though embedded in the whole series, would certainly seem to be a
thing by itself. But if one of them is given alone as an incentive to
reproduction, this change of environment is sufficient in the majority
of cases to make reproduction impossible.
The same influence of actual organization upon reproduction has
been demonstrated in a rather surprising form by Shepard and
Fogelsonger.[63] These psychologists made their subjects learn pairs of
syllables. Some of these pairs had identical second members. (Between
the first occurrence of such a syllable and its repetition in another
pair there was an interval of 25 minutes.) At the time of testing the
product of learning, the first syllable of a pair was given as the
excitant of reproduction; but where two syllables had been followed by
the same second member at different times, both were given together
as incentives to reproduction of their common partner. If it were not
for organization one should expect that, both excitants working in the
same direction, the syllable associated with them would be more easily
reproduced than a syllable for which there was only one excitant.
But the contrary was observed; it seemed as though some inhibition
were in the way of reproduction when it was aroused by two excitants.
The disturbance was particularly striking when both syllables were
presented simultaneously, but it also existed when they were given in
rapid succession. The explanation seems to be that during learning
the subjects had always had a single first syllable together with its
partner, and that when, in the critical cases of reproduction, two
syllables appeared before them, both would look so foreign at first
in this new grouping that neither could immediately reproduce the
common partner. This explanation has been confirmed by observation. The
subjects reported that reproduction became possible through an attitude
of analysis which would sufficiently isolate one of the syllables.
Furthermore, from this explanation it follows that any extraneous
syllable, one which never appeared in the learning series, would have
the same effect when presented together with the first member of a
learned pair. The authors have found this to be the case, in fact. Thus
the explanation seems to be quite verified. Our conclusion is that even
a very slight alteration of circumstances, if only it influences the
organization of the excitants, or incentives, will make reproduction
difficult or impossible.
A similar result was obtained by Frings in his work on inhibitions,[64]
though his problem refers to learning more than to reproduction. In
the classical experiments it had been shown that, if a syllable A
has become associated with a syllable B, the same A can not be as
easily associated with a third syllable C as could any indifferent
syllable. Also, after A has become associated with C as well as with
B, when A is used as an excitant of reproduction, the competition of
the two different tendencies to reproduction will have an inhibiting
effect. Frings was able to show that under certain circumstances these
inhibitions may completely disappear. His subjects were made to learn
series of syllables, the instruction being that the syllables should
be read and memorized as groups of the anapest rhythm in which, after
two less accentuated members, the third one follows with the main
accent. In such a group the first two members will form a sub-whole.
When after a while the product of learning is tested, these two members
are given as an excitant, and the last one is to be reproduced. If
now, in a given case, a group like (ac)d occurs in one series and a
group like (bc)e in another series, we should expect the association
between c and e to be inhibited, because c was first followed by d,
and later followed by e. Similarly, _after_ associating (bc)e as
well as (ac)d, in spite of that inhibition, the subjects should have
difficulty in reproducing e, if bc is given, or d, if ac is given. From
the viewpoint of organization, however, we must realize that in (ac)d
the syllable c is a member of the sub-whole (ac), whereas in (bc)e it
is a member in a different sub-whole (bc), and that therefore c is
not quite the same thing in both cases. We might also say that in the
first case not c, but rather the sub-whole (ac), has been associated
with d; and again that in the other case (bc), not c, becomes or has
become associated with e. Considering this, we should predict that
there will be inhibition neither in learning nor in reproduction.
Experimentation has confirmed this view. Wherever c figured as a member
of two different sub-wholes, no inhibition occurred. It is particularly
interesting, however, that inhibition occurred immediately if a subject
had been very fatigued at the time of learning, and therefore had not
been able to grasp the syllables in rhythmic complexes, according to
the instructions.
Though the reader will have already noticed that, in consequence of
varying organization, experimental findings may differ considerably
from what ought to occur according to the classical laws of association
and reproduction, the most radical restriction of these rules remains
to be considered. We cannot proceed, however, without first discussing
a certain more general topic.
* * * * *
In one of the preceding chapters we laid some stress on the point
that our “self” occurs as an experienced whole in the same field
which contains our experiences of surrounding objects and events.
Consequently, that field of our brain, as a physical system which is
the locus of the processes underlying objective experience, will also
contain processes corresponding to the experience of the “self.” In
many respects, the processes belonging to this particular whole are
different from those corresponding to “outside” experiences, though,
with regard to dynamical interrelation, the processes corresponding to
the “self” prove to be true members of the total field. Two examples
will suffice to corroborate this point.
If a certain thing moves objectively in the visual field, I shall,
under the usual conditions, see that thing as moving. But we know
many instances in which, _objectively_, one thing being in motion and
another at rest, the first remains at rest while the second moves.
This is not an “accidental illusion,” moreover. It depends upon
definite circumstances and necessarily prevails whenever these are
present. Every one has occasionally seen the moon in rapid motion
when clouds were passing it in the opposite direction. When a point
on the window of a moving railroad carriage is fixated, the objects
outside at once begin to glide in the opposite direction. We may say,
then, that any change of spatial relations in a part of the field
may have dynamical effects upon those parts of the whole field which
objectively are not moved. With regard to the spatial relation of the
“external” environment and the “self,” precisely the same observation
is frequently made, as we all know. If our environment is, objectively,
turned around us with appropriate speed, the result in experience will
be that we feel ourselves turning around in the opposite direction.
Michotte and Gatti have recently shown that the same effect may be
produced by moving two handles toward one side, the subject’s hands
being turned passively with the handles: once more the body (as an
experience) seems to turn in the opposite direction. We may draw the
conclusion that under adequate conditions a change of spatial relations
between the processes underlying our objective experience and those
corresponding to the experience of our own self, will have dynamical
effects upon the latter processes, just as the processes corresponding
to the experience of moving clouds exert a dynamical influence upon the
processes underlying our experience of the moon. It becomes obvious,
therefore, that we must include the self in the dynamical interrelation
of the whole field.
As a second example, I refer to the fact that just as things or spots
frequently appear before me as grouped in a definite manner, the self
is very often experienced as a member of such a group. Of course, if I
put my hands on a desk before me and another person does the same on
the opposite side of the desk, I have two pairs of hands before me as
visual groups. But the whole self may enter a group just as easily: If
somebody accompanies me along a street and, ahead of _us_ another pair
is walking, I feel (and partially see) myself as a member of one of two
groups.
Until now the reader may have restricted the concept of organization
more or less to the region of external experiences. From the last
examples it seems to follow that organization is an affair involving
the whole field and that the “self” is included as the most
interesting member of this larger organization. At first one may feel
opposed to this treatment of the “self” because, in a great many
respects, it remains something particular and apart. During all the
radical changes which the outside field undergoes in the course of time
the “self” under normal conditions does not lose its identity. At the
same time, and notwithstanding that identity, inner experiences will
generally be felt as much more lively and dynamical than the average
objective experiences. Although these differences may exert an enormous
influence upon the actual organization of the whole field, nevertheless
they do not place the self beyond organization _as such_. Sometimes
they confer upon the self a central position in the field. But for a
great many persons not even this is permanently the case, especially
since objective experience contains other _persons_ in social life, who
may occasionally become the center of our total field instead of the
“self.”
With this remark, however, we have gone far beyond the discussions
of the previous chapters. We have enlarged our view of dynamics as
determining the field and its changes.
In objective experience grouping may be “static” as, for instance,
in the case of indifferent patches, a group of which would seem to
correspond to a state of equilibrium in the nervous system. On the
other hand, we have seen that nothing is more likely to determine
grouping and organization in general than the direction of attitude
and of visible behavior. Even a behaviorist like Watson describes the
behavior of a child as being directed to or away from an object. In
some situations a barking dog will be experienced by any observer as
barking _at_ something definite in his surroundings. If, therefore,
we apply the term “dynamical” here in a more special meaning, we may
say, perhaps, that the most compulsory organization which can occur in
experience is a dynamical event or attitude, consisting of one member
from which it issues, and another one toward which it is directed.
Sometimes, as in the case of “avoiding” or “yielding,” it would be a
better description to say that one member exhibits an attitude directed
_away_ from the second member of such a whole. In both cases the type
of organization remains the same, the main feature being the bipolar
structure and the dynamical directedness of the whole.