to the Letts themselves. They have studied them and understand them
well. Lettish aspirations were born neither to-day nor yesterday. The
birth of the Lettish movement took place in 1860. Since that time it
has been under the double oppression of the Baltic barons and the
Russian bureaucracy. But it has courageously borne this double yoke,
and has proved its vitality and activity. It has thrived and developed;
it has taken deep root in the soul of the people whence it cannot be
eradicated again. It is certain that the Lettish people possesses what
President Wilson calls “well-defined national aspirations.” These have
clearly appeared in the sharp and closely-followed line maintained
by the Lettish people during the whole war in perfect unanimity. The
Letts have fought with all their might against Germany to defend
their aspirations against Teutonic tendencies. The National Council
of Latvia, in the fatal period of the Russian flight and the German
occupation of a considerable portion of Latvia, was able to centre in
itself the whole social activity and political thought of the Lettish
people. In its first session, from 16th to 19th November, 1917, it
asked for the Lettish nation the right to dispose of themselves. In
the second, from 15th to 19th January, 1918, it very categorically
stated that “Latvia asks to be recognised as a sovereign, independent
and indivisible State.” The National Council informed Russia of its
decision in the speech of its representative, J. Goldman, in the
Constituent Assembly of Russia, on the 5th January, 1918. The National
Council, in spite of the personal danger to its members, in a protest
note addressed on the 4th April, 1918, to the German Chancellor, Count
Hertling, explicitly opposed the German inclination to unite Latvia
to Germany. Already in July, 1918, the National Council had addressed
itself to the Allied Governments and the opinion of the whole world,
protesting against the peace of Brest-Litovsk and revealing the clumsy
deceit of the German occupation authority in proclaiming as the will
of the Lettish people the decisions of the Landesrath, a usurping body
composed of German barons and their servants; and the National Council
emphasised the unbending decision of the Lettish people to attain the
realisation of its natural rights to independence. The National Council
of Latvia considered it a great honour that its aspirations were
crowned with success. It was recognised as an independent body by the
Governments of England and Japan.
Having suffered long at the hands of both Russia and Germany, the
Lettish people has come to the conclusion that it would find its
interests guaranteed only by independence. It is not a passing mood,
but a firm conviction, for which the Lettish people has suffered
and which it will never and in no case surrender. And it awaits the
realisation of its aspirations and the solemn proclamation of its
rights.
PROTESTS OF THE RUSSIAN GROUPS
However, the Russian groups protest in the name of the interests of
the Russian people, who, they say, will oppose the separation of
an independent Latvia. One might briefly reply that the one-sided
interests of the Russian people would not solve this question, and
that an exclusive solution in favour of the interests of the Russian
people would be in opposition to the principle of international
relations proclaimed by the Allies. In his speech delivered on the
4th July, 1918, President Wilson declared: “The settlement of any one
of the questions concerning either territories, national sovereignty,
economic or political relations, must be made on the basis of the free
acceptation of such a settlement by the peoples directly concerned, and
not on the basis of material interest or advantage of any other nation
or people.” And in the message of September 27th, 1918, President
Wilson said: “No individual or special interest of a nation or a group
of nations shall be able so to inspire a part of the arrangement that
it would not be in agreement with the united interests of all.”
It would seem that these declarations leave nothing to be desired
from the point of view of clearness and conciseness, and they were
pronounced in the most solemn manner and adopted both by the Allies and
their adversaries as a basis on which future international relations
might be established. It would seem also that these declarations do
not leave any doubt about the fact that the question of Latvia and her
fate should be solved on the basis of the aspirations and wishes of the
Lettish people, and not in accordance with the interests of Russia.
However, to complete the picture, we might as well discuss the question
of those Russian interests which, we are told, would suffer by the
separation of Latvia.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF RUSSIA
The Russian groups and their ideologists put forward the economic
interests of Russia, which, they say, do not in any way permit
the separation of Latvia. “Russian foreign trade,” says Mandelstam
(_Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_),
“was principally sea-borne; from this point of view the Baltic
ports were of the highest importance to it” (p. 58). “The complete
separation of the Baltic provinces from Russia would put this latter
in an extremely difficult and grave situation, by depriving her of her
outlets in the Baltic, which are not only the most important but also
the only practicable ones in the winter” (p. 60).
The fact in itself is certainly correct. Before the war almost half of
the imports and more than two-fifths of the exports of European Russia
by sea passed through the great ports of Latvia: Riga, Libau, Windau.
But who would suppose that Latvia will close her ports to the transit
trade of Russia? On the contrary, Latvia understands quite well that
she is the natural intermediary between East and West, and will, in
her own interests, do her best by every means to encourage trade with
Russia. The natural destiny of Latvia is to be a storehouse for goods
coming from the West to Russia and _vice versa_. And everything makes
us believe that Latvia will be in a position to perform that rôle
better than Russia herself.
The chief conditions required by commerce are the following: Suitable
technical establishments, simple and precise juridical relations, and
lastly, order and tranquillity. Russia has not been able to provide
these conditions. To be satisfied of this, one has but to remember
the wretched equipment of the ports, so disproportionate to their
world-importance, the miserable state of the railways, the lack of
means of transport, the abuses and disorder. Judicial relations were
regulated by laws dating almost from the Flood, the same for the
Russian villages as for the towns of universal importance, laws which
would much better have suited the former alone. The proceedings at the
courts of law were of fabulous duration; the code of laws affecting
commercial houses and companies was out of date; conditions of credit
were of the worst; and, in consequence, Germany, which enjoys
the ability to accommodate herself to all the Russian conditions,
increasingly invaded the economic life of the Baltic Sea, dispersing
the competition of others. No, it was neither Russian firms nor capital
which prevailed there, but those of Germany, and the watchword came
not from Petrograd but from Berlin. Russia would not have succeeded as
quickly as Latvia in freeing herself from the preponderating influence
on the shores of the Baltic. That is why Russia’s interests will in
no way suffer if the intermediary’s rôle is played neither by her nor
Germany, but by those who are familiar with the Baltic, whom nature has
attached to it, and who consequently have natural rights to it.
STRATEGICAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA
The Russian groups lay great stress on the strategical interests of
Russia. The separation of Latvia, they say, would greatly prejudice
these. The frontiers of Russia, after Latvia’s separation, would
strategically be so disadvantageous that it would be difficult to
defend them successfully. The former frontiers, with Latvia included,
were on the contrary very favourable. Yet Russia did not and could
not defend them. There is no doubt that if, in 1914, the Germans had,
instead of throwing themselves on France, directed their forces to
the East, they would have occupied without much difficulty the whole
territory of Latvia; and Russia would have been deprived anyhow of
the advantages of strategical frontiers and bases for her fleet. This
hypothesis has been fully proved by the events that followed. In the
spring of 1915, the German forces, relatively weak, easily succeeded in
seizing the South of Courland, with the very important base for their
navy at Libau, and took up positions on the River Venta. An attempt
was then made to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand
Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, to the necessity of a vigorous defence of
Courland in view of her military, political and economic importance.
It was then that the Grand Duke, not sharing the opinion of the
Russian groups on the strategical importance of Latvia, made his
famous retort, “I don’t give a damn for your Courland!”--words which
to-day still resound in the ears of every Lett. And in the summer of
1915, a few German detachments were seen occupying, almost without any
resistance on the part of the Russians, the greater part of Courland.
It is easy to believe in the little importance of the German forces
and in Courland’s weak defence when one learns that mere patrols of
cavalry took possession of whole towns almost without firing a shot.
Seeing this, two sections of Lettish reservists who had been ordered to
retreat, begged to be allowed to defend Mitau, and the permission was
granted to them. These heroic soldiers offered to the Germans such a
violent and unexpected resistance that the latter hesitated for a long
time before coming nearer to the town.
In the autumn of 1915, the front was established on the line of the
River Daugava (Dwina). The Russian Political Conference will perhaps
say that this is precisely the strategic line which they contemplate.
If that is so, it is fresh proof that in the hands of Russia
strategical advantages have no importance. We know from the words
publicly pronounced by the commander of an army on the Riga front,
Radko-Dmitrieff, that Riga would have fallen in the autumn of 1915
but for the bravery of the Lettish troops, raised, as it is known, by
Lettish patriots, after heated argument with the Russian bureaucracy.
In the main, it was not the Russians so much as the Letts who defended
the Riga front. It is enough to recollect the long siege which they
sustained without respite on the “island of death,” near Ixküle, and
the famous breach made by them in the German front near Mangoul, a
breach which unfortunately led to nothing, owing to the lack of Russian
troops to support them. Let us quote the characteristic and significant
words spoken by the Kaiser after an inspection of the Riga front:
“Riga will fall into my hands like a ripe fruit when eight stars have
died out on that front.” He meant by this the eight detachments of the
Lettish army.
The 2nd September, 1917, the Germans broke through the Riga front, and
at least two Russian divisions would have been made prisoners if it
had not been for the stubborn resistance of certain Lettish regiments,
which were then annihilated. After this struggle they existed only in
name, a glorious name with which the Bolsheviki continued to frighten
their Russian adversaries.[3]
By this we can see that favourable strategical positions, in unskilful
hands, become rather a snare than an advantage. The fact is that you
cannot get immediate advantage out of a favourable strategical line
if you have not the wish, the will, and the capacity to profit by it.
Russia lacked both the goodwill and the capacity; they were absent in
the Commander-in-Chief as well as in that moujik deserter from Riazan
who replied to all exhortations: “Why should I fight? I’m not going to
fish in that sea.”
The world-war has proved that patriotic spirit in an army and an
understanding of duty are no less indispensable than the technique,
favourable positions, etc. Will Russia be able to make her Grand Dukes
and moujiks believe that their feeling of duty must extend to the
strategic frontiers of the Baltic Sea, in a foreign land? We doubt it.
Therefore, Russia’s defence will not be prejudiced if the strategical
points aimed towards the West fall into stronger and surer hands than
hers.
And the question of Russia’s defence must be examined from another
point of view. Against whom is Russia preparing her defence in the
West? Against Latvia? It would be a grave insult to Russia to pretend
that Latvia, with her two million and a half inhabitants, could
dream of an aggressive act against Russia, which, counting only the
Great-Russians, possesses 65 million inhabitants. Against Esthonia
then, with her million and a half inhabitants? Against Lithuania, with
her six million inhabitants? To put these questions is to answer them.
Against Poland or Ukraine? But in that case the strategical positions
of the Baltic Sea have nothing to do with it. Against a coalition
of all these States? This is questionable, for strong and adequate
as a defensive coalition of all these States might be regarded, an
offensive coalition on their part against Russia is obviously unlikely
and futile, for in the latter case there could be neither community of
interest nor a common object in aggression.
There remains the hypothesis of M. Mandelstam (_Memorandum on the
Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_, p. 57), that
the territory of Latvia may serve as a very favourable point of
disembarkation for armies attacking Russia. If M. Mandelstam has
Germany in view as a potential adversary, one can set him at ease by
telling him that all the interests of Latvia are directed against
Germany, and to suspect her of a future alliance with Germany is simply
inadmissible. In the case of an aggressive tendency on the part of
Germany, Latvia will have to defend herself, and one can suppose that
she will do it more successfully than Russia, which could not thus be
other than much obliged to her, in view of Latvia’s carrying out for
her a task which had proved beyond Russia’s power.
Russia’s defence will thus in no way be prejudiced by the shores of
the Baltic not being guarded by herself but by a more watchful sentry,
of whom one could not expect any aggressive tendency, but who would
nevertheless oppose himself, in the name of his own interests, to any
aggression coming either from the West or East.
The Lettish people claims the realisation of its natural right to an
independent existence and free development. Within the boundaries of
Russia this was and will be impossible. Consequently, the Lettish
people is right in demanding its constitution as an independent State,
and this all the more because the interests of the Russian people will
not suffer by it.
GUARANTEES OF THE WORLD-PEACE
It would be possible to end here if the question was merely one of
tracing a line of delimitation between the interests of the Russian
people and those of the Lettish people. But that is not so--one could
not lose sight of a more universal interest. What will be the result of
the limits traced between the Lettish people and the Russian people,
in the matter of other nations’ interests? A new international dawn
will rise when the Paris Conference has established guarantees for the
maintenance of peace. Everything must be done to avoid the disasters of
a future war.
And precisely from this point of view, voices are heard proclaiming
that in the interests of political equilibrium, a strong Russia must be
rebuilt, as far as possible within her former frontiers. They even say
that if no Russia existed, one must be invented.
PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
Certainly, it is possible to make a primary reply to this opinion by
saying that political equilibrium is incriminated, and that in its
place will come the League of Nations guaranteeing peace and justice
for all. The reply is valid. But we are also disposed to agree with
those who say that the League of Nations will be formed only in the
future and at present it is incapable of fulfilling all the tasks which
we await from it. For this reason, if only as a subsidiary factor, one
must not lose sight of the problems of political equilibrium.
RUSSIA AS A FACTOR IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
This equilibrium does not establish the necessity of re-creating
Russia as she was before the war, for Russia was in no way a factor
powerful enough to support that equilibrium. Knowing Russia’s internal
weakness, Germany had no fear in launching the world-war. And during
the war Russia’s forces proved insufficient to weigh down the scales of
victory on the Allies’ side. On the contrary, during all the time the
hostilities lasted, Russia was strategically, as well as politically
and economically, the weakest point of the Allies. Finally she left
them to the grace of God after having made them a present of the pest
of Bolshevism. It is clear that, even in the case of reconstruction in
her former boundaries, Russia will not for a long time be in a position
to perform the part of an ally and help to maintain the European
equilibrium. Russia is ruined; ruined not only by the war, but also,
and much more, by Bolshevism; ruined physically, economically and
much more morally and intellectually. More than a generation will be
required before Russia can count as a factor in European policy. And
who will maintain the equilibrium in the meantime?
INTERNAL WEAKNESS OF RUSSIA
But even after a long rest and complete external reconstruction,
Russia, in the case of serious aggression, will always prove internally
to be a considerably weaker factor than it would be possible to
judge of from the outside. That was the case during the Japanese war
in 1904-5. And so she was also during the war which has just ended.
Russia’s external strength has always been imaginary, for she has
always been weak internally. And this is not an accidental, momentary
or passing weakness, but a weakness dependent on Russia’s composition
and her home-policy. We have already shown that Russia is composed
of a series of regions which by their population, history, culture
and economic interests are not bound together, but tend in different
directions, and are merely held together by perpetual compulsion.
By reason of this there will always be a centralised home-policy in
Russia, and, consequently, a lot of unsolved and insoluble problems
therein; a policy the principal means of which will always be force
and compulsion. And as soon as compulsion relaxes, the problems and
anomalies artificially kept under come again to the surface and
paralyse all the forces of Russia. The history of Russia shows that
precisely on account of her internal weakness and under the threat of
revolution, she has been unable to end with success any one of the last
wars.
POLITICAL LEANINGS OF RUSSIA TOWARDS GERMANY
But besides that, as concerns Russia, it will never be possible to tell
in which direction she will turn. At the beginning of the last century,
allied to Prussia and Austria, she fought against France, and became
the inspirer of the Holy Alliance which was directed, in full accord
with the character of Russia’s home-policy, against all the rights
of peoples. In the middle of the last century, she fought against
England, France, and Sardinia, after having secured the neutrality of
Austria and Prussia. In 1870, her friendly neutrality gave Prussia
the opportunity to crush France. There is something fateful in her
traditional friendship with Germany. Behind the back of France, though
allied to her, it was towards Germany that Nicholas II. felt himself
attracted (see his correspondence with William II., published in
Bourtzeff’s paper _L’Avenir_, 1917), as well as his ministers Sturmer
and Protopopoff, unmasked in the speech of P. Miliukoff in the Imperial
Douma, in February, 1917; M. Miliukoff himself (_Pages Modernes_, April
number, 1919, page 6); and the Tzar’s General Skoropadsky; and Lenin
and Trotsky who signed peace with Germany of the Kaiser and wanted
an alliance with Germany of Scheidemann at any cost. At heart, M.
Mandelstam also is not too remote from this fatal leaning. He threatens
war if the Paris Conference shows itself disposed to recognise the
independence of the States detached from Russia (_Some Reflections on
the Question of a Great Poland and the Shores of the Baltic_, p. 10;
_Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_,
p. 81). With what war and in alliance with whom does M. Mandelstam
threaten us?
It is evident that the Russian Political Conference is not free from
that fatal inclination. Its representative, M. Sazonoff, former
Minister, is revealed by Prince Lichnovsky as ready to abandon France,
“Russia’s cherished ally,” to Germany for plunder, on condition
that the latter consents to give Russia a free hand in regard to
Austria-Hungary.
It is also very interesting to notice that the crusade against the
independent States of the Baltic, preached by M. Mandelstam in Paris,
is put into execution in Latvia by the armies of General von der
Goltz which have upset the legal Government of Latvia recognised by
England and Japan. The hand of M. Mandelstam, seeking allies for the
crusade against Latvia, has not remained in the air; von der Goltz
has grasped it enthusiastically. Future Russia and bygone Germany
have met in a common intrigue against independent Latvia. Finland,
Esthonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and independent Poland are specks in the
eyes of both; and who can guarantee that the points of contact will not
increase with the lapse of time?
RUSSIA AS A PROBABLE DESTROYER OF THE WORLD-PEACE
Russia has been and will be an ally too unsteady to count as a factor
of equilibrium in European politics. Moreover, she is a troublesome
factor, and likely to become directly or indirectly the instigator of a
European war. In 1904, Russia got herself involved in war with Japan,
which exhausted all her forces. During a sequence of years, Germany
had her hands completely free in the East, and it was certainly not
Russia’s balancing forces, but considerations of a quite different
nature, which then prevented Germany from falling upon France. On
three occasions during the last century Russia’s leanings towards
complete possession of the Black Sea have served as causes of war;
and in that just ended, Russia’s interests in the Balkans were the
motives for aggression on the part of Austria and Germany. With
Russia’s reconstitution her leanings towards possession of the Black
Sea and particularly the Straits will necessarily revive; this has
already been announced by the “Chairman of the Slav Congress in Moscow
and of the Russian Conference in London,” M. Briantchaninoff, with
the idea that the mandate of guardianship over the Dardanelles and
Constantinople should in all justice be entrusted to nobody but Russia.
M. Briantchaninoff’s opinion is not a mere accident; we have no reason
to regard it as such. There is no doubt that, in a reconstituted
Russia, by a natural reaction from the humiliations and outrages
suffered by the country, the nationalist wave will rise very high.
This nationalism will have as its aims those of militant Slavism.
One of these aims has always been the orthodox Cross towering over
“Haghia-Sophia.” And the Straits were promised to Russia. M. Sazonoff
spoke of that in the Imperial Douma amidst a storm of applause. This
long-pursued object has escaped from Russian hands thanks only to the
microbes which made their way into M. Lenin’s sealed-up carriage. It
was almost reached, and it can be reached. It is necessary to try to
reach it. Lenin is already no more. M. Briantchaninoff will be heard
with thundering voice; M. Miliukoff will not be able to refuse his
help, having shown interest in the Dardanelles during his whole life.
M. Sazonoff has in his hands the Allies’ promises, which only for a
time fell into the hands of “Comrade” Tchitcherin. Thus the watchword:
“To Constantinople!” And that means: “To Belgrade! To Athens! To
Bucharest!” and also “To Paris! To London! To Washington!”