From the direction of the Baltic Sea, reconstituted Russia threatens
us with another political danger. This danger comes from the strange
policy Russia has pursued in the Baltic countries, a policy whose
repetition is revealed by many signs. Feeling instinctively her
administrative incapacity, Russia thus distinctly shows the effects of
the influence of German elements in the staff of her administrators.
During all the time of her domination over these countries, she left
full power in the hands of the Baltic barons who--except in some
accidental and temporary cases--have been the administrators and the
real masters of the land. They took great advantage of this situation,
endeavouring to give the country a German character. Further, they
organised systematic German colonisation, for the realisation of which
Berlin put large sums at their disposal. This colonisation took on
such vast proportions and was carried on so openly that it finally
attracted the attention of the Russian Government itself, which, in
order to paralyse its effects, set up Russian colonisation in its turn.
The latter, however, led to no results, the Russian peasant not being
prepared for the intensive agricultural methods adopted in the country.
The feelings and leanings of the Baltic nobility have clearly shown
themselves during the war. It is enough to remember that they offered
to General Hindenburg a third part of their lands for the purpose of
colonisation. Their leanings were in perfect accord with the aims of
the Pan-Germans, of whom many were emigrants from the Baltic, and
who, like Professor Schiemann and P. Rohrbach, have not been playing
an unimportant part. It is extremely interesting to observe that these
tendencies have not ceased with the defeat of Germany. It is known that
the Germans have promised to Latvia energetic assistance against the
Bolsheviki if a right to the land is granted to all the combatants.
It is certain that after the war there will be a surplus of population
in Germany, and it is not for nothing that Count Brokdorff-Rantzau
complains in one of his notes that it will be difficult to find room
for this surplus of inhabitants, as it is probable that the principal
States will close their doors to them. There is no doubt whatever that
a large part of this excess of population will go over to the Baltic,
where they will find land ready for them and will be received with open
arms by the Baltic barons of Pan-German mind. The Russian Government,
as past experience has proved, will be unable to oppose this fresh
_Drang nach Osten_, and if the Lettish people do not possess enough
freedom of action, that is to say, if there is no independent Latvia,
one can be supremely sure that German influence will be very great. On
the other hand, the resolution of the various Landestags, Landesrats,
and Regentschaftsrats, which have asked for the closest _rapprochement_
with Germany, militarily and economically, and have offered the ducal
crown to the Hohenzollern dynasty, leaves no doubt about the direction
in which the sympathies of the Baltic Germans will go. The Baltic is,
in the hands of Russia, a borderland with predominant German interests,
a land to which Germany stretches out her hand, a land always ready, at
a moment favourable to Pan-Germanism, to detach itself from Russia and
pass over to the side of her adversaries. Thus, to be logical in the
matter of the Baltic States, one must decide, not between Russia and
Latvia, but between the latter and Germany.
And thus the argument of political motives leads to a conclusion which
is not at all to the advantage of Russia’s reconstitution. For the
re-establishment of equilibrium in European politics, Russia is of no
value. She is not, to that end, something which should be invented if
she did not exist.[4]
THE POLITICAL RÔLE OF THE NEW STATES
In order to have an absolutely clear idea of the question, it is still
necessary to look at the other side; _i.e._, to represent to oneself
the probable policy of the States detached from Russia. We have
already shown that one cannot expect aggression from these States,
because of the relative external weakness of them individually. It is
equally unimaginable that they should form an aggressive alliance,
for one cannot realise a common aggressive aim for all these States.
Consequently one cannot expect a violation of peace from their side.
But taking into account their relative weakness, will these States
not be subject to envy and aggression on the part of their stronger
neighbours, and will they not in this way, against their will, be the
cause of disturbing the peace? It is necessary to envisage this peril,
but it is possible to avert it. In this one may rightly rely on the
League of Nations in which the small nations put all their hope.
Assuredly, the League of Nations is just now not strong enough; but,
in view of the general national exhaustion, one cannot expect, as soon
as peace is concluded, aggression against the States which have the
authority of the Peace Conference on their side. If aggressive forces
gather later, the League of Nations will have had time in the interval
to organise itself definitely and to command moral and material
strength sufficient to check aggression.
There is another way, too, of guaranteeing the security of the new
States: an alliance between them, or at least between those of them
which have access to the Baltic Sea; viz., Finland, Esthonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and probably White-Russia, an alliance with many
certain chances of development in one direction or another. Assuredly,
there are still ancient accounts to be settled between some of these
nations, but common and vital interests are so strong that History will
be no obstacle in the matter. All these nationalities have always had
continual relations with Western civilisation, and there would quickly
and easily be formed between them a community of intellectual and moral
interests. The economic intercourse between them is also capable of
vast development. For instance, Poland can supply all the other States
with her coal, and Lithuania can supply the corn which Finland needs.
Undoubtedly, there are common interests between all the above-named
States in the trade of the Baltic Sea. Each one of them has a natural
_Hinterland_, and, consequently, is vitally interested in the guarantee
of freedom of trade in the Baltic Sea. Besides, the mere political
interest of common defence is a strong enough basis for an alliance of
all the Baltic States, for they are under the double menace of Germany
on one side and Russia on the other. All these States have experienced
in fact the gravity of this menace, and so all will understand the
great value of this defensive alliance.
THE DOMINIUM MARIS BALTICI
(Command of the Baltic Sea) has been for centuries a bone of contention
between the Northern and Eastern States of Europe. For this the Teutons
have contended, and Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Denmark, Russia.
Germany had the same aim, and before the war had nearly reached it.
During the whole of history, every State which acquired strength and
authority in the North or East of Europe, evinced this inevitable
leaning towards possession of the Baltic Sea, and it was only in the
measure of its success in that direction that it could play its part as
a Great Power, a rôle which ceased the moment the State was deprived
of that DOMINIUM MARIS BALTICI. To give it again to one of
the coastwise States would mean a fresh menace to the peace of Europe;
but by putting it into the hands of those to whom it belongs by
natural right, that is to say, into the common possession of the States
surrounding that sea, one would remove one of the causes of probable
conflicts in the future of Europe.
LINE OF PARTITION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY
For yet another reason the Baltic States, or rather their alliance,
will have a great rôle to play--that of a boundary line of economic and
political culture between Russia and Germany. This partition--which
might be called a _cordon sanitaire_--is absolutely indispensable.
Germany’s direct influence on Russia, with no obstacle between them, is
a real danger. To the naïve and dreamy soul of the childlike Russian
villagers, the extreme sociological theories of the West, born from
a very complex economic situation, are a direct temptation and a
dangerous poison, as illustrated by M. Lenin’s sealed railway carriage.
The teachings of German Social Democracy have taken such root in
Russian soil and have produced such a harvest that it has caused much
merriment to the Teuton Field-Marshals; while to Russia it has brought
extreme abasement and almost irretrievable disaster.
And this is likely to happen again, everywhere and always, whenever a
backward race, neighbour of another highly developed, would fain borrow
from the latter and put into immediate operation “the latest advances
of civilisation.”
It is the same in regard to economic relations. Germany, deprived of
her colonies, and lacking sufficient resources in raw materials and
rich markets, will necessarily direct the surplus of her economic
energy towards Russia, which will easily become a German colony and
submit entirely to German influence. In this respect, Germany had
already arrived at considerable results before the war. She will
work in the same direction, and after the signing of peace with
still greater activity, which will assuredly lead to results hardly
desirable from the political point of view. A Russia invaded by capital
and technical forces from Germany, and a Germany with Russian raw
materials and Russia’s market at her disposal, will be such great
economic powers that each will separately appear a serious menace, and
all the more so if in alliance.
But what is more clear and more important is the line of political
partition between Germany and Russia. The political security of Europe
used to be constantly under the menace of an alliance between Russia
and Germany, an alliance which would have radically destroyed the
balance of power. This menace was in no way artificial but perfectly
real, and might have been realised at any moment. As we have tried to
prove, it will inevitably reappear with the reconstitution of Russia.
The vanquished two of this great war will not at once submit to their
fate; both will be discontented and will cogitate ways of improving
their situation. This alone is a sufficient basis for a _rapprochement_
or an alliance. Russia will not resist for long the temptation of an
alliance with Germany, of which the leaders beyond the Rhine are
already openly talking. Consequently, it is necessary to separate
Russia from Germany, that is, to prevent their direct union, and to
that end it would be impossible to find a more adequate and easy means
than the _cordon sanitaire_ of the States named. Truth to tell, it
would be necessary to invent this alliance if it did not force itself
into being.
CONCLUSION
We have arrived at the end of this study and may now summarise.
The question of the organisation of the Lettish people in an
independent State must be decided quickly and definitely. The
restoration of anything whatever of the _status quo ante_, whether
_de facto_, temporary or indefinite, would serve no purpose because
it would not give to the Lettish people the juridical basis necessary
to the reconstruction of a ruined life. This question must be solved
independently of the will of the Russian people, because, in
principle, the idea that the destiny of any people whatsoever depends
on the will of another people, is inadmissible; because also it is
impossible to foresee when the Russian people will be in a position
to make its will freely known. In definitely deciding the destiny
of Latvia, it is necessary to reject the project of an All-Russian
Federation.
Such a federation is impossible. In accordance with the laws of
historical continuity, it is impossible to pass from a centralised
State to one of the most complicated and most delicate forms of State
organisation. Besides, the peoples of Russia have no such community
of intellectual, moral and economic interests as might become the
solid foundation of a free co-existence in one and the same State. The
All-Russian Federation will either divide itself into different States
or change itself into a centralised State in which the natural rights
of its different peoples will not be guaranteed. The only just solution
of the question of Latvia is the recognition of that country as an
independent State.
This is not only the natural right of the Lettish people. It has long
been the object of its permanent and definite leanings, and these are
in harmony with its well-recognised interests.
The interests of Russia will in no way suffer from the separation of
Latvia; neither economically, for Latvia will certainly be a better
intermediary between the West and the East than Russia was or would
be; nor strategically, for Latvia will be a much more conscientious
sentinel on the Baltic Sea than Russia was or would be.
It is impossible for Russia to claim to re-enter her former boundaries
on the necessity of European balance of power, for, as a factor of
equilibrium, Russia has been found wanting, and one can foresee her
future complete submission to the economic and political influence of
Germany, as well as to her civilisation.
On the other hand, the interests of a lasting peace demand the creation
of a series of independent national States for the peoples inhabiting
the shores of the Baltic Sea; and, between them, a defensive alliance
for which there are sufficient grounds in the shape of common
economic, political and intellectual interests. Such an alliance would
play at the same time the rôle of the necessary line of demarcation
between Russia and Germany. Moreover, it is the only natural solution
of the problem of the _Dominium maris Baltici_, which has been an
apple of discord for centuries and has often been the disturber of the
world’s peace.
[Illustration: THE
TEMPLE PRESS
LETCHWORTH
ENGLAND]
Footnotes:
[1] One of the published works of the Russian Political Conference
(from the pen of Mandelstam), specially devoted to the question of
Poland, has received a well-merited refutation in the brilliant
pamphlet of M. H. Grappin (_Memorandum on the Application of the
Nationalities Principle to the Russian Question_).
M. Gaston Gaillard, in his book _The Pan-Russian Movement and the
Borderland Peoples_, Paris, 1919, gives a remarkable summary, with full
documentary evidence, of the aspirations of the borderland peoples of
Russia.
[2] P. J. Sahlit, _Devastation of Latvia by the Russian Armies_,
Petrograd, 1917 (in Russian).
[3] As fear has big eyes, even among fearless people like M. Savinkoff,
it is believed, for instance, that this latter gentleman has found in
the Bolshevik lines two divisions of Lettish Rifles, _i.e._, 60,000 men
(_Pages Modernes_, No. 1, page 7). If we take into account that many
Letts have fought from the beginning in the ranks of the Czeko-Slovaks,
in the army of Denikin and in that of the North, and remembering that
the Lettish regiments have suffered great losses during the war,
one can only ask with amazement where this great number of Lettish
youths comes from. No more than 3,500 Letts can be counted among the
Bolsheviki, all the rest are a vision inspired by fear.
[4] Details on this point will be found in the pamphlet of Count Jean
Tarnovsky, _La Menace Allemande et le Péril Russe_, Imprimerie Moderne,
17, rue Duler, Biarritz, 1919.
End of Project Gutenberg's Latvia & Russia, by Arveds Karlis Kristaps Bergs