CHAPTER X.

GENERALIZATION

We have seen that Sensation is translated or interpreted into

Perception; and that from the Percepts so created we may "draw off," or

separate, various qualities, attributes and properties by the analytical

process we call Abstraction. Abstraction, we have seen, thus constitutes

the first step in the process of what is called Understanding. The

second step is called Generalization or Conception.

Generalization, or Conception, is that faculty of the mind by which we

are able to combine and group together several particular ideas into one

general idea. Thus when we find a number of particular objects

possessing the same general qualities, attributes or properties, we

proceed to _classify_ them by the process of Generalization. For

instance, in a number of animals possessing certain general and common

qualities we form a concept of a class comprising those particular

animals. Thus in the concept of cow, we include _all cows_--we know

them to be cows because of their possession of certain general class

qualities which we include in our concept of _cow_. The particular cows

may vary greatly in size, color and general appearance, but they possess

the common general qualities which we group together in our general

concept of _cow_. Likewise by reason of certain common and general

qualities we include in our concept of "Man," _all men_, black, white,

brown, red or yellow, of all races and degrees of physical and mental

development. From this generic concept we may make race concepts,

dividing men into Indians, Caucasians, Malays, Negroes, Mongolians, etc.

These concepts in turn may be divided into sub-races. These

sub-divisions result from an analysis of the great concept. The great

concept is built up by synthesis from the individuals, through the

sub-divisions of minor concepts. Or, again, we may form a concept of

"Napoleon Bonaparte" from the various qualities and characteristics

which went to make up that celebrated man.

The product of Generalization or Conception is called a _Concept_. A

Concept is expressed in a word, or words, called "A Term." A Concept is

more than a mere _word_--it is _a general idea_. And a Term is more than

a mere word--it is _the expression of a general idea_.

A _Concept_ is built up from the processes of Perception, Abstraction,

Comparison and Generalization. We must first perceive; then analyze or

abstract qualities; then compare qualities; then synthesize or classify

according to the result of the comparison of qualities. By perceiving

and comparing the qualities of various individual things, we notice

their points of resemblance and difference--the points wherein they

agree or disagree--wherein they are alike or unlike. Eliminating by

abstraction the points in which they differ and are unlike; and, again

by abstraction, retaining in consideration the points in which they

resemble and are alike; we are able to group, arrange or classify these

"_alike things_" into _a class-idea_ large enough to embrace them all.

This class-idea is what is known as a General Idea or a Concept. This

Concept we give a general name, which is called a Term. In grammar our

particular ideas arising from Percepts are usually denoted by proper

nouns--our general ideas arising from Concepts are usually denoted by

common nouns. Thus "John Smith" (particular; proper noun) and "Man"

(general; common noun). Or "horse" (general; common), and "Dobbin"

(particular; proper).

It will be seen readily that there must be lower and higher concepts.

Every class contains within itself lower classes. And every class is,

itself, but a lower class in a higher one. Thus the high concept of

"animal" may be analyzed into "mammal," which in turn is found to

contain "horse," which in turn may be sub-divided into special kinds of

horses. The concept "plant" may be sub-divided many times before the

concept "rose" is obtained, and the latter is capable of sub-division

into varieties and sub-varieties, until at last a particular flower is

reached. Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe

that they are like each other in any respect and, therefore, think of

them together.... In classifying a collection of objects, we do not

merely put together into groups those which resemble each other, but we

also divide each class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is

more complete. Thus the class of _white substances_ may be divided into

those which are solid and those which are fluid, so that we get the two

minor classes of solid-white, and fluid-white substances. It is

desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in

another and, accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or

more smaller ones, the _Genus_; and the smaller ones into which it is

divided, the _Species_."

Every Genus is a Species of the class next higher than itself; and every

Species is a Genus of the classes lower than itself. Thus it would seem

that the extension in either direction would be infinite. But, for the

purposes of finite thought, the authorities teach that there must be a

Highest Genus, which cannot be the Species of a higher class, and which

is called the _Summum Genus_. The _Summum Genus_ is expressed by terms

such as the following: "Being;" "Existence;" "The Absolute;"

"Something;" "Thing;" "The Ultimate Reality," or some similar term

denoting the state of being _ultimate_. Likewise, at the lowest end of

the scale we find what are called the Lowest Species, or _Infima

Species_. The Infima Species are always _individuals_. Thus we have the

_individual_ at one end of the scale; and _The Absolute_ at the other.

Beyond these limits the mind of man cannot travel.

There has been much confusion in making classifications and some

ingenious plans have been evolved for simplifying the process. That of

Jevons is perhaps the simplest, when understood. This authority says:

"All these difficulties are avoided in the _perfect logical method of

dividing each Genus into two Species, and not more than two, so that one

species possesses a particular quality, and the other does not_. Thus if

I divide dwelling-houses into those which are made of brick and those

which are not made of brick, I am perfectly safe and nobody can find

fault with me.... Suppose, for instance, that I divide dwelling-houses

as below:

Dwelling-House

|

--+------+-------+-------+-------+--

| | | | |

Brick Stone Earth Iron Wood

"The evident objection will at once be made, that houses may be built of

other materials than those here specified. In Australia, houses are

sometimes made of the bark of gum-trees; the Esquimaux live in snow

houses; tents may be considered as canvas houses, and it is easy to

conceive of houses made of terra-cotta, paper, straw, etc. All logical

difficulties will, however, be avoided _if I never make more than two

species at each step_, in the following way:--

Dwelling-House

|

+----+----+

| |

Brick Not-Brick

|

+----+----+

| |

Stone Not-Stone

|

+----+----+

| |

Wooden Not-Wooden

|

+----+----+

| |

Iron Not-Iron

"It is quite certain that I must in this division have left a place for

every possible kind of house; for if a house is not made of brick, nor

stone, nor wood, nor iron, it yet comes under the species at the right

hand, which is not-iron, not-wooden, not-stone, and not-brick.... This

manner of classifying things may seem to be inconvenient, but it is in

reality the only logical way."

The student will see that the process of Classification is two-fold. The

first is by Analysis, in which the Genus is divided into Species by

reason of _differences_. The second is by Synthesis, in which

individuals are grouped into Species, and Species into the Genus, by

reason of _resemblances_. Moreover, in building up general classes,

which is known as Generalization, we must first _analyze_ the individual

in order to ascertain its _qualities, attributes and properties_, and

then _synthesize_ the individual with other individuals possessing like

qualities, properties or attributes.

Brooks says of Generalization: "The mind now takes the materials that

have been furnished and fashioned by comparison and analysis and unites

them into one single mental product, giving us the general notion or

concept. The mind, as it were, brings together these several attributes

into a bunch or package and then ties a mental string around it, as we

would bunch a lot of roses or cigars.... Generalization is an

_ascending_ process. The broader concept is regarded as higher than the

narrower concept; a concept is considered as higher than percept; a

general idea stands above a particular idea. We thus go up from

particulars to generals; from percepts to concepts; from lower concepts

to higher concepts. Beginning down with particular objects, we rise from

them to the general idea of their class. Having formed a number of lower

classes, we compare them as we did individuals and generalize them into

higher classes. We perform the same process with these higher classes

and thus proceed until we are at last arrested in the highest class,

that of Being. Having reached the pinnacle of Generalization, we may

descend the ladder by reversing the process through which we ascend."

A Concept, then, is seen to be a _general idea_. It is a general thought

that embraces _all the individuals_ of its own class and has in it all

that is common to its own class, while it resembles _no_ particular

individual of its class in _all_ respects. Thus, a concept of _animal_

contains within itself the minor concepts of _all animals_ and the

animal-quality of all animals--yet it differs from the _percept_ of any

one particular animal and the minor concepts of minor classes of

animals. Consequently a concept or general idea cannot be _imaged_ or

mentally pictured. We may picture a percept of any particular thing, but

we cannot picture a general idea or concept because the latter does not

partake of the _particular_ qualities of any of its class, but embraces

all the general qualities of the class. Try to picture the general idea,

or concept, of Man. You will find that any attempt to do so will result

in the production of merely _a man_--some particular man. If you give

the picture dark hair, it will fail to include the light-haired men; if

you give it white skin, it will slight the darker-skinned races. If you

picture a stout man, the thin ones are neglected. And so on in every

feature. It is impossible to form a correct general class picture unless

we include every individual in it. The best we can do is to form a sort

of _composite_ image, which at the best is in the nature of a symbol

representative of the class--an ideal image to make easier the _idea_ of

the general class or term.

From the above we may see the fundamental differences between a Percept

and a Concept. The Percept is the mental image of a real object--a

particular thing. The Concept is merely a _general idea_, or general

notion, of the common attributes of a class of objects or things. A

Percept arises directly from sense-impressions, while a Concept is, in a

sense, a pure thought--an abstract thing--a mental creation--an ideal.

A Concrete Concept is a concept embodying the common qualities of a

class of objects, as for instance, the concrete concept of _lion_, in

which the general class qualities of all lions are embodied. An Abstract

Concept is a concept embodying merely some one quality generally

diffused, as for instance, the quality of _fierceness_ in the general

class of lions. _Rose_ is a concrete concept; _red_, or _redness_, is an

abstract concept. It will aid you in remembering this distinction to

memorize Jevons' rule: "_A Concrete Term is the name of a Thing_; _an

Abstract Term is the name of a Quality of a Thing_."

A Concrete Concept, including all the particular individuals of a class,

must also contain all the common qualities of those individuals. Thus,

such a concept is composed of the ideas of the particular individuals

and of their common qualities, in combination and union. From this

arises the distinctive terms known as the _content_, _extension_ and

_intension_ of concepts, respectively.

The _content_ of a concept is _all that it includes--its full meaning_.

The _extension_ of a concept depends upon its _quantity_ aspect--it is

its property of including numbers of individual objects within its

content. The _intension_ of a concept depends upon its _quality_

aspect--it is its property of including class or common qualities,

properties or attributes within its content.

Thus, the _extension_ of the concept _horse_ covers all individual

horses; while its _intension_ includes all qualities, attributes, and

properties common to all horses--class qualities possessed by all horses

in common, and which qualities, etc., make the particular animals

_horses_, as distinguished from other animals.

It follows that the larger the number of particular objects in a class,

the smaller must be the number of general class qualities--qualities

common to all in the class. And, that the larger the number of common

class qualities, the smaller must be the number of individuals in the

class. As the logicians express it, "the greater the extension, the less

the intension; the greater the intension, the less the extension." Thus,

_animal_ is narrow in intension, but very broad in extension; for while

there are many animals there are but very few qualities common to _all_

animals. And, _horse_ is narrower in extension, but broader in

intension; for while there are comparatively few horses, the qualities

common to all horses are greater.

The cultivation of the faculty of Generalization, or Conception, of

course, depends largely upon _exercise_ and _material_, as does the

cultivation of every mental faculty, as we have seen. But there are

certain rules, methods and ideas which may be used to advantage in

developing this faculty in the direction of clear and capable work. This

faculty is developed by all of the general processes of thought, for it

forms an important part of all thought. But the logical processes known

as Analysis and Synthesis give to this faculty exercise and employment

particularly adapted to its development and cultivation. Let us briefly

consider these processes.

* * * * *

_Logical Analysis_ is the process by which we examine and unfold the

meaning of Terms. A Term, you remember, is the verbal expression of a

Concept. In such analysis we endeavor to unfold and discover the

_quality-aspect_ and the _quantity-aspect_ of the content of the

concept. We seek, thereby, to discover the particular general idea

expressed; the number of particular individuals included therein; and

the properties of the class or generalization. Analysis depends upon

division and separation. Development in the process of Logical Analysis

tends toward clearness, distinctness, and exactness in thought and

expression. Logical Analysis has two aspects or phases, as follows: (1)

_Division_, or the separation of a concept according to its _extension_,

as for instance the analysis of a genus into its various species; and

(2) _Partition_, or the separation of a concept into its component

qualities, properties and attributes, as for instance, the analysis of

the concept _iron_ into its several qualities of color, weight,

hardness, malleability, tenacity, utility, etc.

There are certain rules of Division which should be observed, the

following being a simple statement of the same:

I. _The division should be governed by a uniform principle._ For

instance it would be illogical to first divide men into Caucasians,

Mongolians, etc., and then further sub-divide them into Christians,

Pagans, etc., for the first division would be according to the principle

of race, and the second according to the principle of religion.

Observing the rule of the "uniform principle" we may divide men into

races, and sub-races, and so on, without regard to religion; and we may

likewise divide men according to their respective religions, and then

into minor denominations and sects, without regard to race or

nationality. The above rule is frequently violated by careless thinkers

and speakers.

II. _The division should be complete and exhaustive._ For instance, the

analysis of a genus should extend to every known species of it, upon the

principle that _the genus is merely the sum of its several species_. A

textbook illustration of a violation of this rule is given in the case

of the concept _actions_, when divided into _good-actions_ and

_bad-actions_, but omitting the very important species of

_indifferent-actions_. Carelessness in observance of this rule leads to

fallacious reasoning and cloudy thinking.

III. _The division should be in logical sequence._ It is illogical to

skip or pass over intermediate divisions, as for instance, when we

divide _animals_ into _horses_, _trout and swallows_, omitting the

intermediate division into _mammals_, _fish and birds_. The more perfect

the sequence, the clearer the analysis and the thought resulting

therefrom.

IV. _The division should be exclusive._ That is, the various species

divided from a genus, should be reciprocally exclusive--should exclude

one another. Thus to divide _mankind_ into _male_, _men and women_,

would be illogical, because the class _male_ includes _men_. The

division should be either: "_male and female_;" or else: "men, women,

boys, girls."

The exercise of Division along these lines, and according to these

rules, will tend to improve one's powers of conception and analysis.

Any class of objects--any general concept--may be used for practice. A

trial will show you the great powers of unfoldment contained within this

simple process. It tends to broaden and widen one's conception of almost

any class of objects.

There are also several rules for Partition which should be observed, as

follows:

I. _The partition should be complete and exhaustive._ That is, it should

unfold the full meaning of the term or concept, so far as is concerned

its several general qualities, properties and attributes. But this

applies only to the qualities, properties and attributes which are

_common_ to the class or concept, and not to the minor qualities which

belong solely to the various sub-divisions composing the class; nor to

the accidental or individual qualities belonging to the separate

individuals in any sub-class. The qualities should be _essential_ and

not _accidental_--general, not particular. A famous violation of this

rule was had in the case of the ancient Platonic definition of "Man" as:

"A two-legged animal without feathers," which Diogenes rendered absurd

by offering a plucked chicken as a "man" according to the definition.

Clearness in thought requires the recognition of the distinction between

the general qualities and the individual, particular or accidental

qualities. Red-hair is an accidental quality of a particular man and not

a general quality of the class _man_.

II. _The partition should consider the qualities, properties and

attributes_, according to the classification of logical division. That

is, the various qualities, properties and attributes should be

considered in the form of genus and species, as in Division. In this

classification, the rules of Division apply.

It will be seen that there is a close relationship existing between

Partition and Definition. Definition is really a statement of the

various qualities, attributes, and properties of a concept, either

stated in particular or else in concepts of other and larger classes.

There is perhaps no better exercise for the cultivation of clear thought

and conception than Definition. In order to define, one must exercise

his power of analysis to a considerable extent. Brooks says: "Exercises

in logical definition are valuable in unfolding our conception. Logical

definition, including both the genus and the specific difference, gives

clearness, definiteness and adequacy to our conceptions. It separates a

conception from all other conceptions by fixing upon and presenting the

essential and distinctive property or properties of the conception

defined. The value of exercises in logical definition is thus readily

apparent."

If the student will select some familiar term and endeavor to define it

correctly, writing down the result, and will then compare the latter

with the definition given in some standard dictionary, he will see a new

light regarding logical definition. Practice in definition, conducted

along these lines, will cultivate the powers of analysis and conception

and will, at the same time, tend toward the acquiring of correct and

scientific methods of thought and clear expression.

Hyslop gives the following excellent Rules of Logical Definition, which

should be followed by the student in his exercises:

"I. A definition should state the essential attributes of the species

defined.

"II. A definition must not contain the name or word defined. Otherwise

the definition is called _a circulus in definiendo_ (defining in a

circle).

"III. The definition must be exactly equivalent to the species defined.

"IV. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative or

ambiguous language.

"V. A definition must not be negative when it can be affirmative."

_Logical Synthesis_ is the exact opposite of Logical Analysis. In the

latter we strive to separate and take apart; in the former we strive to

bind together and combine the particulars into the general. Beginning

with individual things and comparing them with each other according to

observed points of resemblance, we proceed to group them into species or

narrow classes. These classes, or species, we then combine with similar

ones, into a larger class or genus; and then, according to the same

process, into broader classes as we have shown in the first part of this

chapter.

The process of Synthesis is calculated to develop and cultivate the mind

in several directions and exercises along these lines will give a new

habit and sense of orderly arrangement, which will be most useful to

the student in his every-day life. Halleck says: "Whenever a person is

comparing a specimen to see whether it may be put in the same class with

other specimens, he is _thinking_. Comparison is an absolutely essential

factor of thought, and classification demands comparison. The man who

has not properly classified the myriad individual objects with which he

has to deal, must advance like a cripple. He, only, can travel with

seven-league boots, who has thought out the relations existing between

these stray individuals and put them into their proper classes. In a

minute a business man may put his hand on any one of ten thousand

letters if they are properly classified. In the same way, the student of

history, sociology or any other branch, can, if he studies the subjects

aright, have all his knowledge classified and speedily available for

use.... In this way, we may make our knowledge of the world more

minutely exact. We cannot classify without seeing things under a new

aspect."

The study of Natural History, in any or all of its branches, will do

much to cultivate the power of Classification. But one may practice

classification with the objects around him in his every-day life.

Arranging things mentally, into small classes, and these into larger,

one will soon be able to form a logical connection between particular

ideas and general ideas; particular objects and general classes. The

practice of classification gives to the mind a constructive turn--a

"building-up" tendency, which is most desirable in these days of

construction and development. Regarding some of the pitfalls of

classification, Jevons says:

"In classifying things, we must take great care not to be misled by

outward resemblances. Things may seem to be very much like each other

which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals and several other animals

live in the sea exactly like fish; they have a similar shape and are

usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale-fishing. Yet

these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like dogs

and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They cannot

live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the water

like fish, but they have to come up to the surface at intervals to take

breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they fly

about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings are

not like those of birds and in truth bats are much more like rats and

mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to classify

plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs or herbs, but we now

know that a great tree is often more similar in its character to a tiny

herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little resemblance to

a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as very similar.

The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugarcane also

belongs to the same class with wheat and oats."

Remember that analysis of a genus into its component species is

accomplished by a separation according to _differences_; and species are

built up by synthesis into a genus because of _resemblances_. The same

is true regarding individual and species, building up in accordance to

points of resemblance, while analysis or separation is according to

points of difference.

The use of a good dictionary will be advantageous to the student in

developing the power of Generalization or Conception. Starting with a

species, he may build up to higher and still higher classes by

consulting the dictionary; likewise, starting with a large class, he may

work down to the several species composing it. An encyclopedia, of

course, is still better for the purpose in many cases. Remember that

Generalization is a prime requisite for clear, logical thinking.

Moreover, it is a great developer of Thought.

Thought-Culture; Or, Practical Mental Training · 第 10 / 14 章