THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
When I received the news of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
I was dining with the Spanish Ambassador at the Metropolitan Club
in Washington. Signor Riano and I were not for a moment in doubt as
to the very serious, peace-menacing character of the incident, but
we found little interest in the matter among the Americans in the
club, who, as always, regarded European affairs with indifference.
As to the results of the murder, I received in Washington no
information, either officially or through the Press.
I therefore, on the 7th July, began my usual summer leave, which
had been granted a few weeks before. For the last time I crossed
the ocean on one of the proud German liners, and, indeed, on the
finest of our whole merchant fleet, the _Vaterland_. For the last
time I saw, on my arrival, the port of Hamburg and the lower Elbe
in all their glory. Germans who live at home can hardly imagine
with what love and what pride we foreign ambassadors and exiled
Germans regarded the German shipping-lines.
A few days after I had arrived in my home at Starnberg there began
strong public excitement and uneasiness over the political situation.
However, of late years so many crises had been successfully averted
at the eleventh hour, that this time, too, I hoped up to the last
minute that a change for the better would set in. It seemed as
though the responsibility for a war was too great to be borne by
anyone man--whoever he might be--who would have to make the final
decision.
On the wonderful, still summer evening of the 1st August, we heard
across the Starnberger Lake, in all the surrounding villages, the
muffled beat of drums announcing mobilization. The dark forebodings
with which the sound of the drums filled me have fixed that hour
indelibly in my memory.
The following day was devoted to preparations for the journey to
Berlin, where I had to receive instructions before returning with
all possible speed to Washington. The journey from Munich to Berlin,
which could only be made in military trains, occupied forty-eight
hours.
In the Wilhelmstrasse I had interviews with the authorities, the
substance of which was instructions to enlighten the Government
and people of the United States on the German standpoint. In doing
so I was to avoid any appearance of aggression towards England,
because an understanding with Great Britain had to be concluded
as soon as possible. The Berlin view on the question of guilt was
even then very much the same as has been set down in the memorandum
of the commission of four of the 27th May, 1919, at Versailles,
namely, that Russia was the originator of the war.
Further, I was informed at the Foreign Office, that in addition
to some other additions to the staff of the Washington Embassy,
the former Secretary of State of the Colonial Office, Dr. Dernburg,
and Privy Councillor Albert, of the Ministry of the Interior, were
to accompany me; the former as representative of the German Red
Cross, the latter as agent of the "Central Purchasing Company."
Dr. Dernburg's chief task, however, was to raise a loan in the
United States, the proceeds of which were to pay for Herr Albert's
purchases for the aforesaid company. For this purpose the Imperial
Treasury supplied us with Treasury notes, which could only be made
negotiable by my signature. This gave rise later to the legend that
Dr. Dernburg was armed with millions for propaganda purposes.
Our journey was wearisome but passed off without incident. In
forty-eight hours we reached Rotterdam, where we boarded the Dutch
steamer _Noordam_. As we went aboard we were all in high spirits,
for we had seen everywhere in Germany a wonderful, self-sacrificing
and noble enthusiasm. On the steamer, however, which incidentally was
badly overloaded, the picture changed. We suddenly found ourselves
surrounded by hostile feeling, and among our fellow-passengers
there were only a few friendly to the German cause. The bitter
daily struggle toward which we were travelling was to begin on the
ship. We plunged straight into it, and tried as far as possible
to influence our fellow passengers.
At Dover the ship was inspected by a British officer; the inspection,
however, passed off without any inconvenience to us, as in those
first days of the war the regulations of international law were
still to some extent respected. We had already made all preparations
to throw the Treasury notes overboard, in case we were searched.
As a curiosity I mention a comic interlude that occurred after we
had left Dover Harbor. A friendly German-American from a Western
State, who did not know who I was, but had recognized me as a German,
accosted me with the remark: "Take care that you don't expose yourself
to annoyance; the people on board think you are the German Ambassador
in Washington." The excellent man was overcome with amazement when
I admitted my identity. We had not had our names entered on the
passengers' list, but apart from this made no secret of our journey,
as it was already known in Rotterdam.
After an eleven days' voyage, we landed in New York on the 23rd
August. Our arrival was a relief, as during the journey we had
been overwhelmed exclusively with enemy wireless reports of French
victories. Every day we had received news of the annihilation of a
fresh German Army Corps. In comparison with this mental torture,
the cross-fire of questions from countless American Pressmen, not
altogether friendly towards Germany, was comparatively easy to
bear.
As is known, American public opinion at that time had been given a
one-sided view of the causes and course of the war, for England, who,
immediately after the declaration of war, had cut our Transatlantic
cable, held the whole of the Transatlantic news apparatus in her hands.
Apart from this, however, our enemies found from the beginning very
important Allies in a number of leading American newspapers, which,
in their daily issue of from three to six editions, did all they could
to spread anti-German feeling. In New York the bitterest attacks
on Germany were made by the _Herald_ and the _Evening Telegram_,
which were in close touch with France, as well as the _Tribune_ and
_Times_, which followed in England's wake; somewhat more moderate
were the _Sun_ and the _Globe_; the only neutrals were the _Evening
Post_ and the _American_. Outside New York the Press raged against
us, particularly in New England and the Middle-Atlantic States.
In the South and West we were also baited by the Press, but with
considerably less intensity. The only papers which could be called
neutral were those of the Hearst Press, which took up an outspoken
National-American standpoint, and, in addition, the _Chicago Tribune_,
the _Washington Post_, and a few minor newspapers. It was already
very significant that papers like the _Boston Transcript_, the
_Brooklyn Eagle_, the _Baltimore Sun_, and a few others opened
their letter-boxes to anti-German articles, which, it is true,
they condemned with fair regularity in their leading articles or
editorial notes. Against this campaign, fed systematically and
daily with British propaganda information--especially on the subject
of German atrocities in Belgium--the small number of papers in the
German language, which, moreover, were little heeded by public
opinion, and at the head of which stood the old _New Yorker
Staatszeitung_ and the courageous weekly _Fatherland_, founded
shortly after the outbreak of war by the young German-American,
G. S. Vierick, could make but little headway.
On my arrival in New York, and during the next few weeks, I made
an honest effort by daily interviews of the representatives of
the leading daily newspapers to explain the German standpoint to
the American public. I soon noticed, however, that these efforts
were not only practically fruitless but that they were even fraught
with certain dangers for me. The daily struggle with the Press was
threatening to undermine my official position and to compromise
my relations with the Washington Government so seriously that I
should not have been in a position to carry through with success
the diplomatic negotiations which were likely to be called for.
I therefore considered it as my duty to the German people to give
up, as far as I personally was concerned, all propaganda in favor
of the German cause. Certainly I have had a good deal further to
do with American journalists until the final rupture; but I
categorically refused to grant interviews or to receive newspaper
correspondents who were not prepared to treat my statements purely
as confidential, private information.
I should like to take this opportunity to remark that the American
journalist is far better than the reputation he enjoys in Europe.
In spite of the hostile atmosphere which surrounded me in America
I have never had to complain of an indiscretion. True, many minor
New York reporters whom I did not receive invented statements which
I had never made; but such experiences are common to all politicians
in America. Moreover, the results of these journalistic tricks were
almost always local and were easily contradicted. In Washington
such things never occurred. The journalists there were quite
extraordinarily capable and trustworthy men, who always behaved
like "gentlemen." My relations with them remained very friendly
to the last. In so far as I was not forced to keep silence for
political reasons I have always told them the real truth. Of course,
I was as little capable as the American journalists of foreseeing
that the policy I was representing was doomed to ultimate failure.
Just at the time when I gave up personal propaganda in order to
devote myself to my political and diplomatic activities in Washington,
the financial mission of Secretary of State Dr. Dernburg had failed.
President Wilson had stated clearly that it would be an unneutral
act for loans to be raised in the Union by the combatant States.
Our friends in high financial circles in New York regarded this
decision as favorable to Germany, for they foresaw--what actually
happened--that for every million received by us, our enemies would
raise a hundred millions. As a result of this decision of the President,
Privy Councillor Albert had to finance his purchases as far as
possible privately, while Dr. Dernburg, whose time was not fully
occupied by his duties as delegate of the Red Cross, which had
meanwhile been organized by Geheim Oberregierungrat Meyer Gerhardt
and Rittmeister Hecker, would have left America if there had remained
any possibility of doing so. There was not, however, as the English
inspected all neutral ships shortly after they left the American
ports and--in flagrant contravention of international law, which
only allows the arrest of persons who are already enrolled in the
fighting forces--summarily arrested and interned every German capable
of bearing arms. As Dr. Dernburg was thus an unwilling prisoner
in New York he began to write articles on the world-war for the
daily Press. He had a gift for explaining the causes of the war
in a quiet, interesting manner, and particularly for setting out
the German standpoint in a conciliatory form. His propaganda work
therefore met with extraordinary success. The editors of newspapers
and periodicals pressed him to contribute to their columns, and
the whole New York Press readily printed all the articles he sent
in to contradict the statements of the anti-Germans.
Out of this activity developed, in co-operation with the Foreign
Office, Dr. Dernburg's New York Press Bureau, a solution of the
propaganda question which was exceedingly welcome to me. As a private
person Dr. Dernburg could say and write much that could not be said
officially and therefore could not come from me. Consequently I
took it for granted that--in spite of certain suggestions to the
contrary--Dr. Dernburg would not be attached to the Embassy, which
would only hamper his work, and also that the Press Bureau would
retain its independent and unofficial character. I may take it as a
well-known fact that Washington is the political, and New York the
economic, capital of the United States, which has always resulted
in a certain geographical division of the corresponding diplomatic
duties. It naturally had its disadvantages that there should be,
apart from the Consulate-General, four other independent German
establishments in New York, namely, the offices of Dr. Dernburg,
Privy Councillor Albert, the military attache Captain von Papen
and the naval attache Commander Boy-Ed. In order to keep, to some
extent, in touch with these gentlemen, I occasionally travelled to
New York and interviewed them together in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel,
where I usually stayed and in which Dr. Dernburg lived; for their
offices, scattered as they were over the lower town, and which,
moreover, I never entered, were unsuitable for the purpose. Our
mutual personal relations were always of the best. On the other hand,
it was naturally difficult to make any headway with our official
business, since each received independent instructions from Berlin.
This was least the case with Dr. Dernburg, because his responsible
authority as far as propaganda was concerned was partly the Foreign
Office itself and partly the semi-official "Central Office for
Foreign Service." The other three gentlemen, however, were all
responsible to home departments other than mine. Captain von Papen
and Commander Boy-Ed frequently held back from me the instructions
they had received from Berlin in order not to embarrass the Embassy
by passing on military or naval information. Financially, too,
the four officials were completely independent and had their own
banking accounts, for which they had to account individually to
their respective departments at home. Only Privy Councillor Albert
had, for the purchase on a large scale of raw material, definite
funds which were in any event under my control. Concerning the
activities of these four gentlemen, countless legends have been
spread in America and in part have found their way to Germany. In
spite of all the reproaches levelled against them, and indirectly
against myself, with regard to propaganda--I shall speak of the
so-called conspiracies in Chapter V.--nothing has reached my ears
of which these gentlemen need in any way be ashamed. Individual
mistakes we have, of course, all made; in view of the ferocity and
protraction of the struggle they were inevitable. But in general
the German propaganda in America in no way deserves the abuse with
which it has been covered, in part, too, at home. If it had really
been so clumsy or ineffective as the enemy Press afterwards claimed,
the Entente and their American partisans would not have set in
motion such gigantic machinery to combat it. One need only read
G. Lechartier's book, "Intrigues et Diplomaties a Washington," to
see what importance was attached to our propaganda by the enemy.
In spite of all the bitterness which the author infuses into his
fictitious narration, admiration for the German activity in the
United States shines through the whole book. Further, at the end
of 1918 a Commission of the Senate appointed to investigate German
propaganda, as a result of the publication of protocols on this
subject, repeatedly stated that its work had in no way been in
vain, but rather its after effects had made themselves strongly
felt "like poison gas" long after America's entry into the war.
One may well venture to say that, had it not been for the serious
crisis caused by the submarine war, it would probably in time have
succeeded in completely neutralizing the anti-German campaign.
As regards our justification for openly championing the German cause
before the people of the United States by written and spoken word,
this is self-evident in a country which recognizes the principles of
freedom of the Press and free speech. Apart from this, however,
the American Government have themselves provided a precedent in
this connection during the civil war, when President Lincoln in
1863 sent to England the famous preacher, Henry Ward Beecher, whose
sympathies were strongly on the side of the Federals. Through his
speeches, afterwards published as "Patriotic Addresses," he did
much towards swaying public opinion in favor of the Northern States.
In this war, too, America, after abandoning her neutrality, has
carried out vigorous propaganda in neutral countries, as is shown by
the mission of the well-known New York supporter of woman suffrage,
Mrs. Norman Whitehouse, under the auspices of the official Press
Bureau and with the special approval of Secretary of State Lansing.
Moreover our justification has been expressly upheld by a statement
of Commissioner Bruce Bielaski of the American Law Department, who
appeared as chief witness against us before the above mentioned
Commission of Inquiry. He declared that there was no law in the
United States which, before her entry into the war, rendered illegal
German or any other foreign propaganda. Why all this noise then?--it
is reasonable to ask. Why, then, has the suggestion persisted at
home and abroad, almost from the appearance of Dr. Dernburg until
the present day, that we had, with our propaganda campaign, made
ourselves guilty of treachery to the United States?
From the moral point of view, too, no exception can be taken to
the German propaganda. The United States was neutral and wished to
remain so. The German propaganda was working for the same end. I
have never heard of a single case of bribery by our representatives.
If money was spent on our side, it was purely for the purpose of
spreading articles and pamphlets pleading United States neutrality.
Applications were frequently made to us by writers and editors who
from inner conviction were ready to write and circulate articles
of this kind, but were not financially in a position to do so. The
leaders of German propaganda would surely have been neglectful
of their duty if in such cases they had not provided the necessary
funds. All Governments in the world have always proceeded in a
similar way, and in particular that of the United States since
their entry into the war, as is shown by the case of the _Freie
Zeitung_ of Bern--therefore equally in a neutral country. These
facts must throw a strange light on the inquiry of the American
Senate into German propaganda, delayed as it was until last winter
and carried through with such elaborate machinery. It is obvious
that beneath it all there lay--what irony!--a purely propagandist
purpose, namely, that of humiliating Germany in the person of her
late official representative accredited to the United States, and to
make her appear contemptible in the eyes of the uncritical public!
Whereas in the first months of the war no one in America had thought
of connecting "German Propaganda" with anything shocking, our opponents
afterwards succeeded in disseminating the idea that a few offences
against the law committed by Imperial and American Germans represented
an important, even the most important, part of the German propaganda
work. So it was brought about that even in the time before America's
entry into the war, everyone who openly stood up for Germany's
cause was stamped by the expression "German Propagandist" as a
person of doubtful integrity. The gradual official perpetuation
of this admittedly misleading identification of our absolutely
unexceptionable propaganda with a few regrettable offences against
the American penal code--this and no other was the object of that
inquiry by the Senate. The prejudicial headlines under which the
published articles were printed, such as "Brewery and Brandy Interests"
and "German-Bolshevist Propaganda," themselves sufficed to indicate
that our propaganda was to be crucified between two "malefactors";
for to the average American citizen there is nothing more horrifying
than the distillery on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other. In
this connection I must not omit to mention that the great majority
of the documents laid before the Commission had been secured by
means of bribery or theft. It is also worth while to remind the
reader of the significant words of Senator Reed, a member of the
Commission, who said at one point in the examination: "I am interested
in trying to distil some truth from a mass of statements which are
so manifestly unfair and distorted that it is hard to characterize
them in parliamentary language."
As for the fantastic figures with which the Americans have undertaken
to estimate the cost of our propaganda, they rest--in so far as
they are not simply the fruit of a malicious imagination--on the,
to say the least of it, superficial hypothesis that all the money
paid out by the different German offices from the outbreak of war
until the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and
America, the amount of which has been arrived at on the strength
of a minute scrutiny of the books of all the banks with which these
offices have done business, were used for purposes of propaganda.
As a matter of fact, of course, far the greater part of this outlay
went to finance the very extensive purchases of Privy Councillor
Albert as well as certain business transactions concluded by Captain
von Papen, which will be discussed later. In comparison with this
the sum we devoted to propaganda work was quite small. The Press
Bureau was frequently very appreciably hampered by the fact that
even for quite minor expenditure outside the fixed budget, previous
sanction had to be obtained from Berlin. Consequently much useful
work would have had to remain undone if, particularly in the first
months of the war, self-sacrificing German-Americans to whom it
was only of the slightest interest that the German point of view
should be accurately and emphatically explained, had not placed
small sums at the disposal of the leaders of our propaganda. In the
two and a half years between the outbreak of war and the rupture
between Germany and America the sums paid out from official funds
for propaganda work in the Union--including minor contributions
for other countries, as, for example, the pictures distributed
from New York over South America and Eastern Asia--do not, all
told, exceed a million dollars. That is surely only a small fraction
of what England and France have expended during the war in order,
in spite of very thorough preparation in peace time, to win over
American public opinion to their cause. It is actually only a sixth
of what, according to the _Chicago Tribune_ on the 1st November,
1919, the official American Press Bureau of Mr. George Creel has
spent in order to "cement enthusiasm for the war" during the eighteen
months between America's entry into the war and the conclusion of
the Armistice. The thirty-five to fifty million dollars which,
according to the statements of our enemies, were swallowed up by
German propaganda in the United States belong, therefore, to the
realms of fable.
In this connection I must mention yet another, far more malicious
legend, namely, the slander widely spread in America last year,
that the funds collected in America for the German Red Cross were
used to finance German propaganda. It is a fact that every dollar
that went to the German Red Cross Delegation in New York was remitted
to the home organization for which it was intended. Of course these
funds were in the first place paid into the various New York banking
accounts from which Dr. Dernburg drew the funds for the Press Bureau.
But, as Captain Hecker has most definitely stated, their equivalent
was remitted to Germany through the bank, regardless of the changes
in the exchange.
Dr. Dernburg, in organizing the Press Bureau, availed himself of
the assistance he found in New York. The suggestion, widely current
in America and repeated by a member of the American Secret Service
before the Senatorial inquiry, that this Press Bureau had formed,
as it were, a part of the German mobilization, and that, therefore,
the most skilled propaganda experts from Europe and the Far East
had been gathered together in New York in order that, after a
preliminary run there, they might be let loose on the American
world, is a ridiculous invention. Just as Dr. Dernburg himself
became a propagandist without any premeditation, so it was also
the case with his colleagues. At first his only assistants were
the New York Press Agent of the Hamburg-Amerika line, Herr M. B.
Claussen, and after the entry of Japan into the war a Government
official from that country who was unable to continue his journey
to Germany, because the passport across the Atlantic granted him
through the instrumentality of the State Department was rejected
by the British authorities. This official, Dr. Alexander Fuehr,
the interpreter of the Consulate-General in Yokohama, who had great
experience in Press matters and possessed an intimate knowledge
of American affairs, assisted by quite a small staff of assistants
engaged in New York, issued the daily bulletins of the "German
Information Service," which appeared for a year and consisted of
translations of the substance of the German newspapers, comments on
daily events and occasional interviews with people who had returned
from Europe. It was Herr Claussens's duty to circulate the bulletins,
the arrival of which was in no way kept secret, among the American
Press, and to see to it that they should be reproduced as fully
as possible, which was done, especially in the provincial Press.
Later, when the propaganda movement had developed to the extent of
publishing and circulating leaflets, brochures and longer pamphlets,
Dr. Dernburg decided to employ in the Press Bureau a well-known
American publicist in the person of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who
had already done good work, by speaking and writing, towards an
unbiassed appreciation of the German point of view, and he was
assisted by two younger New York journalists. Later, when the bureau
took up war-picture and war-film propaganda, these were joined by
two more young German Government officials, Dr. Mechlenburg and
Herr Plage, who also were held up in America on their way from
Japan. More than a dozen persons, including messengers, have never
been employed by the Press Bureau at a time. Of the thirty-one
trained propagandists imported from Germany who, according to Captain
Lester's evidence before the Senatorial Commission, were supposed
to have worked in the Press Bureau, in so far as their names were
given in the protocols of the inquiry, we are assured by Herr Fuehr
that not one was employed there!
In addition to his direction of the Press Bureau Dr. Dernburg,
who continued with inexhaustible energy to write articles for the
periodicals and instructive letters for the daily Press, was responsible
for keeping in touch with the directors of the American Press.
He also availed himself of invitations to speak in American and
German circles, and sometimes in other places than New York. As far
as I know he never founded any societies for propaganda purposes.
On the other hand, when such societies which had arisen, without
his influence turned to him, he of course supported them by word
and deed.
For all questions of propaganda Dr. Dernburg had the assistance of
a small committee nominated by himself and consisting, in addition
to Herren Albert, Meyer Gerhardt and Fuehr, of a few American
journalists and business men. It was his custom to confer with
this committee once or twice a month, when the general situation,
the prevailing fluctuations of public opinion and the probable
influence of the propaganda material about to be published, were
discussed in detail.
With this entirely improvised and, as will be seen, very modest
machinery, Dr. Dernburg began his campaign. The enemy statement
that the German propaganda in the United States had been actually
organized many years before the war, so that in 1914 we might have
ready at our disposal an organization with branches in every part
of the country, is unfortunately devoid of any foundation. It is
a regrettable fact that, in spite of my repeated warnings to the
authorities, nothing was ever done on the German side before the
war. It is well known that at that time the power of public opinion
in democratic countries was very little understood in Germany. It was
thought at home--which is typical of the objective, matter-of-fact
German national character--that it was much more important that the
right should be done than that it should be recognized as right by
the public. Added to this was the under-estimation of the influence
of the United States on the development of world politics.
Before the war no one in Germany had thought it possible that the
Union would have to be reckoned with as a factor, much less a decisive
factor, in a European war. This was a mistake, the effect of which
unfortunately was felt until well into 1917--the result was that
there was never enough money available to keep in touch and co-operate
with the American Press. As a matter of fact I had, in the course
of my activities in Washington, personally entered into certain
social relations with the proprietors of a few great American
newspapers. But from Berlin no advances were made. Even with the
German-American papers there was no organized connection, and they
themselves did not work together in any way. It is true that for
years there had been a business connection between the greatest
American news-agency, the Associated Press, and the Wolff Telegraphic
Bureau; as, however, the agency was not served direct with Berlin
Wolff-telegrams, but by its own representatives there, this did
not amount to much. England, on the other hand--quite apart from
the close relationship resulting from a common language--had for
years maintained and systematically cultivated the closest contact
with the American Press. It followed, then, that on the outbreak of
war the English influence on the American daily Press was enormous.
It did not rest as exclusively as has been assumed in Germany on
direct proprietary rights. I do not think that, with the exception
of a single newspaper in one of the smaller cities any great American
paper was directly bought by England. Here and there considerable
blocks of American newspaper shares may have been in English hands
and influenced the tendency of certain papers. If, however, it is
true--as was credibly stated in Irish-American quarters during
the first year of the war--that Lord Northcliffe boasted a year
or two before the war of "controlling" seventeen American papers,
it is difficult to believe that this influence of the English
press-magnates was based on hard cash. Rather is it the case that
certain newspapers received their otherwise very costly private
news-service from England on very advantageous terms. To others,
English writers of leading articles are said to have been attached,
without cost to the newspaper--a scheme of which I have often heard in
America, but which is difficult to prove, as all American newspapers
maintain the strictest secrecy as to the origin of their leading
articles. It is, however, common knowledge that with regard to
European affairs the American news service was swayed by this entirely
English organization. Until the outbreak of the war the American
news agencies drew exclusively from English sources. Moreover,
those newspapers which in the United States play a very important
part, inasmuch as they are the fount of most of the new ideas by
which the tone of the Press in influenced, were in a very considerable
degree served from England. On the other hand, the wide field of
cinematographic production was strongly influenced by the French
film. In this way our enemies in the United States had, at the
outbreak of war, a boundless and excellently prepared field for
the propagation of their news, and the representation of their
point of view, but more particularly for their attack on the German
cause. In spite of this, however, they immediately inundated the
Union with propagandist literature, particularly through the agents
of the English shipping lines, who were scattered all over the
country, and the well-known author and politician, Sir Gilbert
Parker, sent from London tons of this matter to well-known American
business men, professors and politicians.
On our side, it is true, and I should like to emphasize this to their
credit, that on the outbreak of war the German-American newspapers
took up our cause unhesitatingly and as one man. Further, they
have, until America's entry into the war, honestly striven to win
full justice for the American point of view, and to combat the
unneutral leanings of the majority of the Americans and the slanderous
attacks of our enemies. As, however, they are not accessible to the
general public, who do not know German, and in particular scarcely
ever come into the hands of the authoritative American political
circles, their support remained more or less academic. Very valuable
services were rendered to the German cause by the already-mentioned
weekly paper _Fatherland_, which was printed in English; in view,
however, of its reputation as a partisan journal, it naturally
could not exert so deep an influence as the local daily papers,
which carried on the English propaganda without allowing it to
become too conspicuous. For telegraphic communication from Germany
to America we had to rely solely on the two German wireless stations
at Sayville and Tuckerton, erected shortly before the outbreak of
war, and we soon succeeded, subject to American censorship, in
getting a regular Press-service, which was spread, not only over
the whole of the United States, but was also passed on to South
America and East Asia. But in the first place, in spite of repeated
extension and strengthening, these two stations were quite inadequate;
in the second place, the Press-service never succeeded in adapting
itself thoroughly to American requirements. The same may be said
of most of the German propaganda literature which reached America
in fairly large quantities since the third month of the war, partly
in German and partly in not always irreproachable English. This,
like the Press telegrams, showed a complete lack of understanding
of American national psychology. The American character, I should
like to repeat here, is by no means so dry and calculating as the
German picture of an American business man usually represents.
The outstanding characteristic of the average American is rather
a great, even though superficial, sentimentality. There is no news
for which a way cannot be guaranteed through the whole country,
if clothed in a sentimental form. Our enemies have exploited this
circumstance with the greatest refinement in the case of the German
invasion of "poor little Belgium," the shooting of the "heroic
nurse," Edith Cavell, and other incidents. Those who had charge
of the Berlin propaganda, on the other hand, made very little of
such occurrences on the enemy side, e.g., the violation of Greece,
the bombing of the Corpus Christi procession in Karlsruhe, etc. One
thing that would have exerted a tremendous influence in America,
if its publicity had been handled with only average skill, was
the sufferings of our children, women and old people as a result
of the British hunger blockade--that they have made no attempt
to bring to the notice of the world.
On the other hand they put themselves to the greatest possible
trouble to lay "The Truth About the War" before American public
opinion. This, however, fell on unfavorable ground, for the American
does not care to be instructed. He had no interest in learning
the "truth" which the German Press communications and explanatory
pamphlets were so anxious to impress upon him. The American likes
to form his own opinions and so only requires facts. The possibility
of exerting influence therefore lies rather in the choice of the
facts and the way in which they are presented, than in logical
and convincing argument. It is all the easier to influence him by
the well-timed transmission of skilfully disposed facts, since his
usually very limited general knowledge and his complete ignorance of
European affairs deprive him of the simplest premises for a critical
judgment of the facts presented to him from the enemy side. It is
quite incredible what the American public will swallow in the way
of lies if they are only repeated often enough and properly served
up. It all turns on which side gets the news in first; for the first
impression sticks. Corrections are generally vain, especially as
they appear as a rule in small print and in inconspicuous places.
When, for example, the American Press got the first news of the
"destruction" of Rheims cathedral from London and in the English
version, no German correction, however well-founded, would succeed
in removing the first impression.
Particularly ineffective in their influence on American public
opinion--as may be said here in anticipation--have been the majority
of our official Notes. In view of the subsequent ever-increasing
interruption of the news service from Germany, they were the last
and only means by which the German standpoint could be brought
before the American people. Their effectiveness depended entirely
on the impression that they made on American public opinion and
not on the Washington Government; yet they were nearly always drawn
up in Berlin in the form of juristic precis, propagandist but quite
futile.
All these factors must be taken into consideration in attempting
to estimate the success of our propaganda in the United States.
They show that on the one hand the prevailing conditions of American
public opinion were extraordinarily unfavorable to our propaganda,
and that the support it received from home, with a few exceptions,
was misguided.
Dr. Dernburg, then, had not a chance during the eight months of his
activity in America of transforming her into a pro-German country,
and it is certain that no one else could have done it in his place.
But he succeeded to a great extent, and within a comparatively short
time, in more or less crippling the enemy propaganda, and at least
in gradually rendering ineffective the grossest misrepresentations
of our enemies. By his own writings and other methods of spreading
the truth, and particularly by the numerous brochures and books,
which at his suggestion were written by American supporters of the
German cause and distributed in thousands directly or indirectly by
the Press Bureau with the help of a skilfully compiled address-book,
he succeeded in exerting very considerable influence. By keeping
in touch with American journalists and other influential persons
he did much good work, particularly in the first months of the
war. His connection with Irish leaders laid the foundation for a
co-operation which in the following year was of great importance
to our position in the United States, and which, with a somewhat
more intelligent backing by our Government departments at home,
might have been more fruitful still.
One branch of our propaganda which was also initiated under Dr.
Dernburg, but was chiefly developed after his departure, was the
moving-picture propaganda, for which a very efficient company was
floated by Privy Councillor Albert. At first it was intended to be
an agency for the circulation of films from Germany. As, however,
suitable material for the American market could not be obtained
there, the "American Correspondent Film Co." decided to send its
own agents to Germany and Austria with a view to making suitable
films for their purpose. In this way several important film-dramas
were produced which have had great success in hundreds of American
cinemas. In spite of this the company had finally to be liquidated,
chiefly owing to lack of support from the military authorities at
home.
With the sinking of the _Lusitania_ our propaganda of enlightenment
in the United States substantially came to an end. Henceforward
the principal aim of its activity, which, after Dr. Dernburg's
departure, came under the direction of Privy Councillor Albert,
was to keep the United States out of the war. Side by side with
this, an attempt was made to influence public feeling against the
export of arms and ammunition and against the Anglo-French loan,
and to demonstrate the increasingly prejudiced effect wrought by
England on American economic interests. In November, 1915, I urged,
as I cabled at the time to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the complete
suppression of propaganda. The Press Bureau in New York continued
under the direction of Dr. Fuehr, until the breaking off of relations
between America and Germany. It concerned itself, however, apart
from certain regular literary contributions to certain journals,
less with propaganda work than with keeping an eye on the American
Press and the development of the news service to and from Germany
as well as to South America and Eastern Asia.