E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall
MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA
by
COUNT BERNSTORFF
1920
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
I. GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE WAR
II. THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
III. POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
IV. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS
V. THE SO-CALLED GERMAN CONSPIRACIES
VI. THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
VII. THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT
VIII. THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
IX. THE "SUSSEX" INCIDENT
X. AMERICAN MEDIATION
XI. THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
XII. THE RETURN HOME
INDEX
MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
MY FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL VIEWS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR
It was in my own home, the German Embassy in London, where the
atmosphere was entirely political, that I learned my first steps
in politics. My father did not belong to that class of diplomats,
so prevalent to-day, who treat politics as an occupation to be
pursued only in their spare time. His whole life was consecrated
to the cause of the German nation, and from my earliest childhood
my mind was filled with the same idea, to the exclusion of all
others.
Owing to my father's share in the negotiations which brought about
the marriage of the Emperor Frederick with the Princess Royal of
England, the Imperial couple became closely connected with my parents,
and, as Crown Prince and Princess, frequently resided at the Embassy
in London. It was the entourage of the Emperor Frederick that first
inspired in me those political views, which, during a long diplomatic
career, gradually crystallized into the deep-rooted convictions
of my political outlook. I believed Germany's salvation to lie
in the direction of a liberal development of Unification and
Parliamentary Government, as also in an attitude of consistent
friendliness towards England and the United States of America.
Thus, to use a modern phrase, I was an avowed supporter of the
Western Policy. At the present moment, while we are standing as
mourners at the grave of our national hopes, I am more than ever
convinced, that had this policy been steadily pursued, we should
have been spared the catastrophe that has overtaken us.
On the other hand, I will not deny, that even the Oriental Policy
would have proved a feasible political scheme, if only we had decided
to pursue it in good time. Albeit, I am of opinion that even Bismarck
had already started us in the direction of the Western Policy, when
in 1879 he decided in favor of Austria-Hungary and not Russia.
Despite all that the careworn recluse of Friedrichsruhe may have
written against Caprivi's policy, which was decidedly Western in
tendency, he was himself the founder of the Triple Alliance, which,
without the good-will of England, could not have come into existence.
Had we pursued an Eastern Policy, though it would ultimately have
led to the sacrifice and partition of Austria-Hungary, it would not
have secured us those advantages in the Orient of which Marschall
speaks. Nevertheless, I have always regretted that we sent such a
first-rate man to Constantinople, for him ultimately to become the
able director of the false policy which we pursued there. There
is an Oriental proverb which says: "Never lay your load on a dead
camel's back."
If, as I always used to hope, we had resolved to adopt the Western
Policy, we should in any case have had to be prepared, in certain
circumstances, to venture with England's help upon a war against
Russia. And the experiences of the Five-Years War have taught us that
we should have won such a conflict with ease. I never wanted a war
with Russia, and was never an enemy of that country; but I believed
that our position among the nations of the world would compel us to
decide one way or the other, and I felt, just as Caprivi did, that
we should not very well be able to avoid war. Even if, in the event
of a war between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France, England
had only maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality, this would
have proved very much more favorable for us than the situation which
developed out of the Encirclement Policy (_Einkreisungspolitik_).
Furthermore, had we pursued the Western Policy, we should have had
to reckon with the possibility of England's wishing to moderate,
even in a perfectly friendly manner, our somewhat explosive economic
development. I should not, however, have regarded this altogether as
a disadvantage. For, truth to tell, we grew a little too rapidly.
We ought, as "junior partners" in Britain's world-empire, to have
gathered our strength more slowly. As an example of what I mean, take
the policy which France and Japan have pursued since the beginning
of the present century. If we had done the same, we should, at all
events, have been saved from so seriously overheating the boilers
of our industrial development, we should not have outstripped England
as quickly as we undoubtedly could have done if we had been left to
develop freely, but we should also have escaped the mortal danger
which we drew upon ourselves by provoking universal hostility.
It is impossible now for me to demonstrate retrospectively that we
should have been able to conclude an alliance with England. Prince
Buelow denies that this was ever the case. Maybe that during his tenure
of office this possibility did not offer a sufficient guarantee of
future security to warrant our incurring the hostility of Russia. I
am convinced, however, that an alliance with England would have been
within our power, if we had pursued Caprivi's policy consistently,
and the Kruger telegram had never been dispatched. Unfortunately we
have always had statesmen at the helm in Germany,--Bismarck not
excepted,--the bulk of whose views and knowledge were essentially
continental, and who never felt quite at home with English ways
of thinking. I feel perfectly satisfied on this point, however,
that English commercial jealousy, with which we naturally had to
reckon, would not have proved an insuperable obstacle to a good
understanding with England, provided that we had declared ourselves
ready, if necessary, to fight Russia.
The policy of the free hand, which we pursued until the outbreak
of war, aimed at the highest possible results. Prince Buelow, who
was the inaugurator of this policy, might possibly have known how
to steer us through the "Danger-Zone" without provoking war. And
then in a few years to come, we should have become so strong and
should have left the Danger-Zone so very far behind us, that, as
far as human judgment could tell, we should no longer have had any
need to fear war. German naval construction from the beginning of the
present century certainly made our relationship to England very much
worse, while it also materially increased the danger of our position
from the standpoint of world-politics. The Buelow-Tirpitz notion of
a _Risikoflotte,_[*] may, however, only have been practicable on
condition that our diplomacy were sufficiently skilful to avoid
war, as long as the "risk" idea in England was not able, of itself,
to maintain peace.
[Footnote *: Literally: a fleet for risks or for taking risks; a
fleet to be used at a venture.]
German foreign policy had been ably conducted by Bismarck; but, in
keeping with the times, it had been almost exclusively Continental
and European. At the very moment when Bismarck withdrew from the arena,
Germany's era of world-politics began. It was not the free bloom of
our statesmen's own creative powers; but a bitter necessity, born
of the imperative need of providing Germany's increasing population
with sufficient foodstuffs. But it was not our world-politics, as
such, that brought about our downfall; but the way we set to work
in prosecuting our policy. The Triple Alliance, with its excellent
Reinsurance Treaty, did not constitute a sufficiently powerful
springboard from which to take our plunge into world-politics. The
Reinsurance contract could not be anything but a makeshift, which
merely deferred the inevitable choice which had to be made between
Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the course of time, we should either
have had to decide entirely in favor of Russia, in the manner outlined
above, or we should have had to try to come to an understanding with
England, upon terms which, at all events, we should not have been
at liberty to choose for ourselves. Unfortunately, however, it was
an axiom of post-Bismarckian German politics, that the differences
between Russia and England were irreconcilable, and that the Triple
Alliance would have to constitute the needle-index of the scales
between these two hostile Powers. This proposition was incessantly
contested both verbally and in writing by Herr von Holstein, who
was then the leading spirit at the Foreign Office. He perceived
that its chief flaw was the weak point in the Triple Alliance
itself,--that is to say, the differences between Austria-Hungary
and Italy on the one hand, and Italy's dependence upon England's
superior power in the Mediterranean on the other. Furthermore, he
recognized the prodigious possibility, which was not beyond the
art of English statesmanship, of a compromise between England and
Russia. He did not see, however, how the hostility of the French
to ourselves would serve as a medium for this universal coalition
against us.
In the last Entente Note of the Five-Years War there is the following
passage:
"For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition,
strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They required that they
should be able to dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe,
as they dictated and tyrannized over subservient Germany."
We Germans know that this indictment is a lie; but unfortunately
all unprejudiced Germans must acknowledge that for years this lie
has been believed outside Germany. We, for our part, cherished
similar views about our enemies, nor did we make a sufficient effort
to dissipate their prejudices. On the contrary we constantly lent
color to them by means of the extravagant and high-flown speeches,
which formed the accompaniment to our world and naval policy, and
by means of our opposition to pacifism, disarmament, and arbitration
schemes, etc., etc. The extent to which our attitude at the Hague
Conference damaged us in the eyes of the whole world is no longer
a secret to anybody. As Heinrich Friedjung rightly observes:
"At the Hague Conference German diplomacy delivered itself up to
the vengeance of the pacifists, like a culprit."
During my tenure of office in Washington I succeeded on three occasions
in coming to an agreement with the Government there regarding the
terms of an arbitration treaty. All three treaties were, however,
rejected in Berlin, and consequently in America I never ceased from
being questioned reproachfully as to the reason why the United
States had been able to conclude arbitration treaties with every
other State in the world, but not with Germany.
The Entente Note, already quoted above, contained this further
statement:
"As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a
subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at forty-eight hours'
notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving the control
of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant
a general war. In order to make doubly sure, they refused every
attempt at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and
the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for
which alone among the nations they were fully equipped and prepared."
The leaders of the Entente Powers would like to exalt this distortion
of history into a dogma, in order that their various peoples may not
bring any unpleasant charges against them. And yet the historical
truth is already pretty clear to all who look for it honestly and
without prejudice. The German Government believed that the Serbian
propaganda would annihilate Austria-Hungary, and hoped, moreover,
that her last faithful ally would experience a political renaissance
as the result of her chastisement of Serbia. That is why they gave
Count Berchtold a free hand, in the belief that Count Buelow's success
over the Bosnian crisis could be repeated. Meanwhile, however, the
situation had changed. Russia and France, relying upon England's
help, wanted to risk a war. When the German Government saw this
they tried, like a driver of a car about to collide with another
vehicle, to jam on all breaks, and to drive backwards. But it was
then too late. The mistake our Government made was to consent to
Austria-Hungary's making so daring an experiment, at a moment of
such critical tension.
It is not true either that we were thoroughly equipped and prepared
for war. We had neither sufficient supplies of munitions, foodstuffs
and raw materials, nor any plan of campaign for a war with England.
Be this as it may, we should not have been defeated if we had abided
firmly by our defensive policy. The heroic spirit displayed by
the German people surpassed all bounds, and they believed quite
honestly that they were fighting a war of defence. If our policy
had been conducted with corresponding consistency we should have
saved our position in the world. We ought always to have borne in
mind the analogy of the Seven Years War, in order to have been
ready at any moment to extricate ourselves from the hopeless business
with the least possible amount of loss.
After the first battle of the Marne, President Wilson consistently
maintained that a decision was no longer possible by force of arms.
This view, which I also shared, gave us some common ground, upon
which, despite our other differences, we were able to some extent
to work together.
Regarding Dr. Wilson's personality certain doubts have been and
are still entertained by many people. He is the most brilliant
and most eloquent exponent of the American point of view. But he
does not devote the same energy and consistency to the execution
of his various programmes as he does to their formation. There
can be no question that, as a result both of his origin and his
training, the President is very much under the sway of English
thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his ambition to be a Peacemaker
and an _Arbiter Mundi_ certainly suggested the chance of our winning
him over to our side, in the event of our being unable to achieve
a decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this case,
Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest neutral Power,
was the most suitable person to propose and to bring about a Peace
by arrangement.
After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alternatives remained
open to us, one of which we were compelled to choose. If the prospects
of a U-boat war promised to secure a victory, it was naturally
incumbent upon us to prosecute it with all possible speed and energy.
If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guarantee a
victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount of friction to
which it could not help giving rise, under all circumstances to
have been abandoned; for, by creating American hostility, it did
us more harm than good.
I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral State, with
the evidences of American power all about me, could not help feeling
it my duty to maintain our diplomatic relations with the United
States. I was convinced that we should most certainly lose the
war if America stepped in against us. And thus I realized ever
more and more the supreme importance of preventing this from taking
place.
My communications to the Central Government were framed with a
view to inducing them also to adopt this attitude; but they, of
course, had to form their conclusions, not from one source, but
from all the sources of information they possessed. At all events,
isolated as I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely
to the task of furnishing my Government with information; but was
compelled on occasion to act on my own initiative, in order to
prevent any premature development in the diplomatic situation from
becoming utterly hopeless.
The policy for which I stood not only promised the negative success
of keeping America out of the war, but it also offered the only
prospect there was of obtaining, with neutral help, a Peace by
arrangement. My belief that such a peace could have been obtained
through Dr. Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible of proof
to-day. It may perhaps sound improbable in view of the President's
behavior at Versailles. It is my opinion, however, that, previous
to the 31st of January, 1917, Dr. Wilson's attitude towards us
was radically different. I base my assumption that Wilson might
in those days have assisted us in obtaining a Peace by negotiation
upon the following points:
(1) A Peace by mediation was the only way in which the United States
could avoid becoming involved in the war, and this is what the
American public opinion of the day wished above all to prevent.
(2) It is true that even if he had wished to do so, Wilson could
not have declared war on England, neither could he by any exercise
of force have prevented the delivery of munitions to the Allies, or
have compelled England to observe the rights of nations. He could,
however, have obliged England to conclude a Peace by arrangement
with us; not only because in so doing he would have had the support
of American public opinion, but also because such a policy was in
keeping with the best political interests of the United States.
I therefore pursued the policy of Peace with undeviating consistency,
and to this day I still believe it to have been the only right
policy. A thorough prosecution of the U-boat campaign was also a
feasible scheme. But the worst thing that we could possibly do,
was, to steer the zigzag course; for by so doing we were certain
not only to cause constant vexations to America, but, by our half
measures and partial pliancy, also to drive Mr. Wilson even further
and further into the inflexible attitude of a policy of prestige.
Unfortunately, however, it was precisely this zigzag course that
we adopted; and thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which
my policy had offered, according to the view of the Naval people,
we also crippled the effects of the U-boat campaign.
My policy might best be described as that of "a silent resolve to
obtain Peace." It was utterly wrong to publish our readiness for
Peace broadcast. We should have presented a strong front to the
outside world, and we should have increased the powers of resistance
which we actually possessed by emphasizing our strength both to
our people at home and to other States. According to my view, we
ought, after the first battle of the Marne, to have recognized
in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and
consequently we should have striven to conclude a Peace, the relatively
unfavorable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered
public opinion in Germany and created some indignation. It was not
right, however, to allow deference to public opinion to outweigh
other considerations, as it did in our case. The political leaders
of the Empire ought to have kept the High Military Command, which
from its point of view naturally demanded firmer "assurances" than
the general situation warranted, more thoroughly within bounds,
just as Bismarck did. Presumably the High Military Command would
have been able to perform its duties quite as efficiently if it
had been prevented from exercising too much influence on the policy
which aimed at a conclusion of peace.
As a politician I consider that the ultimate cause of our misfortune
was our lack of a uniform policy both before and during the war.
If, at the time of Bismarck's retirement, we had made a timely
and resolute decision either in favor of the Western Policy that
he advocated, or in favor of the Eastern Policy, we should have
prevented the development of a situation in the politics of the
world which ultimately led to our own undoing. If, during the war,
however, we had completely abandoned the U-boat campaign, and had
made every possible effort to come to an understanding with America,
we should, in my opinion, have been able to extricate ourselves
from it satisfactorily. Be this as it may, it is also possible
that if the U-boat campaign had been prosecuted resolutely, and
without any shilly-shallying--a thing I never wished--we should not
have suffered so complete a collapse from the military, economic,
political and moral point of view, as we must otherwise have done.
According to my view it is the hesitating zigzag course that we
pursued which is chiefly to blame for the fact that of all possible
results of the epoch of German world-politics, the unhappiest for
ourselves has come to pass. The Wilhelminian Age perished owing to
the fact that no definite objects were either selected or pursued
in good time, and, above all, because both before and during the
war, two systems in the Government of the country were constantly
at variance with each other and mutually corroding.
CHAPTER I
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE WAR
Anyone who has lived some time in the United States will feel with
Goethe that "America is better off than our own Continent." Owing to
the almost perfect autarchy existing there, grave economic problems
never really arise. Nowhere else, during the whole course of my
various diplomatic wanderings, have I ever seen a happier people, who
looked more cheerfully into the future. In view of the comparatively
sparse population of the country, intensive agricultural production
has only become necessary in a few isolated districts; there are
always purchasers in plenty for the rich surplus of raw materials
available, and industry has not yet been directed solely towards
export. As a result of these happy conditions, the American citizen
feels but little interest for what goes on in other countries. In
the period preceding the Five-Years War, if the political interests
of the United States ever happened to cross those of Europe, it was
almost exclusively in regard to American questions. As a proof
of this we have only to think of the Spanish-American War, and of
the various incidents relating to Venezuela; whereas it was only
with difficulty that the German Government succeeded in inducing
President Roosevelt's Administration to take part in the Algeciras
Conference, at which the presence of the United States representative
in no way alleviated our task.
Up to the time of the Five-Years War, the Foreign Policy conducted
from Washington was almost entirely Pan-American, and the Monroe
Doctrine was the beginning and end of it; for even if that versatile
man, President Roosevelt, was fond of extending his activities to
other spheres, as, for instance, when he brought the Russo-Japanese
War to an end by the Peace of Portsmouth, the Panama Canal scheme
remained his favorite child. But in the case of the Russo-Japanese
War, it was home politics, which in America are chiefly responsible
for turning the scales in regard to Foreign Policy, that again
played the principal part. Mr. Roosevelt wished to win over to
his side the very strong pacifist element in America; whereas the
Imperialists--particularly later on--deprecated these successful
attempts at mediation, because they prevented a further weakening
of both of the belligerent parties. Even Roosevelt's Secretary of
State, John Hay, concerned himself actively with the Far East,
and was known in America as the spiritual founder of the policy of
the "Open Door." In this particular matter, the German Government
frequently acted hand in hand with the American, and it was owing
to this circumstance that the Foreign Office at Berlin very much
wished to have the United States represented at the Algeciras
Conference. The German Government believed that the Americans would
also declare themselves in favor of the "Open Door" even in Morocco.
This assumption, however, turned out to be a false one, owing to
the fact that the political and economic interest shown by the
United States for countries on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean
was not sufficiently keen. The Algeciras Conference was a fairly
trustworthy forecast of all that subsequently happened at the Peace
Conference at Versailles. Equally lacking in foundation was also
the assumption, so prevalent in Germany, that, as the result of
their energetic Far-Eastern policy, the Americans would plunge
themselves into a serious conflict with Japan.
The question of the Philippines, which arose out of the Spanish-American
War and the Cuban affair, constitutes a certain contrast to the
customary Pan-American Foreign Policy of the United States. A large
number of Americans--possibly the majority--would like to relinquish
the Philippines as soon as the inhabitants of these islands are in
a position to rule themselves. At its inception, the question of
the Philippines brought us into a conflict with the United States,
which was remembered by Americans for years. Heinrich Friedjung,
referring to this incident, says:
"Quite superfluously it occurred to the German Government to make
our East-Asiatic Squadron, under Admiral Diederichs, appear before
Manila precisely at the moment when, in 1898, the decision was made
regarding the Philippines. This was done simply out of a pointless
consciousness of power, without any intention to cause offence."
This criticism is partly justified. And yet the affair was somewhat
different from the version of it which the American Ambassador,
Andrew White, allowed to filter through; for, seeing that, as the
United States did not intend to retain the Philippines, they could
raise no objection to Germany's wishing to acquire them. Thanks to
his friendly attitude towards Germany, Andrew White had, on his
own initiative, exceeded his instructions and was duly censured
by his Government for his zeal. Nevertheless, a misunderstanding
had occurred, as the result of which the Berlin Foreign Office
had acted in perfect good faith. In the public mind in the United
States, however, the feeling still rankled that Germany had wished
to make a demonstration against their Government; and the English
Press, which at that time was hostile to us, applied the bellows
enthusiastically to the glowing embers of American ill-humor.
The Venezuela affair, in the year 1902, which was a matter of lodging
certain complaints against the Venezuelan Government, ended in a
similar manner. Germany and England together sent their ultimatum
to Venezuela, and when no heed was paid to it, they instituted
a blockade of a number of Venezuelan ports. It was at this time
that I was appointed Secretary to the Embassy in London, where
I had to conduct a good deal of the negotiations regarding the
Venezuela question, with the Foreign Office. The whole affair, as
initiated by ourselves, was, in proportion to the German claims,
much too elaborate. The first suggestion which led to the common
action on the part of the British and ourselves, came from the
English side; but we should have been wiser, from the point of view
of our own advantage, if we had not listened to the suggestion.
It was absolutely clear from the start that the American Government
would raise objections to this sort of procedure, on the part of
European powers, in South America, and that England, true to her
usual custom, would climb down before the United States the moment
she recognized plainly the latter's displeasure. And when public
opinion in America raised a violent protest, and, incidentally,
resolutely assumed that Germany wished to obtain a footing in Venezuela,
the English Press attacked us in the rear by asserting that the
whole affair had been engineered by Germany, in order to embroil
England with the United States. At President Roosevelt's wish the
matter was finally settled with America's help; but in the United
States it left behind the widely prevalent impression that Germany
would infringe the Monroe Doctrine the moment she had the power
to do so.
President Taft, who in the year 1909 took President Roosevelt's
place, endeavored, with his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, to
develop still further the policy of the "Open Door," inaugurated
by John Hay. Both gentlemen felt the keenest interest in the Far
East. The former had been Governor of the Philippines, the latter had
been closely connected with the Pittsburgh iron industry, and knew
the need of extending its sphere of activities. Mr. Knox suggested
the proposal of internationalizing the railways of Manchuria. When,
however, this American notion met with response in Germany, and
apart from its general rejection elsewhere, had the further effect
of drawing Japan and Russia together again, Mr. Knox abandoned his
active Far-Eastern policy, and confined himself to stimulating the
large banks of America into becoming interested in the building of
railways and other economic means of development in China. This policy
was described as "Dollar Diplomacy" by the Democratic Opposition,
and violently opposed. When, therefore, the votes went against the
Republican Party, and President Wilson came to the helm, he let
the Far-Eastern policy drop. High Finance immediately seized this
opportunity in order to extricate itself from Chinese undertakings.
It had only embarked upon "Dollar Diplomacy" at the request of the
Government, and the venture had yielded but little profit, owing
to the fact that Americans are not inclined to invest in foreign
securities.
Secretary of State Knox's policy, which was always supported by
us, accounted for the fact that the official relations between
the German and American Governments were never more cordial than
during the years 1909-13, in spite of a short disturbance resulting
from a dispute over our potash exports to the United States. The best
proof of how friendly the official relations of the two Governments
were is shown by the ease with which this quarrel was settled. We
were also successful in concluding a commercial agreement which
was satisfactory to both sides, and overcame the danger of a customs
war as the result of America's new customs tariffs; whereas Taft's
economic plans, which aimed at reciprocity and union with Canada,
came to grief for political reasons, as the result of Canadian
Opposition, and left behind a bitter after-taste both in the United
States, Canada and England.
Official diplomatic communications excepted, however, it must
unfortunately be admitted, that mutual misunderstanding has been
the principal feature of German-American relations. In Germany
there was no understanding for the curious mixture of political
sagacity, commercial acumen, tenacity and sentimentality, which
goes to make up the character of the American people. The power of
the Union was therefore underestimated by us, and the high-spirited
utterances of American youthful strength were more disapproved of
than was necessary, because they were interpreted as mere "bluff"
and arrogance. We never sufficiently allowed for the fact that
the Americans are very "emotional"--that is to say, that they are
easily carried away by their feelings and then become uncertain.
Political surprises in the United States are almost the rule.
On the other hand, Americans never give themselves time to learn
to understand a foreign nation. A knowledge of foreign languages is
by no means general in the United States. The Americans unconsciously
borrow their thoughts and ideas from England, because it is the only
nation whose literature and Press are accessible to them in the
original tongue. Naturally this fact contributed very considerably,
before the Five-Years War, towards making the comprehension of
Germany difficult; because in those days German-English relations
were growing more and more unfavorable every day, and this decline
in friendliness found a powerful echo in the English Press and
other literature. The English language exercises more absolute
power in the United States than even in England itself. For example,
it would never occur to any diplomat in Washington to transact his
business in any other language than English. Whereas, in London,
I never once heard the French Ambassador pronounce one word of
English--even in an after-dinner speech--M. Jusserand in Washington
always spoke English. But, in spite of the claim that the French
make, that their language prevails in diplomatic circles, he could
not have done otherwise; because I have never, during the whole
of the eight years of my official activities in Washington, met
one Secretary of State who had mastered any other language than
English. It is obvious that this state of affairs opens all doors
and avenues to English political and cultural influences.
Thus, before the outbreak of the Five-Years War, the majority of
Americans already looked upon the Germans, however unconsciously,
through the optics of the English Press and English literary
publications. A large number of people in the United States honestly
believed, moreover, in the rumored German scheme to seize the empire
of the world. Our enormous successes in the economic field provoked
unbounded admiration and led, on the one hand, to an over-estimation
of our power, which did not prove favorable to us politically,
while, on the other hand, the Americans who frequently indulged in
generalizations about Germany were prone to judge us according to
the German-American Beer-Philistine, whom they disdainfully called a
"Dutchman." The Americans' view of the German people wavered between
these two extremes; but every year opinion tended to incline more
and more in the direction of the former. The phantom of a German
world-empire, extending from Hamburg to Bagdad, had already taken
possession of the American mind long before the war; and in the
United States it was feared that the next step would be that this
world-empire would infringe the Monroe Doctrine and found colonies in
South America. Professor Baumgarten, in an entertaining book, has
pointed out to what extent the publications of the Pan-German party
contributed towards promoting such conceptions in America.
Our Press was a little too fond of making attacks on the Monroe
Doctrine in particular. I was always of the opinion that we ought,
openly and officially, to have recognized this American article of
faith. As regards the Monroe Doctrine, the question is not one of
Right, but one of Power. We certainly had not the power to infringe
the Monroe Doctrine, even if we had had the intention, which was never
the case. It would, therefore, have been more wise to acknowledge
it, and thus to improve the political attitude, towards ourselves,
of a country on which we were so very much dependent for a number
of our raw-material supplies. I have often wondered whether the
Imperial Government would not have regarded it as its duty to avoid
war at all costs, if our economic dependence upon foreign countries
had been more clearly recognized. German prosperity was based to
a great extent on the Germans overseas, who had settled down in
every corner of the earth, just as in former days the Greeks had
settled all over the Roman Empire. The Germans overseas constituted
a colonial empire, which was a far more precious source of wealth
than many a foreign possession belonging to other Powers. In my
opinion not sufficient allowance was made for this state of affairs.
Finally, a further cause of misunderstandings, as I have already
mentioned in the Introduction, was to be found in the general disfavor
with which American pacifist tendencies were regarded in Germany.
Nine-tenths of the American nation are pacifists, either through their
education and sentimental prepossession in favor of the principle,
or out of a sense of commercial expediency. People in the United
States did not understand that the German people, owing to their
tragic history, are compelled to cultivate and to uphold the martial
spirit of their ancestors. The types of the German officer of the
reserve and of the members of the student corps are particularly
unsympathetic to the American, and, for certain German foibles,
all sign of that understanding that readily forgives, is entirely
absent in the United States, owing to the fact that our historical
development is not realized over there.
Although the Americans are largely and unconsciously swayed by the
influence of English ideas, we must be careful to avoid falling into
the error, so common in Germany, of regarding them as Anglo-Saxons.
The Americans themselves, in their own country, scarcely ever call
themselves Anglo-Saxons. This term is used by the English when
they are anxious to claim their American cousins as their own.
Occasionally, too, an American may use the expression when making
an after-dinner speech at some fraternizing function. As a rule,
however, the Americans insist on being Americans, and nothing else.
On the 11th May, 1914, at a memorial service for the men who fell
at Vera Cruz, President Wilson, in one of his finest speeches,
said:
"Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American
blood, which is not drawn from any one country, which is not drawn
from any one stock, which is not drawn from any one language of
the modern world; but free men everywhere have sent their sons
and their brothers and their daughters to this country in order
to make that great compounded nation which consists of all the
sturdy elements and of all the best elements of the whole globe. I
listened again to this list of the dead with a profound interest,
because of the mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks
of the several national stocks from which these men came. But they
are not Irishmen or Germans or Frenchmen or Hebrews or Italians
any more. They were not when they went to Vera Cruz; they were
Americans; every one of them, with no difference in their Americanism
because of the stock from which they came. They were in a peculiar
sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing that they were
of our spirit, that no matter what their derivation, no matter
where their people came from, they thought and wished and did the
things that were American; and the flag under which they served
was a flag in which all the blood of mankind is united to make
a free nation."
The above words of President Wilson are the key to the attitude of
the Americans who are of German origin. True, these people, almost
without exception, still cling to their old home with heartfelt
affection; but they are Americans, like the rest of the nation.
"Germania is our mother, and Columbia is our bride," said Carl
Schurz, and with these words he described the situation in a nutshell.
Just as a man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall
cleave unto his wife," so the man who is generally styled the
German-American decides in favor of his new home-land, when a conflict
arises between America and Germany. He will, however, do anything
in his power to avoid such a conflict. Even before the war, we in
Germany entirely failed to understand the difficult and delicate
position of the American of German origin. And during the war this
was more than ever the case. The question of the "German-Americans"
has never been dealt with tactfully in Germany. Our greatest mistake
was to expect too much from them. The Americans of German origin
have retained in their new home all the failings and virtues of
the German people. _We_ could not, therefore, blame them if they
showed less interest and less understanding in regard to political
questions than the rest of America; for did they not, on the other
hand, distinguish themselves by their respect for the established
order of things, and by the fidelity and industry with which they
pursued their various callings? The inevitable consequence of these
national qualities was that they did not exercise the political
influence which would have been only in keeping with their numerical
superiority. For instance, I might mention that, on the occasion
when I first visited Milwaukee, I was welcomed by an Irish mayor,
a circumstance which somewhat surprised me, seeing that at the
time the town contained from 300,000 to 400,000 Germans.
In consequence of the state of affairs described above, the principal
object of German policy in the United States before the war was
to try to bring about a more satisfactory understanding between
the two peoples. Prince Henry's journey to America, the exchange
of University professors and school teachers, which took place on
this occasion, the visits of the two fleets, the American Institute
in Berlin, and similar more or less successful undertakings served
the same purpose. German diplomatic representatives were instructed
to promote this policy with all their power. When I was appointed
Ambassador in Washington, the Kaiser's and the Chancellor's principal
injunction, in taking leave of me, was that I should enlighten
public opinion in the United States regarding the peaceful and
friendly intentions of German policy. Prince Buelow also said to me
that I must without fail bring the negotiations about an Arbitration
Treaty with the United States, which had been left unfinished owing
to the death of my predecessor, to a satisfactory conclusion. Despite
these definite instructions, the German Government, as I have already
pointed out, ultimately blundered and stumbled over legal quibbles.
In any case, however, Prince Buelow had meanwhile vacated his office.
The effect upon the American mind of our obstruction of this matter
should not be under-estimated. It helped not a little to convince
public opinion in the United States of the alleged warlike intentions
of the German people.
In accordance with American custom, the semi-official and semi-private
activities concerned with fostering a better understanding between
the two States had to be published to the whole world, and this
had the inevitable disadvantage of provoking opposition, both in
Germany and in the United States, among all those who had reasons
for being hostile. Unfortunately, the official representatives of
Germany in Washington were always a thorn in the side of a certain
section of the German Press, whenever they tried, in consideration
of the American attitude of mind and social customs, to introduce
a warmer feeling into the relations between the two sides. Even
in the time of my predecessor, Speck von Sternburg, the German
Embassy was on such occasions charged with softness and an excessive
desire to become adapted to American ways; and this remained the
case during my tenure of office.
Our Press in general, moreover, never revealed a sufficient amount
of interest or understanding in regard to American affairs. There
were only a very few German newspaper correspondents in the United
States, and those that did happen to be there were too poorly paid
to be able to keep properly in touch with American social life.
About twelve months before the war, the well-known wealthy
German-American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to help me out of this
difficulty by undertaking to pay the salary of a first-rate American
journalist, of German origin, who was to reside in Washington, and
act as the representative there of Wolff's telegraphic bureau.
I immediately took steps to organize this telegraphic service.
Very shortly afterwards, however, I was informed by Berlin, that
the telegrams would be too expensive, as the subject was not of
enough interest, and in this case the Wolff Bureau would only have
had to defray the cost of the actual telegrams. This was the way
the supply of news was organized in a country that imagined it
was practising world-politics.
Mr. Wilson took up his quarters in the White House, Washington,
about a year before the war, and opened his period of office with
several internal reforms. Then came the American-Mexican crisis,
and relations with Europe in general, and Germany in particular,
therefore, fell somewhat into the background.
Woodrow Wilson was a University don and an historian. His works
are distinguished by their brilliant style and the masterly manner
in which he wields the English language--a power which was also
manifested in his political speeches and proclamations. Mr. Wilson
sprang into political and general fame when he was President of the
University of Princeton, and was elected as Governor of the State
of New Jersey. Even in those days he displayed, side by side, on
the one hand, his democratic bias which led him violently to oppose
the aristocratic student-clubs, and on the other, his egocentric and
autocratic leanings which made him inaccessible to any advice from
outside, and constantly embroiled him with the governing council
of the University. As Governor of New Jersey, The Holy Land of
"Trusts," Mr. Wilson opened an extraordinarily sharp campaign against
their dominion. Mr. Roosevelt, it is true, had spoken a good deal
against the trusts, but he had done little. He could not, however,
have achieved much real success, because the Republican Party was
too much bound up with the trusts, and dependent on them. At the
time when Mr. Roosevelt wanted to take action, he also succeeded in
splitting up his party, so that real reform could only be expected
from the Democratic side. The conviction that this was so was the
cause of Mr. Wilson's success in the Presidential election of 1912.
In regard to external politics, Mr. Wilson was pacifistic, as was
also his party; whereas the Imperialists belonged almost without
exception to the Republican Party. In spite of "Wall Street," and
the influence of English ideas and opinions upon American society,
Pacifist tendencies largely prevailed in the United States before
the outbreak of the Five-Years War; how much more was this the case,
therefore, when Mr. Wilson, in accordance with American custom,
gave the post of Secretary of State to the politician to whose
influence he owed his nomination as candidate for the Presidency
by the Democratic Party. Thus did Mr. William Jennings Bryan attain
to the dignity of Secretary of State after he had thrice stood as
a candidate for the Presidency without success.
In all political questions, Mr. Bryan followed a much more radical
tendency than Mr. Wilson. His opponents call him a dishonest demagogue.
I, on the contrary, would prefer to call Mr. Bryan an honest visionary
and fanatic, whose passionate enthusiasm may go to make an exemplary
speechmaker at large meetings, but not a statesman whose concern is
the world of realities. He who in his enthusiasm believes he will
be able to see his ideal realized in this world next Thursday week
is not necessarily dishonest on that account, even if he overlooks
the fact that things are going very badly indeed.
It was believed in a large number of circles that Mr. Bryan would
not accept the post of Secretary of State, for even at that time
everybody who was in the know was already aware that Mr. Wilson could
only tolerate subordinates and not men with opinions of their own.
Mr. Bryan, however, felt the moral obligation, at least to attempt to
give his radical views a chance of succeeding, and declared, as he
took over the post, that so long as he was Secretary of State the
United States would never go to war. He even wanted this principle
to be generally accepted by the rest of the world, and with this
end in view, submitted to all foreign Governments the draft of
an Arbitration and Peace-Treaty, which was to make war utterly
impossible in the future. As is well known, the German Government,
unlike all the others, refused to fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes.
The Secretary of State was a little mortified by this, even though
he still hoped that we should ultimately follow the example of
the other Powers. Every time we met, he used to remind me of his
draft Arbitration Treaty, which I had forwarded to Berlin. Later on
I often regretted that we did not fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes;
who, by the by, during the war, again returned to the question, but
in vain. If the treaty had been signed by us, it would most probably
have facilitated the negotiations about the U-boat campaign.
The diplomatic corps in Washington thus found itself confronted
by an entirely new situation. The Republican Party had been at
the helm for sixteen years, and had now to vacate every one of
the administrative posts. Even our personal intercourse with the
President was governed by different formalities from those which
existed in the days of his predecessors. Mr. Roosevelt liked to
maintain friendly relations with those diplomats whose company
pleased him. He disregarded the old traditional etiquette, according
to which the President was not allowed to visit the Ambassadors
or any private houses in Washington. The friendly relations that
existed between Mr. Roosevelt and Baron Speck von Sternburg are
well known. When in the year 1908, after this gentleman's decease,
I assumed his post at Washington, Mr. Roosevelt invited me to the
White House on the evening after my first audience, to a private
interview, in which every topic of the day was discussed. Invitations
of this kind were of frequent occurrence during the last two months
of Roosevelt's administration, which, at the time of my entering
office, was already drawing to its close. For instance, Mr. Roosevelt
showed me the draft of the speech which after his retirement he
delivered at the University of Berlin.
My dealings with President Taft were on the same footing; for he
also was in favor of an amicable and unconventional relationship.
On one occasion he invited me to join him in his private Pullman on
a journey to his home in Cincinnati, where we attended the musical
festival together. On another occasion, he suddenly appeared, without
formal notice, at the Embassy, while we were holding a ball in
honor of his daughter, and later on he accepted an invitation to
my daughter's wedding.
President Wilson, who by inclination and habit is a recluse and
a lonely worker, does not like company. He re-introduced the old
etiquette and confined himself only to visiting the houses of Cabinet
members, which had been the customary tradition. He also kept himself
aloof from the banquets, which are such a favorite feature of social
life in America, and severely limited the company at the White
House. Thus the New Year Reception was discontinued entirely. This
attitude on the part of the President was the outcome of his tastes
and inclinations. But I certainly do not believe that he simply
developed a theory out of his own peculiar tastes, as so often
happens in life. I am more inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson
regarded the old American tradition as more expedient, on the grounds
that it enabled the President to remain free from all intimacy,
and thus to safeguard the complete impartiality which his high
office demanded. The peculiar friendship which unites Mr. Wilson
with Mr. House is no objection to this theory, for the latter has
to some extent always been in the position of a minister without
portfolio. An adviser of this sort, who incurs no responsibility by
the advice he gives, is more readily accepted by American opinion
than by any other, because the President of the United States is
known to be alone and exclusively responsible, whereas his ministers
are only looked upon as his assistants.
Generally speaking, the political situation in the United States
before the Five-Years War was as follows: On the one hand, owing
to the influence of English ideas, which I have already mentioned,
it was to be expected that a feeling of sympathy with the Entente
would probably preponderate in the public mind; while on the other
hand, owing to the general indifference that prevailed with regard to
all that happened in Europe, and to the strong pacifist tendencies,
no interference in the war was to be expected from America, unless
unforeseen circumstances provoked it. At all events it was to be
feared that the inflammability of the Americans' feelings would
once again be under-estimated in Germany, as it had been already.
It has never been properly understood in our country, despite the
fact that the Manila and Venezuela affairs might have taught us a
lesson in this respect. The juxtaposition in the American people's
character of Pacifism and an impulsive lust of war should have been
known to us, if more sedulous attention had been paid in Germany to
American conditions and characteristics. The American judges affairs
in Europe, partly from the standpoint of his own private sentiment of
justice, and partly under the guidance of merely emotional values;
but not, as was generally supposed in Germany, simply from a cold
and business-like point of view. If this had been reckoned with in
Germany, the terrible effect upon public opinion in America of the
invasion of Belgium and of the sinking of the _Lusitania_--particularly
in view of the influence of English propaganda--would have been
adequately valued from the start.
On May 17th, 1915, in a report addressed to the Imperial Chancellor,
I wrote as follows:
"It is not a bit of good glossing over things. Our best plan, therefore,
is frankly to acknowledge that our propaganda in this country has,
as the result of the _Lusitania_ incident, completely collapsed.
To everyone who is familiar with the American character this could
have been foreseen. I therefore beg leave to point out in time,
that another event like the present one would certainly mean war
with the United States. Side by side in the American character
there lie two apparently completely contradictory traits. The cool,
calculating man of business is not recognizable when he is deeply
moved and excited--that is to say, when he is actuated by what is
here called 'emotion.' At such moments he can be compared only
to an hysterical woman, to whom talking is of no avail. The only
hope is to gain time while the attack passes over. At present it is
impossible to foresee what will be the outcome of the _Lusitania_
incident. I can only hope that we shall survive it without war. Be
this as it may, however, we can only resume our propaganda when
the storm has subsided."
Here I should like to intrude a few of my own views regarding the
importance of public opinion in the United States.
In Europe, where people are constantly hearing about the truly
extraordinary and far-reaching authority of the American President--the
London _Times_ once said that, after the overthrow of the Russian
Czar, the President of the United States was the last remaining
autocrat--it is difficult to form a correct estimate of the power
of public opinion in the Union. In America, just as no mayor can
with impunity ignore the public opinion of his city, and no governor
the public opinion of his state, so the President of the Republic,
despite his far-reaching authority, cannot for long run counter to
the public opinion of his country. The fact has often been emphasized
by Mr. Wilson himself, among others, that the American President
must "keep his ear to the ground"--that is to say, must pay strict
attention to public opinion and act in harmony with it. For the
American statesman, whose highest ambition consists either in being
re-elected, or at least in seeing his party returned to power, any
other course would amount to political suicide; for any attempt
at swimming against the tide will certainly be avenged at the next
elections.
It must be remembered that public opinion in the United States
is seldom so homogeneous and unanimous a thing as, for example,
in England. Particularly in questions of foreign politics, public
opinion in the Union, stretching, as it does, over a whole continent,
reacts in widely varying ways in different localities, and to a very
different degree. Thus, in the States bordering on the Atlantic
coast, which are more closely in touch with the Old World, there is,
as a rule, a very definite public opinion on European questions,
while the West remains more or less indifferent. On the other hand,
in the Gulf States a very lively interest is taken by the public in
the Mexican problem, and the Pacific States are closely concerned
with the Japanese question, matters which arouse hardly more than
academic interest in other localities. This is also reflected in
the American Daily Press, which does not produce papers exerting
equal influence over the whole nation, but rather, in accordance
with the customary geographical division of the Union into seven
economic spheres of interest--namely, New York, New England, Middle
Atlantic States, Southern States, Middle West, Western and Pacific
States, comprises seven different daily presses, each of which
gives first place to quite a different problem from the rest. It is
true that the New York Press is certainly the most important mirror
of American public opinion on European questions. Nevertheless,
this importance should not lead to the erroneous assumption that
the American Press and the New York Press are synonymous terms.
The perusal of the latter does not suffice for the formation of
a reliable judgment of American public opinion, with regard to
certain questions which concern the whole nation; rather it is
necessary also to study the leading papers of New England, the
Middle Atlantic States, and particularly the West. The reports of
German and English correspondents on feeling in America, which, as
so often happens, are based purely on the New York Press, frequently
play one false, if one relies on them for an estimate of the public
opinion of the whole nation. The "Associated Press," therefore,
makes it a rule with all questions of national importance, not
only to reproduce extracts from the New York Press, but also to
publish precis of the opinions of at least fifty leading journals
from all parts of the Union.
The American daily papers are more important as a medium for influencing
public opinion than as a mirror for reflecting it. The United States is
the land of propaganda _par excellence!_ Every important enterprise,
of no matter what nature, has its Press agent; the greatest of all
is the propaganda lasting for months, which is carried on before
the biennial elections, and of the magnitude of which it is difficult
for the average European to gain any conception. It is therefore
not surprising that the political leaders of the country make very
wide use of the Press in important questions of foreign politics,
to influence public opinion in favor of the Government policy.
Not only the great news agencies, but also all leading newspapers
of the Union maintain their permanent special correspondents in
Washington, and these are received almost daily by the Secretary of
State, and as a rule once a week by the President. The information
that they receive at these interviews they communicate to their
papers in the greatest detail, without naming the high officials
from whom it has emanated, and in this way they naturally act as
megaphones through which the views of the Government are spread
throughout the whole country. In foreign questions it was often
striking how newspapers would hold back their comments until they
had received in this way a _mot d'ordre_ from Washington.
Of course this possibility for the Government to create opinion on
concrete questions only applies so long as a firm public opinion has
not already set in. As soon as the process of "crystallization," as
it is called, is complete, there is nothing left for the Government
but to follow the preponderating public opinion. Even a man like
Mr. Wilson, who possesses an unusually high degree of self-will,
has always followed public opinion, for the correct interpretation
of which--apart from his own proverbial instinct--he commands the
services of his secretary, Mr. Tumulty, and a large staff, as well
as the organization of the Democratic party, which spreads through
the length and breadth of the country. If, in a few exceptional
cases, the President has set himself in opposition to public opinion,
we might be sure that it would not be long before he again set his
course on theirs.