POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
As I mentioned in the first chapter, it was to be expected that
public opinion in America would range itself overwhelmingly on
the side of the Entente. As a result of the violation of Belgian
neutrality, this happened far in excess of expectation. The violence
of the statements of the anti-German party called forth strong
replies from those who desired a strict neutrality on the part of
the United States. The adherents of the latter party were always
stigmatized as pro-Germans, although even the German-Americans never
called for anything more than an unconditional neutrality. This also
was the aim for which the German policy was working through its
representatives in America. We never hoped for anything further.
The waves of excitement ran so high that even the private relations
of the adherents of both parties contending suffered. President
Wilson, therefore, on the 18th August, 1914, issued a proclamation
to the American people which is of special interest because it
lays down in a definite form the policy to which he logically and
unwaveringly adhered until the rupture.
In this proclamation the following sentences occur: "Every man
who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of
neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and
friendliness to all concerned." And further: "The people of the
United States ... may be divided in camps of hostile opinion....
Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and
might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our
duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself
ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels
of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."
The policy outlined in these quotations from Mr. Wilson's proclamation
won the approval of an overwhelming majority of the American people,
for even among the supporters of the Entente there was only a small
minority who desired an active participation in the war by the
United States. Apart from the fact that the traditional American
policy seemed to preclude any such intervention in European affairs,
it was to the interest of the United States to play with unimpaired
power the role of _Arbiter mundi_, when the States of ancient Europe,
tired of tearing one another to pieces, at last longed for peace
again. America could not but hope that neither of the two warring
parties would come out of the war in a dominating position. There
is, therefore, a certain modicum of truth in the view frequently
expressed in Germany that the United States would in any case finally
have entered the war to prevent the so-called "German Peace." But
the question is whether such a peace was possible in face of the
superior strength of our enemies. If we had won the first battle
of the Marne and had then been prepared to restore Belgium and
conclude a moderate peace, it is conceivable that we might have
come to terms with England on the basis of a kind of Treaty of
Amiens. After the loss of the battle of the Marne a "German Peace"
was out of the question. The possibility of such a peace has never
recurred. It was therefore necessary for the German policy to strive
for a peace by understanding on the basis of the _status quo_.
Just as Frederick the Great defended Prussia's newly won position
as a great Power against overwhelming odds, so we were fighting
under similar conditions for the maintenance of Germany's position
in the world.
Our Government had declared _urbi et orbi_ that they were waging a
defensive war, and were therefore obliged to regulate their policy
accordingly. If we had desired a peace like that of Hubertusburg we
should have won. It is often contended in Germany to-day that it
would still have been possible to attain this end. I have struggled
for it in America for two and a half years and am as convinced
to-day as I was then, that by acquiescing in the policy of the
United States we should have obtained a peace which would have
met the needs of the German people, if only those who desired the
same thing at home had been in a position to carry their wishes
through.
In Germany it is also alleged, contrary to my own opinion, that the
German people could not have held out if they had not been driven
on by the "Will to conquer." I regard this view as an injustice to
the German nation. If our home propaganda, instead of continually
awakening vain hopes, had insisted on telling the real truth, the
German people would have faced danger to the last. We ought to
have repeated constantly that our situation was very serious, but
that we must clench our teeth, and our Government must be ready
to seize the first opportunity to end the defensive war by a
corresponding peace.
The controversy about the "German peace" or "peace by negotiation"
must be touched on here because it formed the nucleus of the diplomatic
struggle in Washington. At the beginning of the war these catchwords
had not yet been invented, but their substance even then controlled
the situation. The attitude of the American Government and public
opinion towards us depended in the first place on whether they
thought that we were striving for world-mastery or were waging a
defensive war.
Immediately after my return from Europe I called on President Wilson,
who had taken the opportunity of the war and the death of his first
wife, to withdraw even more than ever from the outer world. He was
generally known as the recluse of the White House. He only received
people with whom he had political business to settle. Particularly
from diplomats and other foreigners Mr. Wilson kept very aloof,
because he was anxious to avoid the appearance of preference or
partiality.
After the disillusionment of Versailles it is difficult for a German
to form an unbiassed judgment of Mr. Wilson. We must not forget,
however, that no serious attempt has ever been made in Germany
to get an unprejudiced estimate of Mr. Wilson's personality. In
the course of the war he has come to be regarded more and more
as unneutral and anti-German, whereas, to the average American
public opinion, he appeared in quite a different light. Later,
after the defeat of our arms, we hailed Mr. Wilson as the Messiah
who was to save Germany and the whole world from dire distress.
When, therefore, at Versailles, the President, instead of unfolding
and carrying through a far-reaching programme for the general
reconstruction of the world, approved all the ultra-chauvinistic
and nationalistic mistakes of the European statesmen and proclaimed
as the aim of the peace the punishment of Germany, Mr. Wilson was
set down in Germany without more ado as a hypocrite.
I think that through all the phases of the war the German opinion of
Mr. Wilson has suffered from sheer exaggeration. The chief mistake lay
in separating Wilson's personality from public opinion in the United
States. In spite of his strong will and his autocratic leanings, Mr.
Wilson is still, in the first place, a perfect type of the American
politician. In his speeches he always tries to voice public opinion,
and in his policy to follow its wishes.
He certainly tries to direct and influence public opinion. But he
changes his front at once if he notices that he has strayed from
the way that the _aura popularis_ would have him follow. In order
to form a correct judgment of Mr. Wilson's actions and speeches
it is always necessary to ask oneself, in the first place, what
end he has in view for his own political position and that of his
party in America. He proclaims in a most dazzling way the ideals
of the American people. But their realization always depends on
his own actual political interests and those of the Democratic
party. Mr. Wilson's attitude has always been synonymous with that
of his party, because the latter can produce no other personality
capable of competing with the President. Therefore, Mr. Wilson
always met with little or no opposition within the Democratic party,
and he was able to follow for a long time his own inclination to
adopt a quite independent policy.
Socially the President is very congenial when once he has made up
his mind to emerge from his narrow circle. He has not the reputation
of being a loyal friend, and is accused of ingratitude by many of
his former colleagues and enthusiastic adherents. In any case,
however, Mr. Wilson is an implacable enemy when once he feels himself
personally attacked or slighted. As a result of his sensitiveness
he has a strong tendency to make the mistake of regarding political
differences of opinion as personal antipathy. The President has
never forgiven the German Government for having caused the failure
of his peace-policy of 1916-17, which was supported by public opinion
in America. In Germany his later speeches, in which he drew a
distinction between the German people and the Imperial Government,
were regarded as hypocrisy. Such a differentiation was at that
time based on American public feeling, which held autocracy and
militarism responsible for the disasters which had been brought
upon the world. The question has, however, never been answered
why this distinction was abandoned by Mr. Wilson at Versailles.
Without wishing in any way either to accuse or defend him I consider
the answer to this riddle to be that the President allowed himself to
be convinced of the complicity of the German people by the statesmen
of the Entente. He was at the time in a mood with regard to us which
predisposed him to such influences. Mr. Wilson was by origin,
up-bringing and training a pacifist. When it is remembered that
with us and in neutral countries it was the pacifists themselves
who were the most indignant at the Peace of Versailles, that they
were the very people who for the most part advised against the
signature of this peace, one can imagine the feelings aroused in
a disillusioned pacifist like Wilson by those whom he regards as
responsible for having thwarted the possibility of an ideal pacifist
peace.
Apart from this, Mr. Wilson at Versailles no longer dominated American
public opinion, and his political power consequently collapsed. In
the United States the old indifference to European affairs regained
the upper hand. Men were satisfied with having brought about a
victory over autocracy and militarism. They wanted nothing further.
The American troops were crowding home, and, finally, feeling in
the United States was still so strongly against us that no one
would have understood the President if he had caused a rupture with
his Allies on our behalf.
At Versailles, too, an outstanding peculiarity of Mr. Wilson's may
have played a part which even during the earlier negotiations had
been of great importance. He is a man who is slow to make up his
mind, and likes to postpone decisions until they are inevitable. He
is always ready to wait and see whether the situation may not improve
or some unexpected event occur. How often during the Washington
negotiations did, first I and then our enemies, believe that we had
set President Wilson on a definite course. But again and again
the requisite decision would be postponed. In Washington it was
generally taken under the strong pressure of public opinion. In
Versailles the Entente statesmen may well have forced a decision
by displaying a stronger will and a wider knowledge of European
affairs. Mr. Wilson was at Versailles in the position of the giant
Antaeus, who drew his strength from his native soil. Once away from
American ground Hercules (Clemenceau) was able to crush him.
At the time I am now describing the circumstances were quite different,
because at that time Mr. Wilson had a reliable support for his
policy in American public opinion. In Germany, at the very beginning
of the war, great resentment was felt against Mr. Wilson for the
cold negative in his reply to the Emperor's telegram in which Mr.
Wilson was asked to condemn the atrocities perpetrated by the Belgian
population and _francs-tireurs_. It was not, however, noticed in
Germany that the President at the same time likewise refused to
receive a Belgian deputation which came to America to beg for his
help.
During my conversation with the President already mentioned, he
made a statement on the lines of his proclamation of neutrality
of which I have already given the substance. My reply that the
American neutrality seemed to us to be tinged with sympathy for
our enemies Mr. Wilson contradicted emphatically. He thought that
this appearance was the result of England's naval power, which
he could do nothing to alter. In this connection the President
made the following remark, which struck me very forcibly at the
time:
"The United States must remain neutral, because otherwise the fact
that her population is drawn from so many European countries would
give rise to serious domestic difficulties."
My remark about the benevolence of the United States' neutrality
towards our enemies was at the time chiefly prompted by the differences
that had arisen with regard to the wireless stations.
The fact that this question arose gives yet another proof of how
little we were prepared for war. By German enterprise two wireless
stations had been erected on the east coast of the United States
as a means of direct communication with Europe, one at Sayville
(Long Island), the other at Tuckerton (New Jersey). Both were partly
financed by American and French capital. As at the beginning of the
war the cable fell entirely into English hands and was destroyed by
them, we had no telegraphic communication with home at our disposal.
We had to fall back exclusively on the wireless stations, when, as
frequently happened, we were unable to make use of the circuitous
routes via neutral countries. Unfortunately it appeared that the
legal position with regard to the proprietorship of the two stations
was not clear. Actions were immediately brought on the French side,
and the closing of the stations by decree of the courts demanded.
Under these circumstances it was fortunate for us that the American
Government, after tedious negotiations with me, took over possession
of both stations. Otherwise they would have been closed and we
should have been unable to use them.
Our satisfaction at this decision was modified by the establishment
of a censorship of radio-telegrams on the part of the American
Government on the strength of the Hague Convention, which prohibits
the communication by wireless from a neutral country with the military
or naval forces of a combatant. If the stations had been publicly
used before the war we should have stood on firm legal ground, for
such cases are excepted by the Hague Convention. Unfortunately the
stations were in 1914 only partially completed, and the application
of the clauses in question was therefore doubtful. It is true that
the stations were ready for immediate use, but as a result of the
French protest the American Government held strictly to the legal
standpoint. In these negotiations we had to content ourselves with
pointing out that whereas our enemies could pass on military information
to their Governments by means of coded cablegrams, we should be
confined to the use of the wireless stations. Finally we came to
an agreement with the American Government that they should have
a copy of the code which we used for the wireless telegrams. In
this way their contents were kept secret from the enemy, but not
from the Washington Government. This course we only agreed to as
a last resource as it was not suitable for handling negotiations
in which the American Government was concerned.
The course of this controversy was typical of the fate of German
interests in America throughout the whole period of American neutrality.
Unfortunately we had absolutely no means at hand for putting any
pressure on America in our own favor. In comparison with the public
opinion in the Eastern States, which followed in the wake of the
Entente, and with the authoritative circles of New York, Wilson's
Administration without question strove for an honorable neutrality.
In spite of this most of their decisions were materially unfavorable
to us, so that a German observer from a distance might, not without
reason, obtain the impression that the neutrality of the American
Government was mere hypocrisy and that all kinds of pretexts were
found for helping England.
This was not the chief impression made on a near observer. In politics
the Americans are first and foremost jurists, and indeed in a narrower
and more literal sense than the English Imperialists, with whom,
according to their old traditions, justice only serves as a cloak
for their political ambitions. I cannot judge how far the Americans
have become full-blooded Imperialists since their entry into the
war, i.e., since about 1917. At the time of which I speak this was
far from being the case. If, moreover, it is a fact that the majority
of the decisions of the United States turned out unfavorably to us,
the question of the American motives should have been carefully
differentiated from the other question as to what inferences may be
drawn from the state of affairs. Even if we had had just reason
to complain of unfair treatment it was for us to be as indulgent
towards America as was compatible with our final aim not to lose
the war. The question is not whether we had cause for resentment
and retaliation, but simply what benefit could be extracted for
Germany out of the existing situation.
At this visit to the White House, the only question that was acute
was that of the wireless stations. This and the negotiations which
I shall mention later, dealing with the coaling of our ships of war
and the American export of arms and ammunition, I discussed with
Secretary of State Bryan. The first time I visited this gentleman he
exclaimed with great warmth: "Now you see I was right when I kept
repeating that preparation for war was the best way of bringing
war about. All the European Powers were armed to the teeth and
always maintained that this heavy armament was necessary to protect
them from war. Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace
because we are unarmed."
Mr. Bryan has always been a genuine pacifist, and later sacrificed
his Ministerial appointment to his convictions. So long as he remained
in office he continued to influence the American Government to
maintain neutrality and constantly strove to bring about peace.
A first attempt in this direction was made from Washington immediately
after the outbreak of the war, but met with no response from the
combatant Powers. At the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated
the offer of American mediation.
At that time a vigorous agitation had begun in New York for the
restoration of peace. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the well-known
editor of widely circulated newspapers, and other well-known
personalities, called together great meetings at which America's
historical mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale
murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, together
with several other gentlemen, staying with James Speyer, the banker,
at his country house. The host and the majority of the guests,
among whom was the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus,
were supporters of the prevailing pacific movement. The question
of American mediation was eagerly discussed at the dinner table.
Mr. Straus was an extremely warm adherent of this idea. He turned
particularly to me because the German Government were regarded as
opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not desired the
war and would certainly be ready at the first suitable opportunity
for a peace by understanding. Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that
he would at once travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr.
Bryan. Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on the
following day I received a wire from the Secretary of State, asking
me to return to Washington as soon as I could to discuss the matter
with him. There we had a long interview in his private residence,
with the result that an American offer of mediation was sent to
the Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone to the
ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who all more or less
rejected the proposal. The friendly reply of the German Government
coincided in principle with what I had said, but added that Mr.
Bryan should first address himself to the enemy, as the further
course of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which was not
yet known. The American Government never returned to the question
and I had no reason to urge them to do so. Any importunity on our
side would have given an impression of weakness. Nevertheless this
interlude was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readiness
for negotiation with the enemy's refusal.
In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to intervene the
American Government thought it necessary to exercise more restraint.
In spite of this, however, President Wilson, before the end of
the winter of 1914-15, sent his intimate friend, Colonel Edward
M. House, to London, Paris and Berlin, in order to ascertain
semi-officially whether there were any possibilities of peace.
Mr. House, who lived in an unpretentious abode in New York, occupied
a peculiar and very influential position at the White House. Bound
to the President by intimate friendship, he has always refused
to accept any Ministerial appointment, either at home or abroad,
although he was only possessed of modest means and could certainly
have had any post in the Cabinet or as an ambassador that he had
liked to choose. In this way he remained entirely independent, and
since President Wilson's entry into office, was his confidential
adviser in domestic, and particularly in foreign politics. As such
Colonel House had a position that is without precedent in American
history. During his stay in London, at this time, he is said to
have described himself to the wife of an English Cabinet Minister,
herself not favorably disposed towards America, as the "eyes and
ears of the President." I know from my own experience how thoroughly
and effectively he was able to inform his friend on the European
situation, and how perfectly correctly, on the other hand, he
interpreted Mr. Wilson's views.
It was not easy to become more closely acquainted with Colonel
House, whose almost proverbial economy of speech might be compared
with the taciturnity of old Moltke.
Unlike the majority of his fellow-nationals, and particularly his
immediate fellow-countrymen of the Southern States, Colonel House,
while possessing great personal charm and the courtesy that is
characteristic of the Southern States, is reserved and retiring.
It took a considerable time before I got to know this able and
interesting man at all intimately. I did not become intimate with
him until the time of the journey to Berlin already mentioned.
Even then it was the earnest wish of Colonel House to obtain for
his great friend the chief credit of being the founder of peace.
Colonel House was particularly well fitted to be the champion of the
President's ideas. I have never known a more upright and honorable
pacifist than he. He had a horror of war because he regarded it as
the contradiction of his ideals of the nobility of the human race.
He often spoke with indignation of the people who were enriching
themselves out of the war, and added that he would never touch the
profits of war industry. He afterwards repeatedly told me that
he had spoken as energetically in London against the blockade,
which was a breach of international law, as against the submarine
war in Berlin. Both these types of warfare were repugnant to the
warm, sympathetic heart of Colonel House. He could not understand
why women and children should die of hunger or drowning in order
that the aims of an imperialist policy, which he condemned, might
be attained. At the same time he was convinced that neither of
these types could decide the war, but would only serve to rouse
in both the combatant countries a boundless hatred which would
certainly stand in the way of future co-operation in the work of
restoring peace. In many of his remarks at that time, Colonel House
proved to be right, since the war was decided mainly by the entry
of America and the consequent overwhelming superiority in men,
money and material.
Meanwhile, as a result of the traffic in munitions, feeling in
Germany had turned sharply against the United States. Our position
with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had no legal
basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which permitted
such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention at our
own suggestion. Nevertheless it was natural that the one-sided support
of our enemies by the rapidly growing American war industry roused
strong feeling in Germany. As a result there began a controversy
with the American Government similar to that with England during the
war of 1870-71. Even in the United States there was a considerable
minority which disapproved of the munitions traffic, though on moral
rather than political or international grounds. It goes without
saying that the agitation of this minority was supported in every
way by the German representatives. There was no law in America
to prohibit such support, which could not, moreover, be regarded
as a breach of American neutrality. It is true that in this way a
few Germans got themselves into an awkward position because they
were suspected of stirring up the German-Americans, who together
with the Irish played a leading part in the agitation against the
Government. In particular, Dr. Dernburg became unpopular in America,
since he began to address meetings in addition to his journalistic
work. The Washington Government regarded him as the leader of the
"hyphenated Americans" who were opposing the policy of the President's
Administration, because the latter took up the strict legal standpoint
that the traffic in munitions was permissible, and that it would
therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic
were forbidden after the outbreak of hostilities. President Wilson
himself even had an idea of nationalizing the munition factories,
which would have rendered traffic with the combatant Powers a breach
of international law. When, however, he sounded Congress on this
matter, it became evident that a majority could not be obtained
for such a step. The United States had already brought forward
a similar proposal at the Hague Conference with the intention of
conceding one of the chief demands of the pacifists. It was in
wide circles in America an axiom that the munitions factories were
the chief incentives to war. As during the first winter of the
war there were very few such factories in America the President's
plan was not merely Utopian but meant in all seriousness, in which
connection it should be noted that American industrial circles were
among Mr. Wilson's bitterest opponents. If Mr. Wilson's proposal
had been known to German public opinion he would have been more
favorably judged.
The negotiations which I had to carry out on this question of the
munitions traffic concerned themselves also with the question of
the coaling of our ships of war. This was based on an agreement
between the American Government and the Hamburg-Amerika line. The
port authorities had at first shown themselves agreeable. As a
result of the English protest the attitude of the American Government
became increasingly strict. With the actual coaling I had nothing
to do. That came within the sphere of the Naval Attache, who, for
obvious reasons connected with the conduct of the war at sea, kept
his actions strictly secret. My first connection with this question
was when I was instructed to hand over to the American Government
the following memorandum, dated 15th December, 1914:
"According to the provisions of general international law, there is
nothing to prevent neutral States from allowing contraband of war
to reach the enemies of Germany through or out of their territory.
This is also permitted by Article VII. of the Hague Convention of the
19th October, 1907, dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals
in the case of land or sea war. If a State uses this freedom to the
advantage of our enemies, that State, according to a generally
recognized provision of international law, which is confirmed in
Article IX. of the two aforesaid Conventions, may not hamper Germany's
military power with regard to contraband through or out of its
territory.
"The declaration of neutrality of the United States takes this
view fully into account since the furnishing of contraband of war
to all combatants is likewise permitted: 'All persons may lawfully
and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war,
manufacture and sell within the United States, arms and ammunitions
of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war.'
"This principle has been accepted in the widest sense by the public
declaration of the American State Department of the 15th October,
1914, with regard to neutrality and contraband.
"Nevertheless different port authorities in the United States have
refused to supply the necessary fuel to merchant vessels in which
it might be carried to German ships of war on the high seas or in
other neutral ports. According to the principles of international
law already mentioned, there is no need for a neutral State to
prevent the transport of fuel in this way; such a State then ought
not to hold up merchant ships loaded in this way nor interfere with
their freedom of movement, once it has countenanced the supply
of contraband to the enemy. The only case in which it would be the
duty of such a nation to hamper the movements of these ships in
this one-sided fashion would be one in which such traffic might
be turning the ports into German naval bases. This might perhaps
have been the case if German coal depots had been situated at these
ports, or if the ships used them for a regular calling port on
their way to the German naval forces. It is, however, unnecessary
to urge that the occasional sailing of a merchant ship with coal
for German ships of war does not make a port into a base for German
naval enterprises out of keeping with neutrality.
"Our enemies are obtaining contraband of war from the United States,
in particular rifles, to the value of many milliards of marks; this
is within their rights. But toleration becomes serious injustice
if the United States refuses to allow the occasional provisioning of
our ships of war from her ports. This would mean unequal treatment
of the combatants and a recognized rule of neutrality would be
infringed to our disadvantages."
This memorandum played an important part in the subsequent negotiations,
because Mr. Flood, the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs
of the American House of Representatives, interpreted it as amounting
to a German agreement to the supply of arms and ammunition to her
enemies.
In view of the situation in the United States, it was to our interest
to leave the struggle for a prohibition of the munitions traffic to
our American friends. The efforts of Senator Stone in this direction
are well known, and have been recently quoted before the Commission of
the German National Assembly. If a considerable number of influential
Americans took up the case for the prohibition there was far more
hope of bringing it about than if it was apparent that the American
Government were surrendering to German pressure. The pacifist Mr.
Bryan was very sensitive on this point and visited me frequently
to assert his neutrality.
I therefore advised the Imperial Government in this matter not to
send an official Note for the moment, so that the American agitation
in favor of the prohibition of munition traffic might have full freedom
for development. As, however, our enemies continually harked back
to the idea that the Imperial Government did not take exception
to the supply of munitions, I was forced, as the result of continual
pressure from our American friends, to alter my attitude, and,
after receiving permission from Berlin, to hand to the Washington
Government on 4th April, 1915, a memorandum, of which I give the
most important part here.
"Further I should like to refer to the attitude of the United States
towards the question of the export of arms. The Imperial Government
is convinced that the Government of the United States agree with
them on this point, that questions of neutrality should be dealt
with not merely with regard to the strict letter, but the spirit
also must be taken into consideration, in which neutrality is carried
through.
"The situation arising out of the present war cannot be compared
with that in any previous war. For this reason no reference to
supplies of arms from Germany in such wars is justified; for then
the question was not whether the combatants should be supplied
with material but which of the competing States should secure the
contract.
"In the present war all the nations which possess a war-industry of
any importance are either themselves involved in the war, or occupied
with completing their own armament, and therefore have prohibited
the export of war material. The United States are accordingly the
only neutral State in a position to supply war-material. The idea
of neutrality has, therefore, assumed a new significance, which
is quite independent of the strict letter of the laws that have
hitherto prevailed. On the other hand the United States are founding
a gigantic war industry in the broadest sense, and they are not
only working the existing plant but are straining every nerve to
develop it and to erect new factories. The international agreement
for the protection of the rights of neutrals certainly arose from
the necessity of protecting the existing branches of industry in
neutral countries as far as possible against an encroachment upon
their prerogatives. But it can in no way accord with the spirit of
honorable neutrality, if advantage is taken of such international
agreements to found a new industry in a neutral State, such as
appears in the development in the United States of an arms-industry,
the output of which can, in view of the existing situation, be
solely to the advantage of the combatant powers.
"This industry is at present only delivering its wares to the enemies
of Germany. The readiness, in theory, to do the same for Germany,
even if the transport were possible, does not alter the case. If
it is the desire of the American people to maintain an honorable
neutrality, the United States will find the means to stop this
one-sided traffic in arms, or at least to use it for the purpose
of protecting legitimate commerce with Germany, particularly in
respect of foodstuffs. This conception of neutrality should appeal
all the more to the United States in view of the fact that they
have allowed themselves to be influenced by the same standpoint
in their policy in regard to Mexico. On the 4th February, 1914,
President Wilson, according to a statement of a member of Congress
on 30th December, 1914, before the commission for foreign affairs
with regard to the withdrawal of the prohibition of the export of
arms to Mexico, said: 'We shall be observing true neutrality by
taking into consideration the accompanying circumstances of the
case.... He then took up the following point of view: 'Carranza, in
contrast to Huerta, has no ports at his disposal for the importation
of war-material, so in his case we are bound, as a State, to treat
Carranza and Huerta alike, if we are to be true to the real spirit
of neutrality and not mere paper neutrality.'
"This point of view, applied to the present case, indicates prohibition
of the export of arms."
Although during the war all Notes were at once made public, the
American Government were very annoyed at my publishing this memorandum,
which in any case would have met with no success. The agitation for
the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions was vigorously
pressed, and in spite of the "_Lusitania_ incident" never completely
subsided. But the American Government held to their point of view,
which they explained to me on the 21st April, as follows:
"In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing
the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States
to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellency seems to be under the
impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the
United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its
diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit
this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair
attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your
Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of
the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law,
that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress
of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United
States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure
from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently
sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none
of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters
the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade
in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and
be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It
will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, holding
this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out
of the question for this Government to consider such a course."
In the meantime, Colonel House returned from Europe without having
met with any success, but he had opened useful personal relations.
The Governments of all the combatant Powers then held the opinion
that the time had not yet come when they could welcome the mediation
of President Wilson. Colonel House, however, did not allow the
lack of success of his first mission to deter him from further
efforts, and remained to the last the keenest supporter of American
mediation. Since this journey Colonel House and I became on very
friendly and intimate terms, which should have helped to bring
about such a peace.