When Sylla brought back his army to Italy, L. Cornelius Scipio and

C. Norbanus Balbus were consuls: here also we again find patricians

siding with the democrats. If any one of them had had dictatorial

power, and had known how to make use of it; if therefore the military

resources had been properly managed, Sylla must have been lost: for

against the overwhelming numbers of the opposite party, his success

would have been impossible. But the Roman state was at that time so

disorganized, and the leaders after Marius’ death so incapable; that

it was just as it was in France, in the year 1799, when the Directory

was so helpless, that without Buonaparte’s return it would have been

lost. Under such circumstances, rebellions multiply, as the people

expect more from any change, than from the continuance of the existing

state of things. Sylla reckoned on the incapacity of the chiefs of the

opposite faction, and on the hatred which every one had had for their

leaders: that now happened which the judicious Cælius Rufus writes

to Cicero of the contest of Cæsar and Pompey.[99] Even of the new

citizens, very many were filled with disgust and abhorrence against the

actual government, and ready to go over to Sylla, if they had only a

hope of being maintained in their rights: could the ruling party have

relied on the bulk of the new citizens, and on part of the old ones,

Sylla would certainly never have been victorious. He therefore, even

while his first campaign was still going on, made an alliance with

the new citizens in which he confirmed all their rights. Thus, when

he landed at Brundusium, he was received with open arms. Preparations

for attacking him had been talked of; but those ordered by Carbo,

had miscarried owing to the general opposition. Sylla marched quite

peacefully through Apulia; near Canusium,[100] if a statement which

certainly is very likely, be correct, he had a battle indeed with

the consul Norbanus, although it was but an insignificant one. The

main force of the enemy, however, he found encamped near Capua, quite

close to which city, in the neighbourhood of Mount Tifata, he once

more defeated Norbanus; the very troops arrayed against him already

went over to him by whole sections. When still in Greece, he had

begun to treat, endeavouring to bring about a fair agreement without

any exclusive rights for himself; and now he again entered into

negotiations with the consul Scipio, and an armistice was concluded,

and hostages given. But this truce was broken by Sertorius, because

he saw that Sylla was only temporising that he might deceive the

consuls and tamper with the soldiers: he therefore occupied Suessa

which had declared for Sylla. The soldiers, however, partly from

contempt for their general, and partly because they were dazzled by

the renown of Sylla, went over to him in such numbers that Scipio was

left quite alone. Towards the end of the year, when Sylla was gaining

ground in the south of Italy, several of his partisans took up arms:

Metellus Pius, in what is now the Romagna; Cn. Pompeius (Pompey),--who

afterwards got the surname of Magnus, and was then twenty-three years

of age,--in Picenum, where his influence was great, as that district,

which had been subjected by his father, stood in a kind of clientship

to him; M. Lucullus and several others. Their party and their forces

consisted in some degree of old Romans, but mostly of new citizens;

Metellus, however, may have had with him a greater number of the older

ones from Cisalpine Gaul and the Romagna.

The beginning of the next year was most bloody and decisive. Marius the

younger, said to have been a son or nephew of C. Marius (very likely

an adopted son), a young man about twenty-seven years of age, was

consul with Cn. Papirius Carbo. The latter took the command in northern

Etruria and in the neighbourhood of Ariminum, especially against

Metellus, Pompey, and Lucullus; Marius was stationed at the frontier

of Latium, whither Sylla came from Campania where he had passed the

winter. Here the decisive battle near Sacriportus was fought, probably

on the road from Segni to Palestrina, hard by the latter place: perhaps

there was only a defile. Marius had concentrated thither all the troops

which belonged to him, most of which were Samnites, that he might cover

Rome; and so long as he held this position, Sylla could not march by

the Appian road against the city. All this country, as well as Etruria,

was the stronghold of Cinna’s party, the Latin towns there being most

zealous in the cause: the rest of the Italians, on the other hand,

with the exception of the Samnites and Lucanians, seem to have been

lukewarm, even when they did not keep aloof. Thus at Sacriportus, Sylla

gained a decisive victory, and, it is said, with very little loss to

himself. Marius fled to the strong town of Præneste, which was quite

devoted to him, and was also at that time a very large place; the

Palestrina of the present day, a town of six thousand inhabitants,

is but a part of the ancient _arx_, and lies within the precincts of

the temple of _Fortuna_. Here Sylla hemmed in his conquered foes,

intrusting the siege to Q. Lucretius Ofella, who blockaded and starved

the city in which, besides the Prænestines, there were old Romans, and

Samnites.

Sulla himself marched upon Rome. As yet, he displayed great moderation;

nay, had it not been for the infatuation of his opponents, he would

perhaps have made up his mind to settle affairs without bloodshed: but

these were quite drunk with rage; for there was a fanaticism among

them, just as there was at the destruction of Jerusalem. Even in the

last days of the rule of Cinna’s party, the prætor Damasippus had

all the partisans of Sylla, whether open or suspected, put to death,

particularly the senators: among those who were thus murdered, was the

venerable _pontifex maximus_, Q. Mucius Scævola, who, being conscious

of his innocence, had not left the city. But as this fury after all

did not give them strength to defend the city, the leaders made their

escape. Rome opened her gates to Sylla, and he promised moderation;

but his moderation had a terrible meaning. He first went to Etruria,

where Carbo was: on the side of the Etruscans, the war was truly a

national one, as Sylla took away from them the rights of citizenship

which had been granted them: the details of this campaign are shrouded

in impenetrable darkness. Carbo had posted himself near Clusium, from

whence he made two vain attempts to relieve Præneste; he also engaged

in other expeditions which were equally unsuccessful, as, for instance,

that against Picenum, in which Carinas was concerned. The troops of the

Marian party dwindled to nothing under his hands, desertion spreading

more and more among them. Of this there were many cases which are quite

inconceivable. Even at the very outset, P. Cethegus, one of the twelve

who were outlawed with Marius, had surrendered himself to the mercy

of Sylla; and Albinovanus, to make his peace with him likewise, now

murdered his colleagues and legates at a banquet.

The last effort was made by Pontius Telesinus, whose brother commanded

with Marius the Samnites in Præneste. He and the Lucanian M. Lamponius,

had tried to relieve Præneste, and had failed; after which, believing

Sylla to be out of the way, they marched in all haste to surprise

Rome: but Sylla heard of it, and came up just in time to ward off

the danger. Had they been successful, they would have destroyed

Rome; but the very fear of this must have roused the Romans to exert

themselves to the utmost. There were said to have been forty thousand

Samnites and Lucanians; the dread of such allies led many a partisan

of Marius to fight under the banners of Sylla. The terrible battle

near the Porta Collina now followed, by which the fate of the world

was decided; and it was only after fortune had long wavered, and had

often been in favour of the Samnites, that Sylla in the evening of the

day broke through the ranks of the enemy: so great was their defeat,

that Telesinus died by his own hand. After such a blow, Marius also,

and the younger Telesinus in Præneste, gave themselves up for lost.

They tried to escape from the town by passages under ground which led

into the open fields; but the outlets were guarded, and so they both

killed each other. Of the son of Marius, we cannot say as we did of

the father, “he was a great man:” he was rather a dreadful man; he had

the faults of his father, without any of his great qualities but that

of perseverance, in which, under such circumstances, there is nothing

so very wonderful. Carbo also soon fled from his men to Africa. Unless

perhaps in Spain, the party had no longer an army; and in Italy,

although single towns still held out, the war was virtually at an end.

Eight thousand Samnites had been taken prisoners in the battle before

the Colline gate; and Sylla had them surrounded with troops in the

Campus Martius, and cut down to a man. When also, after the death of

the younger Marius, Præneste surrendered at discretion, he caused the

Roman citizens, the Prænestines, and the Samnites, to be divided into

three bodies: to the first he granted their lives; but the Prænestines

and Samnites he ordered to be shot down with javelins. The Etruscan

towns yielded to him one after another, and met with the same fate as

Præneste, besides being razed to the ground. Thus also fared Clusium,

Aretium, Populonia, and Volaterræ; the latter after a two years’

siege. So perished likewise all the larger towns of Etruria; with the

exception perhaps of Fæsulæ, which, however, may also have been rebuilt

afterwards.

At Rome, Sylla now held absolute sway, and although until then had

been humane, he all at once showed himself at length a bloodthirsty

monster. For he gave for the first time the example of a proscription;

that is to say, he made out a list of all those whom not only any one

might kill with impunity, but on whose head moreover a price was set.

There were among his victims few indeed who were to be compared to

those whom Marius and Cinna massacred; but in the extent of suffering

inflicted, nothing could surpass the revenge of Sylla, who visited even

whole peoples with his wrath. That proscription affected the lives of

several thousands; two thousand four hundred knights[101] are said to

have been in it: that so many had been on the list, seems doubtful.

Twenty-three (according to another, but probably incorrect statement,

forty-three,) legions had military colonies allotted them. The first

colonies of Rome were settlements, in which one of every _gens_ was

placed to garrison the conquered towns; these men had a third part of

the land, and, of course, they kept themselves under arms. The Latin

colonies were divided between the Romans and Latins: very likely, every

one who belonged to them had served as a soldier; but this was only

an accidental circumstance, that colonisation being no special reward

for military service. After the second Punic war, we meet with the

first instances of the _ager publicus_ being assigned to superannuated

soldiers; and in Bononia alone there are signs of a still continuing

obligation to serve in war, a difference being made there between the

lots given to horsemen, centurions, foot-soldiers, &c. Sylla’s are the

first true military colonies, a system by which the inhabitants of some

particular town were stripped of the whole of their land, and some

legion or other, which was now discharged, was to form the population

there: should the territory of the town not be sufficient, there was

added to it from the adjoining districts as much as was required. Thus

the soldiers gained a right of having land assigned to them, a right

to which in former days plebeianism only could give a title. According

to an old and extremely plausible Florentine tradition,--which cannot

indeed be traced to any classic author, but which is all but proved by

an old reading in the orations of Cicero against Catiline,[102]--we

may say that Florence has risen as such a military colony out of the

old Fæsulæ; thus it was also with New Aretium and several places of

Etruria, with Præneste and other towns, of which, however, few only

can be ascertained by satisfactory evidence; in these cases, the

inhabitants had almost everywhere been murdered. These legions were the

corner-stone of Sylla’s power. Something of the same kind was done in

places where the old inhabitants were not exterminated: the new comers

became κληροῦχοι, whilst the old residents had to pay a land tax for

the allotments which they still retained. This was especially the fate

of the old Latin colonies. Those which did not fare thus, had by the

_lex Julia_ become _municipia_, and remained as such; those, on the

other hand, which Sylla had proscribed, were now called _coloniæ_,

not, however _Latinæ_, but _Romanæ militares_,--Sylla’s military

colonies. These are the _coloniæ_ of which Pliny[103] speaks, and

which always have been mistaken. This matter was an obscure one even

for the ancients: Asconius Pedianus, a writer of first-rate historical

learning, did not in his time understand how Cicero could have called

Placentia a colony, when it had become a _municipium_.[104] Nearly the

whole of Etruria became a wilderness, and the towns which had not been

turned into military colonies, lay in ruins as late as in the days of

Augustus. The Samnite nation he had all but rooted out, the whole of

the Hirpinian country being laid waste: all that had been made _ager

publicus_, was left by him to his favourites.

A marked feature of Sylla is a sort of fantastic activity. He looked

upon himself as born to be the achiever of great things, especially as

a reformer: he was aware of the disorganized condition of the nation;

but he did not know that when what is old is worn out, the only thing

to be done, is to create, in the spirit of the ancient institutions,

new ones which are suited to the age. What Sylla wanted to do, could

have been of no avail whatever: it was the restoring of what was dead,

the return to a state of things which had fallen away because the life

had fled from it;--he recalled the old forms of the republic into

existence, and believed that they had strength enough to stand. He

thought (as in Tieck’s World Turned Upside Down) that he could push

the world back to the point at which in his opinion it ought to have

stopped. Moreover, he deemed himself called upon to rule; and therefore

he stuck at nothing, as he held that he was above all these forms, so

that they did not affect him in the least.

He reorganised the senate, which was fearfully diminished after the

many executions. It might have been expected that he would have tried

to restore it from the ranks of the old nobility; yet instead of doing

so, he selected the new senators--with a remarkable inconsistency,

which shows that notwithstanding all his arbitrary rule, he was swayed

by circumstances--not only from the knights, but also from his own

low-born centurions, who were ready, it is true, to lay down their

lives for him. He had not the elements of an aristocracy at hand: the

party, which really had vitality, influence, and refinement of mind and

manners, being that of the monied classes, the knights and the Italian

_municipia_. These he hated and wanted to crush; and as in such cases,

one has usually recourse to the rabble, thus Sylla, true to the example

of all oligarchs and counter-revolutionists, filled up with the lowest

of the people his senate which was a mere skeleton, and ought most

naturally to have been recruited from the rich class of the _equites_;

this was just as in the year 1799 at Naples, when the dregs of the

populace were armed. Whilst wishing to save the republic by forms, he

began by departing from them himself.

As long as his influence lasted, even for four years running, a

patrician and a plebeian were regularly made consuls; before that

plebeians alone had often been chosen for four or five years in

succession: beyond this Sylla durst not go, as all the leaders of his

party were plebeians. This was indeed quite a childish arrangement.

The tribuneship he brought back to its original state, as it was before

the Publilian law of the year 283; which was as much as going back

four hundred years. For he took away from the tribunes the right of

bringing bills into the assembly of the people, and revived the old

way of making laws: these were now proposed by the consuls, and passed

by the senate and the centuries. One might wonder at his not having

restored the curies; yet he could not do this, as they were so changed

that he would have had in them a democratical assembly. As he neglected

every means which ought to have been tried for raising the state again

to a healthy condition, he despaired of all gradual improvement, and

therefore he rushed headlong into violent measures and all kinds of

makeshifts. Much might be said for his changes in the tribuneship, as

at that time the office could no longer be made available for good:

it had become a nuisance, every one cried out against it; and so

the tribunes were henceforth to be only _ad auxilium ferendum_. No

tribune of old could have been allowed to have a curule office, as he

was a plebeian; and therefore Sylla, wishing in this respect also to

retrograde, lessened the influence of the tribunes by enacting that no

tribune, after having laid down his magistracy, should fill any office

which was a stepping-stone to the senate.

To secure himself still further, he deprived the children of those

who had been proscribed, of part of their rights as citizens, that is

to say, of eligibility to hold office. This unjust law remained many

years in force until Cæsar repealed it.

The administration of justice he gave back to the senators. The knights

had employed the power which they had acquired by the exercise of such

jurisdiction, entirely against the nobility. The senators should now

have taken some care to do away with the old reproaches made against

them, by judging righteously; but the courts were never as venal as

they were then. Sylla’s faction so basely and infamously abused the

advantages which they had gained, that they cut their own throats; and

had it not been for the military colonies, a heavy vengeance would soon

have been wreaked upon them.

Sylla was a very active legislator, nor are every one of his enactments

to be found fault with. For though he showed great want of sense in

his constitutional measures, in those which were administrative, as in

criminal legislation, he did things which prove that he had excellent

advisers; in fact, he was the first who placed these matters on even a

tolerable footing. And for the management also of criminal trials, his

regulations were real improvements. He likewise made a _lex annalis_ to

settle the order in which the different offices were to be held.

Moreover, it is one of Sylla’s changes that there was a considerable

increase in the number of the magistracies and priesthoods. In the

earliest times, the pontificate consisted of four members, two from

each of the oldest tribes, besides the _pontifex maximus_: so it was

with the augurs. Afterwards, the number of the pontiffs was, by the

addition of four plebeian ones,[105] raised to nine, in which the

_Pontifex Maximus_ was included, his office being common to both

orders; the augurs were also increased, as it was still intended in

those days that the two orders should share the priestly dignities

alike. It cannot be stated with certainty, when this was no longer

done; yet it must have been before the _Lex Domitia_. Sylla himself

thought no more of dividing these between the patricians and plebeians;

so much did the power of circumstances prevail over the crotchets which

he otherwise used to form! He suspended the _lex Domitia_; restored to

the priestly colleges the right of co-optation; and raised the number

of the pontiffs[106] and augurs to fifteen.

This had no material influence on the state; but certainly the great

increase of the prætors and quæstors had. By his reforms of the

criminal law, he assigned to the prætors the _quæstiones perpetuæ_;

and because the vast extent of the commonwealth had now made many

more accountants necessary, he raised the establishment of quæstors

to twenty. Thus there was a considerable multiplication of curule and

other dignities. The senate he enlarged to six hundred;[107] and now

every year, more as a matter of course than by any wish of his, the

twenty quæstors came into it, forming the thirtieth part of the whole

body. As no one was quæstor more than once, its numbers were almost

always full, and thus the censors all but lost their power of choosing

the members. Thus the question whether the senate was elective, is

placed in quite a different light. The senate is never to be looked

upon as a representative body, unless it were in the very earliest

times, when it was elected directly by the curies; its being filled up

by the quæstors, makes it indeed an elective assembly.

Sylla had a body-guard of freedmen whom he called Cornelians, and

these soon became most powerful people. That at that time, anybody in

the country towns who had either interest or connexions with these

Cornelians, especially with Chrysogonus, Sylla’s favourite, might

do whatever he listed, and even commit murder; is borne out by the

evidence of Cicero’s orations _pro Sexto Roscio Amerino_ and _pro

Cluentio_. The state of things in those days, was horrible and shocking

beyond description.

Sylla gave all these laws as dictator, which, after the deaths of

Marius and Carbo, he had caused himself to be made for an indefinite

period by the interrex L. Valerius Flaccus. It was thought that he

would never again lay down the dictatorship; but he held it only

two years. He was tired of every thing around him: he would either

have had to wage wars abroad, for which perhaps he felt that he was

too old, and for which he had no longer any taste; or he must have

gone on with reforms at home, though he thought that this had been

done already as far as it was practicable.[108] For this reason he

resigned the dictatorship, a step which was not by any means so very

bold as it would seem; for the condition of the republic, the utter

prostration of the enemy, and his military colonies insured his safety.

He went to Puteoli, where he was attacked by that most dreadful of all

diseases, the phthiriasis: his whole body became full of boils which

bred vermin. This in all likelihood is no romance: the chief cases of

this disorder are those of tyrants, like Philip II., Herod the king

of the Jews, Antiochus Epiphanes, and of land-owners who have ground

down their peasants; but the philosopher Pherecydes likewise had it.

Though Sylla’s strength was wasted away by this sickness, his death was

brought on by an accident, and it was most lucky for him that he died

before the whole of the machinery which he had created fell to pieces.

He thought, that in Puteoli he might even lead history astray, and make

posterity believe that all his measures had only been overthrown by

the bad management of those who came after him; yet he still ruled the

state, even from thence, by means of his trembling creatures who could

not do without him. He amused himself at Puteoli with the legislation

of the place, wishing to seem as if he were nothing more than a plain

citizen, yet for all that his will was to be law: being contradicted

one day, he got into such a rage that he broke a blood vessel and

died, at the age of sixty. Even if his death had happened ten years

later, his last days would have been peaceful: the party against him

was crushed, the tribunes were paralysed, and the whole of Italy was

occupied by military colonies on whose devotion he could rely. His body

was brought to Rome; and the pomp of his burial, which was not inferior

to that of Augustus, shows that his rule was not dependent on his

person, nor on the circumstances of the moment.

LITERATURE. MANNERS AND MODE OF LIVING.

With the consulship of Lepidus and Catulus began the History of

Sallust, the loss of which, to judge from the fragments, is one of

the most painful of all those which we have to mourn over in Roman

literature, not only on account of the matter in it, but above all,

because of its value as a work of art. The history of the Social

War was written by Sisenna, who was in some measure a forerunner of

Sallust: he was also an earlier acquaintance of Cicero’s, who does not

speak over favourably of the literary merits of his writings. Yet I am

inclined to think that here we should not blindly follow the opinion of

Cicero: for Sisenna’s manner was one which he did not like; it was the

_horridum_ of the ancients, an imitation of Clitarchus.[109] He wrote

quite differently from his predecessors, in reading whose fragments we

can hardly believe that any one could ever have written in such a way.

At that time, the whole style of literature was changed. It was as in

Germany about the period of the Seven Years’ War; and just as there

were then some stragglers in our republic of letters, thus was it also

in Rome. Among these I class Claudius Quadrigrarius, who has still the

stiff, uncouth, quaint manner: the want of refinement in the whole of

his performances is quite astonishing.

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