Pacuvius, who was somewhat younger than Ennius, and very much younger

than Plautus, ranks very high among the poets; he was exclusively a

tragic writer, and undoubtedly a very good one: not a trace, however,

is to be met with among the Romans of anything like the Satyric plays.

In the beginning of the seventh century, Terence introduced quite a

different manner, which, if compared with Ennius and Pacuvius, and

Plautus above all, is infinitely more modern: he is already quite free

from the πῖνος of antiquity, as there are good grounds for believing

that his writings have never been revised.--Somewhat younger was

Cæcilius Statius, a Campanian, whose comic skill and playfulness are

praised by Cicero, who, however, finds fault with his language: his

fragments, especially a larger one in Gellius, give us no great idea of

him. A far greater poet was L. Attius (not Accius, nor Actius either),

who lived to so great an age so that even Cicero still knew him. His

was a truly tragic genius; and he not only composed after the Greek

models, especially after Æschylus,--what we have left to us in this

style is so beautiful, that it may very well be placed by the side of

what the Greek has written,--but he also wrote _prætextatæ_, that is

to say, historical pieces in the manner of Shakspeare, which are not

tied down to the unities of time or place. He came much nearer to the

form of the Greek dramas than his predecessors had done; at least the

anapæsts of four feet in his choruses were strictly according to the

rules of Greek verse: in his own tragedies also, the _senarii_ and

anapæsts seem to have been the prevailing measures, and not the long

verses of Ennius and Pacuvius; and though indeed the _senarii_ are

not formed quite so accurately as in Greek metres, they are much more

so than in Terence. His anapæsts are already metrical, and not merely

rhythmical; whereas, on the contrary, the _prætextatæ_ were composed

in long rhythmical _octonarii_, part of which were iambic and part

trochaic. In him we have a proof how much quicker the ear of the Romans

had already become. It was not so with his contemporary Lucilius, from

Suessa Aurunca, who indeed made use of a hexameter of dactyls and

spondees, but with much greater licence than even Ennius had done,

as the hexameters which can only be scanned according to rhythm,

are really _sermoni propiora_: of the laws of Greek versification,

he either had no knowledge whatever, or he entirely set them at

naught. Most of his books were written in hexameters, some of them

in trochaics. Wit and raciness his satires must have had in a high

degree; we might indeed have been reconciled to his slovenly manner

and have enjoyed him, instead of scornfully turning up our noses at

him, as Horace did.--About the same time, the lyric poet Lævius may

have written, who perhaps reached the highest point of gracefulness and

sweetness in the native style.

Prose was still in a quite neglected state; a fragment of C.

Lælius,[110] which has lately come to light, shows how uncouth and

harsh it then was, even harsher than in the times of Cato: only C.

Gracchus wrote prose in measured periods, which nearly approached

perfection. The orators of that age either did not write at all, or

they wrote in a dreadfully stiff style, much worse than they spoke.

The historians before Sisenna had as little claim to the name of

writers, as our knightly authors of the sixteenth century, Schärtlin

von Burtenbach and others. The Roman historians were yet inferior to

them; for the knights were men of action, whilst these were men of the

school, and even then not worth much.

The manners and mode of life had but one aim, that of making money:

even before the civil wars, people had become exceedingly immoral. The

immense riches which had been heaped together by means of plunder and

robbery, were squandered in luxury; the old ways having been abandoned

in everything, Greek fashions were copied as much as possible. The

orator L. Crassus was the first who sent for marble pillars from

Greece, though indeed he had only four set up in his house; before

that, the houses were built of brick plastered over, or of peperino:

the furniture was equally mean. The condition of Italy was wretched

beyond description. Samnium was a wilderness, and Strabo says that even

as late as in his day, no towns there were able to thrive. And yet the

misery had not reached its greatest height, but things were still to

become much worse.

Cicero was in his eight and twentieth year when Sylla died; he had

already made several speeches, and awakened great attention. Older than

he, and not altogether free from envy, but rather inclined to keep

down the younger man, was Q. Hortensius. The latter was in no way to

be compared with Cicero, and being fully tainted with the villainy of

his age, he was ever ready to sell his convictions for money. Among

Cicero’s contemporaries, in those awful times, a number of able men

of very different kinds sprang up. Such upheavings of party spirit

generally have this effect: the _Ligue_ indeed quite blighted the study

of antiquity in France; but it sharpened the wit and quickened the

minds of the people; the Thirty Years’ War did nothing but destroy,

whilst the Seven Years’ War gave a new impulse to Germany, and awakened

the Muses. Sallust was a great deal younger than Cicero, being as yet

a mere boy; but he was a full-grown man when Cicero was still in the

pride of his strength.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION. LEPIDUS. SERTORIUS. POMPEY.

Sylla was still living when M. Æmilius Lepidus, as the head of

the democracy, rose against Q. Lutatius Catulus, the head of the

aristocracy. This movement was one of those convulsions which will

always follow such great events, owing to the infatuation of those who

do not understand the things which have happened. Lepidus was working

_acta Sullæ rescindere_; this counter-revolution aimed at nothing less

than drawing the legions out of the military colonies, dismissing the

senators of Sylla, and putting into their places the children of the

proscribed. (Of those who had been outlawed, hardly one had escaped.)

Lepidus’ whole undertaking was an impracticable one; nor did either his

abilities or his moral worth fit him for such a task. He had himself

taken a part in the struggles of Sylla’s times; and, as we may gather

from the fragments of Sallust’s History, he had purchased confiscated

estates for a mere trifle, and thus enriched himself. In the French

revolution, many people were forced to buy such estates, so as to

bind them to the interests of the revolution; just in the same way,

Sylla had gained over thousands who would otherwise have been hostile

to him, by letting them have estates of the proscribed at a bargain.

Lepidus, however, may have been a worthless man, in which case the

split would be a matter of course: he set himself up as the avenger of

the old Romans who had been ruined. Any party which rules by bloodshed,

must necessarily split: many who had shared in the intoxication of

the moment, were afterwards ashamed of it, and now banded themselves

together in the cause of humanity. Catulus, the colleague of Lepidus,

was an honest man, and devoted heart and soul to Sylla. He undoubtedly

had approved of his atrocities in some measure; but he himself was

a man of honour to whom no foul deed could be imputed; he had kept

himself pure from the purchase of ill-gotten property. As he was a

person of great experience, he was looked upon as a judicious adviser,

and enjoyed on the whole a great deal of consideration; whilst Lepidus,

on the contrary, was not respected at all.

Elements of agitation were not wanting. The old inhabitants of the

military colonies were driven from their abodes, with the exception of

those who, like Ofellus in Horace, kept their estates as tenants of the

new _colonus_ (of these there were probably a great number). Thousands

from the Etruscan and Umbrian municipal towns roamed about as beggars,

ready to fight at any time for whatever cause might engage them: many

soldiers of Sylla, who had already run through the land which they had

gotten, were likewise to be had. The senate, seeing in the enterprise

of Lepidus the beginning of fresh misery, made Catulus and Lepidus

swear not to take up arms against each other. This answered so long as

they were in Rome. In those days,--owing perhaps to a regulation of

Sylla’s,--it was the custom for the consuls not to leave Rome during

their year of office, and it was only after its expiration that they

went to their provinces. As soon then as his consulship was over,

Lepidus betook himself into Gaul, and the war broke out; he himself

in Etruria, and in Cisalpine Gaul M. Brutus, a kinsman of the last

Brutus, had gathered together a great number of desperadoes. An attempt

of his on Rome was foiled, Catulus having been wise enough to get

reinforcements; and thus the whole undertaking burst like a bubble.

After a slight engagement, Lepidus himself gave up all hope, and fled

to Sardinia where he died. His soldiers at first roved about for some

time in Gaul, under his lieutenant M. Perperna; afterwards, they went

to Sertorius in Spain. M. Brutus was defeated by Pompey, and put to

death.

Infinitely more important was the war of Sertorius, of which we should

have been glad to have read a circumstantial account in Sallust. What

was the number of books in his _Historiæ_, we can no longer tell

exactly: we have many quotations from the first five; but these could

by no means have been all. From the fragments of the speeches, we may

presume, that they went down from the war of Lepidus, to which without

doubt the history of Sisenna reached, to the end of the war of Pompey

in Asia. In this work, Sallust may in some degree have adopted the form

of annals, which otherwise he could not bear. It was the last of his

works, the Catiline having been the first.

Sertorius was a Sabine of by no means high birth, of Nursia, a

_præfectura_ where Vespasian also was born, and which even long

afterwards was proverbial for its old-fashioned sternness (_durities

Nursina_). It is a kind of Alpine valley in the midst of the Apennines

(_val di Norcia_), and it only lost its freedom owing to the French

revolution, before which time it was a small democratic republic,

which even had the right of judging cases of life and death without

any further appeal to Rome. On the whole, the different parts of the

States of the Church were quite on a different footing; thus also

Tivoli had such a free municipal constitution.[111] There is no book

which can give us any insight into this state of things in Italy; it is

quite unknown. The papal legate, or delegate, arbitrarily interfered,

just like the proconsuls of old, though he had no formal powers of

government. Some states were under the sternest baronial despotism;

others had wretched communal constitutions; others again were real

republics. In the march of Ancona, the towns had a diet with great

privileges, a system, under which the country was very well off; but

there were other places indeed in which the magistrates did just what

they liked, there being no check upon them. In the States of the

Church alone, there were probably a hundred petty commonwealths whose

only point of union was the Pope. All this was done away with by the

Revolution, and remained so, the system of præfects being introduced

instead.

To this very day, the people of the Val di Norcia are looked upon

as rough mountaineers, and indeed also as what the Italians call

_facinorosi_. When they come to other parts of the country, they are

very apt, from their wild habits, to become malefactors and banditti;

but in their own home they behave very quietly, as an old Roman Abbé

has assured me. In Cicero’s day, they bore the character of having kept

up the old Sabellian manners in their purest state, like the Marsians,

Hernicans, and Vestinians.[112]

Sertorius had risen by his valour alone. In the times of Cinna, he had

delivered Rome from the freedmen of Marius; when Sylla came to Italy,

he was a _legatus_ of the consuls. And now, when in the following year

Carbo had managed affairs in Etruria in a hopelessly wretched way,

he succeeded in getting a commission out in Spain to maintain that

province for his party. Had he chanced to be at the head of Marius’

faction, (which was not the case, as he was above all intrigues,)

he would have baffled the plans of Sylla. In Spain, not merely from

policy, but because he was a man of noble mind, it was his aim to

win over the Spaniards; wherever he could remedy their grievances,

he did it, not treating them as despised provincials, but trying as

much as possible to amalgamate them with the Romans: he thought of

holding out in Spain, even when Italy was entirely lost. He had an

army in the eastern Pyrenees, on the road which leads from the country

between Perpignan and Collioure, with which he made head against the

enemy under Livius[113] Salinator: but his men, after having already

beaten off Annius whom Sylla had sent against them, were seduced to

go over to the other side; on which he was forced to flee with a few

followers who were true to him. This piece of treachery was part of

Sylla’s astonishing luck. Sertorius at first roved over the sea, where

the Romans had little power, and the pirates had greatly spread; then

he tried for some time to maintain himself in Ivica. From thence he

fled to the Lusitanians, who were the sworn foes of the Romans, and

who trusted in his honour and uprightness; but as he could not stand

his ground against overwhelming numbers, he embarked for Mauritania:

there he declared for one of the two pretenders to the crown, and

took Tangier, and got a great deal of booty. He was even thinking

of withdrawing from public life altogether, and going to the Canary

islands, so as to be out of the reach of Roman rule, and to live there

in freedom; when there now came again to him an invitation from the

Lusitanians, and with it the hope of being able to achieve something.

The Roman commanders had, as usual, given vent to their rage in Spain,

and had made the pursuit of Sertorius a pretext for plundering;

Sylla moreover was dead, and in so distant a province, the belief

that the fabric which he had built would fall to pieces, was quite

natural. Romans and Spaniards declared for Sertorius; particularly the

half-citizens (_hybridæ_), who, being the children of Roman soldiers by

Spanish women, had no franchise, but yet considered themselves as Roman

citizens, and had Roman names, and also spake both Roman and Spanish:

they were the corner-stone of his power, the link which connected

him with the Spaniards. Proscribed Romans who had hidden themselves

hitherto, now came forward to join him; the Spaniards likewise,

especially the Celtiberians, were filled with enthusiasm for him and

took up arms.

As soon as he could look upon himself as having the chief command in

Spain, he proceeded, according to a well-arranged plan, to change the

Spaniards into Romans, so that they were to take their tone from Roman

civilisation and Roman life; but he did not wish to sacrifice any of

that loftiness which the Spanish character had of its own. He gathered

from among the proscribed, and the other Romans who were scattered in

the provinces, from among the _hybridæ_, and partly also, no doubt,

from among the noble Spaniards, a senate of three hundred members,

which is spoken of in history (_Sall._ Fragm.)[114] as _Senatus

Hispanicus_; thus making a Rome out of Rome. Then he established at

Osca, a town in the north of Spain (the Huesca of the present day), an

academy, into which he got together the sons of the most distinguished

men, and had them instructed in the Roman language and grammar,

according to the ancient meaning of that word. They were also, like

the young Romans of rank, adorned with the _bulla_ and dressed in the

_prætexta_; it is evident that he secured to them the Roman franchise.

These boys were at the same time to be to him the hostages for the

fidelity of the parents, a thing which was very necessary, owing to the

capricious disposition of the Spaniards. There was moreover formed

around him a body-guard of men who, according to a custom which was

peculiar to the Spaniards, took a vow not to survive him, and therefore

in fighting for him, fought also for their own lives: this he readily

agreed to, and it was a very numerous band. He also worked on their

imagination, addressing himself to their own fancies. We need not

assume with Plutarch, that it was trickery and cunning: it is very

possible that, living among them, he shared their prejudices, when

he treated a white hind as a fairy who disclosed to him the future.

I believe that he was open to such impressions, like his master and

instructor Marius.

The war lasted eight years from his first appearance in Spain to his

death; but in fact there were not more than six years from the time

when, after the downfall of his party, he placed himself at the head of

the Spaniards. The Romans sent Q. Metellus--called _Pius_ on account of

his filial love to his father Q. Metellus Numidicus--against him into

Bætica. Metellus was at first successful; but Sertorius soon gained

more and more the advantage over him, so that the Romans gave the

command to Cn. Pompey.

Cn. Pompey, at that time, was still of the equestrian order, that is

to say, he had not yet held any office which entitled him to be chosen

into the senate; he was about thirty years old. It is very difficult to

speak at all decidedly of Pompey, as he is not one of those characters,

like Marius, Sylla, Sertorius, or Cæsar, the outlines of which are

distinct and marked; it is even hard to say whether he was a great

general or not. He was one of those whose high position depends on

their having been, if not altogether, at least to a certain degree

favoured by fortune; he had not sufficient strength and greatness of

soul to display the same bearing throughout a whole life, even in

misfortune itself. There can be no mistake as to his having greatly

distinguished himself under Sylla in the Social War, as the latter, who

certainly was a competent judge on this point, particularly esteemed

him. In the war of Sertorius, Pompey undoubtedly showed himself very

different from Metellus, although Sertorius was superior to him in

generalship; the war against the pirates was uncommonly well planned

and speedily executed; the war with Mithridates was not a difficult

one to carry on, still he was quick and resolute, and turned every

circumstance to good account. Yet from the time of his triumph over

Mithridates to the civil war against Cæsar, he appears to have been any

thing but great, either as a citizen or a statesman. In the madness

of his folly he wants to crush Cæsar, yet he is intimidated by the

factions; just in the same way, he quailed before the faction of

Clodius, and he was mean towards Cæsar, to whose superiority he was

wilfully blind: he behaved like a trimmer and a thorough coward in the

affair of Cicero’s impeachment, and he never could be trusted as a

friend. In his youth, during the war of Sylla, he showed himself cruel;

and Cicero entertains no doubt but that in his old age, he would, if

victorious, have renewed the proscriptions of Sylla. Nor is he much to

be praised for any other great qualities: in eloquence and education he

was nothing remarkable, he was even below mediocrity.

His head on his statues and busts, which we have no reason not to

believe true likenesses, has something vulgar and coarse about it;

in that of Cæsar’s, we see the full expression of his vast and quick

intellect. Pompey from weakness was at different times a different man,

and had very much fallen off in his later years, though he was not more

than fifty-six when he died: in his youth he was a much abler man.

In several campaigns, (in two of them especially,) Sertorius succeeded

so well, that Metellus had to retreat to Andalusia, and Pompey across

the Pyrenees, whilst he himself was able to return quietly into

winter-quarters. Had the Spaniards only stood by each other, he would

certainly have beaten both of these enemies; but he had just as much

to struggle against the traitors among the Spaniards as against the

Romans themselves. In two battles, on the Guadalquivir and on the

Sucro, he withstood the united forces of the two Roman generals, and in

both, one wing of each army was victorious; but as the Spaniards did

not remain true to him, he got at last into very serious difficulties,

notwithstanding all the readiness of his inventive mind. Many towns

fell away from him; but in other quarters he met with all that faithful

attachment is able to do: when Calagurris held out against a very sharp

siege, he did his utmost to relieve it, in which he was also at length

successful. Yet the cowardice and faithlessness of several towns goaded

him into an action which is a stain upon his life: he even sold their

hostages for slaves. It is true that other generals have often behaved

in the same way; but yet he ought not to have done it, as it was at

variance with his noble-heartedness, and his power was altogether a

moral one: the consequence of it was, that the attachment of the other

towns began likewise to waver.

With Sertorius was M. Perperna, a Roman of very high rank, probably a

son of the consular M. Peperna: to judge from his name, he was most

likely of Etruscan extraction, _-na_ being an Etruscan termination

which corresponds to the Roman _-ius_.[115] He had gathered together

the remnants of the soldiers of Lepidus, and had wished at first to

carry on the war by himself; but he was forced by his own troops to

lead them over from Sardinia into Spain, and to acknowledge Sertorius

as commander-in-chief. This man conspired with some other Romans

against Sertorius, who before that had already had several persons

executed for plots of this kind; owing to this circumstance, Perperna

found many who were ready to join him. Sertorius was murdered at a

feast. At his funeral, an incredible number of Spaniards, faithful to

their vow, fell by each other’s hands. Perperna was from necessity

acknowledged as general; but in the first engagement with Pompey, he

was utterly routed, taken prisoner, and put to death.[116]

SERVILE WAR. SPARTACUS. M. LICINIUS CRASSUS.

Pompey was now made consul: he was the favourite of the people, as it

was expected that he would restore the tribuneship. In no other way can

I account for this enthusiasm. It might indeed much rather have been

felt for Cæsar, whose nature was such that no worthy hearted man could

come near him without loving him, even as Cicero in truth was always

fond of him: it is a very noble want of the people, that it longs so

often to find an object for its enthusiasm. Pompey had not yet been

invested with any curule dignity; notwithstanding which, he was consul

with Crassus, a man with whom he was at that time on such ill terms,

that the Romans trembled lest the two foes should take up arms against

each other. But at the urgent entreaties of the senate they made up

their quarrel, and both of them behaved like honourable men; for during

nineteen years afterwards they never were really enemies again, and

they sometimes even appeared to be very good friends.

Crassus had gained his importance as the conqueror of Spartacus. About

three[117] years after Sylla’s death, Spartacus, a Thracian, had with

forty, others say with seventy-four gladiators, broken out of a barrack

of gladiators at Capua. There is a house at Pompeii which is very

like a barrack, with rooms in which arms were found, and which has

therefore been called the soldiers’ quarters. The very fact that there

should have been a garrison at Pompeii, seemed to me quite incredible;

but on closer examination, I recognised the arms as being of the same

description as those described by Livy as having been in use among the

Samnites, which were afterwards adopted by the Campanians, and then by

the gladiators; there is therefore no doubt but that it was a _ludus

gladiatorius_, which we must thus suppose to have been a building of

this kind, in which the gladiators were shut up at night. The number of

the gladiators had gone on increasing; as the rage for them among the

Romans had daily become greater, and such games were the surest means

by which the men of rank could make themselves popular.

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