to the instructions which he had from Rome, and this he did in a way
which is shocking to our ideas. The Epirotes were involved in the fate
of Perseus: although they were not faithful to the treaties which
bound them to Rome, yet the dreadful revenge which the Romans took
upon them, can never be justified. The Roman soldiers were quartered
upon the Molossians, and the senate determined to reward them with the
plundering of the Epirote towns: it was undoubtedly meant to requite
them for the calamities which formerly had been brought upon the Romans
by Pyrrhus. Æmilius was charged with the business of exterminating the
Epirote nation. In seventy places, the Roman army was stationed, and
the Epirotes were ordered to gather together and deliver up all their
gold and valuables, having already been obliged before that to yield
up their arms. When in this manner everything was collected which in
a general plunder might have been spoilt and wasted, all the troops
on the self-same day turned their arms against the inhabitants. One
hundred and fifty thousand Epirotes are said to have been either slain
or led away as slaves, and seventy places to have been destroyed. This
is horrible; it shows the rank degeneracy of the Roman people, as there
is no longer in it any balance of its different elements, but only the
dead weight of one promiscuous mass. Slavery strips man of half of
his virtue, but absolute liberty to do what one lists creates double
vice: as rulers of the world, the Romans thought themselves privileged
to do any thing and everything. After such a deed as this, we cannot
agree with Plutarch in ranking Æmilius among great and virtuous men.
Throughout the whole of Greece, and particularly in Bœotia, things
were just as bad: the sword was put into the hands of the partisans
of the Romans, and their rage was ruthless. In Ætolia, as in all
Greek countries, there were two factions, the one devoted, and the
other hostile to the Romans; the Roman party ruled without any one to
control it, and the lengths to which it went in its outrages, beggar
all belief. Besides other atrocities, it broke into the senate house,
and butchered all the senators who were accused of being friendly to
the Macedonians. Roman troops were sent thither under the command of
A. Bæbius. This frightful state of things extended likewise to the
Achæans: there the party of Perseus had not been very strong, but so
much the stronger was that which had striven to uphold that dignity,
which had been injured by the Romans. These had kept none of the
treaties with them, and they had received separate embassies from
some of the towns, which they had even encouraged; as in the case of
Lacedæmon and Messene, which brought complaints against the Achæans,
whilst, according to the treaty, none were to be listened to but those
which came from the whole of the Achæan league. It was seen how much
the Romans were endeavouring to disturb the peace of the people; they
even required that the exiles should be reinstated. There was among
the Achæans a traitor, Callicrates, who had entirely sold himself to
the Romans, and who was so detested and execrated, that people were
loth to go near him, or even to touch his garment: the more he became
an object of contempt, the deeper he sank in his infamy. After the
victory over Perseus, ten Roman commissioners appeared in Greece,
two of whom, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, went to the Achæans.
They asserted that among the papers of Perseus clear proofs had been
discovered of the treachery of many eminent Achæans, and they now
demanded that the Achæans should pronounce sentence of death upon all
whom the Romans had found guilty. This the senate at once refused to
do, declaring most properly, that the names must be given, the evidence
produced, and the parties regularly tried; those who were brought in
guilty should then be punished without mercy. But the envoys would
have nothing to say to this, they wanted to give in the list after
the executions only; and when they were urged to mention names, they
said, that all those who had been _strategi_ were guilty. Then Xeno,
who had formerly been _strategus_, got up, and declared that he was
so conscious of his innocence, that he would take his trial before a
tribunal in Achaia, and, if this were not sufficient, he would even
defend himself at Rome. The Roman commissioners eagerly caught at this,
and they had a list drawn up by Callicrates of those who were to be
sent to Italy and judged there. There were more than a thousand of
these; some of them made their escape, for which they were denounced
as convicted offenders, and the punishment of death was inflicted upon
them when they were taken. The rest were not brought before a court
of justice at all, but were distributed as hostages in the municipal
towns: it was only after the lapse of seventeen years, that the three
hundred who were still alive, were let go. On this occasion, Polybius
also came to Rome: his lot was soon bettered; for he got intimate with
several families of high rank, and Æmilius Paullus himself made him the
companion of his sons, that he might guide them into Greek learning.
Macedon was nominally declared free; but half the taxes were laid
upon it, which had been formerly paid to the kings,--an example, how
the Romans still exacted tribute from those countries which they
did not convert into Roman provinces. The country was divided into
four states. This splitting into cantons of the strangest shape; the
taking away of all _connubium_ and _commercium_ between them; and the
geographical division of these districts, by which tribes belonging to
the same stock were torn asunder, and others which were quite distinct
were united, are masterpieces of Macchiavellian policy: those which
suited each other were disjoined, and those which clashed were jumbled
together, in order that no moral strength and unity might ever grow
up in the whole. The consequence of this was, that the power of the
Macedonians was completely broken. And yet the Romans were behaving
all the time as if they were giving them a republican constitution: to
every one of these quarters they granted a _synedrium_, and on pretext
of removing those who were dangerous to this new equality, they drove
all the men of rank and distinction out of the country. The advantage
of this arrangement showed itself afterwards in the rebellion of the
pseudo-Philip.
The triumph of Æmilius Paullus is the most brilliant of any which had
been seen until then, owing to the quantity of costly things displayed
in it. The life of Paullus by Plutarch is very well worth reading, and
the account also of the triumph is very instructive: twelve millions of
dollars in hard money were carried in the procession. Yet the people
did not find itself the better for all these riches; its condition, on
the contrary, became worse and worse: the bane of downright poverty
was showing itself; the rabble and beggars were increasing fast. We
likewise now see, and even somewhat earlier already, traces of a
debased moral state: at times, a series of the most monstrous crimes
makes its appearance. Even before the war with Perseus, frightful
atrocities are met with, which have the most incredible ramifications.
In the beginning of the seventh century, two Roman matrons of the
highest rank, the wives of men who had been consuls, were accused
of having poisoned their husbands, and were put to death by their
cousins. Whilst the moral condition grew worse every day, the wealth
of the republic became greater. During the war with Perseus, taxes
had still been paid, which was done no longer, except, no doubt, in
the Social War, when everything was turned into money. This is indeed
mentioned nowhere. Historians talk as if the Macedonian booty, which
Æmilius Paullus brought with him, had been inexhaustible; but the fact
is rather, that the permanent revenues from Macedonia, Illyricum, and
elsewhere, made it now quite superfluous to lay on direct taxes. The
indirect duties only, as the customs for instance, were still paid:
they were part of them rather high, at least in after times, and they
had this peculiarity, that they were raised in a number of harbours as
an excise, whilst in the interior of the country everything circulated
quite freely.
The Rhodians, who had aroused the wrath of the Romans by their pride,
were still left: to these the Romans now turned their attention, and
declared war against them. They on the other hand, being well aware
that resistance was impossible, stooped to the lowest humiliations to
appease the Romans. Those who had actually corresponded with Perseus,
made the negotiations more easy for the republic by laying hands on
their own lives, on which their dead bodies were given up. Others fled,
but could nowhere find a refuge, and were likewise forced to kill
themselves. Polyaratus and Dinon, unfortunately, were really guilty;
they were banished, and they fell into the power of the Romans. Dealing
one blow after another, the Romans now took from the Rhodians all that
they had formerly granted them; nay, even places of which they had
long before been masters: Stratonicea had belonged to them for seventy
years. With great difficulty, by the skill of the Rhodian ambassador,
and through the intercession of Cato who interested himself for the
Rhodians, the war was prevented. The Romans got Caria and Lycia,
hardly leaving to them their nearest possessions on the coast; and the
Rhodians, who for so long a time had lived in friendship with Rome,
had to think themselves lucky in obtaining an alliance, in which they
had to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome, and to support it in war.
They, however, still kept their independent government; and they showed
their sound judgment in confining themselves to their small but noble
island, making themselves everywhere respected by their commerce.
Now follows a period, from the end of the Macedonian to the beginning
of the third Punic war, which is quite barren of events. Polybius had
concluded the first edition of his history with the destruction of the
Macedonian empire, and the reconciliation of the Rhodians. When, after
the fall of Carthage and of Corinth, he once more took his work in
hand, he wrote the wars by which this was achieved, separately; but he
prefixed to them an introduction connecting this account with his first
history, which also contained in a short summary all that happened in
the times between. They are therefore two different works, a fact which
has been frequently overlooked.[51] We follow his example, giving only
what is absolutely indispensable.
Towards the end of the sixth century, the Romans began to attack the
Gauls in the Alps; and soon after the war with Perseus, they took the
Massaliote colonies of Antibes and Nizza from the Ligurians. It now was
their object to bring the coast as far as Spain under their own rule
(601). About the same time, they also tried on the other side of the
Adriatic to subdue the Dalmatians, from Zara to about as far as Ragusa.
They compelled them to acknowledge their supremacy, though not for
long. In Corsica likewise, they made some progress.
The two kings, Prusias and Eumenes, were each of them compromised, yet
in a different way; the former, owing to his connexion by marriage
with Perseus, the latter by his breach of faith. Prusias disgusted his
contemporaries by his abject baseness. In Roman attire, with his head
shaved, and wearing the cap of a slave made free, he came humbly to
Rome, prostrated himself in the senate, and declared himself a freedman
of the Romans. He attained his end so far, that the Romans did not
curtail his territory: he had to give his son Nicomedes as an hostage,
by whom he was afterwards to be overthrown. Eumenes was forbidden to
come to Rome, when his brother Attalus implored for him the mercy of
the Romans.
At the same time, Antiochus Epiphanes waged war against the two infant
princes of Egypt, Ptolemy Philometor and Euergetes II. (Physcon),
and their sister Cleopatra: Cœlesyria was lost; they still possessed
only Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrene. All these likewise, Antiochus made
successful attempts to conquer; he had advanced as far as Memphis, and,
as the Egyptian towns were nearly all of them open places, he was all
but sure of victory: Alexandria alone could have withstood him. But the
Romans did not wish to let him grow powerful; they sent the celebrated
embassy of M. Popillius, who with his staff drew a circle round the
king, within which he forced him to decide upon evacuating Egypt. The
Romans now mediated between the two princes, giving to Physcon, the
younger of the two, Cyrene, and afterwards Cyprus also, on which he
made up, and then again quarrelled with his brother, who had all the
rest. The details do not belong to Roman history.
In the meanwhile, the Parthians had begun to spread. They had taken the
country east of the desert, and ancient Hyrcania which bordered on the
Caspian sea; nor did the Syrian kings keep Media, Susiana, and Persia
long (until 620). The great Parthian empire was then founded, and in
the year 630, the Parthians had already taken Babylon.
In Spain, the wars still lasted. Most of the undertakings there were
directed against the Celtiberians, whom the Romans tried to bring under
subjection. The terms granted by Gracchus were not kept with them, and
thus insurrections and wars sprang up, the history of which is a dismal
one. The Romans had laid upon the Celtiberians the condition not to
build any new towns; at the end of the sixth century therefore, the
war broke out anew, because they had considerably enlarged the circuit
of the walls of Segida, that they might gather together thither. With
this the Romans interfered, and thence the first Celtiberian war
arose. The Romans at first made some progress; but on many occasions
they were also soundly beaten. The small tribes in the mountains of
eastern Castile, and western Aragon, were on the whole an heroic race;
there were four peoples altogether, of which the Arevaci were the
most important: in former days they might indeed have been dangerous
also to their neighbours; but now, all their efforts were only put
forth for the maintenance of their independence. Yet the Romans had
so much the superiority in force, that the wars generally turned out
in their favour, although they did not bring on any final decision.
A Roman general, M. Claudius Marcellus,--the grandson of the great
Marcellus of the second Punic war, and well worthy of him, who also was
thrice consul, a thing which is without example in those times,--in
some measure brought back to the Spaniards the days of Gracchus: he
was quite a man of the old virtue and humanity, and he honoured and
respected these people who were struggling for their freedom, and tried
to mediate for them. But the senate would have it, that the honour of
the republic did not allow of a peace being made with them as with
equals: they must surrender at discretion; then only could one deal
mildly with them. Marcellus, who well knew that a successor might
treat these poor creatures much more harshly, won their confidence in
a way which is so often seen in ancient Spanish history. He concluded
a very fair peace, making them send hostages to him whom he gave back:
they were merely bound to furnish the Romans with horsemen for their
wars in Spain, and perhaps also in Africa. Other generals followed
quite a different course, as, for instance, L. Lucullus, who, after
Marcellus, commanded in Spain: he had flattered himself with the hope
of conquering the Celtiberians, and as he was now hindered from doing
this by the peace of Marcellus, he picked up a war against the Vaccæans
who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. He carried it on with
varying success. Had the Spanish nations trusted each other, and had
they chosen to go forth as one man to fight the Romans, they might have
stood their ground against them, and have pent them to the sea-coast.
But they were utterly wanting in unity. So long, for instance, as the
Lusitanians were not attacked, they were glad to be able to till their
fields, nor did they mind if the Romans waged war against another
people. Hence it was, that the Romans gradually made their way. With
the Lusitanians also, a war had arisen about the same time as that with
the Vaccæans: these did not inhabit the whole of Portugal, as they
had only a little land to the north of the Tagus, but the southern
part, all but Algarve; and they were in a league with the Vettones
in Spanish Estremadura. The Lusitanians were a race of robbers, and
were just as troublesome to the ancient Spaniards themselves as to the
Romans; but they had not yet the great leader, who soon afterwards
arose among them. They plundered the subjects of Rome in Andalusia,
and thereby drew down upon themselves the vengeance of the Romans. How
horribly the Romans were wont to act in those times, is shown by the
fate of Cauca. The men of that town had been bidden by Lucullus, as a
condition of his pardon, to yield up their arms; and when they relied
upon his word, all were put to the sword. This breach of faith made the
resistance of the Spaniards so desperate. The Lusitanians, who were
excellent light troops, were, owing to their forays, very dangerous to
the Romans; nothing, however, can justify the conduct of the latter
towards them. Sulpicius Galba, a distinguished rhetorician and lawyer,
who belonged to one of the first patrician houses, and was a pillar
of the aristocracy, by such behaviour sullied his own fair fame, and
that of his forefathers. He vanquished the Lusitanians, and they sought
for mercy, gave hostages, and surrendered their horses: they were not,
however, the whole of the nation, but only part of it, and as they
were inclined for peace, he declared to them, that he was quite aware
that distress had driven them into war, and that therefore he would
assign them abodes in more fruitful lands. They agreed to this, on
which he made them gather together in three bodies into three different
places; then, under a lying pretext, he got them to deliver up their
weapons, which were to be returned to them in their new dwellings;
and now, whilst they were divided and unarmed, he had them massacred,
perhaps from sheer ferocity, or indeed because he did not trust them.
Among those who escaped was Viriathus, who, by a war of several years
in which they had nothing but shame, made the Romans smart for their
faithlessness. This, however, belongs to a later period. Unhappily,
the crime of Galba had not at Rome the consequences for him which it
deserved. Honest old Cato brought an impeachment against him, and he
was tried for his life, and would have been condemned, had he not
raised the pity of the people by leading forth his own infant children
and those of a cousin.
Of organic changes in the constitution, none can be mentioned as
having taken place at this period: it remains quite the same in its
outward form as it had been since the first Punic war. Some laws are
given, and some little attempts made to remedy existing evils, but
without any effect. Thus the _lex Voconia_ was passed, which forbids
the leaving of property to females either by will or by legacy, except
in the case of an only daughter and child: this clause respecting
the only daughter (ἐπίκληρος) had its reason in the relations of the
clans, such a daughter being bound, just as in Attica, to marry within
her own _gens_, so that the fortune did not go out of it. Yet the law
proves that the spirit of family had already died away: Cicero, in
his Republic, is wrong in judging of it according to the standard of
his own times. The Romans had already gone so far downhill, that no
single law, like the _lex Voconia_, could any longer have staved off
the impending crash. It was then, as forty years ago in England, a time
in which a thorough-going, deep-searching legislation might still have
checked the wayward course of the state. But such timely and thorough
reforms are very rare indeed in history. Fate leads states onward
towards their downfall; and thus I prophesy of the English state, that
within fifty years it will be radically changed.[52] In Rome also,
single laws were now brought in, which were carried against the wishes
of individuals; yet one always made shift to find some quibble by which
it might be evaded. The _lex Ælia et Fufia_ is another remarkable
law: when, and how it was passed, is very obscure; it is generally
considered as one law, but according to Cicero, it is probable that
there were two: they must have been of great importance. As far as we
know of its contents, it enacted that the proceedings of the tribunes
might be interrupted by auguries which had been observed. This shows
in what estimation, even at that time, the old forms still were. To
us, who, of course, look upon the whole system of auguries as a tissue
of lies, this has only the appearance of an extension of priestcraft,
and we wonder how this could have been done in an enlightened age. Yet
it was meant as a mere form. The power of the tribunes had risen to
a fearful height, and now that the augurs received authority to set
forth what might break up an assembly of the people called together
by the tribunes, no one thought in this of signs given by the powers
above: it was only a means for the _optimates_, to check the unbounded
encroachments of the tribunes. By the _Lex Hortensia_ the tribunes
might have laws passed without the consent of the senate; but now the
augurs, who were chosen, half of them from the patricians, and the
other half from the plebeians, but from the most eminent families,
might oppose these enactments, and restrain that unbridled power.
The form indeed is unworthy and offensive, as the augurs evidently
were obliged to tell a lie; yet the meaning of the law, to create a
counter-tribunate in matters of legislation, was a good one. The law is
to be met with in Cicero only; Clodius repealed it.
Among the events which show how greatly the state of things at Rome had
changed, is the circumstance that in the year 600, either a tribune,
or the whole college, ordered the consuls to be led to prison for
having been guilty of unfairness at the enlistment, particularly L.
Licinius Lucullus.[53] Such a decree of the tribunes is so much against
the spirit of the ancient constitution, that this is of itself enough
to show the completeness of the change. This change is a proof that
personal conscientiousness could no more be relied upon. In early
times, the consuls designated every one singly who was to serve in war,
and this had continued to be the custom ever since: at first, nearly
all were taken; afterwards, those who were most able-bodied, and who
were already well trained in war, were picked out. As the legions were
now stationed longer and longer in distant provinces, the burthen of
military service grew more and more oppressive, and many tried to
screen themselves from it by making interest; for the tribunes would,
without giving any reason, get off those whom they favoured. Moreover,
the enlistments, owing to the wide extent of the empire, must have
been fraught with still greater difficulties, as the men had to appear
in person. The system of selection was now done away with, and the
general conscription so managed, that the lot decided the obligation to
serve, and the grounds for exemption were to be considered afterwards.
This was not a change for the worse, but it was still a change. The
tribunes, however, on this demanded that each of them should have
the right of liberating ten, and when the consuls would not allow
this, they arrested them.[54] Still more significant is the fact,
that even before the end of the sixth century, it became necessary to
make laws against canvassing which were directly aimed at venality;
for the form of the organization by centuries was now changed, and
attempts at bribery had become possible. Whether the _Lex Cornelia_
against _ambitus_ is that of Cornelius Cethegus, or of Sulla, cannot
be ascertained, although it has been held to be the former beyond a
doubt; certain it is, however, that as early as in the year 570 a law
was passed against _ambitus_, a circumstance which has become somewhat
better known from the Milan scholia on Cicero.[55]
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR.
The third Punic war had been long threatened, owing to the relations
between Carthage and Masinissa. The peace lasted more than fifty
years, during which the Carthaginians had never given any handle for
complaint, nor do we know of any mentioned on the side of Rome.
It may be said that this must have been a time of some prosperity
for Carthage, as at the end of it we find the city wealthy and
well-peopled. This we may also easily understand: the wars in the
east were highly profitable to Carthage, since as a neutral state it
had free intercourse everywhere; as, for instance, during the war
between Syria and Egypt, when the trade of these two countries was
altogether stopped. The energy of the Carthaginians could not turn
itself to foreign affairs, and therefore it was engaged at home in
accumulating wealth. Whilst, however, Carthage by the peace of Scipio
was placed in fact in a kind of pupillage, its national character and
constitution seem to have quite fallen away: the rottenness of the
government, and the anarchical preponderance of the rabble, was, to
use Polybius’ remarkable words, an old evil, older even than at Rome.
We see that a power like that of the consuls at Rome had by this time
long ceased to exist in Carthage, and that the authority of the senate
was also very much reduced. A people of eastern origin, with republican
self-government, but without institutions like those which among the
Greeks and Romans checked democratical degeneracy, could not but sink
into utter lawlessness.
The real thorn in their side from abroad, was the neighbourhood of
Masinissa. He may have had instructions from Rome; yet, even if it were
not so, he knew well, that however much he worried the Carthaginians,
even though he were hatefully in the wrong, the Romans would never
declare against him. The Carthaginians showed immense forbearance,
and resigned themselves to their hard lot. In such cases, one should
indeed yield to necessity, yet always cling to the feeling of being
unfortunate; for as soon as that is lost, cowardice and baseness spring
up: we can hardly help believing that the Carthaginians had fallen into
this condition, and given themselves up.