Gallis Insubribus et_ GERMANIS. I cannot say positively whether the
piece of stone on which the _er_ stands, has been put in at a later
period or not, often as I have examined that monument. The stone is
broken at the _r_, thus much is certain: but whether the restoration
is new, or whether the piece which was broken off, was again fastened
in, I do not venture to decide. It cannot be _Cenomanis_, the _G_
being distinct; _Gonomanis_ does not occur among the Romans. The thing
is not quite impossible. This would then be the earliest mention of
our national name. In the age of Julius Cæsar, the Germans in all
likelihood dwelt only as far as the Main, or the Neckar at most; but in
earlier times, they lived further to the south, and were pushed back by
the Gauls. Those Germans in the Valais who were known to Livy,[13] are
remnants of that migration.
After the victory at Clastidium, between Piacenza and Alessandria, the
Romans immediately founded two colonies, Placentia and Cremona, on
both banks of the Po: the boundary was pushed on to the Ticinus. There
is every reason to think that Modena also was fortified; but it was
afterwards lost again for some time, during a fresh insurrection of
the Boians. The Ligurian tribes in Piedmont were still independent by
rights, though not in reality.
In the first Illyrian war, the Romans owed their speedy success to
a Greek, Demetrius of Pharus. As governor of Corcyra, having in all
probability been bribed, he had surrendered the island to them; and
by their influence he had been appointed guardian of the king who was
a minor. His was a character in keeping with that age of infamy; he
was a traitor to all parties. He now conspired against the Romans, and
during the Gallic war he excited the Illyrians to rebellion, which
shows that these peoples paid tribute to Rome. Besides this, with a
fleet of fifty _Lembi_, he dared to commit piracy in the Archipelago
against the defenceless Cyclades. The Romans sent over a consular army
under L. Æmilius Paulus; the hopes of the rebels were quickly blighted,
and their capital Dimalus was taken (a name which proves, that the
modern Albanian language is like the ancient Illyrian, for _dimal_
in Albanian means a double mountain). The seat of Demetrius was his
native island Pharus, which the Romans took by a stratagem: he himself
made his escape to Macedon, where the last Philip had just begun his
reign, and he became his evil genius. Thus the second Illyrian war
was very soon ended. The Romans on the whole at that time enlarged
their dominion. We have nothing to inform us when the Venetians
became dependent: in the great Gallic war we find them as allies. The
Istrians, however, were subjected even before the war of Hannibal,
and the Venetians must then have been already conquered; so that the
acquisition of the supremacy over them probably dates from this period.
While all this was taking place, events were brooding, of the fearful
nature of which the Romans were far from having the least conception.
Hamilcar Barcas had turned his eyes towards Spain, thus showing that
he was a truly great man in not allowing himself to be discouraged
by his former ill successes, and in not repining against fate. The
Carthaginians had until then placed all their hopes on Sicily; and
there were fellows indeed at Carthage (like Hanno, by whose speeches
Livy spoils his fine description of the war of Hannibal), who partly
from envy and bad feeling, and partly from miserable cowardice, were
of opinion, that after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, one ought now
to yield altogether. Just as Pitt, after the American war, when it
was believed in foreign countries that the peace of Paris had broken
the power of England, with redoubled courage undertook the task of
infusing new strength into his country; thus also did Hamilcar. At an
early period already, the Phœnicians had settled in Spain. Gades is
said to have been older than Carthage, and that place was indeed very
important as the centre of the trade with the Cassiterides. Tin was
of the greatest value to the ancients for making the copper, of which
they had plenty, fusible: the use of calamine in the manufacture of
brass, is of much later invention. Very likely, neither the Phœnicians
nor Carthaginians had any settlements on the western coast besides
Gades; but they certainly had some on the southern coast, in Granada,
Malaga, and Abdera, and a mixed nation (Μιξοφοίνικες) had sprung up
there, namely the Bastulans. But into the interior the Carthaginians
had not yet penetrated, although they seem to have had connexions
there. The yoke of Carthage was deeply hated in Africa, as was shown
in the insurrection of the mercenaries; now, on the contrary the great
tact of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal shines forth in the foundation of a
Carthaginian empire in Spain: they laid upon the Spaniards a very easy
yoke. Hannibal was married to a Spanish woman of Castulo, and these
alliances between Carthaginians and native women must have been of very
frequent occurrence: among the Romans, such marriages were regarded
only as concubinage. Hamilcar had devised the plan of creating in Spain
a province, which was to make up to Carthage for Sicily and Sardinia,
and from which it might also derive what it could never have got from
those isles: neither Sicily nor Sardinia were able to give Carthage any
considerable military strength. The weakness of Carthage lay in this,
that it had no army of its own; and that great man now conceived the
idea of forming a national Carthaginian army out of Spaniards, who were
partly to be subjected, and partly to be gained over and made Punic.
Southern Spain has immense natural advantages; its silver mines are of
extraordinary richness. The Carthaginians had known of these before;
but it was Hamilcar who first introduced a regular system of working
them, and thus he, or his son-in-law Hasdrubal, was led to found the
town of New Carthage (Carthagena). The stores which had been furnished
by Sicily and Sardinia, were just as well supplied by Spain. They now
got a population of millions, from which they no more took faithless
mercenaries; but there they made levies as in their own country. The
Romans no doubt looked with jealousy at the progress they were making;
yet they could not hinder it, so long as the Cisalpine Gauls stood on
their frontier, prepared to avenge the defeat of the Senonians and
Boians.
The whole of Spain consisted of a number of petty tribes without any
connexion whatever between them; whilst in Gaul, at least some one
nation or other, the Æduans, the Arvernians, held the supremacy. The
Spaniards were of various kinds: whether the Turdetanians and the
northern peoples, the Cantabrians, were of a different race, as the
ancients say; or whether all the Iberians were sprung from the same
stock, as is maintained by that great etymologist, Humboldt, we cannot
decide. Not being acquainted with the language myself, I must abstain
from giving an opinion; yet surely, notwithstanding the great weight
of Humboldt’s authority, the statements of the ancients ought also to
be taken in consideration. Certain it is, that the tribes south of
the Sierra Morena, the inhabitants of Bœtica, had quite a different
character from those of the northern part of the country. They were
highly civilized; they had a literature of their own, written laws, and
books; of their alphabet, which is altogether peculiar to themselves,
and not derived from that of the Phœnicians, there are remnants still
existing on inscriptions and coins. The letters have quite a primitive
form. Yet these peoples were quite as warlike as those of the north:
they were not, however, good for attack, but merely for defence. In
earlier times only, they succeeded in driving the Celts across the
Pyrenees into Aquitain; afterwards, we always find them confined to
their boundaries, within which they made a desperate stand; so that
what an Arab general said of them is true, that behind walls they
were more than men, and in the field more cowardly than women, which
has also been borne out in the latest wars. An exception to this,
however, were the Celtiberians; and the others also showed themselves
brave, when they were trained by great generals like Hannibal and
Sertorius, and likewise in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Otherwise, they confine themselves to desperate resistance, even behind
wretched fortifications; they kill their women and children, and defend
themselves to their last drop of blood. Now Hamilcar, and after him
Hasdrubal, spread further and further, drawing one people after the
other into the Carthaginian league, and training soldiers.
Hamilcar had hardly finished his war against the mercenaries, when he
founded the Carthaginian empire in Spain. He staid there eight years,
of which he made an incomparable use. He died in Spain, and left the
command to his son-in-law Hasdrubal, which was quite different from the
Roman custom. The Carthaginian general not only keeps his office for
life, but he also bequeaths it at his death to his son-in-law, like an
heirloom. It is true that this required a great deal of influence at
Carthage, and this is what Livy calls _factio Barcina_.
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.
Livy begins his account of the war of Hannibal with the remark, which
several others had made before him, that it was the greatest war which
had ever been waged by the greatest and most powerful states, when in
the height of their greatest vigour. Yet now that two thousand years
are passed, we can no longer say the same. The seven years’ war,
especially the campaign of 1757, exhibits a greater accumulation of
achievements than any part of the war of Hannibal; nor is it inferior
in the greatness of the generals. But thus much we may say, that no
war in the whole of ancient history is to be compared to this. Nor is
there, on the whole, any general to be placed above Hannibal, and of
the ancients none can stand at his side. Whilst in the first Punic
war, only one great general makes his appearance upon the stage, we
see in this, besides Hannibal, Scipio likewise, who, as a general, is
indeed not fully his equal, but has claims notwithstanding to be ranked
among the very first; and after him, Fabius and Marcellus, who in any
war would have gained a high renown, and could have only been eclipsed
by men of such extraordinary greatness; and besides these, many other
stars of the second magnitude.
The war of Hannibal has been described by several of the ancients.
It formed the substance of the works of Fabius and Cincius: in those
of the latter it was treated exclusively. He wrote it, as far as
he himself lived to see it, very explicitly, merely prefixing an
introduction on the earlier history. Fabius had a more extensive plan;
he took in both wars. Of Fabius we may say with certainty, that his
account to a great extent forms the groundwork of that of Appian:
Dionysius left him at the beginning of the first Punic war, and he
is there without any guide. I am able to show, that statements of a
marked character in Appian and in Zonaras are taken from Fabius; for
Dio Cassius also acknowledged that he could find no better source.
Very nearly about the same time, Chæreas and Sosilus wrote: of both of
these Polybius speaks with censure; he denounces them as fabulists,
although Sosilus had staid in the camp with Hannibal. It is strange
that Livy did not think of making any use of Hannibal’s short memoirs,
and of a letter of Scipio to Philip of Macedon in which he recounted
his achievements. Polybius has made use of an authentic document of
Hannibal, on a brass tablet in the temple of Juno in Lacinia,[14]
in which the numbers especially were given with great accuracy. As
far as Polybius goes, we have nothing left to desire: the third book
is the masterpiece of what has been preserved to us of his history;
unfortunately we have but the first years of his. He too certainly had
before him the excellent work of L. Cincius, who described this war as
an eye-witness. There was also an account of it in Latin, about the
middle of the seventh century, by L. Cœlius Antipater, probably a Greek
freedman. He wrote with rhetorical pretension, and I think that many
things in Livy are to be traced to him, particularly where the latter
goes off into the romantic. For Cœlius had wished to write history for
effect, and it may not have been without justice, that Cicero speaks
slightingly of him.
In Livy’s work we may clearly distinguish the different sources. In
the beginning, the description of the siege of Saguntum is taken
beyond a doubt from Cœlius Antipater; other parts follow most closely
in the footsteps of Polybius; elsewhere he has either made use of the
_Annales Pontificum_, or of those annalists who had embodied them in
their histories. The whole of the third decade is written with evident
fondness for the subject; yet he is wanting in the knowledge of facts,
in experience of real life, and in the power of taking a general
view: he never gets away from the _umbracula_ of the school. Wherever
he deviates from Polybius, he is altogether unworthy of belief; and
however beautifully his history of the war is written, it is still
quite plain that he was unable to bring before his mind one single
event, as it really happened: his account of the battle of Cannæ, for
instance, is untrue and impossible; whilst, on the other hand, that
of Polybius is so excellent, that one may get a most distinct idea of
the locality, and even draw a map from his statements, and the better
one knows the nature of the spot, the clearer becomes his description.
The work of General Vaudoncourt, published some years ago at Milan
under the title of _Campagnes d’Annibal_, which, merely because its
author is such an able man, has been praised by every body, is an
utterly worthless production. The maps are good for nothing, and the
plans are drawn from fancy; he did not understand how to read an
author critically, he had no knowledge of Greek, and he has not given
anything new: there is only one point of ancient tactics about which
I have learned anything from him. He is especially mistaken in the
notion which he has formed of the battle array of the Carthaginians;
he believes them to have been drawn up in phalanx, which they were
not. They were just as moveable as the Romans, and the sword alone was
the weapon which they relied on: lances they very likely had none,
but javelins in abundance. Ulric Becker’s treatise on the history
of the war of Hannibal (in Dahlmann’s “Researches in the Field of
History”),[15] although not a mature work, is really valuable, and
should not be overlooked.
Hamilcar was succeeded by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who, after an
administration of nine years, was murdered by an Iberian whose
chieftain he had caused to be put to death. This personal attachment
to their princes prevailed among the Iberians: no one durst leave
the death of his chief unavenged,--nay, if possible, he was not to
survive him. Hasdrubal had with him for his education young Hannibal,
who soon became the favourite of the army. The oath of Hannibal rests
on his own authority; the circumstances of it, however, are told
in different ways. He is said to have been nine years old when his
father went over to Spain (516 according to Cato), and this seems to
be historical: if so, he was born about 507, which would make him
twenty-seven years old when he marched to Italy. This is the very age,
at which several generals have shown themselves greatest. Frederic the
Great was twenty-eight years old when he conquered Silesia; Napoleon
twenty-seven, or twenty-eight, when he undertook the Italian campaign.
The whole conduct of Hannibal during this war bears the character of
a very young man; and he was by no means an old one when he died,
being nearer his fiftieth than his sixtieth year. Very likely, he was
born just before Hamilcar went to Sicily. His brothers were Hasdrubal
and Mago. Whether Hasdrubal was his elder, is doubtful; Mago was
considerably younger.
The opinions of the ancients as to Hannibal’s personal character
might very easily have been divided. In the Roman writers, he appears
throughout only as a terrific being. Livy’s delineation of him is in
some parts quite excellent,--no one could gainsay his extraordinary
qualities as a general: yet when Livy says that these were darkened by
_vitia_ of equal magnitude, he is in direct opposition to Polybius.
The latter expressly disputes the fact of Hannibal’s cruelty, and says
that whenever anything of the kind did happen, it was through the
fault of some subordinate commander, especially of another Hannibal.
He also flatly contradicts the statements about his bad faith (_plus
quam Punica fides_). Atrocities may have been committed,--there are
stories of these in Appian which are borrowed from Fabius,--nor will
I doubt in the least that the war was conducted with cruelty on the
side of the Carthaginians; but so it was likewise by the Romans. This
is the general character of the ancient wars, which we are far from
representing to ourselves as so horrible as they really were. Sometimes
also there are cases in which a general cannot help himself.[16] Of
the bad faith of Hannibal, not an instance can be brought forward; on
the contrary, as far as we have any positive evidence, he must have
kept his word; otherwise he would have been taxed with it, especially
in capitulations, and then indeed people would not have capitulated to
him. The Romans are awful liars when they want to lay the blame upon
their enemies. Such stories as the murder of the senate of Nuceria,
and the extermination of that of Acerræ,[17] are unauthenticated. In
peace, he is quite a different man from Scipio. The latter forgot
himself after his victory; he did not find himself at home in the
free constitution of his native city, and as a peaceful citizen he
never was of any use to the commonwealth; the example which he set of
contempt for an impeachment was perhaps highly perilous and baneful.
It was great in him, that he did not make an ill use of the popular
enthusiasm in his behalf: but he was conscious of his own greatness;
he displayed from the very first, when he stood for the ædileship
and the consulship, an overbearing pride; he wished to raise himself
with impunity above the laws wherever he could harmlessly do it. With
the influence which he had, he might have become the source of the
greatest blessings to the state; but this was not the case. Not a law,
not a beneficial measure is to be traced to him. The neglect of the
Roman constitution after the Punic wars, was a principal cause of the
decay of the republic: with regard to this, it was in his power to
have done much good. Hannibal, on the contrary, comes forth after the
Punic war as a public benefactor likewise, as a reformer of the law,
of the administration and finances of his country. Scipio and Hannibal
were both of them well acquainted with Greek literature. Hannibal
had Greeks for his companions, and though indeed they were not the
most distinguished men of their day, this shows that in his leisure
hours he enjoyed a literary conversation.[18] There was something
irresistible about him, which he seems to have inherited from his
father. For sixteen years, he commanded an army which at last, like
that of Gustavus Adolphus, had not a man of the old soldiers left;
but consisted only of a herd of abandoned adventurers. Though he was
placed in the most difficult circumstances, no Gaul ever attempted
anything against him; the ruthless, reckless Numidians never dared
to raise a hand against him. He demanded of the Italians the most
gigantic efforts; he wore them out, was not able to protect them; and
still he so fascinated them also, that they never wavered in their
fidelity. A man, like him, who achieved such things as the settlement
and subjugation of Spain, the march across the Alps, the victories over
the Romans, the shaking of Italy to its centre, we may call the first
and greatest of his age,--indeed we might almost call him the first and
greatest in all history. How little in comparison has Alexander done!
He had no difficulties whatever to overcome. As for Scipio, he entered
the lists against his rival under the most favourable circumstances:
if he had not conquered, Hannibal must have been more than man. But
Hannibal worked for the sole purpose of delivering his country; and
when he returned thither, it was his only object to restore it. Even
when banished, he did not seek for protection anywhere; but wherever he
was, he commanded, he stood forth as a superior, and never bowed before
any one, nor ever sinned against truth. Such a man I admire and love,
almost without any qualification. That he let Decius Magius go from
Capua, was not policy: it was a greatness of mind of which very few
only would have been capable. Scipio could have done it.
The third general of this war, Q. Fabius Maximus, had gained some
reputation already in the former obscure contest: the surname
of Maximus, however, is inherited from his grandfather, or
great-grandfather, Q. Fabius Rullianus in the days of the Samnite
wars, who received it when he separated the four city tribes from the
country ones. He acted in what seemed to him the fittest way, and was
net afraid of doing what might be mistaken in him for cowardice. _Unus
homo nobis cunctando restituit rem_, says Ennius. He was a very good
general; he had coolness, circumspection, and quickness of eye: but he
has been much overrated notwithstanding. Daun has been compared to him,
and there were many who thought that this was doing too much honour to
the Austrian commander; but Daun was by no means inferior to him as a
general. The only important achievement of Fabius is the recovering of
Tarentum; yet, after all, what was it? What is certainly true, is his
opposition to Scipio. All the speeches of Hanno and others in Livy, are
perhaps rhetorical trifles from Cœlius Antipater; but this opposition
bears the impress of history. One sees distinctly that he was of an
envious mind. He could not bear the great rising star; he would rather
have had Hannibal unconquered, than that Scipio should gain a glory
which outvied his own. He did not rejoice at the freshness of the new
generation; he wished Hannibal to be worn out by the power of time
alone.
The fourth character of this war is M. Claudius Marcellus, a dashing,
able general, the opposite to Fabius in his daring, distinguished as a
commander, and at the same time a brave soldier.
We also divide this war into periods. To the introduction belongs
all that happened previously in Spain from the taking of Saguntum
to the march over the Alps 534. The first period of the war itself
contains the first three years, and a part of 537, during which was
the irresistible progress of Hannibal. The second extends from 537
to the taking of Capua 541, when his star was already on the wane,
while the Romans once more gained ground, and their prospects became
brighter. The third is from 541 to 545, when Hannibal set his hopes on
Spain, and on being reinforced by his brother Hasdrubal. He maintains
himself in Apulia, Bruttium, and Lucania, until Hasdrubal’s defeat on
the Metaurus. The fourth period is from 545 to 550, when Hannibal was
obliged to evacuate Italy. The last, from his arrival in Africa to the
end of the war.
The years 535 to 546, or 547, are those of the wars of the Romans in
Spain, which were waged with various success until the taking of New
Carthage. The time from 548 to the end, may be called the African war
of Scipio. The Sicilian war and the conquest of Sardinia, from 535 to
540, come in like episodes. In 540, the Macedonian war begins, which
lasts until 547.