recovered from so exhausting a struggle. Their losses had been immense;
besides other things, there were seven hundred ships of war: of the
arrangements and measures which they adopted after the restoration of
peace, we know but little. Soon afterwards, a war broke out against the
Faliscans, which was ended in six days. It is almost incomprehensible,
when the whole of Italy, with the exception of some little troubles
in Samnium, had remained in obedience all the time of the Punic War,
that after its conclusion such a dwarf could now have risen against the
giant. This can only be accounted for in this way, that perhaps at that
period a truce had expired, and the Romans did not wish to renew the
former conditions. The town was destroyed, in order to strike terror
into the Italians by the example.
Yet the Carthaginians were in a still worse plight than the Romans.
Their distress was the same; they had also been beaten, and had every
year to pay a portion of the heavy contribution; and the Romans
moreover were no indulgent creditors. They had likewise to pay off
their mercenaries who had returned from Sicily; but they had no money.
Besides all this, the state was badly governed, and Hamilcar, the
greatest man of his age, was thwarted by a whole faction. The friends
of Hamilcar are likewise called _factio_; yet this means nothing else
but people from all ranks, the best part of the nation, who sided with
the distinguished man whom the majority attempted to cry down. Such was
the condition of Carthage, that the great resources which Providence
gave her in Hamilcar and Hannibal, led to nothing but her ruin; had she
followed the advice of Hamilcar, and not spared her rich citizens, but
made another mighty effort, she might have paid off the mercenaries,
and have raised a new army. Instead of this, the Carthaginians
foolishly tried to bargain with these barbarians, and with this view
brought together the whole army. The consequence was, that it threw off
its obedience to them, and a dreadful war broke out, which became a
national one for Africa, as the Libyans, even with enthusiasm, rushed
into the arms of the troops: the women gave their trinkets for the
support of the war. Even old Phœnician colonies, such as Utica, Hippo,
Clupea, rose against Carthage, so that the power of the city was often
driven back almost within its own walls. The Roman deserters, who were
afraid of being given up to their own government, placed themselves at
the head of the insurrection, especially a slave from Campania of the
name of Spendius: Carthage was brought to the brink of destruction.
The Romans, during this war, at first behaved in a high-minded manner;
and here we meet with the first traces of navigation laws, and of
those claims on neutrals which have caused so many quarrels in modern
history. The Romans in fact decreed, that no ships of the rebels should
be allowed to come to Italy; and that, on the other hand, none should
sail from thence to the harbours of the rebels in Africa. The Italian
ship-masters did not observe this; but they went whithersoever their
interest called them: the Carthaginians had therefore a right to seize
all the Roman ships which were bound for such a harbour, to confiscate
the cargo, and to detain the crews as prisoners; and for this they
might appeal to the Roman proclamation. The Romans had even let the
Carthaginians levy troops in Italy; they also negociated with them for
the liberation of the prisoners: the Carthaginians gave them up, and
the Romans, on their side, released those whom they had still kept
since the war. They likewise facilitated the traffic with Carthage. The
war lasted three years and four months; it was waged with a cruelty
which is beyond all conception, very much like the thirty years’ war,
which was a war of fiends. At last, owing to the generalship of the
great Hamilcar Barcas, and the horrors committed by the mercenaries
themselves, it was put down, and revenge was taken.
Then the envy of the Romans was aroused. The mercenaries in Sardinia
had likewise risen against the Carthaginians, and had murdered many
of those who were settlers there, though probably only the officers
and magistrates; for as late as Cicero’s times, the population of
the sea-port towns of Sardinia was Punic. Against the mercenaries,
the Sards now rose in their turn, and drove them out of the island,
renouncing also their allegiance to the Carthaginians. After the
war in Africa was ended, Carthage wished to reconquer Sardinia; but
the rebels placed themselves under the Romans, who, with shameful
hypocrisy, declared themselves bound not to abandon those who had
committed themselves to their protection, and, when the Carthaginians
fitted out a fleet against Sardinia, asserted that this would be a war
against themselves. It was therefore impossible for the Carthaginians
to carry on this war; and Hamilcar, who like all men of sterling
mind, was for letting go what could not be kept, without giving way
to maudlin sorrow, advised them to yield in this matter until better
times: on this, the Carthaginians swore to have their revenge, but for
the present not to make war. They made a new peace, in which they gave
up Corsica and Sardinia, and had besides to pay twelve hundred talents.
This conduct is one of the most detestable misdeeds in the Roman
history.
To the east of Italy, since the Peloponnesian war, an empire had arisen
in a country where formerly there were only single tribes. This was
the Illyrian kingdom. How it rose, we cannot exactly tell: it did not
spring from the Taulantians. Since the days of Philip especially,
larger states had formed themselves out of the small ones; and perhaps
it was created by Bardylis, who in the times of that king founded an
empire in those parts. Nor do we know anything for certain about the
royal city: it was probably in the neighbourhood of Ragusa; the worst
pirates must have dwelt in northern Dalmatia. For some time (about the
year 520), in the then broken state of Greece, they, like the Albanians
of the present day, roamed everywhere by land and by sea; and wasting
the coasts, particularly the unfortunate Cyclades, they dragged away
the full-grown inhabitants, and cut off all traffic. Perhaps only the
Macedonians and Rhodians opposed to them any resistance; yet they
were very likely not sorry to see piracy carried on against others,
as is also the case with modern nations, which rule the seas. The
Illyrians, however, meddled also with the Romans; and the more so as
their boldness increased, when under Agron, their king, the gain from
their piracy grew greater, and having a run of luck, they made prizes
on the coast of Epirus and Acarnania. The Romans dispatched an embassy
thither. Agron had died in the meanwhile, and his son Pinnes was under
the guardianship of his mother, queen Teuta, who held the regency. She
answered, that on the part of the state no wrong would be done to the
Romans; but that it was an ancient right and custom of the Illyrians,
for every single captain to take whatever fell in his way. One of the
Roman envoys, probably a son of the great Ti. Coruncanius, now replied
that it was the custom of the Romans to amend the bad customs of other
nations. For this she had the ambassadors murdered, whereupon the
Romans sent a fleet and army over to Illyria. The Illyrians, who now
began to spread their rule, were just besieging Corcyra, which before
the Peloponnesian war was a paradise guarded by a fleet of several
hundred galleys, but owing to incessant wars, was now all but a desert.
The island was obliged to surrender before the Romans arrived. These
however landed from Brundusium before Dyrrhachium near Apollonia,
and rescued it, as they also did Epidamnus and Dyrrhachium. The
neighbouring tribes submitted; and the governor of Corcyra, Demetrius
Pharius, a scoundrel, who in all likelihood was bribed, gave up to
them the island. Issa also the Romans delivered, and they advanced
through Upper Albania along the Dalmatian coast. They met with no
resistance of any consequence: only one strong place held out, all the
rest surrendered; so that the queen was obliged to come to terms and
make peace. The Illyrians now renounced their dominion over part of
the Dalmatian isles and over Upper Albania; and they bound themselves
not to sail to the south beyond the Drin, a river which flows from the
lake of Scutari, and with no more than two unarmed vessels. This was an
immense benefit for the Greeks. What was the fate of the tribes between
Epirus and Scutari, cannot be told with certainty; but most likely,
they, as well as Epidamnus and Apollonia, remained absolutely dependent
on the Romans, although these had no garrison and no prætor there. The
latter may perhaps have levied a moderate tribute from them.
As benefactors of the Greeks, and attracted by the irresistible charm
which the praises of that people had for so many nations, the Romans
sent ambassadors to Greece, to make known there the conditions of the
treaty with the Illyrians. At that time, the Ætolians and Achæans were
united against Demetrius of Macedon, which gave a moment of relief
to this unfortunate country: to both of these peoples the Romans
dispatched the embassy on political grounds. But the one to Athens had
no other object than to earn Greek praises; it was an homage paid to
the intellectual power of that city. For though the poor Athenians had
in those days fallen to the very lowest ebb, yet the memory of their
ancestors was still alive, and honours bestowed by them were still
of value.[10] The motive for a special embassy to Corinth, although
it belonged to the Achæan league, is evident, as Corcyra, Apollonia,
and Epidamnus, were Corinthian colonies. The Corinthians rewarded the
Romans by giving them the right of taking part in the Isthmian games;
the Athenians granted them isopolity, and admission to the Eleusinian
mysteries.
Once before already,--soon after the Punic war, or even while it
yet lasted,--the Romans had meddled in the affairs of Greece. The
Acarnanians and Ætolians were then at war. The Ætolians and Alexander
of Epirus had divided Acarnania between them; but the Acarnanians
had recovered their freedom, and were defending it against the
Ætolians. They now betook themselves to Rome, on the strength of
their forefathers not having fought against Troy; in proof of which
they referred to the Catalogue of Ships in the Iliad. Patron too,
who piloted the ships of Æneas, was an Acarnanian. The Romans also
alleged this as the motive of their protection; but their embassy
was treated by the Ætolians with utter scorn, and it led to nothing.
Justin, not without a certain feeling of enjoyment, tells this from
Trogus Pompeius; for Trogus was no Roman by birth, but was sprung from
a Ligurian or Gallic tribe.[11] They now, in the year 524, had better
success, and obtained from the Greeks the honours which have been
mentioned.
It is by no means true that history has the effect of weakening
one’s belief in an overruling Providence: in it we see realized what
Herodotus so often says, ἔδεε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀπολέσθαι; one may say just
as often, ἔδεε γὰρ αὐτὸν σώζεσθαι. Had the Gauls, for instance, burst
upon Italy during the first Punic war, they alone would have been
sufficient to interrupt its course, and the Romans could not have
thrown themselves with all their might on Sicily. If Alexander, son of
Pyrrhus, had tried to avenge the misfortunes of his father in Italy,
there can be no doubt but what he might at that time have still broken
up the leagues in that country, and have destroyed the power of the
Romans. Yet everything combined in their favour: the Carthaginians
got a good general only at the end of the war; Alexander of Epirus
contented himself with small conquests; the Gauls were quiet. The
Romans indeed were in dread of an attack from the east; they seem to
have been prepared for whatever might happen, and for this reason they
still kept a garrison in Tarentum. Even before the first Punic war,
they had made a friendly alliance with Ptolemy Philadelphus; after the
peace they concluded another with Seleucus Callinicus. Thus far did
they now already stretch out their arms.
The Gauls had lost the Romagna, and had not stirred for fifty years:
they were perhaps themselves glad that the Romans seemed to have
forgotten them. The Senonian territory had come into the hands of the
Romans as a wilderness; but it is a fine country: here, according to
the provisions of the agrarian law, a great number might settle and
occupy land. About the year 522, the tribune C. Flaminius, in spite of
the violent opposition of the senate, carried a bill in the assembly of
the people for the division of this _ager Gallicus Picenus_. The _ager_
of the Senonians is part of the Romagna, of Urbino, and the March of
Ancona; the colony of Ariminum was already established there. Polybius,
in a most unaccountable manner, calls this motion of Flaminius an
attempt at rebellion; an example of how even a sensible man may err
in judging of some particular circumstance, or follow others, without
thinking himself on the subject. As none of the other tribunes would
interfere, those who were in power got the father of Flaminius to make
his son desist; and the old man ascended the _rostra_, and led him
off. Here we behold the change which had taken place in the state of
things: the father, a plebeian like his son, opposes the division of
the _ager_. And again, we see in this an instance in which, as might
be done by virtue of the _Lex Hortensia_, a measure of this kind
was carried against the wishes of the senate, by a _plebiscitum_
which emanated from a single body; and in this meaning perhaps is the
expression of Polybius to be understood (ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον
διαστροφῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας). In this assignation of the _ager
publicus_, the point in dispute was no longer whether the plebeians
were to have any share in it. On the contrary, the leading men of both
orders had divided the possession between them, and had thus enriched
themselves; and now the population which had since grown up, laid
claim to its assignation, so as to establish a new and free peasantry
in the room of those who had died off, or had been bought up, and to
give fresh life to what was left of the old yeomanry, which had thus
dwindled away.
It is, however, quite a different question, whether an extensive
settlement in those parts was prudent at such a time, when a war with
the neighbouring Gauls was to be dreaded. Yet after all, this war
must one day or other have broken out. The Gauls could not long dwell
quietly in Lombardy, and it was all one, whether it came on a little
sooner. Certain it is, that this settlement alarmed the Boians in what
are now the districts of Modena and Bologna, probably also in that of
Parma: the population in fact had recovered from its losses, and was
thirsting for revenge. They were also afraid that the great men at
Rome, who had lost their large estates in the Romagna, might seek for
new ones in their own country. The Romans, however, did not yet think
of war with the Gauls: they had cast their eyes on Spain, and they had
no hope of being able to drive the Gauls out of Lombardy. It is said
that at that time the Romans carried on wars against the Ligurians; but
we should be sadly mistaken if we fancied that they had already invaded
Liguria proper, the territory of Genoa. It was, on the contrary, the
Ligurians who had spread in the Apennines as far as Casentino and
Arezzo, after the might of the Etruscans and Gauls had been broken at
the Vadimo; and it could have been none other than these. It was a hard
struggle. The Ligurians defended every single mountain, and each of
the small tribes was only mastered after having been almost entirely
crushed.
Of the Gauls, there were in the north of Italy the Boians and
Insubrians; the former, south of the Po in the Romagna; the latter, in
the territory of Milan, and in the plain between Bergamo and Brescia;
yet these two cantons were not Gallic, but probably Rhætian, of
Etruscan extraction. Between the Insubrians and Venetians dwelt the
Cenomanians, between Milan and Mantua; these had placed themselves
under the protection of the Romans. On the other side of the Alps,
there was a great movement, and the Boians could now induce Transalpine
volunteers to come over: these negociations caused the Romans great
alarm. Several years now passed away: at length, eight years after
the Flaminian law, a countless horde made its appearance, and the war
broke out in 527. This war is memorable in history for the immense
preparations of the Romans; it was a swarm which they had to deal with,
very much as in the time of the Cimbrians. Among the tribes which were
in arms, there were also Tauriscans. These, on other occasions, we
meet with only in Carniola: whether in those days they were also in
Helvetia, we must leave undecided. The Romans called forth a general
levy throughout all Italy: the allies obeyed very readily, as they
looked forward with dismay to an invasion of the Gauls. The Romans
opposed to the enemy an army on the common road of the Gauls near
Rimini, which was under the consul L. Æmilius, and another, a prætorian
one, in Etruria. At the same time, the consul C. Atilius had gone
with a fleet and army to Sardinia, as the Sards had revolted. In the
neighbourhood of Rome, there was a reserve: all the Italian nations
were in marching order. Polybius here gives a list, from which we
find that he had not a clear insight into the subject. The numbers
are wrongly written, and all attempts to sum them up are fruitless:
several peoples are not named at all. I believe that Fabius wrote in
a hurry, when he stated the numbers at 800,000 foot and 80,000 horse.
In short, this list is of no use; and at any rate, one ought never to
draw from this census such conclusions with regard to the population of
the ancient world, as was done in the dispute between Hume and Wallace;
for although Hume keeps on the side of common sense, yet he takes the
matter too lightly. Perhaps something has slipped out in Polybius.
The Romans evidently looked forward to this war with far greater fear
than they did to that of Hannibal. Such is human nature! The Apennines
north of Tuscany were then quite impassable, and there were only two
ways there by which Italy could be invaded: the one was by Fæsulæ, and
the other through the territory of Lucca, down by Pisa, where the whole
valley at that time was a great marsh. By one of these two roads the
Gauls must have passed, probably by the latter; but whilst Hannibal’s
march through these swamps has become famous, history is silent with
regard to that of the Gauls. They left the Roman consul in his position
near Ariminum, and fifty thousand of them burst into Etruria. Probably
the army of the Romans was stationed near Florence, so as to block up
the road to Rome; and thus one can understand that they were late in
knowing of the invasion of the Gauls, and of their march as far as
Clusium. Thither the Gauls had arrived, within three days’ march from
Rome. The Romans now broke up, that they might either cut off from
them the way to Rome, or at least follow after them: the Gauls were
apprised of this, and retreated. They marched from Clusium through the
Siennese territory to the sea: here we find them in the neighbourhood
of Piombino, over-against Elba. Polybius says that they now fell in
with the Romans near a place called Φαίσολα. This the commentators
preposterously mistook for Fæsulæ above Florence; yet it must have been
between Chiusi and the sea-coast, not far from Aquapendente.[12] Here
they laid a trap for the Romans. They broke up with their infantry,
and withdrew to a good position; the cavalry remained behind, and was
to provoke the Romans, and then, slowly falling back, to entice them
to the spot whither they wished to bring them. The Romans suffered
there a great defeat: a part only of them retreated to a strong height
among the Apennines, where they defended themselves against the Gauls.
Luckily, the consul Æmilius, who had left his station near Ariminum,
had now advanced through the Apennines to reinforce the army; and
when he did not find it in its former place, he proceeded by forced
marches along the road to Rome, and came up the night after the
disastrous battle. He did not know that the Romans were surrounded on
the mountains; but the Gauls halted when they saw his watch-fires, and
the hard-pressed Romans sent messengers to him, and acquainted him with
their situation. The next morning, he now wanted to attack the Gauls;
these, however, had chosen to retire. As they had gotten a vast deal
of booty during the campaign, they did not wish with such an _agmen
impeditum_ to enter into battle, and so they resolved to return home,
and advance again afterwards. Such a resolution can only be made by
a barbarous people. They marched slowly along the sea-coast, laying
everything waste: the consular army followed, to keep them in check,
but was afraid of them. The Gauls would thus have returned unhurt, had
not Atilius in the meanwhile brought his undertaking in Sardinia to a
successful close. The Sardinian army having been recalled, was driven
by contrary winds to land at Pisa, not far from the very spot where
the Gauls just happened to be. Atilius had the intention of joining
the other army; but when he heard of the invasion of the Gauls, he
left his baggage behind at Pisa, and began his march to Rome along the
coast: as for the defeat of the Romans, he knew nothing of it. Near a
place, called Telamon, his light troops fell in with some of the Gauls.
Some of these, who were made prisoners, let out how matters really
stood; that the Gauls were close at hand, and that the consul Æmilius
was following them. Æmilius had heard of the march of Atilius; but he
was not aware how near he was. Now as the battle of Telamon was fought
in the neighbourhood of Populonia, it is evident also from this, that
Φαίσολα could not possibly have been Fæsulæ near Florence. The Gauls,
who were now in a dreadful plight, first got their baggage out of the
way, and then tried to occupy an eminence hard by the road: thither
Atilius sent his cavalry, and the fight began. The Gauls opposed one
front to Atilius, and another to Æmilius. Atilius was slain, and his
head cut off, and brought to the prince of the Gauls; but his troops
avenged his death, and the cavalry became masters of the hillock. The
warriors who were arrayed against Æmilius, fought stark naked with
all the wildness of savages; the rest of the Gauls also were without
coats of mail, and they had narrow shields, and large Celtic mantles.
Polybius speaks in this battle of _Gæsati_; these can hardly have
been mercenaries, as he supposes, but javelin bearers,--from _gæsum_,
a javelin, inasmuch as Virgil in his magnificent description of the
Gauls uses this word in contradistinction to the swordbearers: they
were Allobroges; for they came from the Rhone. These Gæsatians all of
them made a stand against Æmilius; the light troops, armed likewise
with missiles, were sent to attack them, and after a fierce struggle
they fled. The rest of the Gauls having collected on both sides into
immense masses, the day ended in the death of 40,000, and the captivity
of 10,000 of them, so that scarcely any one escaped. Thus, by the most
lucky combination of circumstances, the danger was warded off. The war
was not, however, decided before the fourth year.
In the following year, the Romans crossed over the Apennines into the
country of the Boians, who immediately submitted. In 529 and 530, the
war was in the Milanese territory, the land of the Insubrians. These
were supported by the Transalpine Gauls, and they offered a stout
resistance: that such an open country, which had but one stronghold,
was defended in this manner, does honour to the bravery of these
tribes. The Romans were forced at the confluence of the Po and the
Adda to retreat. The Cenomanians, between the Adda and the Lago di
Garda; the Venetians, whose capital was Patavium; and the Euganeans,
were friendly to the Romans: the Venetians were a people of quite a
different race from the Tuscans, being probably of Liburno-Pelasgian
descent; they possessed the country between the Adige and the four
eastern rivers, and were highly civilized. The Insubrians afterwards
sued in vain for peace: the Romans did not trust them, and wished for
their destruction. In 529, C. Flaminius gained a great battle against
the Insubrians, north of the Po, in which he is unjustly reproached
with bad generalship. In the fourth year of the war, the Romans
reduced their only fortified place, Acerræ, and utterly routed them
near Clastidium. The great captain M. Claudius Marcellus slew with his
own hand the Gallic chief Virodomarus. After this campaign, Milan was
taken, and the Insubrians made their unconditional submission, having
been all but exterminated.