judicious arrangement. Their left wing, being about the fourth part of
the whole of their fleet, sailed in a long line along the coast; and
joining it at a right angle was the main body of their large armament,
which, ship by ship, stood out far into the sea. The Romans passed by
the line along the coast, and attacked the salient line. It was not
the plan of the Carthaginian admiral, that this should withstand the
end of the wedge which was forcing itself in; they therefore set sail,
and seemed to flee, so as to separate the Romans from their third
and fourth lines, and the Romans pursued them. But two parts of the
long line formed again, and fell upon the Romans, who had detached
themselves from the third squadron; the third part, which was sailing
in the open sea, returned and attacked the fourth Roman squadron;
and in the meanwhile, the line which was off the coast, came up and
engaged the third squadron, which now abandoned the transports to their
fate. Thus arose three distinct sea-fights: the first and second Roman
squadrons conquered easily; the fourth had a doubtful victory; and the
third was hard pressed, but the centre turned back to defend it. The
boarding-bridges were also employed in this action with great effect.
The result was the complete rout of the Carthaginians: thirty ships
were sunk, part of them being driven ashore and wrecked, and sixty-four
taken; from thirty to forty thousand men fell into the power of the
Romans.
After this defeat, the beaten fleet made its escape to Africa, and went
to protect Carthage against an attack; the men had lost all strength
and spirit. The Romans had the sea clear before them to carry their
plan into execution, and the two consular armies, that of Manlius
and that of Regulus, proceeded to Africa. They landed on the south
side of the headland of Hermæum, over-against Carthage, at the mouth
of the gulf of Tunis, near a town which the Romans call Clupea, the
Greeks Aspis, (the Punic name we do not know,) a place, which they
took after a creditable defence. They now made it their arsenal, and
spread from thence into the heart of the country. The really efficient
armies of the enemy were stationed in Sicily; the Carthaginians had
made sure of baffling the undertaking, and were therefore quite
unprepared in Africa. They had fortified colonies on the coast only;
as for the interior, with the exception of a few _municipia_, they
had the same policy as the Vandals, who, fearing rebellions, pulled
down all the walls of the towns, just as the Lombards did afterwards
in Italy. Wherever therefore the Romans came, they marched in: a
foreign conqueror was looked upon by the Libyans as a deliverer; for,
although the Carthaginians were no barbarians, yet they were very hard
masters. For they followed the system, which is found throughout the
East, that the sovereign is the owner of the soil, and the possessor
has the enjoyment of it only so long as it pleases the lord and
master. They also wanted immense sums of money for their Celtic and
Iberian mercenaries, and were therefore obliged to squeeze them out
of their subjects. In the war of Agathocles, the consequences of this
system had already been seen. Indeed the spirit of the Africans had
been crushed, so that they did not break out in open rebellion, as
they did in his time; for the Carthaginians had taken a fell revenge
after his departure. Yet they did not aid Carthage in any way. A
most inconceivable order now came from Rome, that one of the consuls,
L. Manlius, should return home, it being perhaps believed, that the
force of Regulus was sufficient by itself: Manlius therefore sailed
back with almost the whole of the fleet, and brought over the booty.
The Carthaginians retreated into inaccessible parts of the country:
Regulus nevertheless defeated them near Adis. Their militia troops
were exceedingly timid; it was easy for the Romans to drive them out
of their strongholds. Regulus stationed himself not far from Carthage:
he took the fortified town of Tunes, and encamped near the river
Bagradas: the Carthaginians were pressed most closely. In this camp,
as the ancients generally relate, (Livy also has it,) a serpent, which
was a hundred and twenty ells in length, is said to have made its
appearance, and to have torn to pieces a great many Romans, until the
soldiers battered it with catapults and _ballistæ_. This tale, in the
midst of an account which is quite historical, is most surprising. That
earth and sea may contain creatures which occur so rarely, that one is
inclined to take them for fabulous, cannot indeed be positively denied;
it may have been a giant serpent. But in all likelihood, this story,
like so many others, has its origin in Nævius’ _Bellum Punicum_, which
poet himself served as a soldier in that war. At all events, it would
be wonderful if the size of the dragon had amounted in ells to exactly
that number which is so often met with in Roman measurements, namely,
12 × 10.
The Carthaginians had utterly lost courage, and they could not withdraw
their army from Sicily without giving up that island altogether: they
therefore sent an embassy to Regulus, and sued for peace. Regulus’
fame has been very much exaggerated by apophthegmatical histories; he
is undeservedly represented as a martyr: in the heyday of his good
fortune, he showed himself ruthless, intoxicated with victory, and
ungenerous. We have a story of him, that he had then asked the senate
for his recall, that he might attend to his farm; but we know on the
contrary from Polybius, that he had particularly set his heart upon
bringing the war to a brilliant end, before a successor arrived. So
much the more senseless was it in him to ask of the Carthaginians
impossibilities, and to offer them much worse terms than they really
obtained at the conclusion of the war, just as if he had meant to drive
them to despair. Had he stipulated for the evacuation of Sicily and
the payment of a contribution, the Carthaginians would have been quite
willing; but he had the preposterous idea of crushing Carthage with one
blow. His conditions were quite insane: even had they been besieged,
the Carthaginians could not have fared worse. They were to acknowledge
the supremacy of Rome; to make an offensive and defensive alliance
with the Romans; to enter into no treaty without the permission of
the Romans; to yield up all their ships of war but one, and to have
nothing but triremes; to give up Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the
Lipari isles; to abandon their Italian allies; to deliver up the
prisoners and deserters; to ransom their own captives; to pay all the
expenses of the war, and a contribution besides. The Carthaginians
declared that they would rather perish; and luckily for them the Romans
carried on the war badly. Instead of establishing themselves within
the gulf of Tunis, opposite Carthage, as they ought to have done, they
had now sent off their fleet; the Carthaginians therefore could make
use of their ships to hire troops everywhere. Among these, there were
also many from Greece; one of them, the celebrated Xanthippus, who
was not, as Diodorus says, a Spartan, but as we learn from Polybius,
a Neodamode who in his education had been subjected to the laws of
the Spartans (τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετεσχηκώς), and had thereby
acquired an inferior right of citizenship. In the case of a Spartan,
this would have been quite a matter of course; but, besides these,
Lacedæmonians also (περίοικοι), and Neodamodes, even the children of
foreign πρόξενοι, might subject themselves to the laws of Lycurgus,
which is a position not yet clearly explained. Xanthippus was one of
the greatest men of his age; and he furnishes us with a case in point,
which shows how much Sparta must have been stunted, owing to her not
making the Lacedæmonians equal to the Spartans. He came to Carthage
as a mercenary, but as an officer: he had certainly been recruiting
at Tænarus. When he saw the preparations of the Carthaginians, he
openly declared that it was no wonder that Carthage was going to ruin;
and on this he was called before the senate,--in this case, it was
an advantage that the military and the civil administrations were
distinct,--and he was asked for his opinion. He explained to them,
that as indeed they had plenty of elephants[4] and Numidian cavalry,
which was a formidable force against such a small army as that of the
Romans in the midst of an enemy’s country, (about 16,000 men, according
to Polybius; with all the reinforcements, perhaps 20,000, among whom
there were 15 or 1,600 cavalry) they ought to seek the plains, whilst
the advantage of the Romans was in the mountains. The elephants had
hardly been employed in any battle by land at all, unless perhaps in
the little skirmish near Tunis. Xanthippus was listened to: he was
intrusted with the charge of the mercenaries. His arrangements excited
astonishment: the soldiers believed that under his guidance they were
sure to conquer; the whole of the camp demanded him for their leader,
and the Carthaginian general, who very likely had got his instructions
in this matter from the city, yielded the command to him. This is a
great resolve. When Xanthippus had now well drilled the Carthaginians,
he went out against the Romans into the open field, and thereby filled
them with great wonder and dismay. He compelled them to fight, and
made a masterly disposition: the Roman army had no centre; but the
Greeks had three divisions, and he drew up his army in the following
manner. The Carthaginians occupied the centre as a phalanx; for being
townsmen, they could only be usefully employed in masses:[5] on the two
wings, he placed the mercenaries, and joined to them the cavalry on the
flanks. The Romans likewise put their cavalry on the flanks; but in
placing the infantry they departed from their general custom, as before
the centre of the Carthaginians a hundred elephants had been stationed:
they formed themselves against these in an order of battle of great
depth. Yet the shock was irresistible: the left wing of the Romans
indeed conquered the mercenaries; but in the meanwhile, the cavalry
of the Carthaginians had thrown itself upon the right wing, and the
elephants trampled down everything before them: then the phalanx rushed
on, and the whole of the Roman army was annihilated. Only two thousand
men of the left wing made their escape in the rear of the Carthaginians
to Clupea. Regulus retreated with five hundred Romans to a hill, and
was obliged to surrender. Xanthippus was now the universal hero: they
wished him to stay at Carthage; but he was wise enough to return
home with the rich presents which he received, lest he should become
an eyesore to an envious and heartless people, as the Carthaginians
were. Polybius tells us that there was also another account, even
that the Carthaginians had given him a bad ship, that he might perish
on the passage; and that according to some, he had really become a
victim, and according to others, he had saved himself by getting into
another vessel. The Romans sent out the fleet, which had been still
preserved, to take up the garrison of the besieged town of Clupea; the
Carthaginians went against them, and were defeated. The number of ships
which, according to Polybius, were captured on this occasion, is very
likely to have been changed from 114 to 14.
The Romans now evacuated Africa, taking with them the garrison of
Clupea; and they sailed back for Syracuse, to make their passage
through the straits of Messina to Rome. As it was the time of the
summer-solstice, the pilots warned them against the possibility of a
storm, as the Sirocco at that season of the year sometimes increases
into the most dreadful hurricane, and the coast in those parts is
destitute of harbours. But the commanders scorned them, most likely
because they were foreigners; and thus a terrible shipwreck between
Agrigentum and Pachynus utterly destroyed nearly three hundred vessels
out of three hundred and sixty, which was the most dreadful disaster
that had occurred until then (497). Not long afterwards, Seleucus
Callinicus also suffered a similar shipwreck. The Carthaginians
might now believe that the Romans would grant a peace on fair terms.
For this reason, it is said, they sent Regulus to Rome with offers
of peace: if he could not get them accepted, he was to obtain at
least an exchange of prisoners; yet Regulus advised against both of
these things, returned to Carthage, and was there put to death by
torture. The first who, with great independence of spirit, proved the
groundlessness of this story, was the excellent French philologist
Paulmier de Grentemesnil (Palmerius). He lived in the times of the
brothers Henry and Adrian Valesius (Valois); he was particularly well
read in Polybius, and he pointed out, how incomprehensible it was,
that Polybius, although he told the achievements of Regulus at such
length, should not have mentioned a word of this story. The further
arguments have been put forth by Beaufort. From a fragment of Diodorus,
it appears that the Roman senate gave as a pledge for Regulus, into
the hands of his wife and family, two Carthaginian prisoners of rank;
and that these were most frightfully tortured, so that the tribunes of
the people called together the senate, and compelled the monsters to
liberate one of the prisoners whom they had shut up in an exceedingly
narrow chest with the other, who was already dead. Now, both of these
learned critics say very rightly, that even if the Carthaginians had
really tortured Regulus, this had merely been done in retaliation;
and that moreover the accounts of his death are so very different.
According to some, he was blinded; according to others, tortured to
death in a chest stuck full of iron spikes; and again, according to
others, he was exposed to the sun and the insects. Some writers of
the middle ages, like the authors of the spurious _Acta Martyrum_,
felt quite a particular pleasure in devising the most horrible and
complicated tortures: this is also the case with the story of Regulus.
It is altogether a forgery; and Palmerius and Beaufort have just
grounds for their conclusion, that it was only invented to wash out the
foul stain of the tortures of the Carthaginian prisoners. I believe
that it has been borrowed from Nævius; for Diodorus does not know of
it, as is evident from his fragments: he had but a very imperfect
knowledge of Roman history, and only from the earlier, and almost
contemporary writers, Philinus of Agrigentum, Timæus, and Fabius
Pictor; the poet Nævius, he had not read. Thus it was very likely that
the latest Roman historians brought that tale into circulation from
Nævius. Cicero already is acquainted with the legend; it must have
therefore been either in Cato’s _Origines_ or in Nævius.[6] If it
originated with the later historians, it has arisen at least a hundred,
or a hundred and twenty years after the time of Regulus.
The Romans did not conclude the peace; in spite of their ill luck,
they were resolved upon going on with the war. The Carthaginians
now armed themselves with redoubled courage: they sent considerable
reinforcements to Sicily, and learnt how to make a right use of their
elephants; the Romans, on the other hand, became daunted, and withdrew
into the mountains. The Carthaginians wished to carry on the war
either by sea or by land: to do both at the same time, was more than
they could manage. The Romans then built a new fleet, took Panormus
(Palermo), and went again to Africa, and wasted the country between
Carthage and Tripolis; hereupon they returned to Sicily, the fleet
having had a wonderful escape in the small Syrtis. When bound for
Italy, they were again overtaken on the passage by a storm, and hardly
a vessel was saved.
The southern gales, every one of them from south-east to south-west,
are always in the Mediterranean the most dangerous storm-winds; and
they are the more destructive, as the Italian coast is almost without
any harbours, and full of breakers: the storms which blow from the
north are harmless. Yet when the currents from the Adriatic and the
Pontus meet, ships during a north easterly wind are irresistibly drawn
into the Syrtes (from σύρειν), so that they are in them before their
reckonings would lead one to suppose it.
This was now a second blow for the Romans, and one from which they did
not recover: they did not think of making peace, yet they tried to
carry on the war at less expense. The Carthaginians were masters of the
sea, and they made use of their superiority to lay waste the Italian
coasts; but they managed the war in a wretched manner. The Romans
remained unshaken in Sicily, and thus, although indeed they shunned
a general engagement, they took several strong places under the very
eyes of the enemy, and reduced the Carthaginians to the possession
of the north-western part of Sicily. In the year 501 (according to
Cato), fortune turned her back upon the Carthaginians: L. Cæcilius
Metellus defeated Hasdrubal near Palermo. Hasdrubal had tried to
take advantage of the great fear which the Romans had of the African
cavalry, and to recover Palermo, very likely with the connivance of the
inhabitants: he encamped in its beautiful plain about half a (German)
mile from the town, and ravaged the fields. Metellus kept himself in
his fortified camp ready to fight: he showed himself here to be a great
general, and made it his particular object to render the elephants
harmless. The Carthaginians advanced to attack the camp: Metellus drew
up all his light troops on the edge of the ditch, with a good supply
of missiles; the legions manœuvred on the flanks. The light infantry
now sallied forth against the enemy, enticed them on, and then threw
themselves into the ditch, and hurled an immense number of javelins
and burning arrows against the Carthaginians and their elephants:
the camp-followers were constantly bringing them fresh ammunition
from the town, and at the same time, the soldiers from behind the
breast-works discharged their _pila_. The Carthaginians now wished to
sweep them down with one mighty onset; but the elephants were wounded,
and thus became wild, and several of them plunged into the trenches,
from whence the light-armed soldiers of the Romans jumped behind the
fortified lines, and the maddened beasts turned against their own
masters. This was the moment for which Metellus had waited all along:
from the sidegates of the lines, the legions burst forth, routed the
Carthaginian infantry, and put their whole army to flight. More than a
hundred elephants were captured. These were brought to Rome on rafts
built for the purpose, and killed by missiles in the circus, perhaps to
give the people a representation of the battle in which they had been
taken.
This victory restored the courage of the Romans; yet the conclusion
of the war was extremely hard to bring about, as they did not again
venture over to Africa, and the Carthaginians made no attempts to
recover what they had lost in Sicily. The latter were now pent up
quite at the western end of the island; all that they had still left
were the towns of Lilybæum, Drepana, and Eryx. The year after (502),
the Romans therefore began the siege of Lilybæum, which lasted till the
close of the war, yet not as a siege in form, but as a blockade. The
part of the war which follows, might with great propriety be called
the Lilybæan one. This last act is the finest on the side of the
Carthaginians; the Romans distinguish themselves in it only by their
perseverance.
The victory of Metellus in the fourteenth year of the war, was the
first pitched battle, with the exception of that near Adin in Africa,
in which the Romans had conquered. The siege of Lilybæum was undertaken
by them under very unfavourable circumstances. The Carthaginians were
in fact masters of the sea; but owing to the tremendous expenses of the
war, they had retrenched their naval armaments as much as they possibly
could: the Romans had again a fleet off Lilybæum, which was likewise
of limited force, and not intended for sea-fights, yet sufficient to
make the communication difficult with that town. Lilybæum is a Punic
name; it means, according to Bochart, the place which lies towards
Libya (לְלֻבִּי); it was without doubt a mixed Punico-Libyan colony,
and at that time the only Punic town in Sicily, having been founded by
the inhabitants of Motye, which had been destroyed by Dionysius. As
Lilybæum was the residence of the Carthaginian general, it had grown
into a considerable town just as did Carthagena in Spain; Palermo,
on the contrary, was a thoroughly Greek city, peopled by Greeks and
Hellenized Siculians and Sicanians, although it had long been under the
Punic rule. Lilybæum had a good harbour, which was yet safer from its
being so difficult to get into it. The sand which the south winds bring
thither from the Syrtes, had already accumulated there, and formed a
sort of lagune; owing to this very cause, the whole harbour of Marsala
is now no longer in existence. The fortifications of the place were
very strong.
Besides Lilybæum, three German miles from it, the Carthaginians had
Drepana (the present Trapani) with its noble harbour, which even now,
in spite of the attempts of Charles V. to fill it up, is excellent;
and besides Drepana, the town of Eryx with the mountain of that name.
Within this district the war was concentrated for nine years; this gave
rise to the utter wretchedness of the island, which was quite ruined by
it.