NIEBUHR’S LECTURES
ON
ROMAN HISTORY.
VOL. II.
NIEBUHR’S LECTURES
ON
ROMAN HISTORY
TRANSLATED FROM THE EDITION OF DR. M. ISLER,
BY H. M. CHEPMELL, M.A., AND F. DEMMLER, PH.D.
[Illustration]
_IN THREE VOLUMES.--VOL. II._
London:
CHATTO & WINDUS, PICCADILLY.
1875.
CONTENTS.
Page
FIRST PUNIC WAR, 1
Foundation of Carthage, 1
Earliest history of Carthage, 2
Extent of the Carthaginian empire at the outbreak of the war, 4
Constitution of Carthage, 5
Geographical description of Sicily, 8
Division of the war, 9
Siege of Agrigentum, 10
Conquest of Agrigentum, 11
A Roman fleet built, 12
Boarding-bridges, 14
Naval victory of C. Duilius near Mylæ, 15
Events of less importance, 16
New naval force of the Romans, 17
Seafight near Ecnomus, 19
Regulus lands in Africa, 20
Prodigy in Regulus’ camp, 21
Negotiations for a peace, 21
Xanthippus, 22
Regulus defeated, 24
Shipwreck of the Roman fleet, 24
Regulus’ death. Criticism on the tales concerning it, 25
Victory of Metellus near Panormus, 28
Siege of Lilybæum, 29
Defeat of P. Claudius near Drepana, 32
Claudius appoints M. Claudius Glycia as dictator, 33
Destruction of a merchant fleet, 34
Eryx surprised and taken, 35
Hamilcar Barcas, 35
Seafight near the Ægatian Isles, 38
End of the war, 40
SICILY A ROMAN PROVINCE. _PRÆTOR PEREGRINUS._ WAR WITH THE
FALISCANS. MUTINY OF THE MERCENARIES AT CARTHAGE. THE FIRST
ILLYRIAN WAR. THE _LEX FLAMINIA_ FOR THE DIVISION OF THE
_AGER GALLICUS PICENUS_. WAR AGAINST THE CISALPINE GAULS.
SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR. THE CARTHAGINIANS FOUND AN EMPIRE IN SPAIN, 41
Sicily a Roman province. Definition of the word province, 41
_Prætor peregrinus_, 42
The public festivals are paid for by the ædiles, 42
The character of the senate changes, 43
War with the Faliscans, 43
Mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, 44
Sardinia rebels against Carthage, 45
Another peace between Carthage and Rome, 46
The first Illyrian war, 46
Embassy of the Romans to Greece, 47
Greek affairs, 48
The agrarian law of Flaminius, 50
War with the Cisalpine Gauls, 52
Battle near Clastidium, 56
Second Illyrian war, 57
A Carthaginian empire founded in Spain, 58
Peoples of Spain, 59
Death of Hamilcar, 61
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR, 61
Sources and literature, 62
Hannibal, 64
P. Cornelius Scipio, 66
Q. Fabius Maximus, 67
M. Claudius Marcellus, 68
Division of the war, 68
War in Spain, 68
Siege of Saguntum, 71
Embassy to Carthage, 72
March of Hannibal across the Pyrenees, 75
Hannibal in Gaul, 76
His passage over the Alps, 77
Battle on the Ticinus, 83
Battle on the Trebia, 84
C. Flaminius, 87
Hannibal wades through the marshes, 89
Battle of the Trasimene lake, 91
Q. Fabius Maximus dictator, 94
Fabius hems in Hannibal near Mount Callicula, 96
Minucius defeated by Hannibal, 97
C. Terentius Varro, 97
Battle of Cannæ, 99
Maharbal advises Hannibal to march to Rome, 103
Hannibal in Capua, 103
The Italian peoples fall off from Rome, 107
Efforts made by the Romans, 108
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus conquers near Beneventum, 110
Hannibal at the gates of Rome, 112
Taking of Capua, 113
Death of Hiero, 114
Negotiations of Hieronymus, 115
Disturbances at Syracuse, 115
Siege of Syracuse, 116
Archimedes, 117
Taking of Syracuse. Marcellus’ conduct, 117
Taking of Agrigentum, 119
War in Spain, 120
Death of the two Scipios, 121
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, 122
Taking of New Carthage, 124
Hasdrubal goes to Italy, 124
Battle of Sena, 126
Spain in the power of the Romans, 128
Mutiny of the troops in the camp of Scipio in Spain, 128
Scipio goes to Africa to Syphax, 131
Scipio is appointed consul, 132
Voluntary armaments of the Italians, 133
Scipio lands in Africa, 135
Masinissa, 135
Syphax made prisoner, 137
Offers of peace by the Carthaginians, 137
Hannibal and Mago summoned to Africa, 139
Battle of Zama, 140
Peace, 141
MACEDONIAN WAR, 143
Treaty of Philip with Hannibal, 143
Philip, 144
Affairs of the Greek states, 144
Peace of the Romans with the Ætolians, 146
Peace of the Romans with Philip, 146
Attacks of Philip and Antiochus on the Egyptian empire, 147
Causes of the second Macedonian war, 148
Its outbreak, 150
State of Greece, 150
T. Quinctius Flamininus, 153
Victory of the Romans near the _fauces Antigoneæ_, 155
Battle of Cynoscephalæ, 157
Quarrels of the Romans and Ætolians, 159
Peace with Philip, 161
Peace with Greece, 161
THE INSUBRIANS AND BOIANS VANQUISHED. WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS. WAR
WITH THE GALATIANS, 164
War with the Insubrians, 164
War with the Boians, 164
Antiochus, 165
Hannibal in Syria, 167
Battle of Thermopylæ, 173
Siege of Ambracia, 174
Peace with the Ætolians, 175
Battle of Myonnesus, 175
Battle of Magnesia, 178
Peace with Antiochus, 179
War with the Galatians, 180
Earlier history of the Galatians, 181
Cn. Manlius conquers the Galatians, 182
IMPEACHMENT OF L. SCIPIO. END OF P. SCIPIO AFRICANUS AND OF
HANNIBAL. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. M. PORCIUS CATO, 184
Impeachment of the Scipios, 184
Increase of the tribes, 185
Increase of the number of prætors, 185
Fate of the Italians, 186
Changes at home, 187
Corruption of morals, 188
Embellishment of the city, 190
M. Porcius Cato, 190
Influence of moneyed property, 192
Hannibal’s death, 193
LITERATURE OF THE ROMANS AT THIS PERIOD. _ATELLANÆ_,
_PRÆTEXTATÆ_; LIVIUS ANDRONICUS; NÆVIUS; ENNIUS; PLAUTUS.
ROMAN HISTORIANS IN GREEK, 194
Native Roman civilization, 194
Atellan plays, 195
Translation of Greek literature. Livius Andronicus, 195
Nævius, Plautus, 196
Ennius, 198
Pacuvius, 199
Q. Fabius Pictor. L. Cincius Alimentus, 199
WARS WITH THE LIGURIANS; WITH THE CELTIBERIANS. THE THIRD
MACEDONIAN WAR. PEACE WITH THE RHODIANS. FURTHER WARS IN SPAIN.
STATE OF AFFAIRS AT HOME, 199
War with the Ligurians, 200
Standing armies, 201
Campaign of Cato in Spain, 202
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus concludes the war with the
Celtiberians, 203
Third Macedonian war, 203
Negotiations with the Bastarnians, 204
Perseus, Demetrius, 205
Character of Perseus, 206
State of affairs in Greece and Asia, 206
Murderous attack on Eumenes at Delphi, 206
Outbreak of the war, 208
The neighbouring countries inclined in favour of Perseus, 211
L. Æmilius Paullus, general of the Romans, 212
Battle of Pydna, 213
Perseus, a prisoner of the Romans, 215
Fate of the Greek states, 216
Macedon newly constituted, 217
Moral condition of Rome, 218
Peace with Rhodes, 219
Wars in Gaul and Dalmatia, 220
Prusias, Eumenes, 221
Events in Egypt. The Parthians, 221
War in Spain, 222
M. Claudius Marcellus, 222
Treachery of Sulpicius Galba to the Lusitanians, 224
_Lex Voconia_, 225
_Lex Ælia et Fusia_, 225
Changes in the system of enlistment, 226
Law against the _ambitus_, 227
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR, 227
Masinissa, 228
War of the Carthaginians against Masinissa, 229
Opinions in Rome with regard to Carthage, 230
War against Carthage resolved upon at Rome, 231
Conditions of the Romans, 232
Outbreak of the war, 233
Masinissa tries to connect himself with Carthage, 236
P. Cornelius Scipio _Paulli f._, 237
Typography of Carthage, 239
Scipio’s attack on the town, 241
The Carthaginian fleet destroyed, 242
Conquest of the town, 243
Destruction of Carthage, 244
THE PSEUDO-PHILIP. THE ACHÆAN WAR. DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH, 244
Andriscus, 245
Victory of Metellus, 247
The Achæan war, 248
Its causes, 249
Successes of Metellus, 254
Mummius takes the command, 255
Destruction of Corinth, 256
Polybius, 256
WARS IN SPAIN. VIRIATHUS. DESTRUCTION OF NUMANTIA, 257
Viriathus, 257
War with the Celtiberians, 260
War with Numantia, 260
Q. Pompeius _A. f._, 261
C. Hostilius Mancinus conquered and hemmed in, 262
Ti. Gracchus, 262
Scipio conquers Numantia, 263
Destruction of Numantia, 264
SERVILE WAR IN SICILY. ACQUISITION OF THE KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS.
ARISTONICUS. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, 264
State of Sicily, 264
Servile war, 265
Death of Attalus, 266
Aristonicus, 267
The consulate for the first time filled by two plebeians, 268
TIBERIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS, 269
_Ager publicus_ and the Licinian law, 271
Agrarian law of Tib. Gracchus, 277
Opposition to this law, 279
Dismissal of the tribune M. Octavius, 281
Opposition of the Latins, 282
Distribution of the inheritance of Attalus, 283
_Comitia_ for elections; murder of Tib. Gracchus, 284
Tyranny of the victorious party, 287
C. Papirius Carbo, 288
Death of P. Cornelius Scipio, 289
Rebellion of Fregellæ, 291
CAIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS, 291
C. Gracchus in Sardinia, 293
His tribuneship, 293
Laws against the adversaries of his brother, 294
Corn law, 295
Relief of the soldiers, 296
The dispensation of justice transferred from the senate
to the knights, 296
Plan for the extension of the franchise, 299
Distribution of the provinces, 300
Counter operations of M. Livius Drusus, 301
Reaction against C. Gracchus. His death, 303
Persecutions of his partizans, 306
FOREIGN CONQUESTS DOWN TO THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA, 307
Conquest of the Balearic isles and of Dalmatia, 307
War against the Allobroges, 307
The Cimbri and Scordiscans, 308
THE WAR AGAINST JUGURTHA. Q. CÆCILIUS METELLUS NUMIDICUS. C.
MARIUS, 309
Sallust, 309
State of Numidia after Masinissa’s death, 309
Division of the empire. Jugurtha, 310
M. Æmilius Scaurus, 312
Horace’s want of historical lore, 312
L. Calpurnius Bestia goes to Africa, 314
Jugurtha in Rome, 315
An inquiry instituted in Rome, 316
Metellus goes to Africa, 316
His success against Jugurtha, 317
C. Marius, 318
Marius elected consul, 319
End of the war of Jugurtha, 321
WAR WITH THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES, 322
Ethnography of the Cimbri, 322
The Teutones, 323
Their victories over the Romans, 323
Marius changes the Roman tactics, 325
The Cimbri march into northern Italy, 328
Q. Lutatius Catulus, 328
Victory of the Romans over the Ambrones, 329
Victory over the Teutones near Aquæ Sextiæ, 330
Victory over the Cimbri near Vercellæ (campi Raudii), 332
Triumph of Marius, 333
MARIUS’ SIXTH CONSULSHIP. L. APULEIUS SATURNINUS. C. SERVILIUS
GLAUCIA, 334
L. Apuleius Saturninus, 334
C. Servilius Glaucia, 336
Legislation of Saturninus, 336
Agrarian law, 337
Opposition of Metellus, 338
Defeat of Saturninus and Glaucia, 339
M. LIVIUS DRUSUS, 340
Split between the different orders, 341
Position of the allies, 342
M. Livius tries to reform the courts of law, 344
He tries to procure the franchise for the Italians, 346
Opposition to his plans, 347
Murder of Livius Drusus, 348
His laws repealed, 349
THE SOCIAL WAR. MITHRIDATES. CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE PARTIES OF
MARIUS AND SYLLA. L. CORNELIUS CINNA, 350
The Roman proconsul in Ascalum murdered, 351
The Italians establish an independent state, 352
_Lex Julia_, 354
General view of the war, 355
Victory of C. Pompeius Strabo, 356
Single Italian peoples receive the Roman franchise, 357
New tribes, 357
The Umbrians and Etruscans participate in the war,
but soon receive the Roman franchise, 358
L. Cornelius Sylla, 359
Earlier history of Pontus, 361
Mithridates, 361
Massacre of the Roman citizens in Asia Minor, 363
Sylla is appointed general against Mithridates, 364
P. Sulpicius, 366
Sylla marches with his army against Rome, 367
Marius’ flight, 368
Q. Pompeius murdered, 369
L. Cornelius Cinna, 370
Civil war, 370
Cinna deposed from the consulate, 370
Q. Sertorius, 371
Cinna marches against Rome, 372
Marius consul for the seventh time, 373
The Samnites receive the franchise, 374
Cinna murdered, 375
THE FIRST MITHRIDATIC WAR. SYLLA RETURNS TO ROME. HIS
DICTATORSHIP AND DEATH, 375
Taking of Athens, 376
Peace with Mithridates, 376
Sylla returns to Italy, 378
Civil war, 379
Battle of Sacriportus, 381
Pontius Telesinus marches against Rome; battle at the
Colline gate, 382
Sylla’s cruelty, 383
Proscriptions, 384
Military colonies, 384
Sylla’s laws, 384
The senate remodelled, 384
Limitation of the tribuneship, 387
The senate recovers the jurisdiction, 388
Increase of the sacerdotal offices, 388
Increase of the number of prætors and quæstors, 389
The Cornelians, 390
Sylla resigns the dictatorship, 390
His death, 391
LITERATURE. MANNERS AND MODE OF LIVING, 391
Sallust’s histories. Sisenna, 391
Claudius Quadrigarius, 392
Pacuvius, Terentius, Cæcilius Statius, 392
Attius Lucilius, Lævius, 393
Prose. Manners and mode of living, 394
Cicero. Hortensius, 394
COUNTER-REVOLUTION. LEPIDUS. SERTORIUS. POMPEY, 395
Designs of M. Æmilius Lepidus, 395
Catulus, 396
Elements for a commotion, 396
Lepidus’ undertaking against Rome miscarries. He
and M. Brutus die, 397
The war of Sertorius, 397
Sallust’s histories, 397
Sertorius. Character of the people of the Val di Norcia, 397
Sertorius, abandoned in Spain by his troops, wanders
about, 399
He is recalled to Spain. His measures, 400
Cn. Pompey, 401
His character, 402
Sertorius conquers, 403
His murder, 404
M. Peperna executed, 404
SERVILE WAR. SPARTACUS. M. LICINIUS CRASSUS, 404
Pompey and Crassus consuls, 404
Spartacus assembles about him the gladiators and
slaves, 405
Germans. Crixus, Oenomaus, 406
Victory of Crassus, 406
Atrocities of the war, 406
SECOND AND THIRD WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES, 407
Mithridates fulfils the stipulations of the peace, 407
L. Murena, 407
Sertorius concludes an alliance with Mithridates, 408
LECTURES ON ROMAN HISTORY.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.
Every body knows that Carthage is a colony of Tyre, founded seventy-two
years before the received date of the building of Rome. This statement
is quite historical. It rests upon those highly important notices in
Josephus’ work against Apion, from Phœnician chronicles which he read
in a Greek version of Menander of Ephesus. They are fully as genuine
as Berosus and Sanchoniathon, and closely tally with the history of
the Jewish kings: fraud on the part of Josephus is not to be thought
of. The Romans knew of the historical books of the Phœnicians: after
the destruction of Carthage, they presented them to the library of
the Numidian kings. If we wish for a true and authentic account of
the earliest history, we should be very thankful to have such dates
as these. The assertion also of Timæus that Rome was built about the
same time as Carthage, is not wide of the mark; that is to say, if we
reckon the Sæcula at a hundred and ten years. Utica (Athika עֲתִיקָא)
is an older colony of Tyre than Carthage: its foundation belongs to the
age in which the power of the Phœnicians was at its height, and they
had settlements in Cyprus, and were establishing themselves in every
quarter. Those of Cythera, Thasos, and elsewhere, are of much later
date; but it is likely that Cadiz (Gades) already existed when Carthage
was built.
Carthage was originally founded under the name of Bozra (in Greek
Βύρσα, whence the legend of the bullock’s hide). By the side of this
Bozra, that is to say, city, there arose, even as Naples did at the
side of Parthenope, a new town, קַרִתָּה חַדְתָּא _Kartha chadtha_, (by
contraction Karchadta, from which the Greeks made out Καρχηδών). The
town, for perhaps two hundred years, increased but slowly; it paid
tribute to the Libyan peoples, and was for a long time in a state of
dependence upon Tyre. Towards this, her mother-city, Carthage was
never wanting in filial piety, not even when its relations to her had
completely changed, which is one of the fine traits in her history.
Of the time when Carthage began to extend its sway, we know nothing:
placed as it was in the midst of barbarous nations, which were not
able to amalgamate with it, it could not have risen into prosperity
as quickly as the Greek colonies on the Asiatic coasts, where races
of men were dwelling between which and the Pelasgian stock there was
affinity, although not in language, yet in that spirit of refined
humanity which distinguished them; as, for instance, the Lycians, and
Carians, who, even before they were hellenized, had already attained to
a considerable degree of civilization, as we see from their monuments
and institutions. The Carthaginians did not betake themselves to
husbandry, and therefore they could not multiply as fast as families
which spread out; the Libyans were hard, oppressive neighbours,
barbarians (_Berbers_ as they are called to this very day) who only
gradually mingled with the Phœnician settlers. It was not until the
middle of the third century of Rome, more than three hundred years
after her own foundation, that Carthage made her appearance as a power.
The earlier times are shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Justin gives
some notices from Trogus, but most carelessly; so does also Diodorus,
who in all likelihood borrowed from Timæus: the former has an account
of a civil war, and of a conquest of Carthage by Malcus, one of its
generals. Certain it is, that Carthage for a long time paid tribute
to the Libyans; and the first sign of its vigour, is the throwing off
of this yoke in a hard-fought struggle. Particularly favourable to
Carthage seem to have been the fortunes of the mother country Phœnicia,
which, after having long and painfully striven against Egypt, yielded
itself to Persian protection; for though indeed its condition was thus
tolerable enough, yet at times a foreign yoke was felt to be galling,
and many may have then emigrated to the free colony, which was made
to thrive the more, as Tyre, owing to its connexion with Persia, now
became the port for the whole of Asia, even as far as India. The treaty
with Rome in the year of the city 245, shows that the Carthaginians
were then already masters of part of Sicily, of Sardinia, and of Libya,
so that they were a great people for that age. About the year 272, they
are said to have come over with an army of 300,000 men into Sicily,
against Gelon of Syracuse and Theron of Agrigentum: this, however, is
not real history. Pindar and Simonides sang the achievements of Gelon
and Theron; but history was not yet written. It is not that such an
expedition has never taken place; what is doubtful, is the assertion
that it happened at the same time as the invasion of Xerxes. The battle
of Himera is said to have been fought on the very day that he was
defeated at Salamis; but, on the other hand, the better chronological
statements which rest upon the authority of Timæus, show that Gelon,
who is supposed to have conquered at Himera, came to the throne at a
later date than that of the battle of Salamis. The expedition of the
Carthaginians must have happened in the 76th, or 77th Olympiad, and
it must have been insignificant. They were beaten, and did not for a
long time think again of undertaking anything against Sicily: they now
strengthened themselves in other quarters. When the Athenians engaged
in their enterprise against Sicily, we hear little or nothing of the
Carthaginians; they were confined to Motye, Panormus, and Solois, the
first of which three places is a Phœnician settlement. Yet when the
expedition had come to such an unhappy end, the implacable revenge
wreaked against Segesta and the other cities which had welcomed the
Athenians, now brought on the ruin of Sicily. These cities applied to
Carthage, which sent a considerable army over (350): all the Greek
towns were involved in the greatest danger; Selinus, Agrigentum,
Camarina, Gela, and other places were destroyed. Dionysius the elder
concluded a disadvantageous peace, but was afterwards more successful.
In the reign of Dionysius the second, the Carthaginians renewed the
contest. Timoleon defeated them, and drove them back to Motye and
Lilybæum; yet in the peace the old _status quo_ was re-established,
and the western part of Sicily remained in their hands: the rivers
Nimera and Halycus continued to be the boundaries which thenceforth
were looked upon as the normal ones, and were generally restored when a
peace was made. In the days of Agathocles, the Carthaginians besieged
Syracuse; but in a second campaign, during which Motye was destroyed,
and they were for some time confined to Lilybæum, they were compelled
to restore the boundary of the Himera. Then followed the events of
the times of Pyrrhus, who carried out the plans of Agathocles still
further. After his departure, the Carthaginians spread themselves
again, and afterwards got possession once more of Agrigentum.
At the beginning of the first Punic war, Carthage was mistress of
the whole of the western half of Sicily, and of the northern coast
as far as Messana. In Africa, her rule extended to the corner of the
great Syrtis; nearly the whole of the territory of Tunis was subject
to her. Along a great part of the African coast, there was a number
of Carthaginian colonial towns. There were likewise several of them
in the interior; for the Libyans had adopted Punic civilization: even
St. Augustine says that the Punic language was his mother tongue.
When two hundred years afterwards the Arabs conquered these regions,
they were able in some degree to converse with the inhabitants; and
the present Tunisian dialect, as well as the Maltese, without doubt
has still retained some Punic elements. The coast of Algiers, as far
as the straits of Gibraltar, was occupied by their factories only,
the mountains there approaching too near the sea to leave room for
colonies. In Sardinia, the Carthaginians ruled over the whole of that
gloomy but fruitful isle, with the exception of the inner highlands;
and these were inhabited by savage tribes, which to this day have not
changed their way of living, but, for instance, even now wear those
sheep skins which Cicero calls _mastrucæ_. In Corsica, they had a
few settlements, probably the excellent harbours there: the Balearic
isles were also subject to them. The coasts of Granada and Murcia were
likewise in their possession; and Cadiz, although a sister town, was
treated as a dependent.
As to the constitution of Carthage, we are utterly in the dark. What
has been written on it, is but insignificant; nor have my researches
led me to any important results. They had, according to Aristotle,
a δῆμος, that is to say, a mixed commonalty which had come together
(συνήλυδες) of colonial citizens and Libyans (Amazirgh, Schilha’s,
Maxyes, Massesyles). The Libyans, in their whole physical constitution,
do not in the least differ from the nations of Southern Europe; and
thus likewise ancient Egypt, before it was conquered by the Æthiopians,
had a white population: the whole of the Mediterranean therefore was
inhabited around by whites. These Libyans could very easily have
amalgamated with the _Pœni_ in a δῆμος, even as at Rome the plebeians
did with the patricians; yet there would be this distinction, that
these last were of the same stock, whereas the Libyans and the _Pœni_
were altogether different, and particularly so in their language. The
relation between the Libyans and the _Pœni_ is analogous to that of
the Lettish and Lithuanian tribes to the German settlers, or of the
Slavonic population near Lübeck and the Germans, the former of whom
also became completely Germanized. We know moreover that Carthage had
a senate; this is still the governing body in the first Punic war.
According to Aristotle, the δῆμος at Carthage had but little to say,
not much more than at Sparta, where only those who were in authority
might speak in the assembly, and not the people, who were merely to
assent or to reject; at Carthage, any one of the people was at least
free to stand up and make a speech. Those whom Aristotle calls the
βασιλεῖς, even the Suffetes or _Schofetim_, were no doubt in earlier
times the commanders of the army likewise: afterwards, when the civil
and military power were jealously kept distinct, their office was
merely an administrative one. We also find that there was a powerful
corporation called the Hundred, which cannot but be the same as the
Hundred and Four in Aristotle: these I have long ago referred to
the fifty weeks of the year. Moreover, he speaks of another kind of
magistracy, of which we merely know that it was a πενταρχία (if the
reading be correct, as the text of Aristotle’s Politics is derived from
a single Parisian MS. of the fourteenth century), and that its members
were chosen by the Hundred and Four. Of what nature it was, we do not
know.
The Hundred and Four are no doubt the _centum senatores_, before whom,
says Justin, the kings and generals had to undergo their εὐθύναι; they
may have been a court of control to check the administration of the
senate, very much like the Ephors in Sparta (παραπλήσιοι ἐφόροις).
Aristotle points out, that, properly speaking, the power of government
lay with the senate; single cases only were brought before the people:
there was therefore no magistracy which could agitate the δῆμος, like
the tribunes at Rome. The chief offices were given ἀριστίνδην and
πλουτίνδην: in a later passage, Aristotle says positively that the
highest places were ὠνηταί, and Polybius confirms it. People were
not in the least ashamed to take money from the candidates: things
were managed as in the small cantons in Switzerland, where the office
of bailiff (_Landvogt_) was sold in the most shameless manner, or
as in Venice. There the places were not quite bought in due form;
but it was well understood, that one had to pay for them: the great
offices of state were sought after as a _provvigione_, as a means of
restoring embarrassed fortunes. The rich were never punished, not
even for murder; but they paid damages, and there was a regular sale
of _cartes blanches_ for manslaughter. This was also the case with
the Carthaginians. They were a commercial people, but this should by
no means have bereft them of the feeling of honour: we do not find
it to be so in England, for instance. Among the trading communities
of the United States, similar sentiments are said to prevail as in
Carthage. Such a disposition as this cannot but lead to utter ruin.
The Carthaginians, owing to their rapacity, were grievously hateful to
their subjects: the Libyans had to pay a fourth part of their produce,
and in some extraordinary cases even half; besides which, there was
whatever the governors might squeeze out of them on their own account;
and these, as Aristotle already tells us, were positively sent down
to suck the blood of those who were under their rule. This plan was
adopted to keep individuals among the citizens in good humour. The
contrast between the Carthaginians and the Romans in their better
times, is very striking. Some great men, of course, were exceptions,
as they were able to act freely, like kings: when Hamilcar commanded
in Spain, the Carthaginians were quite popular there. The nation was
unwarlike; they kept mercenaries, and had only a cavalry of their own:
the mercenaries were faithless in a countless number of instances.
The Carthaginians not unseldom left the same generals for many years
in possession of their command; but the separation of it from the
civil magistracy had this disadvantage, that they often rebelled. The
generals, however, became very familiarly acquainted with their armies,
and a good captain was thus enabled to achieve quite incredible things,
whilst a bad one might also do great mischief. Among the Romans, it
was, of course, quite different. With them, there was a constant
change; men were in office for one year, and then, at most, one more as
proconsuls.
If we would understand the first Punic war, we ought to have in our
mind’s eye an outline of the natural features of Sicily. As every body
knows, the core and frame-work of the whole island is Ætna, from which
a chain of mountains stretches close along the sea, and is continued on
the opposite shore as far as Hipponium in Bruttium. For the mountain
ranges in the South of Italy belong geologically to Sicily, whilst the
hills of the Northern Apennines are a different ridge. The _Apenninus_
so ends that the two sets of mountains are connected together by low
hills, on the spot where the Greeks had more than once the intention
of making a canal. The mountain ridge, therefore, runs north from
Ætna as far as Messina on the eastern coast; to the south, it leaves
a considerable plain near Leontini towards the sea; between Syracuse
and the western country, there is only a low range of hills. West
of Ætna, it continues under the names of the Heræan and Nebrodian
mountains. From Pelorus to Himera, it is quite close to the sea, which
washes its foot; so that sometimes there is not even a road between.
From Himera onward, there is a small strip of coast, and the mountains
fall off in height: at some distance from Palermo, the country becomes
quite flat; the only eminence is the hill in which is the cavern of
St. Rosalia (the ancient Hercta).[1] The range of mountains then goes
further to the west, and rises again: Eryx (Monte San Giuliano) is
the largest mountain after Ætna; it towers in a quite extraordinary
way from among the lower groups. The country round Enna is flat. The
southern coast to Agrigentum is a large plain, by Gela and Camarina
also it is flat; south of a line drawn from Agrigentum to Catana, there
is either nothing but hillocks, or a dead level.--According therefore
to this nature of the ground, campaigns had to be managed. Otherwise
it would be incomprehensible why the Romans did not march from Messina
to Palermo by the northern coast, but went to the southern part, where
they could have had no other base but Syracuse to rest upon. To this,
my attention was directed by the campaigns of the English in 1812, in
which likewise the troops could not go by land from Messina to Palermo.
The first Punic war may be divided into five periods:--
1. From 488 to 491, when the Romans carry on the war without a
fleet. The Carthaginians are masters of the sea; the Romans have
the greatest difficulty in crossing, and can only get at them in
Sicily by land.
2. From 492 to 496, to the landing of Regulus in Africa.
3. From 496 to 497, the campaign of Regulus in Africa.
4. From the destruction of the army of Regulus to the victory of
L. Cæcilius Metellus near Panormus. Fortune is nearly equally
balanced; the Romans lose two fleets by storms, the Carthaginians
have the upperhand in Sicily: nevertheless the Romans are
victorious at last.
5. From the beginning of the year 502 to 511; from the contest
for Lilibæum and Drepana, to the victory near the Ægatian
isles. The ten years’ struggle is confined to an exceedingly
narrow space, being important rather in a military than in an
historical point of view. The diversion of Hamilcar Barcas, of
which, unfortunately, we know so little, is, owing to the taking
of Hercta and Eryx, one of the most remarkable in the military
history of any age; it shows a great man, who creates new
resources for himself, and avails himself of them. Yet for the
history of nations this period is not so important.
The Carthaginian system of warfare is quite unknown to us; we can only
say, that, where the Carthaginians themselves were in arms, they were
drawn up in a phalanx just like the Greeks. The Spaniards very likely
stood in _catervæ_, and fought with small swords, and _in cetris_, that
is to say, linen coats of mail. The Gauls, no doubt, fought in great
masses.
In the year 490, the third of the war, the Romans undertook to besiege
Agrigentum with two armies. This town was of great extent; yet, as a
city it was but a mere shadow of what it had been a hundred and forty
years earlier, before its first destruction by the Carthaginians.
Within its high and strong walls, a considerable army of the enemy had
now thrown itself. The name of the Punic general was Hannibal. The
Carthaginians were called by their first-names only, and one might be
easily led to think that they were all related to each other, as there
were so few of these names, Hannibal, Hanno, Hamilcar, and some others.
These correspond to our christian names, to the Roman _prænomina_,
as Gaius, &c. They certainly had, all of them, family names also,
which, however, at that time were not yet made use of to designate
individuals: they had even bye-names, but these have been partly lost
to us. The generals who bear the name of Hannibal, are in the whole of
Carthaginian history so insignificant, when set beside that great man
who gave the name its renown, that little mention only is made of them.
Hannibal had posted himself with fifty thousand men within the wide
and waste precincts of Agrigentum; the two consular armies advanced on
the south against the town, entrenched themselves in two camps, and
constructed two lines against the city, and against any one who might
attempt to relieve it. The Carthaginian generals were very bad in the
beginning of the war; they either made no use at all of the elephants,
or only a limited one, and they were very loth to give battle to the
Romans. Hannibal had now imprudently allowed himself to be thus hemmed
in, and as Agrigentum does not lie close to the sea, he could not
get any succours from thence: yet he succeeded in conveying to the
Carthaginians, by single messengers and letters, his entreaties for
relief. They indeed, when he had been besieged five months, sent Hanno
with a large army and fifty elephants. This general pitched a strong
camp near Heraclea; took Erbessus, the arsenal of the Romans; and by
means of barricades of felled trees, &c., so shut them in, that they
were much distressed for want of supplies, and on account of the state
of health of their troops: for the Carthaginians were masters of the
sea, and the Numidian horsemen, the Cossacks of the ancients, made it
exceedingly difficult for them to forage. It seemed as if they would be
obliged to give up the siege, and to retreat; yet they could not bring
themselves to do so, showing in this instance also their perseverance,
and on the contrary, they kept up the blockade so strictly, that
Hannibal found no means of bettering the condition of his troops.
When under these circumstances two months had gone by, Hanno may have
had reasons to attack; yet the Romans gained a complete victory, and
set themselves up again by the booty which they got in his camp. All
this time, Hiero had given them every possible help: without him they
would have perished. Hannibal, who had been brought to extremities,
took advantage of the moment when the Romans were enjoying themselves
the night after their victory, to make preparations for a sally. The
soldiers filled the ditches of the Roman lines with fascines and sacks
of straw, climbed over the ramparts, drove back the outposts, and thus
fought their way through: all that the Romans could do, was to annoy
them in the rear. Whoever was able to bear arms, got off in this way;
but the inhabitants of the town were for the most part left behind,
as well as the sick and the weak. Agrigentum was, on the following
morning, sacked and pillaged, like a town taken by storm. Here the
Romans made up for all their privations: the whole of the unfortunate
population was swept away.
After this frightful event, a year passed by without any remarkable
occurrence. The Carthaginians strongly provisioned and fortified their
other stations in the west; yet they also acted on the offensive.
Their fleet cruised off the coasts of Italy, which it laid waste; the
northern coasts of Sicily likewise surrendered to their power from
fear, whilst the Romans kept the inner island and the eastern coast.
The conquest of Agrigentum gave the latter quite different ideas with
regard to the war. Formerly, they merely wanted to have Messana and
Syracuse as dependent allies; but now their object was to drive the
Carthaginians altogether from the island, as Dionysius, Agathocles,
and Pyrrhus had done: they saw, however, that this could not be done
without a fleet. It was the same difficulty as at Athens, where, in the
Peloponnesian war, and in the times immediately following it, they had
no other ships but penteconters, _lembi_, and triremes (with from 200
to 220 men, who were partly rowers and partly marines, and with a deck;
the penteconters, which had 50 men,[2] were open, and the benches for
the rowers in both were placed across, before and above each other);
these vessels had been outdone long since, and larger ones were needed.
In Syracuse, the cradle of mechanical art, quadriremes, and soon
afterwards quinqueremes, were first mounted, ships of a larger class,
which were not round, and which might properly be called ships of
the line; for, the difference of the triremes and quinqueremes cannot
have consisted merely in the number of the benches and the rowers,
but it must really have been in the build itself, otherwise no great
skill would have been required to construct them. These quinqueremes
had already for a long time been in use, especially in the Macedonian,
Sicelian, and Punic fleets; but neither the Romans, nor the Antiates
had them. The Romans had also triremes, and wherever the Antiate
vessels are mentioned, they are triremes.--The oars had the same effect
as our steam boats, being independent of wind and tide: the ancients
could, however, sail very well besides.
A quinquereme had three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty
marines; to these rowers the triremes could oppose but a hundred
and twenty, who therefore were able to do as little against them,
as a frigate or a brigantine would against a ship of the line.
This accounts for the statement, that the Romans had had no fleet
at all; and yet they had built triremes for the passage to Sicily.
They wanted therefore a model, from which the ships might be built
on correct principles, so that they could be worked with ease; and
they might certainly have sent for a shipbuilder to Greece, or to
Egypt, to Ptolemy Philadelphus, with whom they were already allied,
and have fetched a model thence; for the ancients indeed built from
models. But it so happened that a Carthaginian ship of war was driven
ashore, and from it they built a hundred and twenty quinqueremes.[3]
These were indeed very unwieldy, and the Romans had not the number
of sailors which they wanted, that is to say, more than 30,000.
They were therefore obliged to man them with levies from the inland
districts, and with slaves, as the Russian ships are by conscription
in the interior of the empire;--for, the seamen from Etruria and the
Greek towns were by no means sufficient (Polybius goes too far, in
stating that they had had no able seamen at all): these were trained
to ply the oars upon scaffoldings on dry ground. This drilling, as it
is told to us, seems to be utterly ridiculous; and the Carthaginians
must have been altogether unlike our nations, if on this occasion a
whole crowd of caricatures were not published among them. There was
in those times the same contrast between a Roman and a Carthaginian
ship, which there is now-a-days between a Russian and an English or
American man of war. But the Romans, being great in this as they were
in all things, devised the means of overcoming this disadvantage. Their
fleet was unable to make head against the Carthaginians in the ordinary
tactics; and it was very likely at that very time, and not at a later
one, that the idea was conceived of ridding the sea-fight of all
artificial evolutions, and rather making ship fight against ship. For
it required the greatest skill to manage and steer the ships against
wind and tide in the same way as a rider manages his horse, so as to
shatter the enemy’s vessel by means of the _rostrum_, and to tear off
the benches of the rowers; this was more than the Romans dared to think
of. Wherever an enemy is to be met who is greatly superior in skill,
the only way of conquering is by employing masses, or some unexpected
invention. Thus Carnot gained the victory for the French, by opposing
masses to the thin lines of the enemy; the battle of Wattignies (15,
16 Oct. 1793) is the turning point of the modern history of warfare,
the end of the old, and the beginning of the new tactics. General Hoche
had recourse to the same system in Lorraine; by masses the Americans
also beat the English ships, which, otherwise, they would have never
succeeded in doing. The Romans invented boarding-bridges made of wood,
which were wide enough for two men to run upon abreast, and protected
on both sides by railings; on the prow of every ship a large mast was
set up, resting on which the bridge was drawn up aloft, the upturned
end having an iron ring through which a hawser was passed: the bridge
was raised or lowered by a windlass, and it fastened itself to the
hostile vessel by means of a grappling-iron. Thus the advantage of
superior skill which the Carthaginian rowers possessed, was done away
with. The Romans, moreover, had their best legions on board, and in all
likelihood the Carthaginians had only middling or bad marine soldiers,
as these were not picked. This was in the year 492, according to
Cato; in 494, according to Varro. The first attempt was not, however,
successful, or in the beginning all the ships were not yet armed in
this manner. A squadron was caught at a great disadvantage near the
Liparian isles, owing to the bad look-out of the Roman commander Cn.
Cornelius, and many ships were lost; but the Carthaginians also, some
time afterwards, got right into the midst of the Roman squadron, and
several of their ships were taken. But the decisive affair was the
naval victory of the consul C. Duilius off Mylæ. The Carthaginians
engaged in the battle with a feeling of great contempt for their enemy,
having 130 vessels against 100 Roman ones; but they soon found how much
they were mistaken, when the Romans began to board, and the sea-fight
was changed into the nature of a land one. Fifty Carthaginian ships
were taken; then the Romans, quite intoxicated with their victory,
landed in Sicily, and relieved Segesta (which, like Rome, boasted of
its descent from Troy). Duilius was the first who led forth a naval
triumph at Rome. He got the right of being lighted by a torch carried
before him, when returning home of an evening from a feast, and of
being accompanied by a flute player; moreover, as is generally known,
the _columna rostrata_ was erected to him. What this really was, we do
not exactly know; perhaps it was a brazen pillar, cast from the beaks
of the ships which had been taken: a pillar from which brazen beaks
stick out, as it is generally represented, is quite a modern, and
altogether ungrounded conceit. On the column there was an inscription,
in which the victory and the booty won by Duilius were set forth. A
small remnant of it is still in existence; yet the present tablet has
not been put up in the time of Duilius himself, as some of the Roman
antiquaries have also perceived. It is built of Greek marble, which
in those days was not yet known in Rome. According to Tacitus, it was
struck by lightning in the reign of the emperor Tiberius, and restored
by Germanicus; but the old language and spelling were still faithfully
kept. With that age, the form of the letters also agrees: those on the
tombs of the Scipios are altogether different.
After this victory, the hopes of the Romans were unbounded: the war
in Sicily was pursued with redoubled vigour. In the following year,
the Roman fleet went to Sardinia. The conquest of this island was
difficult, as on the coasts the Punic language and manners had spread;
yet as all the subjects there had been kept in an unwarlike condition
owing to the jealousy of the mother state, the attack was somewhat
facilitated. But for all that, it had no important result.
The two following years were spent in making conquests in Sicily,
besides this expedition to Sardinia. In this war, A. Atilius Calatinus
got into an impassable part of the country; and a tribune, whose
name is stated differently, M. Calpurnius Flamma, or Q. Cæditius
Laberius, sacrificed himself with a small band for the sake of the
army, as Decius did in Samnium. According to Cato, in the _Origines_,
he was found after the battle, dangerously wounded and still scarcely
breathing, among the dead; but he afterwards recovered.
In the third year after the victory of Duilius, the Romans appeared
with a considerable naval force before Sicily; and a drawn battle was
fought off Tyndaris on the northern coast, of which the Carthaginians
were masters, from Lilybæum nearly to Mylæ. But as the war in Sicily
was not decided, and year by year a few small places only were taken,
while the Carthaginians still held all the important possessions in
their province, the Romans in 496 resolved upon transporting the war
to Africa, as there was no hope of its being ended without some great
blow being struck. The example of Agathocles had shown how vulnerable
the Carthaginians were in Africa. They therefore intended to force
the Carthaginians to make peace; at that time they would indeed have
contented themselves with Sicily. They now doubled their armaments,
and built an immense fleet; the Carthaginians likewise, when they
heard of it, built a very great number of ships. Such huge masses do
not give one much pleasure in history, as even barbarians are able to
get them up: the superiority of talent and skill over physical force
has no chance on such occasions. The victory also of Duilius by means
of boarding-bridges, is, when closely looked at, only the result of a
clumsy device by which the true science of the Carthaginian navy was
baffled. In the seven years’ war, when line-tactics were in vogue,
the art of war, as an art, was of a far higher order than it is, now
that armies fight in masses: the masses likewise of artillery mark the
evident decline of the intellectual spirit and of humanity in warfare.
The Romans put to sea with three hundred and thirty ships, most of
which were quinqueremes, and the Carthaginians with three hundred and
fifty. Polybius himself is amazed at these huge masses, and remarks
in his preface, how even the great battles of the Macedonian kings,
of Demetrius, Ptolemy, and others, and in later times, those of the
Rhodians, shrink to nothing in comparison. They also outvied each
other from henceforth in the size of their ships, some of which had
even as many as nine banks of oars, like the one which was built by
Archimedes for Hiero, who sent it to Alexandria. These preposterous
monsters surpassed in bulk our ships of the line. Men afterwards came
back to the use of the very lightest vessels, such as _liburnæ_ and
_lembi_; of these we are unable to give a clear idea. In the most
brilliant days of the Byzantines and Venetians, battles were fought
with very small ships. The Romans were 140,000 rowers and marines,
the land forces alone amounting to 40,000: they had also a number of
transports, especially for the cavalry (ἱππηγοί). It is not unlikely
that the Romans built so many ships, merely to carry over their large
army to Africa in one voyage; and that the Carthaginians did so, on
the other hand, in order to resist them. The expectations of every one
were riveted upon this undertaking, just as in the times of the Spanish
Armada.
As the most important points on the northern coast of Sicily were
still in the possession of the Carthaginians, and provisions had to
be taken in at Syracuse, the Romans did not venture to sail round
Lilybæum; but they preferred the way round Pachynus. Between that
headland and Agrigentum, the Carthaginians met them with the whole of
their fleet. The Roman ships being still unwieldy, the result depended,
as before, on the use of the boarding-bridges. They had hit upon a
strange disposition: their ships were divided into four squadrons, each
of which had one legion with its brigade of allies, and a number of
transports. The two first squadrons sailed so as to form two sides of a
triangle, or an angle, the two admirals being placed side by side, and
therefore with their _rostra_ standing out towards the sea. The base of
the triangle was formed by the third squadron, which advanced straight
forwards, and had the transports in tow. Behind these sailed the
fourth squadron, which was to cover the rear. The two first were each
commanded by a consul, the third and fourth by other leaders, of whom
we do not know any thing further. They therefore formed an ἔμβολον, in
which the attack of the enemy is a manœuvre for the execution of which
a great many favourable circumstances are requisite; and the ships
which at other times used to sail on in a straight line, diverged and
made a wedge.
[Illustration: 1, 2, 3, 4, the numbers of the squadrons.
5, the transports.
.
. .
. .
. .
1 . . 2
. .
. 3 .
...............
5···············5
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4
]