DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
In the autumn of 1914, the rush of getting the Americans out
of Germany was over. The care of the British civilians was on a
business basis and there were comparatively few camps of prisoners
of war. Absolutely tired by working every day and until twelve
at night, I went to Munich for a two weeks' rest.
On February fourth, 1915, Germany announced that on February
eighteenth the blockade of England through submarines would commence.
Some very peculiar and mysterious negotiations thereafter ensued.
About February eighth, an American who was very intimate with
the members of the General Staff came to me with a statement
that Germany desired peace and was ready to open negotiations
to that end. It was, however, to be made a condition of these
peace negotiations that this particular American should go to
Paris and to Petrograd and inform the governments there of the
overwhelming strength of the German armies and of their positions,
which knowledge, it was said, he had obtained by personally visiting
both the fronts, it was further intimated that von Tirpitz himself
was anxious that peace should be concluded, possibly because of
his fear that the proposed blockade would not be successful.
Of course, I informed the State Department of these mysterious
manoeuvres.
I was taken by back stairways to a mysterious meeting with von
Tirpitz at night in his rooms in the Navy Department. When I was
alone with him, however, he had nothing definite to say or to
offer; if there was any opportunity at that time to make peace
nothing came of it. It looked somewhat to me as if the whole
idea had been to get this American to go to Paris and Petrograd,
certify from his personal observation to the strength of the
German armies and position, and thereby to assist in enticing
one or both of these countries to desert the allied cause. All of
this took place about ten days before the eighteenth of February,
the time named for the announcement of the blockade of England.
Medals were struck having the head of von Tirpitz on one side
and on the other the words "Gott strafe England," and a picture
of a sort of Neptune assisted by a submarine rising from the
sea to blockade the distant English coast.
The Ambassador is supposed to have the right to demand an audience
with the Kaiser at any time, and as there were matters connected
with the treatment of prisoners as well as this coming submarine
warfare which I wished to take up with him, I had on various
occasions asked for an audience with him; on each occasion my
request had been refused on some excuse or other, and I was not
even permitted to go to the railway station to bid him good-bye
on one occasion when he left for the front.
When our Military Attaché, Major Langhorne, left in March, 1915,
he had a farewell audience with the Kaiser and I then asked him
to say to the Kaiser that I had not seen him for so long a time
that I had forgotten what he looked like. Langhorne reported
to me that he had given his message to the Kaiser and that the
Kaiser said, "I have nothing against Mr. Gerard personally, but
I will not see the Ambassador of a country which furnishes arms
and ammunition to the enemies of Germany."
Before the departure of Langhorne, I had succeeded in getting
Germany to agree that six American army officers might visit
Germany as military observers. When they arrived, I presented
them at the Foreign Office, etc., and they were taken on trips
to the East and West fronts.
They were not allowed to see much, and their request to be attached
to a particular unit was refused. Nearly everywhere they were
subject to insulting remarks or treatment because of the shipment
of munitions of war to the Allies from America; and finally after
they had been subjected to deliberate insults at the hands of
several German generals, Mackensen particularly distinguishing
himself, the United States Government withdrew them from Germany.
Colonel (now General) Kuhn, however, who was of these observers,
was appointed Military Attaché in place of Major Langhorne. Speaking
German fluently and acting with great tact, he managed for a long
time to keep sufficiently in the good graces of the Germans to
be allowed to see something of the operations of the various
fronts. There came a period in 1916 when he was no longer invited
to go on the various excursions made by the foreign military
attachés and finally Major Nicolai, the general intelligence
officer of the Great General Headquarters, sent for him early in
the autumn of 1916, and informed him that he could no longer go
to any of the fronts. Colonel Kuhn answered that he was aware of
this already. Major Nicolai said that he gave him this information
by direct order of General Ludendorf, that General Ludendorf had
stated that he did not believe America could do more damage to
Germany than she had done if the two countries were actually
at war, and that he considered that, practically, America and
Germany were engaged in hostilities. On this being reported to
Washington, Colonel Kuhn was quite naturally recalled.
I cannot praise too highly the patience and tact shown by Colonel
Kuhn in dealing with the Germans. Although accused in the German
newspapers of being a spy, and otherwise attacked, he kept his
temper and observed all that he could for the benefit of his own
country. As he had had an opportunity to observe the Russian-Japanese
war, his experiences at that time, coupled with his experiences
in Germany, make him, perhaps, our greatest American expert on
modern war.
It was with the greatest pleasure that I heard from Secretary
Baker that he had determined to promote Colonel Kuhn to the rank
of General and make him head of our War College, where his teachings
will prove of the greatest value to the armies of the United States.
Colonel House and his wife arrived to pay us a visit on March 19,
1915, and remained until the twenty-eighth. During this period the
Colonel met all the principal members of the German Government and
many men of influence and prominence in the world of affairs, such
as Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and Dr. Walter
Rathenau, who succeeded his father as head of the Allgemeine
Elektricitats Gesellschaft and hundreds of other corporations. The
Colonel dined at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister,
and lunched with von Gwinner.
In April, negotiations were continued about the sinking of the
_William P. Fry_, an American boat loaded with food and
destined for Ireland. The American Government on behalf of the
owners of the _William P. Fry_ claimed damages for the boat.
Nothing was said about the cargo, but in the German answer it was
stated that the cargo of the _William P. Fry_ consisting of
foodstuffs destined for an armed port of the enemy and, therefore,
presumed to be destined for the armed forces of the enemy was,
because of this, contraband. I spoke to von Jagow about this and
told him that I thought that possibly this would seem to amount
to a German justification of the British blockade of Germany.
He said that this note had been drawn by Director Kriege who
was their expert on international law, and that he would not
interfere with Kriege's work. Of course, as a matter of fact,
all foodstuffs shipped to Germany would have to be landed at
some armed port, and, therefore, according to the contentions
of Germany, these would be supposed to be destined to the armed
forces of the enemy and become contraband of war.
At international law, it had always been recognised that private
individuals and corporations have the right to sell arms and
ammunitions of war to any belligerent and, in the Hague Convention
held in 1907, this right was expressly ratified and confirmed.
This same Director Kriege who represented Germany at this Hague
Conference in 1907, in the debates on this point said: "The neutral
boats which engage in such a trade, commit a violation of the
duties of neutrality. However, according to a principle generally
recognised, the State of which the boat flies the flag is not
responsible for this violation. The neutral States are not called
upon to forbid their subjects a commerce which, from the point of
view of the belligerents, ought to be considered as unlawful."
(Conférence International de la Paix, La Haye, 15 Juin-18 Octobre
1907. Vol. III, p. 859.)
During our trouble with General Huerta, arms and ammunition for
Huerta's forces from Germany were landed from German ships in
Mexico. During the Boer war the Germans, who openly sympathised
with the Boers, nevertheless furnished to England great quantities
of arms and munitions, expressly destined to be used against
the Boers; and this, although it was manifest that there was
no possibility whatever that the Boers could obtain arms and
munitions from German sources during the war. For instance, the
firm of Eberhardt in Dusseldorf furnished one hundred and nine
cannon, complete, with wagons, caissons and munitions, etc., to
the English which were expressly designed for use against the
Boers.
At one time the Imperial Foreign Office sent me a formal note
making reference to a paragraph in former Ambassador Andrew D.
White's autobiography with reference to the alleged stoppage
in a German port of a boat laden with arms and ammunition, for
use against the Americans in Cuba during the Spanish War. Of
course, former Ambassador White wrote without having the Embassy
records at hand and those records show that the position he took
at the time of this alleged stoppage was eminently correct.
The files show that he wrote the letter to the State Department
in which he stated that knowledge came to him of the proposed
sailing of this ship, but he did not protest because he had been
advised by a Naval Attaché that the United States did not have
the right to interfere. The Department of State wrote to him
commending his action in not filing any protest and otherwise
interfering.
It seemed as if the German Government expressly desired to stir
up hatred against America on this issue in order to force the
American Government through fear of either the German Government,
or the German-American propagandists at home, to put an immediate
embargo on the export of these supplies.
In the autumn of 1914 Zimmermann showed me a long list sent him
by Bernstorff showing quantities of saddles, automobiles, motor
trucks, tires, explosives, foodstuffs and so on, exported from
America to the Allies and intimated that this traffic had reached
such proportions that it should be stopped.
In February, 1915, in the official _Communiqué_ of the day
appeared the following statement: "Heavy artillery fire in certain
sections of the West front, mostly with American ammunition;"
and in April in the official _Communiqué_ something to this
effect: "Captured French artillery officers say that they have
great stores of American ammunition." I obtained through the State
Department in Washington a statement from the French Ambassador
certifying that up to that time, the end of April, 1915, no shells
whatever of the French artillery had been furnished from America.
Nothing, however, would satisfy the Germans. They seemed determined
that the export of every article, whether of food or munitions
which might prove of use to the Allies in the war, should be
stopped. Newspapers were filled with bitter attacks upon America
and upon President Wilson, and with caricatures referring to
the sale of munitions.
It never seemed to occur to the Germans that we could not violate
the Hague Convention in order to change the rules of the game
because one party, after the commencement of hostilities, found
that the rule worked to his disadvantage. Nor did the Germans
consider that America could not vary its international law with
the changing fortunes of war and make one ruling when the Germans
lost control of the sea and another ruling if they regained it.
From early in 1915 until I left Germany, I do not think I ever
had a conversation with a German without his alluding to this
question. Shortly before leaving Germany, in January, 1917, and
after I had learned of the probability of the resumption of ruthless
submarine war, at an evening party at the house of Dr. Solf, the
Colonial Minister, a large German who turned out to be one of
the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, planted himself some
distance away from me and addressed me in German saying, "You are
the American Ambassador and I want to tell you that the conduct
of America in furnishing arms and ammunition to the enemies of
Germany is stamped deep on the German heart, that we will never
forget it and will some day have our revenge." He spoke in a
voice so loud and slapped his chest so hard that everyone in
the room stopped their conversation in order to hear. He wore
on his breast the orders of the Black Eagle, the Red Eagle, the
Elephant and the Seraphim, and when he struck all this menagerie
the rattle alone was quite loud. I reminded him politely of the
Hague Convention, of the fact that we could not change international
law from time to time with the change in the situation of the war,
and that Germany had furnished arms to England to use against the
Boers. But he simply answered, "We care nothing for treaties,"
and my answer, "That is what they all say," was a retort too
obvious to be omitted.
The German press continually published articles to the effect
that the war would be finished if it were not for the shipment
of supplies from America. All public opinion was with the German
Government when the warning was issued on February fourth, 1915,
stating that the blockade of England would commence on the eighteenth
and warning neutral ships to keep out of the war zone. From then
on we had constant cases and crises with reference to the sinking
of American boats by the German submarine. There were the cases
of the _Gulfflight_ and the _Cushing_ and the _Falaba_, an English
boat sunk without warning on which Americans were killed. On May
sixth, 1915, Director Kriege of the Foreign Office asked Mr. Jackson
to call and see him, and told him that he would like to have the
following three points brought to the attention of the American
public:
"1. As the result of the English effort to stop all foreign
commerce with Germany, Germany would do everything in her power
to destroy English commerce and merchant shipping. There was,
however, never at any time an intention to destroy or interfere
with neutral commerce or to attack neutral shipping unless
engaged in contraband trade. In view of the action of the
British Government in arming merchant vessels and causing
them to disguise their national character, the occasional
destruction of a neutral ship was unavoidable. Naval officers
in command of submarines had been instructed originally, and
new and more stringent instructions had been issued repeatedly,
to use the utmost care, consistent with their own safety, to
avoid attacks on neutral vessels.
"2. In case a neutral ship should be destroyed by a submarine
the German Government is prepared to make an immediate and
formal expression of its regret and to pay an indemnity, without
having recourse to a prize court.
"3. All reports with regard to the destruction of a neutral
vessel by a German submarine are investigated at once by both
the German Foreign Office and Admiralty and the result is
communicated to the Government concerned, which is requested in
return to communicate to the German Government the result of its
own independent investigation. Where there is any material
divergence in the two reports as to the presumed cause of
destruction (torpedo or mine), the question is to be submitted
to investigation by a commission composed of representatives of
the two nations concerned, with a neutral arbiter whose decision
will be final. This course has already been adopted in two cases,
in which a Dutch and a Norwegian vessel, respectively, were
concerned. The German Government reserves its right to refuse
this international arbitration in exceptional cases where for
military reasons the German Admiralty are opposed to its taking
place."
Director Kriege told Mr. Jackson that a written communication in
which the substance of the foregoing would be contained, would
soon to be made to the Embassy.
Mr. Jackson put this conversation down in the form above given
and showed Director Kriege a copy of it. Later in the day Geheimrat
Simon called on Mr. Jackson at the Embassy and said that Dr.
Kriege would like to have point two read as follows:
"In case _through any unfortunate mistake a neutral ship_,"
and continuing to the end; and that Dr. Kriege would like to
change what was written on point three beginning with "Where
there is" so that it should read, as follows:--"Where there is
any material divergence in the two reports as to the presumed
cause of destruction (torpedo or mine), the German Government has
already in several instances declared its readiness to submit
the question to the decision of an international commission in
accordance with the Hague Convention for the friendly settlement
of international disputes."
This had been suggested by Director Kriege in case it should
be decided to make a communication to the American Press. Mr.
Jackson told Geheimrat Simon that he would report the subject of
his conversation to me, but that it would depend upon me whether
any communication should be made to the American Government or
to the press upon the subject.
Of course, the news of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ on
May seventh and of the great loss of American lives brought
about a very critical situation, and naturally nothing was done
with Kriege's propositions.
It is unnecessary here for me to go into the notes which were
exchanged between the two governments because all that is already
public property.
Sometime after I had delivered our first _Lusitania_ Note of
May 11th, 1915, Zimmermann was lunching with us. A good looking
American woman, married to a German, was also of the party and
after lunch although I was talking to some one else I overheard
part of her conversation with Zimmermann. When Zimmermann left
I asked her what it was that he had said about America, Germany,
Mr. Bryan and the _Lusitania_. She then told me that she
had said to Zimmermann that it was a great pity that we were
to leave Berlin as it looked as if diplomatic relations between
the two countries would be broken, and that Zimmermann told her
not to worry about that because they had just received word from
the Austrian Government that Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador
in Washington, had cabled that the _Lusitania_ Note from
America to Germany was only sent as a sop to public opinion in
America and that the government did not really mean what was
said in that note. I then called on Zimmermann at the Foreign
Office and he showed me Dumba's telegram which was substantially
as stated above. Of course, I immediately cabled to the State
Department and also got word to President Wilson. The rest of
the incident is public property. I, of course, did not know what
actually occurred between Mr. Bryan and Dr. Dumba, but I am sure
that Dr. Dumba must have misunderstood friendly statements made
by Mr. Bryan.
It was very lucky that I discovered the existence of this Dumba
cablegram in this manner which savours almost of diplomacy as
represented on the stage. If the Germans had gone on in the belief
that the _Lusitania_ Note was not really meant, war would
have inevitably resulted at that time between Germany and America,
and it shows how great events may be shaped by heavy luncheons
and a pretty woman.
Before this time much indignation had been caused in Germany
by the fact that the _Lusitania_ on her eastward voyage
from New York early in February, 1915, had raised the American
flag when nearing British waters.
Shortly after this incident had become known, I was at the
Wintergarten, a large concert hall in Berlin, with Grant Smith,
First Secretary of the Embassy at Vienna and other members of
my staff. We naturally spoke English among ourselves, a fact
which aroused the ire of a German who had been drinking heavily
and who was seated in the next box. He immediately began to call
out that some one was speaking English and when told by one of
the attendants that it was the American Ambassador, he immediately
cried in a loud voice that Americans were even worse than English
and that the _Lusitania_ had been flying the American flag as
protection in British waters.
The audience, however, took sides against him and told him to
shut up and as I left the house at the close of the performance,
some Germans spoke to me and apologised for his conduct. The
next day the manager of the Wintergarten called on me also to
express his regret for the occurrence.
About a year afterwards I was at the races one day and saw this
man and asked him what he meant by making such a noise at the
Wintergarten. He immediately apologised and said that he had
been drinking and hoped that I would forget the incident. This
was the only incident of the kind which occurred to me during
all the time that I was in Germany.
Both before and after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, the
German Foreign Office put forward all kinds of proposals with
reference to American ships in the war zone. On one afternoon,
Zimmermann, who had a number of these proposals drafted in German,
showed them to me and I wrote down the English translation for him
to see how it would look in English. These proposals were about
the sailing from America of what might be called certified ships,
the ships to be painted and striped in a distinctive way, to come
from certified ports at certain certified times, America to agree
that these ships should carry no contraband whatever. All these
proposals were sternly rejected by the President.
On February sixteenth, the German answer to our note of February
tenth had announced that Germany declined all responsibility for
what might happen to neutral ships and, in addition, announced
that mines would be allowed in waters surrounding Great Britain
and Ireland. This note also contained one of Zimmermann's proposed
solutions, namely, that American warships should convoy American
merchantmen.
The German note of the sixteenth also spoke about the great traffic
in munitions from the United States to the Allies, and contained
a suggestion that the United States should induce the Allies to
adopt the Declaration of London and omit the importation not
only of food but also of all raw materials into Germany.
February twentieth was the date of the conciliatory note addressed
by President Wilson to both Great Britain and Germany; and contained
the suggestion that submarines should not be employed against
merchant vessels of any nationality and that food should be allowed
to go through for the civil population of Germany consigned to
the agencies named by the United States in Germany, which were
to see that the food was received and distributed to the civil
population.
In the meantime the mines on the German coast had destroyed two
American ships, both loaded with cotton for Germany; one called
the _Carib_ and the other the _Evelyn_.
In America, Congress refused to pass a law to put it in the power
of the President to place an embargo on the export of munitions
of war.
In April, Count Bernstorff delivered his note concerning the
alleged want of neutrality of the United States, referring to
the numerous new industries in war materials being built up in
the United States, stating, "In reality the United States is
supplying only Germany's enemies, a fact which is not in any
way modified by the theoretical willingness to furnish Germany
as well."
To this note, Secretary Bryan in a note replied that it was
impossible, in view of the indisputable doctrines of accepted
international law, to make any change in our own laws of neutrality
which meant unequally affecting, during the progress of the war,
the relations of the United States with the various nations at
war; and that the placing of embargoes on the trade in arms which
constituted such a change would be a direct violation of the
neutrality of the United States.
But all these negotiations, reproaches and recriminations were
put an end to by the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_, with the
killing of American women and civilians who were passengers on
that vessel.
I believed myself that we would immediately break diplomatic
relations, and prepared to leave Germany. On May eleventh, I
delivered to von Jagow the _Lusitania_ Note, which after
calling attention to the cases of the sinking of American boats,
ending with the _Lusitania_, contained the statement, "The
Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of
the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the
sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and
its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercises and
enjoyments."
During this period I had constant conversations with von Jagow
and Zimmermann, and it was during the conversations about this
submarine warfare that Zimmermann on one occasion said to me:
"The United States does not dare to do anything against Germany
because we have five hundred thousand German reservists in America
who will rise in arms against your government if your government
should dare to take any action against Germany." As he said this,
he worked himself up to a passion and repeatedly struck the table
with his fist. I told him that we had five hundred and one thousand
lamp posts in America, and that was where the German reservists
would find themselves if they tried any uprising; and I also
called his attention to the fact that no German-Americans making
use of the American passports which they could easily obtain,
were sailing for Germany by way of Scandinavian countries in
order to enlist in the German army. I told him that if he could
show me one person with an American passport who had come to
fight in the German army I might more readily believe what he
said about the Germans in America rising in revolution.
As a matter of fact, during the whole course of the war, I knew
of only one man with American citizenship who enlisted in the
German army. This was an American student then in Germany who
enlisted in a German regiment. His father, a business man in New
York, cabled me asking me to have his son released from the German
army; so I procured the discharge of the young man who immediately
wrote to me and informed me that he was over twenty-one, and
that he could not see what business his father had to interfere
with his military ambitions. I thereupon withdrew my request
with reference to him, but he had already been discharged from
the army. When his regiment went to the West front he stowed
away on the cars with it, was present at the attack on Ypres,
and was shot through the body. He recovered in a German hospital,
received the Iron Cross, was discharged and sailed for America.
What has since become of him I do not know.
I do not intend to go in great detail into this exchange of notes
and the public history of the submarine controversy, as all that
properly belongs to the history of the war rather than to an
account of my personal experiences; and besides, as Victor Hugo
said, "History is not written with a microscope." All will remember
the answer of Germany to the American _Lusitania_ Note, which
answer, delivered on May twenty-ninth, contained the charge that
the _Lusitania_ was armed and carried munitions, and had been
used in the transport of Canadian troops. In the meantime, however,
the American ship, _Nebraskan_, had been torpedoed off the coast
of Ireland on the twenty-sixth; and, on May twenty-eighth, Germany
stated that the American steamer, _Gulfflight_, had been torpedoed
by mistake, and apologised for this act.
Von Jagow gave me, about the same time, a Note requesting that
American vessels should be more plainly marked and should illuminate
their marking at night.
The second American _Lusitania_ Note was published on June
eleventh, 1915; and its delivery was coincident with the resignation
of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State. In this last Note President
Wilson (for, of course, it is an open secret that he was the
author of these Notes) made the issue perfectly plain, referring
to the torpedoing of enemy passenger ships. "Only her actual
resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so
for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the
submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of
those on board the ship in jeopardy." On July eighth the German
answer to this American _Lusitania_ Note was delivered, and
again stated that "we have been obliged to adopt a submarine war
to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method of
warfare adopted by them in contravention of international law".
Again referring to the alleged fact of the _Lusitania's_
carrying munitions they said: "If the _Lusitania_ had been
spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to
Germany's enemies and thereby thousands of German mothers and
children robbed of breadwinners." The note then contained some
of Zimmermann's favourite proposals, to the effect that German
submarine commanders would be instructed to permit the passage of
American steamers marked in a special way and of whose sailing
they had been notified in advance, provided that the American
Government guaranteed that these vessels did not carry contraband
of war. It was also suggested that a number of neutral vessels
should be added to those sailing under the American flag, to
give greater opportunity for those Americans who were compelled
to travel abroad, and the Note's most important part continued:
"In particular the Imperial Government is unable to admit that
the American citizens can protect an enemy ship by mere fact
of their presence on board."
July twenty-first, the American Government rejected the proposals
of Germany saying, "The lives of noncombatants may in no case
be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape
after being summoned to submit to examination," and disposed
of the claim that the acts of England gave Germany the right
to retaliate, even though American citizens should be deprived
of their lives in the course of retaliation by stating: "For a
belligerent act of retaliation is _per se_ an act beyond the
law, and the defense, of an act as retaliatory, is an admission
that it is illegal." Continuing it said: "If a belligerent cannot
retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals,
as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a
due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate
that the practice be discontinued."
It was also said: "The United States cannot believe that the
Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton
act of its naval commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or
from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far
as reparation can be made for the needless destruction of human
life by an illegal act." And the meat of the Note was contained
in the following sentence: "Friendship itself prompts it (the
United States) to say to the Imperial Government that repetition
by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention
of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United
States, when they affect American citizens, as being deliberately
unfriendly."
There the matter has remained so far as the Lusitania was concerned
until now. In the meantime, the attack of the American ship,
_Nebraskan_, was disavowed; the German Note stating that
"the torpedo was not meant for the American flag and is to be
considered an unfortunate accident."
The diplomatic situation with regard to the use of the submarine
and the attack on many merchant ships without notice and without
putting the passengers in safety was still unsettled when on
August nineteenth, 1915, the British ship _Arabic_, was
torpedoed, without warning, not far from the place where the
_Lusitania_ had gone down. Two Americans were among the
passengers killed.
The German Government, after the usual quibbling, at length,
in its Note of September seventh, claimed that the Captain of
the German submarine, while engaged in preparing to sink the
_Dunsley_, became convinced that the approaching _Arabic_
was trying to ram him and, therefore, fired his torpedo. The
Imperial Government refused to admit any liability but offered
to arbitrate.
There followed almost immediately the case of the _Ancona_,
sunk by a submarine flying the Austrian flag. This case was naturally
out of my jurisdiction, but formed a link in the chain, and then
came the sinking of the _Persia_ in the Mediterranean. On this
boat our consul to Aden lost his life.
In the Note of Count Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, dated September
first, 1915, Count Bernstorff said that liners would not be sunk
by German submarines without warning, and without putting the
passengers in safety, provided that the liners did not try to
escape or offer resistance; and it was further stated that this
policy was in effect before the sinking of the _Arabic_.
There were long negotiations during this period concerning the
_Arabic_. At one time it looked as if diplomatic relations
would be broken; but finally the Imperial Government consented
to acknowledge that the submarine commander had been wrong in
assuming that the _Arabic_ intended to ram his boat, offered
to pay an indemnity and disavowed the act of the commander. It
was stated that orders so precise had been given to the submarine
commanders that a "recurrence of incidents similar to the
_Arabic_ is considered out of the question."
In the same way the Austrian Government gave way to the demands
of America in the _Ancona_ case at the end of December, 1915.
Ambassador Penfield, in Austria, won great praise by his admirable
handling of this case.
The negotiations as to the still pending _Lusitania_ case
were carried on in Washington by Count Bernstorff and Secretary
Lansing, and finally Germany offered to pay an indemnity for
the death of the Americans on the _Lusitania_ whose deaths
Germany "greatly regretted," but refused to disavow the act of
the submarine commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or to admit
that such act was illegal.
About this time our State Department sent out a Note proposing
in effect that submarines should conform to "cruiser" warfare,
only sinking a vessel which defended itself or tried to escape,
and that before sinking a vessel its passengers and crew should
be placed in safety; and that, on the other hand, merchant vessels
of belligerent nationality should be prohibited from carrying
any armaments whatever. This suggestion was not followed up.
Zimmermann (not the one in the Foreign Office) wrote an article
in the _Lokal Anzeiger_ of which he is an editor, saying
that the United States had something on their side in the question
of the export of munitions. I heard that von Kessel, commander of
the _Mark of Brandenburg_ said that he, Zimmermann, ought to be
shot as a traitor. Zimmermann hearing of this made von Kessel
apologise, but was shortly afterwards mobilised.
Colonel House had arrived in Germany at the end of January, 1916,
and remained only three days. He was quite worried by the situation
and by an interview he had had with Zimmermann in which Zimmermann
expressed the readiness of Germany to go to war with the United
States.
In February, 1916, the Junkers in the Prussian Lower House started
a fight against the Chancellor and discussed submarine war, a
matter out of their province. The Chancellor hit back at them hard
and had the best of the exchange. At this period it was reported
that the Emperor went to Wilhelmshafen to warn the submarine
commanders to be careful.
About March first it was reported that a grand council of war
was held at Charleville and that in spite of the support of von
Tirpitz by Falkenhayn, the Chief of Staff, the Chancellor was
supported by the Emperor, and once more beat the propositions
to recommence ruthless submarine war.
In March too, the "illness" of von Tirpitz was announced, followed
shortly by his resignation. On March nineteenth, his birthday,
a demonstration was looked for and I saw many police near his
dwelling, but nothing unusual occurred. I contemplated a trip
to America, but both the Chancellor and von Jagow begged me not
to go.
From the time of the _Lusitania_ sinking to that of the _Sussex_
all Germany was divided into two camps. The party of the Chancellor
tried to keep peace with America and did not want to have Germany
branded as an outlaw among nations. Von Tirpitz and his party of
naval and military officers called for ruthless submarine war, and
the Conservatives, angry with Bethmann-Hollweg because of his
proposed concession as to the extension of the suffrage, joined
the opposition. The reception of our last _Lusitania_ Note in
July, 1915, was hostile and I was accused of being against Germany,
although, of course, I had nothing to do with the preparation of
this Note.
In August, 1915, the deputies representing the great industrials
of Germany joined in the attack on the Chancellor. These men
wished to keep Northern France and Belgium, because they hoped
to get possession of the coal and iron deposits there and so
obtain a monopoly of the iron and steel trade of the continent.
Accelerators of public opinion, undoubtedly hired by the Krupp
firm, were hard at work. These Annexationists were opposed by the
more reasonable men who signed a petition against the annexation
of Belgium. Among the signers of this reasonable men's petition
were Prince Hatzfeld (Duke of Trachenberg) head of the Red Cross,
Dernburg, Prince Henkel Donnersmarck, Professor Delbrück, von
Harnack and many others.
The rage of the Conservatives at the _Arabic_ settlement
knew no bounds, and after a bitter article had appeared in the
_Tageszeitung_ about the _Arabic_ affair, that newspaper was
suppressed for some days,--a rather unexpected showing of backbone
on the part of the Chancellor. Reventlow who wrote for this newspaper
is one of the ablest editorial writers in Germany. An ex-naval
officer, he is bitter in his hatred of America. It was said that
he once lived in America and lost a small fortune in a Florida
orange grove, but I never succeeded in having this verified.
In November, 1915, after the _Arabic_ settlement there followed
a moment for us of comparative calm. Mrs. Gerard was given the
Red Cross Orders of the first and third classes, and Jackson
and Rives of the Embassy Staff the second and third class. The
third class is always given because one cannot have the first
and second unless one has the third or lowest.
There were rumours at this time of the formation of a new party;
really the Socialists and Liberals, as the Socialists as such were
too unfashionable, in too bad odour, to open a campaign against
the military under their own name. This talk came to nothing.
The Chancellor always complained bitterly that he could not
communicate in cipher _via_ wireless with von Bernstorff.
On one occasion he said to me, "How can I arrange as I wish to
in a friendly way the _Ancona_ and _Lusitania_ cases
if I cannot communicate with my Ambassador? Why does the United
States Government not allow me to communicate in cipher?" I said,
"The Foreign Office tried to get me to procure a safe-conduct for
the notorious von Rintelen on the pretense that he was going to do
charitable work for Belgium in America; perhaps Washington thinks
you want to communicate with people like that." The Chancellor then
changed the subject and said that there would be bad feeling in
Germany against America after the war. I answered that that idea
had been expressed by a great many Germans and German newspapers,
and that I had had private letters from a great many Americans
who wrote that if Germany intended to make war on America, after
this war, perhaps we had better go in now. He then very amiably
said that war with America would be ridiculous. He asked me why
public opinion in America was against Germany, and I answered
that matters like the Cavell case had made a bad impression in
America and that I knew personally that even the Kaiser did not
approve of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_. The Chancellor
said, "How about the _Baralong_?" I replied that I did not
know the details and that there seemed much doubt and confusion
about that affair, but that there was no doubt about the fact
that Miss Cavell was shot and that she was a woman. I then took
up in detail with him the treatment of British prisoners and
said that this bad treatment could not go on. This was only one
of the many times when I complained to the Chancellor about the
condition of prisoners. I am sure that he did not approve of the
manner in which prisoners of war in Germany were treated; but
he always complained that he was powerless where the military
were concerned, and always referred me to Bismarck's memoirs.
During this winter of submarine controversy an interview with
von Tirpitz, thinly veiled as an interview with a "high naval
authority," was published in that usually most conservative of
newspapers, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_. In this interview the
"high naval authority" advocated ruthless submarine war with
England, and promised to bring about thereby the speedy surrender
of that country. After the surrender, which was to include the
whole British fleet, the German fleet with the surrendered British
fleet added to its force, was to sail for America, and exact from
that country indemnities enough to pay the whole cost of the war.
After his fall, von Tirpitz, in a letter to some admirers who
had sent him verses and a wreath, advocated holding the coast of
Flanders as a necessity for the war against England and America.
The successor of von Tirpitz was Admiral von Holtzendorff, whose
brother is Ballin's right hand man in the management of the Hamburg
American Line. Because of the more reasonable influence and
surroundings of von Holtzendorff, I regarded his appointment as
a help towards peaceful relations between Germany and America.
I have told in another chapter how the Emperor had refused to
receive me as Ambassador of a country which was supplying munitions
to the Allies.
From time to time since I learned of this in March, 1915, I kept
insisting upon my right as Ambassador to be received by the Emperor;
and finally early in October, 1915, wrote the following letter
to the Chancellor:
"Your Excellency:
Some time ago I requested you to arrange an audience for me
with his majesty.
Please take no further trouble about this matter.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES W. GERARD."
This seemed to have the desired effect. I was informed that I
would be received by the Emperor in the new palace at Potsdam
on October twenty-second. He was then to pay a flying visit to
Berlin to receive the new Peruvian Minister and one or two others.
We went down in the train to Potsdam, von Jagow accompanying us,
in the morning; and it was arranged that we should return on
the train leaving Potsdam a little after one o'clock. I think
that the authorities of the palace expected that I would be with
the Emperor for a few minutes only, as when I was shown into the
room where he was, a large room opening from the famous shell
hall of the palace, the Peruvian Minister and the others to be
received were standing waiting in that hall.
The Emperor was alone in the room and no one was present at our
interview. He was dressed in a Hussar uniform of the new field
grey, the parade uniform of which the frogs and trimmings were
of gold. A large table in the corner of the room was covered
with maps, compasses, scales and rulers; and looked as if the
Emperor there, in company with some of his aides, or possibly
the chief of staff, had been working out the plan of campaign
of the German armies.
The Emperor was standing; so, naturally, I stood also; and, according
to his habit, which is quite Rooseveltian, he stood very close to
me and talked very earnestly. I was fortunately able to clear
up two distinct points which he had against America.
The Emperor said that he had read in a German paper that a number
of submarines built in America for England had crossed the Atlantic
to England, escorted by ships of the American Navy. I was, of
course, able to deny this ridiculous story at the time and furnish
definite proofs later. The Emperor complained because a loan to
England and France had been floated in America. I said that the
first loan to a belligerent floated in America was a loan to
Germany. The Emperor sent for some of his staff and immediately
inquired into the matter. The members of the staff confirmed my
statement. The Emperor said that he would not have permitted
the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ if he had known, and that
no gentleman would kill so many women and children. He showed,
however, great bitterness against the United States and repeatedly
said, "America had better look out after this war:" and "I shall
stand no nonsense from America after the war."
The interview lasted about an hour and a quarter, and when I finally
emerged from the room the officers of the Emperor's household were
in such a state of agitation that I feel sure they must have
thought that something fearful had occurred. As I walked rapidly
towards the door of the palace in order to take the carriage which
was to drive me to the train, one of them walked along beside
me saying, "Is it all right? Is it all right?"
The unfortunate diplomats who were to have been received and
who had been standing all this time outside the door waiting for
an audience missed their train and their luncheon.
At this interview, the Emperor looked very careworn and seemed
nervous. When I next saw him, however, which was not until the
end of April, 1916, he was in much better condition.
I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous part of this interview,
on account of the many spies not only in my own Embassy but also
in the State Department, that I sent but a very few words in a
roundabout way by courier direct to the President.
The year, 1916, opened with this great question still unsettled
and, in effect, Germany gave notice that after March first, 1916,
the German submarines would sink all armed merchantmen of the
enemies of Germany without warning. It is not my place here to
go into the agitation of this question in America or into the
history of the votes in Congress, which in fact upheld the policy
of the President. A proposal as to armed merchantmen was issued by
our State Department and the position taken in this was apparently
abandoned at the time of the settlement of the _Sussex_ case
to which I now refer.
In the latter half of March, 1916, a number of boats having Americans
on board were torpedoed without warning. These boats were the
_Eaglejoint_, the _Englishman_, the _Manchester Engineer_ and the
_Sussex_. One American was killed or drowned on the _Englishman_,
but the issue finally came to a head over the torpedoing of the
channel passenger boat, _Sussex_ which carried passengers between
Folkstone and Dieppe, France.
On March twenty-fourth the _Sussex_ was torpedoed near the
coast of France. Four hundred and thirty-six persons, of whom
seventy-five were Americans, were on board. The captain and a
number of the passengers saw the torpedo and an endeavour was
made to avoid it. After the boat was struck the many passengers
took to the boats. Three Americans were injured and over forty
persons lost their lives, although the boat was not sunk but
was towed to Boulogne.
I was instructed to inquire from the German Government as to
whether a German submarine had sunk the _Sussex_. The Foreign
Office finally, at my repeated request, called on the Admiralty
for a report of the torpedoing of the _Sussex_; and finally
on the tenth of April the German Note was delivered to me. In the
meantime, and before the delivery of this Note I had been assured
again and again that the _Sussex_ had not been torpedoed by
a German submarine. In this Note a rough sketch was enclosed,
said to have been made by the officer commanding the submarine, of
a vessel which he admitted he had torpedoed, in the same locality
where the _Sussex_ had been attacked and at about the same
time of day. It was said that this boat which was torpedoed was
a mine layer of the recently built _Arabic_ class and that a
great explosion which was observed to occur in the torpedoed ship
warranted the certain conclusion that great amounts of munitions
were on board. The Note concluded: "The German Government must
therefore assume that injury to the _Sussex_ was attributable
to another cause than attack by a German submarine." The Note
contained an offer to submit any difference of opinion that might
develop to be investigated by a mixed commission in accordance
with the Hague Convention of 1907. The _Englishman_ and
the _Eaglepoint_, it was claimed, were attacked by German
submarines only after they had attempted to escape, and an
explanation was given as to the _Manchester Engineer_. With
reference to the _Sussex_, the note continued: "Should the
American Government have at its disposal other material at the
conclusion of the case of the _Sussex_, the German Government
would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material
also to investigation."
In the meantime, American naval officers, etc., had been engaged
in collecting facts as to the sinking of the _Sussex_, and
this evidence, which seemed overwhelming and, in connection with
the admissions in the German note, absolutely conclusive, was
incorporated in the note sent to Germany in which Germany was
notified: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately
declare and effect abandonment of this present method of submarine
warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the
Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever
diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."
The issue was now clearly defined.
I have already spoken of the fact that for a long time there had
been growing up two parties in Germany. One party headed by von
Tirpitz in favour of what the Germans called _rücksichtloser_,
or ruthless submarine war, in which all enemy merchant ships
were to be sunk without warning, and the party then headed by
the Chancellor which desired to avoid a conflict with America
on this issue.
As I have explained in a former chapter, the military have always
claimed to take a hand in shaping the destinies and foreign policies
of Germany. When the Germans began to turn their attention to the
creation of a fleet, von Tirpitz was the man who, in a sense,
became the leader of the movement and, therefore, the creator of
the modern navy of Germany. A skilful politician, he for years
dominated the Reichstag and on the question of submarine warfare
was most efficiently seconded by the efforts of the Navy League,
an organization having perhaps one million members throughout
Germany. Although only one of the three heads of the navy (he
was Secretary of the Navy), by the force of his personality, by
the political position which he had created for himself, and by
the backing of his friends in the Navy League he really dominated
the other two departments of the navy, the Marine Staff and the
Marine Cabinet.
Like most Germans of the ruling class, ambition is his only passion.
These Spartans do not care either for money or for the luxury
which it brings. Their life is on very simple lines, both in
the Army and Navy, in order that the officers shall not vie with
one another in expenditure, and in order that the poorer officers
and their wives shall not be subject to the humiliation which
would be caused if they had to live in constant contact with
brother officers living on a more luxurious footing.
Von Tirpitz' ambition undoubtedly led him to consider himself
as a promising candidate for Bethmann-Hollweg's shoes. The whole
submarine issue, therefore, became not only a question of military
expediency and a question for the Foreign Office to decide in
connection with the relations of America to Germany, but also a
question of internal politics, a means of forcing the Chancellor
out of office. The advocates for the ruthless war were drawn from
the Navy and from the Army, and those who believed in the use
of any means of offence against their enemies and particularly
in the use of any means that would stop the shipment of munitions
of war to the Allies. The Army and the Navy were joined by the
Conservatives and by all those who hoped for the fall of the
Chancellor. The conservative newspapers, and even the Roman Catholic
newspapers were violent in their call for ruthless submarine war
as well as violent in their denunciations of the United States
of America.
American passengers on merchant ships of the enemy were called
_Schutzengel_ (guardian angels), and caricatures were published,
such as one which showed the mate reporting to the Captain of
an English boat that everything was in readiness for sailing
and the Captain's inquiry, "Are you sure that the American
_Schutzengel_ is on board?" The numerous notes sent by America
to Germany also formed a frequent subject of caricature and I
remember particularly one quite clever one in the paper called
_Brummer_, representing the celebrations in a German port
on the arrival of the one hundredth note from America when the
Mayor of the town and the military, flower girls and singing
societies and _Turnverein_ were drawn up in welcoming array.
The liberal papers were inclined to support the Chancellor in
his apparent intention to avoid an open break with America. But
even the liberal papers were not very strong in their stand.
The military, of course, absolutely despised America and claimed
that America could do no more harm by declaring war than it was
doing then to Germany; and that possibly the war preparations
of America might cut down the amount of the munitions available
for export to the enemies of the Empire. As to anything that
America could do in a military way, the Navy and the Army were
unanimous in saying that as a military or naval factor the United
States might be considered as less than nothing. This was the
situation when the last _Sussex_ Note of America brought
matters to a crisis, and even the crisis itself was considered
a farce as it had been simmering for so long a period.
I arranged that Colonel House should have an interview with the
Chancellor at this time, and after dinner one night he had a long
talk with the Chancellor in which the dangers of the situation
were pointed out.
With this arrival of the last American _Sussex_ Note, I
felt that the situation was almost hopeless; that this question
which had dragged along for so long must now inevitably lead
to a break of relations and possibly to war. Von Jagow had the
same idea and said that it was "fate," and that there was nothing
more to be done. I myself felt that nothing could alter public
opinion in Germany; that in spite of von Tirpitz' fall, which had
taken place some time before, the advocates of ruthless submarine
warfare would win, and that to satisfy them Germany would risk
a break with America.
I was sitting in my office in a rather dazed and despairing state
when Professor Ludwig Stein, proprietor of a magazine called
_North and South_ and a writer of special articles on Germany's
foreign relations for the _Vossische Zeitung_, under the
name of "Diplomaticus," called to see me.
He informed me that he thought the situation was not yet hopeless,
that there was still a large party of reasonable men in Germany
and that he thought much good could be done if I should go to
the great general headquarters and have a talk with the Kaiser,
who, he informed me, was reported to be against a break.
I told Dr. Stein that, of course, I was perfectly willing to
go if there was the slightest chance of preventing war; and I
also told the Chancellor that if he was going to decide this
question in favor of peace it would be possibly easier for him
if the decision was arrived at under the protection, as it were,
of the Emperor; or that, if the decision lay with the Emperor,
I might possibly be able to help in convincing him if I had an
opportunity to lay the American side of the case before him. I
said, moreover, that I was ready at any time on short notice
to proceed to the Emperor's headquarters.
Dr. Hecksher, a member of the Reichstag, who must be classed
among the reasonable men of Germany, also advocated my speaking
directly to the Kaiser.