FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR: POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
At the commencement of the war for some days I was cut off from
communication with the United States; but we soon established a
chain of communication, at first through Italy and later by way
of Denmark. At all times cables from Washington to Berlin, or
_vice versa_, took, on the average, two days in transmission.
After the fall of Liège, von Jagow sent for me and asked me if
I would transmit through the American Legation a proposition
offering Belgium peace and indemnity if no further opposition
were made to the passage of German troops through Belgium. As the
proposition was a proposition for peace, I took the responsibility
of forwarding it and sent the note of the German Government to
our Minister at the Hague for transmission to our Minister in
Belgium.
Dr. Van Dyke, our Minister at the Hague, refused to have anything
to do with the transmission of this proposition and turned the
German note over to the Holland Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and through this channel the proposition reached the Belgian
Government.
The State Department cabled me a message from the President to
the Emperor which stated that the United States stood ready at
any time to mediate between the warring powers, and directed
me to present this proposition direct to the Emperor.
I, therefore, asked for an audience with the Emperor and received
word from the chief Court Marshal that the Emperor would receive
me at the palace in Berlin on the morning of August tenth. I
drove in a motor into the courtyard of the palace and was there
escorted to the door which opened on a flight of steps leading
to a little garden about fifty yards square, directly on the
embankment of the River Spree, which flows past the Royal Palace.
As I went down the steps, the Empress and her only daughter,
the Duchess of Brunswick, came up. Both stopped and shook hands
with me, speaking a few words. I found the Emperor seated at a
green iron table under a large canvas garden umbrella. Telegraph
forms were scattered on the table in front of him and basking in
the gravel were two small dachshunds. I explained to the Emperor
the object of my visit and we had a general conversation about
the war and the state of affairs. The Emperor took some of the
large telegraph blanks and wrote out in pencil his reply to the
President's offer, This reply, of course, I cabled immediately
to the State Department.
_For the President of the_
_United States personally:_
10/VIII 14.
1. H. R. H. Prince Henry was received by his Majesty King George
V in London, who empowered him to transmit to me verbally, that
England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent
involving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. This message
was telegraphed to me by my brother from London after his
conversation with H. M. the King, and repeated verbally on the
twenty-ninth of July.
2. My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir E.
Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to
be crushed England would interfere.
3. On the thirtieth my Ambassador in London reported that Sir
Edward Grey in course of a "private" conversation told him that
if the conflict remained localized between _Russia_--not
Serbia--and _Austria_, England would not move, but if we
"mixed" in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave
measures; i. e., if I left my ally Austria in the lurch to
fight alone England would not touch me.
4. This communication being directly counter to the King's
message to me, I telegraphed to H. M. on the twenty-ninth or
thirtieth, thanking him for kind messages through my brother
and begging him to use all his power to keep France and
Russia--his Allies--from making any war-like preparations
calculated to disturb my work of mediation, stating that I
was in constant communication with H. M. the Czar. In the
evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his
Government to use every possible influence with his Allies
to refrain from taking any provocative military measures. At
the same time H. M. asked me if I would transmit to Vienna
the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a
few other Serbian towns and a strip of country as a "main-mise"
to make sure that the Serbian promises on paper should be
fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment
telegraphed to me from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction
with the British proposal; besides, I had telegraphed to H. M.
the Czar the same as an idea of mine, before I received the two
communications from Vienna and London, as both were of the same
opinion.
5. I immediately transmitted the telegrams _vice versa_ to
Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question
over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.
6. While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar the next
morning, to inform him that Vienna, London and Berlin were agreed
about the treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from
H. E. the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given
the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian army, which was,
of course, also meant against Germany; whereas up till then the
southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.
7. In a telegram from London my Ambassador informed me he
understood the British Government would guarantee neutrality
of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from
attack. I telegraphed to H. M. the King personally that
mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but
if H. M. could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of
France I would refrain _from attacking her_, _leave her alone_
and employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. answered that he thought my
offer was based on a misunderstanding; and, as far as I can make
out, Sir E. Grey never took my offer into serious consideration.
He never answered it. Instead, he declared England had to defend
Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on
strategical grounds, news having been received that France was
already preparing to enter Belgium, and the King of Belgians
having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee
of his country's freedom. I am most grateful for the President's
message.
WILLIAM, H. R.
When the German Emperor in my presence indited his letter to
President Wilson of August tenth, 1914, he asked that I cable
it immediately to the State Department and that I simultaneously
give it to the press. As I have already stated, I cabled the
document immediately to the State Department at Washington, but
I withheld it from publication.
My interview with the Emperor was in the morning. That afternoon
a man holding a high position in Germany sent for me. I do not
give his name because I do not wish to involve him in any way
with the Emperor, so I shall not even indicate whether he is a
royalty or an official. He said:
"You had an interview today with the Emperor. What happened?"
I told of the message given me for the President which was intended
for publication by the Emperor. He said:
"I think you ought to show that message to me; you know the Emperor
is a constitutional Emperor and there was once a great row about
such a message."
I showed him the message, and when he had read it he said: "I
think it would be inadvisable for us to have this message published,
and in the interest of good feeling between Germany and America.
If you cable it ask that publication be withheld."
I complied with his request and it is characteristic of the
President's desire to preserve good relations that publication
was withheld. Now, when the two countries are at war; when the
whole world, and especially our own country, has an interest in
knowing how this great calamity of universal war came to the
earth, the time has come when this message should be given out
and I have published it by permission.
This most interesting document in the first place clears up one
issue never really obscure in the eyes of the world--the deliberate
violation of the neutrality of Belgium, whose territory "had to
be violated by Germany on strategical grounds." The very weak
excuse is added that "news had been received that France was
already preparing to enter Belgium,"--not even a pretense that
there had ever been any actual violation of Belgium's frontier
by the French prior to the German invasion of that unfortunate
country. Of course the second excuse that the King of the Belgians
had refused entrance to the Emperor's troops under guarantee of
his country's freedom is even weaker than the first. It would
indeed inaugurate a new era in the intercourse of nations if a
small nation could only preserve its freedom by at all times,
on request, granting free passage to the troops of a powerful
neighbour on the march to attack an adjoining country.
And aside from the violation of Belgian neutrality, what would
have become of England and of the world if the Prussian autocracy
had been left free to defeat--one by one--the nations of the
earth? First, the defeat of Russia and Serbia by Austria and
Germany, the incorporation of a large part of Russia in the German
Empire, German influence predominant in Russia and all the vast
resources of that great Empire at the command of Germany. All the
fleets in the world could uselessly blockade the German coasts
if Germany possessed the limitless riches of the Empire of the
Romanoffs.
[Illustration: ALLEGED DUM-DUM BULLETS, WHICH THE GERMANS DECLARED
HAD BEEN FOUND IN LONGWY.]
The German army drawing for reserves on the teeming populations
of Russia and Siberia would never know defeat. And this is not
idle conjecture, mere dreaming in the realm of possibilities,
because the Russian revolution has shown us how weak and tottering
in reality was the dreaded power of the Czar.
Russia, beaten and half digested, France would have been an easy
prey, and England, even if then joining France in war, would
have a far different problem to face if the V-boats were now
sailing from Cherbourg and Calais and Brest and Bordeaux on the
mission of piracy and murder, and then would come our turn and
that of Latin America. The first attack would come not on us,
but on South or Central America--at some point to which it would
be as difficult for us to send troops to help our neighbor as
it would be for Germany to attack.
Remember that in Southern Brazil nearly four hundred thousand
Germans are sustained, as I found out, in their devotion to the
Fatherland by annual grants of money for educational purposes
from the Imperial treasury in Berlin.
It was not without reason that at this interview, when the Kaiser
wrote this message to the President, he said that the coming
in of England had changed the whole situation and would make
the war a long one. The Kaiser talked rather despondently about
the war. I tried to cheer him up by saying the German troops
would soon enter Paris, but he answered, "The English change
the whole situation--an obstinate nation--they will keep up the
war. It cannot end soon."
It was the entry of England into the war, in defence of the rights
of small nations, in defence of the guaranteed neutrality of
Belgium, which saved the world from the harsh dominion of the
conquest-hungry Prussians and therefore saved as well the two
Americas and their protecting doctrine of President Monroe.
The document, which is dated August tenth, 1914, supersedes the
statement made by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in
his speech before the Reichstag on August fourth, 1914, in which
he gave the then official account of the entrance into the war of
the Central Empires. It will be noted that von Bethmann-Hollweg
insisted that France began the war in the sentence reading: "There
were bomb-throwing fliers, cavalry patrols, invading companies
in the Reichsland (Alsace-Lorraine). Thereby France, although
the condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked our
territory." But the Emperor makes no mention of this fact, of
supreme importance if true, in his writing to President Wilson
six days later.
Quite curiously, at this time there was a belief on the part
of the Germans that Japan would declare war on the Allies and
range herself on the side of the Central Powers. In fact on one
night there was a friendly demonstration in front of the Japanese
Embassy, but these hopes were soon dispelled by the ultimatum
of Japan sent on the sixteenth of August, and, finally, by the
declaration of war on August twenty-third.
During the first days of the war the warring powers indulged in
mutual recriminations as to the use of dumdum bullets and I was
given several packages of cartridges containing bullets bored out
at the top which the Germans said had been found in the French
fortress of Longwy, with a request that I send an account of them
to President Wilson and ask for his intervention in the matter.
Very wisely President Wilson refused to do anything of the kind,
as otherwise he would have been deluged with constant complaints
from both sides as to the violations of the rules of war.
The cartridges given to me were in packages marked on the outside
"_Cartouches de Stand_" and from this I took it that possibly
these cartridges had been used on some shooting range near the
fort and the bullets bored out in order that they might not go
too far, if carelessly fired over the targets.
On August fifth, with our Naval Attaché, Commander Walter Gherardi,
I called upon von Tirpitz, to learn from him which ports he
considered safest for the ships to be sent from America with gold
for stranded Americans. He recommended Rotterdam.
I also had a conversation on this day with Geheimrat Letze of
the Foreign Office with reference to the proposition that English
and German ships respectively should have a delay of until the
fourteenth of August in which to leave the English or German
ports in which they chanced to be.
The second week in August, my wife's sister and her husband,
Count Sigray, arrived in Berlin. Count Sigray is a reserve officer
of the Hungarian Hussars and was in Montana when the first rumours
of war came. He and his wife immediately started for New York and
sailed on the fourth of August. They landed in England, and as
England had not yet declared war on Austria, they were able to
proceed on their journey. With them were Count George Festetics
and Count Cziraki, the former from the Austrian Embassy in London
and the latter from that in Washington. They were all naturally
very much excited about war and the events of their trip. The
Hungarians as a people are quite like Americans. They have agreeable
manners and are able to laugh in a natural way, something which
seems to be a lost art in Prussia. Nearly all the members of
Hungarian noble families speak English perfectly and model their
clothes, sports and country life, as far as possible, after the
English.
The thirteenth saw the departure of our first special train
containing Americans bound for Holland. I saw the Americans off
at the Charlottenburg station. They all departed in great spirits
and very glad of an opportunity to leave Germany.
I had some negotiations about the purchase by America or Americans
of the ships of the North German Lloyd, but nothing came of these
negotiations. Trainloads of Americans continued to leave, but
there seemed to be no end to the Americans coming into Berlin
from all directions.
On August twenty-ninth, Count Szoegyeny, the Austrian Ambassador,
left Berlin. He had been Ambassador there for twenty-two years and
I suppose because of his advancing years the Austrian Government
thought that he had outlived his usefulness. Quite a crowd of
Germans and diplomats were at the station to witness the rather
sad farewell. His successor was Prince Hohenlohe, married to a
daughter of Archduke Frederick. She expressly waived her right
to precedence as a royal highness, and agreed to take only the
precedence given to her as the wife of the Ambassador, in order not
to cause feeling in Berlin. Prince Hohenlohe, a rather easy-going
man, who had been most popular in Russia and Austria, immediately
made a favourable impression in Berlin and successfully occupied
the difficult position of mediator between the governments of
Berlin and Vienna.
On September fourth the Chancellor gave me a statement to give
to the reporters in which he attacked England, claiming that
England did not desire the friendship of Germany but was moved by
commercial jealousy and a desire to crush her; that the efforts
made for peace had failed because Russia, under all circumstances,
was resolved upon war; and that Germany had entered Belgium in
order to forestall the planned French advance. He also claimed
that England, regardless of consequences to the white race, had
excited Japan to a pillaging expedition, and claimed that Belgian
girls and women had gouged out the eyes of the wounded; that
officers had been invited to dinner and shot across the table;
and Belgian women had cut the throats of soldiers quartered in
their houses while they were asleep. The Chancellor concluded by
saying, in this statement, that everyone knows that the German
people is not capable of unnecessary cruelty or of any brutality.
We were fully occupied with taking care of the English prisoners
and interests, the Americans, and negotiations relating to commercial
questions, and to getting goods required in the United States out
of Germany, when, on October seventh, a most unpleasant incident,
and one which for some time caused the members of our Embassy
to feel rather bitterly toward the German Foreign Office, took
place.
A great number of British civilians, men and women, were stranded
in Berlin. To many of these were paid sums of money in the form
of small allowances on behalf of the British Government. In order
to facilitate this work, we placed the clerks employed in this
distribution in the building formerly occupied by the British Consul
in Berlin. Of course, the great crowds of Americans resorting to
our Embassy, when combined with the crowds of British, made it
almost impossible even to enter the Embassy, and establishment
of this outlying relief station materially helped this situation.
I occupied it, and employed English men and English women in this
relief work by the express permission of the Imperial Foreign
Office, which I thought it wise to obtain in view of the fact
that the Germans seemed daily to become more irritable and
suspicious, especially after the Battle of the Marne.
On the night of October second, our Second Secretary, Harvey, went
to this relief headquarters at about twelve o'clock at night, and
was witness to a raid made by the Berlin police on this establishment
of ours. The men and women working were arrested, and all books
and papers which the police could get at were seized by them.
The next morning I went around to the place and on talking with
the criminal detectives in charge, was told by them that they had
made the raid by the orders of the Foreign Office. When I spoke
to the Foreign Office about this, they denied that they had given
directions for the raid and made a sort of half apology. The raid
was all the more unjustified because only the day before I had had
a conversation with the Adjutant of the Berlin Kommandantur and
told him that, although I had permission from the Foreign Office,
I thought it would be better to dismiss the English employed and
employ only Americans or Germans; and I sent round to my friend,
Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and asked him to
recommend some German accountants to me.
The Kommandantur is the direct office of military control. When
the Adjutant heard of the raid he was almost as indignant as I
was, and on the tenth of October informed me that he had learned
that the raid had been made on the joint orders of the Foreign
Office and von Tirpitz's department.
The books and papers of an Embassy, including those relating
to the affairs of foreign nations temporarily in the Embassy's
care, are universally recognised in international law as not,
subject to seizure, nor did the fact that I was carrying on this
work outside the actual Embassy building have any bearing on
this point so long as the building was directly under my control
and, especially, as the only work carried on was work properly
in my hands in my official capacity. The Foreign Office saw that
they had made a mistake, but at Zimmermann's earnest request
I agreed, as it were, to forget the incident. Later on, this
precedent might have been used by our government had they desired
to press the matter of the seizure of von Igel's papers. Von Igel,
it will be remembered, was carrying on business of a private
nature in a private office hired by him. Nevertheless, as he
had been employed in some capacity in the German Embassy at
Washington, Count von Bernstorff claimed immunity from seizure
for the papers found in that office.
On August sixteenth the Kaiser left Berlin for the front. I wrote
to his master of the household, saying that I should like an
opportunity to be at the railway station to say good-bye to the
Emperor, but was put off on various excuses. Thereafter the Emperor
practically abandoned Berlin and lived either in Silesia, at
Pless, or at some place near the Western front.
At first, following the precedent of the war of 1870, the more
important members of the government followed the Kaiser to the
front, even the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
abandoning their offices in Berlin. Not long afterwards, when it
was apparent that the war must be carried on on several fronts
and that it was not going to be the matter of a few weeks which
the Germans had first supposed, these officials returned to their
offices in Berlin. In the meantime, however, much confusion had
been caused by this rather ridiculous effort to follow the customs
of the war of 1870.
When von Jagow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was absent at the
Great General Headquarters, the diplomats remaining behind conducted
their negotiations with Zimmermann, who in turn had to transmit
everything to the great general headquarters.
In August, there were apparently rumours afloat in countries
outside of Germany that prominent Socialists at the outbreak of
the war had been shot. The State Department cabled me to find
out whether there was any truth in these rumours, with particular
reference to Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.
Liebknecht is a lawyer practicing in Berlin and so I telephoned
him, asking him to come and see me. He did so, and of course, by
his presence verified the fact that he had not been executed.
He told me that the rumours as to the treatment of the Socialists
were entirely unfounded and said that he had no objection to my
cabling a statement that the Socialists were opposed to Czarismus
and that he personally had confidence in the German army and the
cause of the German people.
Many people confuse Liebknecht with his father, now dead. Liebknecht,
the son, is a man of perhaps forty-three years, with dark bushy
hair and moustache and wearing eye-glasses, a man of medium height
and not at all of strong build. In the numerous interruptions
made by him during the debates in the Reichstag, during the first
year of the war, his voice sounded high and shrill. Of course,
anyone who defies the heavy hand of autocracy must suffer from
nervousness. We all knew that sooner or later autocracy would
"get" Liebknecht, and its opportunity came when he appeared in
citizen's clothes at an attempted mass-meeting at the Potsdamerplatz.
For the offence of appearing out of uniform after being called
and mobilized, and for alleged incitement of the people, he was
condemned for a long term of imprisonment. One can but admire
his courage. I believe that he earns his living by the practice
of law before one of the minor courts. It is hard to say just
what _rôle_ he will play in the future. It is probable that
when the Socialists settle down after the war and think things
over, they will consider that the leadership of Scheidemann has
been too conservative; that he submitted too readily to the powers
of autocracy and too easily abandoned the program of the Socialists.
In this case, Liebknecht perhaps will be made leader of the
Socialists, and it is within the bounds of probability that
Scheidemann and certain of his party may become Liberals rather
than Socialists.