future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself
against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the
displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the
future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal
strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he
did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship
which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in
these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the _Royal Sovereigns_ are still
looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the
beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction.
In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the
Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which
he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that
the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the
_Trafalgars_. The following points were also mentioned by him:--
“(_a_) ‘That (it was officially decided that) it was preferable to
have two separate strongly protected stations for the four heavy
guns, rather than to have a single citadel.’
“(_b_) ‘That on the whole the 4-inch armour amidships, from the
belt deck to the main deck, associated as it would be with the
internal coal bunkers, sub-divided into numerous compartments,
might be considered satisfactory; but that if armour weight became
available, it could be profitably utilised in thickening the 4-inch
steel above the middle portion of the belt.’
“I would draw particular attention to the first of these
conclusions, since it expresses a most important distinction
between the two systems of protection.
“With separate redoubts, placed far apart, the two stations
are isolated, and there is practically no risk of simultaneous
disablement by the explosion of shells, or perforation of
projectiles from the heaviest guns. Each redoubt offers a small
target to the fire of an enemy, and its weakest part--the thick
steel protective plating on the top--is of so small extent that the
chance of its being struck is extremely remote. Serious damage to
the unarmoured turret bases therefore involves the perforation of
the thick vertical armour on the redoubts.
“With a single citadel, extending the full breadth of a ship, the
case is widely different.
“Over a comparatively large area of the protective deck-plating in
the neighbourhood of each turret, perforation of the deck, or its
disruption by shell explosions at any point, involves very serious
risk of damage to the turret bases and the loading apparatus. In
fact, such damage may be effected and the heavy guns put out of
action while the thick vertical armour on the citadel is uninjured.
Moreover, as the turrets stand at the ends of a single citadel,
there is a possibility of their simultaneous disablement by the
explosion of heavy shell within the citadel.
“This last risk may be minimised (as in the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_)
by constructing armoured ‘traverses’ within the citadel; but it
cannot be wholly overcome, so long as both turrets stand in one
armoured enclosure.
“It may be thought that the risk of damage to a 3-inch steel deck
situated 11 ft. above water is remote; but I think the facts are as
stated, when actions at sea are taken into account.
“For example, if a ship of 70 to 75 ft. beam is rolling only to 10
degrees from the vertical, which is by no means a heavy roll, she
presents a target having a vertical (projected) height of 13 to 14
ft. to an enemy’s fire, and even if she is a steady, slow-moving
ship, she will do this four or five times in each minute.
“Now, at this angle of inclination, assuming the flight of
projectiles to be practically horizontal, even the thickest
protective steel decks yet fitted in battleships are liable to
serious damage from the fire of guns of moderate calibre, and this
danger is increased by the employment of high explosives. Of
course, I do not mean to say that this damage is to follow from
fire intentionally aimed at the protective deck; but with a great
and sustained volume of fire, such as is possible with a powerful
auxiliary armament, and especially with quick-firing guns, it is
obvious that there is a very real danger of chance shots injuring
seriously the wide expanse of the protective deck at the top of a
long citadel.
“Again, it must be noted that the chances of damage to a deck
placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces
in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or
rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower,
and with 5-inch armour on the sides protecting the deck from the
direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the
naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am
greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number
of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above
water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft.
“These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the
separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour
above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top
of the belt in the new designs.
“It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should
be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater
thickness than 5-inch steel, and more strongly backed. This is
perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an
additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size
of the ship.”
The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief
objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin
armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very
conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views
were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date
with the _Majestic_ class (see a few pages further on), he effected
modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir
Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that
this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered
possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the
_Royal Sovereigns_.
In connection with the later career of the _Royal Sovereign_
class these items may be added. On completion they were found
to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and
extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12,
they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They
proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which
resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This
was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after
which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of
being steady gun platforms.
The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them
rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much
less than they did in the past. The defects of the _Sovereigns_, as
realised not very long after completion, were:--
(1) That the big guns’ crews were practically unprotected, and
easily to be annihilated by the newly-introduced high
explosive shells of the secondary armament of an enemy.
(2) Only four of the ten 6-inch were armour protected, which also
was considered a fatal drawback.
In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the
year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships
except the _Hood_,[14] which on survey was found unsuitable for such
reconstruction.
The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of
years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the
very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely.
In addition to the _Sovereigns_ two “second-class battleships” were
built, the _Centurion_ and _Barfleur_, of which details are:--
Displacement--10,500 tons. Complement, 620.
Length--(Waterline) 360ft.
Beam--70ft.
Draught--(Maximum) 27ft.
Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve
3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes
(18-inch)--two submerged and one above water in the stern.
The _Barfleur_ was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in
August, 1892, and completed two years later. The _Centurion_, laid down
at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed
before her sister.
The ships were armoured generally on the _Royal Sovereign_ plan,
with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead
of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt
(nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were
reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular
instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big
guns--probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns
of the _Sovereigns_. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the
base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has
been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every
other.
Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed
for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots,
which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal
endurance--they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for
a nominal 9750 mile radius--makes them something more than the
“second-class battleships” which they nominally were.
Compared to the _Sovereigns_ they were:--
=========================+====================+==================
_Minus Points_: | _Barfleurs._ | _Sovereigns._
| |
Displacement (tons) | 10,500 | 14,100
Principal guns | 4--10in., 10--4.7 | 4--13.5, 10--6in.
Armour belt | 12 inches. | 18 inches.
-------------------------+--------------------+------------------
_Plus Points_: | |
| |
Horse Power | 13,000 | 13,000
Speed | 18.5 | 17
Nominal endurance (kts.) | 9,750 | 7,900
=========================+====================+==================
From which the existence of an elementary conception of the
“battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the
battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a
reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for
increased speed” obtains.
The _Barfleur_ and _Centurion_ proved excellent steamers and good
sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was
decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their
4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the
upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the
foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference.
The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed
far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter
realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they
were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they
performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order.
For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples
of the _Blenheim_ were decided on. These vessels were the _Edgar_,
_Endymion_, _Grafton_, _Hawke_, _St. George_, _Gibraltar_, _Crescent_,
and _Royal Arthur_ (formerly designated as the _Centaur_). They were
launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed)
and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four
mentioned). Except the two last, all had the _Blenheim_ armament of two
9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a
raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2.
No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the _Blenheims_--19.5
knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the _Edgar_
class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably
good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever
encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were
still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the
battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch
of the _Blenheims_.
In the course of their service careers, the _St. George_ (or rather
her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The _Crescent_
was served in by King George V, and the _Hawke_ achieved notoriety by
ramming the _Olympic_ in the Solent in 1911.
The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of
these twenty belonged to the _Apollo_ class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed)
and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were _Apollo_, _Andromache_, _Latona_,
_Melampus_, _Naiad_, _Sappho_, _Scylla_, _Terpsichore_, _Thetis_,
_Tribune_ (unsheathed), and _Aeolus_, _Brilliant_, _Indefatigable_
(named _Melpomene_ in 1911), _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Pique_,
_Rainbow_, _Retribution_, _Sirius_, and _Spartan_ (sheathed).
In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and,
above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the
unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones.
When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years
service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however,
remained as fast as when they were built--the _Terpsichore_, in 1908,
averaging 20.1 knots, and the _Aeolus_, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots.
During their service, the _Melampus_ was commanded by King George as
Prince George, while the _Scylla_, under Captain Percy Scott, gave
birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In
1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service--the
_Latona_, _Thetis_, _Apollo_, _Andromache_, Iphigenia, _Intrepid_, and
_Thetis_--were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine
layers.
[Illustration: SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA. NOW
CONVERTED INTO A MINE-LAYER]
The remaining eight cruisers of the Act--_Astræa_, _Bonaventure_,
_Cambrian_, _Charybdis_, _Flora_, _Forte_, _Fox_, and _Hermione_--were
increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra
4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s
being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper
deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never
proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the
earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight
improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every
staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove
one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements
invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small
cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong.
Four _Astræas_ cost as much as five _Apollos_. They were rather more
seaworthy, but no faster--if as fast. The total broadsides obtained
were only _one_ 4.7 more and _two_ 6-inch _less_.[15] A considerably
greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply
(400 tons) was the same for both.
In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained.
It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907,
displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with
practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about
8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a
twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to
be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots.
Here, however, there was a definite aim--increased speed, with only
trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British
cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what
the original design _might have been_ if plotted a year or two later
than it actually was. There is no question--or very little--but that
Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better
than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war.
Minor cruisers _must_ be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them
_must_ have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very
little. The _Astræas_, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may
even be a real deficit from another point of view.
The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament
easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design
rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given
certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon
it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance
of everything.
The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class
cruisers--_Pallas_, _Pearl_, _Philomel_, and _Phœbe_--for the ordinary
service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally
named _Pandora_, _Pelorus_, _Persian_, _Phœnix_, and _Psyche_. These
were later altered to Australian names, _Katoomba_, _Mildura_,
_Wallaroo_, _Tauranga_, and _Ringarooma_. They were of 2,575 tons, with
2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch
tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots.
Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved _Rattlesnakes_, were laid down
under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme,
of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were _Alarm_,
_Antelope_, _Circe_, _Gleaner_, _Gossamer_, _Hebe_, _Renard_,
_Speedy_--all laid down in 1889, as also were the _Whiting_ (afterwards
_Boomerang_) and _Wizard_ (renamed _Karahatta_) for Australia. Those
laid down normally in the previous year were the _Salamander_,
_Seagull_, _Sheldrake_, _Skipjack_, _Spanker_, _Speedwell_, for the
British Navy. Two others, _Assaye_ and _Plassy_, were built for the
Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch
guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as
“catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with
locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date,
reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed
speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary
purposes--many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest
used as tenders for various services.
They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the
destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and
general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament--two 4-inch instead
of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten
knots faster--an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in
the course of twenty years!
More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White
should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what--except in the
matter of modern speed possibilities--is to-day the recognised ideal
for destroyers.
In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher”
stage--they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note
that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern
war conditions--the Chilian _Blanco Encalada_ and the Brazilian
_Aquidaban_--were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type
as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats.
So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the
“secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the
torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at
least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success,
perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought
of as an offensive arm against big ships--destruction of the torpedo
boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South
American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the
way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era.
Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was
Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small
cruiser” _Hela_; in 1898 the _Gazelle_ of 2,645 tons was set afloat.
For years Germany added to the _Gazelle_ class, at a time when all the
rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless.
Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had
seen the matter of the _Lynch_ and the _Sampaio_[16] better than any
other Power.
Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But
they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit
badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes.
Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities,
no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day
Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving
that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes
against a battleship at night.
[Illustration:
HOOD.
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
BARFLEUR.
RENOWN.
MAJESTIC.
LONDON.
KING EDWARD.
BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA.]
So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers
being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the
past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for
other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser
in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked.
In February, 1893, there was laid down the _Renown_, the only armoured
ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved _Centurion_, with thinner
belt armour. Harvey armour--three inches of which had the resisting
value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron--was adopted in
this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of
the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however,
at work, for in the _Renown_ sacrifices were made at the water-line in
order to secure better protection to the lower deck side.
Details of the _Renown_:--
Displacement--12,350 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--380ft.
Beam--72⅓ft.
Draught--(maximum) 27ft.
Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders,
four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern.
Armour--8--6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above.
Bulkheads 10--6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones
6in., upper deck ones, 4in.
Horse-power--12,000 = 18 knots.
Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles
at ten knots.
Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895,
and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼
years to build. Cost, £746,247.
She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a
four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical
speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after
thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease.