mincemeat by the advent of the quick-firer. Even to-day his ideas seem
somewhat obsolete. Yet a few years hence (if big ships survive) they
stand every chance of being reverted to, because to-day the big gun has
more or less come back to where it was in 1875–1885. Barnaby, though
he worked into its era, never realised the preponderance or possible
preponderance of the “secondary gun.” In his era it fired too slowly to
count for very much; in our own, range neutralises whatever it may have
accomplished in the rapidity of fire direction.
Likely enough, the reversion to Barnaby ideals, which is reasonably
probable for the immediate future, will be merely a phase; and casual
historians will ever put him down as the naval constructor who was
least able to anticipate the years ahead of his creations. But a
hundred years hence Barnaby may come into his own in a way little
suspected to-day. A hundred years hence, when all the most modern ideas
are ancient history, Barnaby may stand with Phineas Pett, and the Navy
which he created stand for something infinitely more than the scrap
heap to which a later age swiftly relegated it. Only the historian
of the distant future can estimate him at his real value. His own
generation never placed much faith in his ships; the generation that
followed generally regarded them with scorn. It was probably wrong, but
only the future can prove it to have been so.
_GUNS IN THE ERA._
The guns which especially belong to the Barnaby era were as follows:--
======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+================
| | | | | | Penetration
| Weight| Length | Weight | Muzzle | Muzzle | 2000 yds.
Cal. | in | in |projectile| velocity | energy +-------+--------
ins. | tons. | cals. | lbs. | f.s. | ft. | iron. | comp.
------+-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+--------
M.L. | | | | | | |
16 | 81 | 18 | 1684 | 1590 | 29,530 | 22 | 15
----- +-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+--------
B.L. | | | | | | |
16.25 | 110 | 30 | 1800 | 2148 | 57,580 | 29 | 19
13.5 | 67 | 30 | 1250 | 2025 | 35,560 | 26 | 17
12 | 45 | 25 | 714 | 2000 | 18,060 | 19 | 12½
9.2 | 22 | 25 | 380 | 1809 | 8622 | 15 | 10
8 | 14 | 30 | 210 | 2200 | 7060 | 14 | 9
6 | 5 | 26 | 100 | 1960 | 2665 | 8 | 5
======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+=======+========
In the early part of the period, guns of the Reed era, down to the
10-inch 18-ton M.L., were also made use of; but generally speaking,
the Barnaby designs coincide with early breechloading types. It is
interesting to note that the 81-ton gun figured in one ship only (the
_Inflexible_), and that after this the 38-ton 12.5 M.L. was reverted
to, to be replaced in later designs by the 45-ton 12-inch B.L.
The M.L. guns available for early Barnaby designs were considerably
superior to earlier examples of their type; as after the fiasco of
the _Glatton_ trials,[7] copper gas checks were introduced. These
were affixed to the base of the projectile and expanded on firing.
They led to a certain increased power and accuracy; but, even so,
only of a relative nature compared with the better results obtained
from breechloaders. The _Thunderer_ gun disaster, which after many
experiments was found to have been caused by doubly loading the gun,
added another argument to the anti-muzzle-loader cause.
The 12-inch, which was the first large B.L. to be introduced, compared
as follows with the 12-inch M.L.:--
==========+========+======+=======+==========+===========================
| | | | | Penetration of iron at
|Length |Weight|Muzzle |Weight of +---------------------------
Gun. |in cals.| tons.|energy |projectile|Muzzle.|1000 yds.|2000 yds.
| | | ft. | lbs. | in. | in. | in.
----------+--------+------+-------+----------+-------+---------+---------
12in. M.L.| 13½ | 35 | 9470 | 706 | 16 | 15 | 13
12in. B.L | 25 | 45 |18,060 | 1250 | 30½ | 28 | 26
==========+========+======+=======+==========+=======+=========+=========
The enormous difference in efficiency was of course traceable to other
causes than the adoption of the breechloader instead of the old M.L.;
but this was, equally naturally, overlooked; which, perhaps, was just
as well--otherwise the muzzle-loader might have persisted to quite
recent times. Though the _Thunderer_ disaster showed that a M.L. could
be loaded twice over by accident, this was an obviously unlikely thing
to occur again. The impression was made by the fact that the 12-inch
B.L. was far more powerful than the old 16-inch M.L. It was possibly
this which directly led to the “monster-gun craze” of the Barnaby
era, the way to which had already been shewn by the 16-inch M.L.
Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present monster gun era
is the third in which, after a period of adhesion to a 12-inch gun,
greatly increased calibres have suddenly and more or less generally
been resorted to.
_THE COMING OF THE TORPEDO._
Reference has been made in the past chapter to Sir E. J. Reed’s
recognition of the possibilities of the torpedo; and floating mines
were, of course, well known. It was not, however, till 1874 that either
mine or torpedo came to be regarded at all seriously.
The earliest Whitehead “fish torpedo” was produced in 1868; though it
was then little more than a curiosity. It was a crude weapon, although
it embodied, with two notable exceptions, most of the features that it
possesses to-day. Its motive power was compressed air; it carried an
explosive head with a sensitive pistol.
The secret was bought by the British Government at an early stage.
It was made strictly confidential; indeed, to the present day, the
internal mechanism of a torpedo is more or less sacred. Most other
nations purchased the secret also, and guarded it with like care!
It is but fair to add that this ridiculous situation was brought about
by the inventor, who particularly specified that the balance chamber
must not be revealed even to admirals commanding fleets, but only to
specially selected officers.
A main difficulty with the torpedo was how to discharge it. For some
while only two methods existed: the first, a mechanism of catapult
type which hurled the torpedo into the water; the other, by a crude
application of dropping gear, suitable, of course, for launches only.
In either case, especially the former, there was a strong element of
uncertainty as to the direction the torpedo would take; for one to
describe a circle and return to the firer was not unknown.[8]
The charge was inconsiderable, and range and speed were both very small.
An instrument called the Harvey torpedo was more or less
contemporaneous with the Whitehead. It was a very primitive idea,
consisting as it did merely in attempting to tow explosives across
the course of an enemy. It was too obviously cumbersome to cause
disquietude, and with the invention of torpedo tubes passed into
oblivion.
The advantages of the torpedo tube were quickly recognised; and though
the range was still little over a hundred yards or so--at any rate, so
far as any probability of hitting was concerned--the torpedo quickly
became a part of the armament of all important ships. So much was this
the case that the submerged tube was developed with sufficient celerity
to be adopted into the equipment of the _Inflexible_, of 1874 design.
None the less, however, the possible results of torpedo attack remained
uninvestigated till 1874, and even then only came to be inquired into
after the _Oberon_ experiments, which were primarily if not entirely
brought about by the advent of the observation mine as a practical
thing.
The mine’s arrival counted for little; the automobile torpedo being
at the moment much in the public eye, the point that the _Oberon_
experiments were primarily designed to test the effect of mines got
somewhat lost sight of. The essential fact is that by 1874 the fact of
other enemies to the ship than the gun was established. For a long time
it affected ship design no further than the gradual introduction of an
anti-torpedo-boat armament; but this was mainly due to Sir E. J. Reed
having in the _Bellerophon_ design endeavoured to anticipate torpedo
effect. In 1874, and onward therefrom for some time, the double bottom,
combined with water-tight bulkheads, was considered a suitable “reply”
to the “new arm,” and it was not for many years that torpedo nets were
in any degree appreciated.
In the later eighties some torpedo experiments were conducted against
the old ironclad _Resistance_, in which the Bullivant net defence
system proved altogether superior to the cumbersome old wooden booms
which were in use: but, despite this, nothing was done for many a year,
and the old pattern was adhered to.
_ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._
===============+=============+===========
Financial Year.| Amount. | Personnel.
---------------|-------------|-----------
1869 | 9,996,641 | 63,000
1870 | 9,370,530 | 61,000
1871 | 9,789,956 | 61,000
1872 | 9,532,149 | 61,000
1873 | 9,899,725 | 60,000
1874 | 10,440,105 | 60,000
1875 | 10,825,194 | 60,000
1876 | 11,288,872 | 60,000
1877 | 10,971,829 | 60,000
1878 | 12,129,901 | 60,000
1879 | 10,586,894 | 58,800
1880 | 10,566,935 | 58,800
1881 | 10,945,919 | 58,100
1882 | 10,483,901 | 57,500
1883 | 10,899,500 | 57,250
1884 | 11,185,770 | 56,950
1885 | 12,694,900 | 58,334
===============+=============+===========
II.
THE WHITE ERA.
The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less
synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and
ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the
sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887
mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at
Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily
to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more
extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report
upon them, especially with regard to the following points:--
“The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade
in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly
fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of--
(a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports
to be blockaded with an inshore squadron.
(b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base,
with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded
ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet.
(c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships
and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet,
as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet.
“The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both
with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient
manner of utilising them.
“As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of
commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection.
“As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on
an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying
contribution.
“As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command
of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation.
“As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the
vessels employed, and their cause.”
As Supplementary Instructions there were:--
(1) As to the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the
defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels,
as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of
the respective squadrons.
(2) The general conclusion to be drawn from the recent
operations.”
A summary of the findings[9] is as follows:--
“That to maintain an effective blockade of a Fleet in a strongly
fortified port a proportion of at least five to three would be
essential and possibly an even larger proportion, unless a good
anchorage could be found near the blockaded port which could
be used as a base, in which case a proportion of four to three
might suffice, supposing the blockading squadron to be very amply
supplied with look-out ships and colliers.”
Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders,
though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the
torpedo-gunboats of the _Rattlesnake_ class were highly commended.
Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down
below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and
the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the _Warspite_ was
specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen
knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every
available deck hand would have been required above had the operations
been real war.
A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going
qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to
this particular report, and the following extracts are especially
interesting:--
_Admiral_ class.
“So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and
their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind
and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders
them unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service
with the Fleet, as their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is
necessary to force them against a head sea or swell.
“On the only occasion on which the _Collingwood_ experienced any
considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20 degrees
each way; this does not make it appear as if the _Admiral_ class
will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather.
“They are said to be ‘handy’ at 6 knots and over.
“In the _Benbow_ much difficulty was experienced in stowing the
bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels,
more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in
this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being
supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of
improved Martins.
“Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles
leak badly, and that the mess-deck is made uninhabitable whenever
the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this
defect might be remedied.”
This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented
as follows:--
“I cannot concur in this opinion, my view being that the objects
of primary importance to be fulfilled in a first-class battleship
are: (1) That, on a given displacement, the combined powers of
offence and defence shall be as great as can be given; (2) that she
shall be handy and possess good speed in ordinary weather, combined
with sea-worthiness; (3) that she shall have large coal-carrying
capacity. I certainly do not consider that the _Admiral_ class,
which, on account of their comparatively low freeboard forward,
must have their speed reduced when steaming against a heavy
head sea or swell to a greater extent than is the case with the
long, high freeboard, older armour-clads, as the _Minotaur_,
_Northumberland_, _Black Prince_ are for this reason rendered
unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with a
Fleet. The power of being able to force a first-class battleship
at full speed against a head sea is not, in my opinion, a point
of the first importance, although in the case of a fast cruiser
it certainly is. Admiral Tryon draws an unfavourable comparison
between the speed of the new battleships and that of the long ships
of the old type, when steaming against a head sea. I admit at once
that vessels like the _Minotaur_ class would maintain their speed
and make better weather of it when being forced against a head
sea than would the _Admirals_; but this advantage, under these
exceptional conditions, cannot for a moment be compared with the
enormous increase in the power of offence and defence possessed by
the _Admirals_.”
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._
SIR WILLIAM WHITE.]
The _Conqueror_ and _Hero_ were reported to roll a great deal. Being
short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low
freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at
anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as
“half-boots.”
Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with
these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised,
as he had done with the _Admirals_, that however fast these short ships
might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway.
The _Mersey_ class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms
and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.[10] The captain
of the _Severn_, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should
be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with
this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly
opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of
the other cruisers.
The _Arethusa_ type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was
abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine
guns in the tops would be useless.”
The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these
should be reduced.
For the _Archer_ class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns
should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which,
however, was never carried into effect.
Particular interest attaches to the _Rattlesnake_[11] class of
torpedo-gunboats--these vessels being really prototypes of the
destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided
they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported
on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be
removed. This, however, was never done.
With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported
as deserving immediate consideration:--
(1) Generally strengthen the hull in this type of vessel.
(2) Raise the freeboard forward.
_or_ (3) “Turtle-back” the forecastle.
In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably
raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it
is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted,
and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high
forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the _River_ class.
The report concluded:--
“The proportion of untrained (2nd class) stokers which were drafted
to several of the ships appears to have been too large; in point of
physique they are reported as unequal to their work, and in many
instances the experience of these men in stokehold (or any other
work on board ship) was nil.
“As a means of affording opportunities for training newly-raised
stokers we recommend that at least one year should be served
by them as supernumerary in a sea-going ship before they are
considered fit to be draughted as part complement to any vessel;
we further are of opinion that a Committee should be appointed
to inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the complements
allowed in the steam department of each class of ship, the
proportion of 2nd class stokers which should be borne, and the
amount of training which they should be required to undergo before
they can usefully be borne as part complement in a fighting ship.”
An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the
year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the _Pall Mall Gazette_,[12]
finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This
provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting
of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine
second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats,
to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000.
The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big
turret ships, the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, and two armoured cruisers,
_Immortalité_ and _Aurora_ of the _Orlando_ class. In 1887 nothing
larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most
important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers,
_Blake_ and _Blenheim_. There was, therefore, ample material for panic.
Details of the _Blake_ class:--
Length (_p.p._)--375 ft.
Beam--65 ft.
Guns--Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr.
H.P.--20,000.
Designed speed--22.0 kts.
Coal--1500 tons.
Builder of Ship--_Blake_, Chatham; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks.
Builder of machinery--_Blake_, Maudsley; _Blenheim_, Thames
Ironworks.
Launched--_Blake_, 1889; _Blenheim_, 1890.
Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament
of the _Orlando_ class with greatly increased speed secured by the
development of deck armour in place of the belts of the _Orlando_
class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the
development of some predecessor, the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ may be
described as enlarged _Merseys_. They were, however, unique on account
of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement
as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a
leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made
its first appearance. It was employed in the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ for
four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields.
The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little
attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered
possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the
_Orlando_ class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper
deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer
had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of
armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system
of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ secured this much larger distribution,
rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the
five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the _Orlando_ class at
least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell.
Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured
glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used
before in the Italian monster ships _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, but it was
first introduced in the British Navy in the _Blakes_.[13]
The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her
expected twenty-two knots on trial.
Trial results:--
_Blake_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,525 = 19.4
knots.
_Blenheim_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,925 =
20.4 knots.
_Blake_: Four hours’ force draught, mean I.H.P.--19,579 = 21.5
knots.
_Blenheim_: Four hours’ forced draught, mean I.H.P.--21,411 = 21.8
knots.
The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and
two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir
William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the
_Blake_ and _Blenheim_, so far as the disposition of their armament was
concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine
in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place
of the low freeboard of the _Admiral_ class, seven of the _Royal
Sovereigns_ were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns
about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the _Hood_, was
modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an
improved _Trafalgar_, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet
above the water, in turrets instead of _en barbette_, with guns exposed
as in the rest of the class.
In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first
introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared.
The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the
bow in place of the ram. The _Polyphemus_ was the first ship in which
an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the
bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of
a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never
secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still
has, in Germany.
The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or
overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim
ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear.