Regarding God's relation to the sinful actions of men, Luther held that
God is not the cause of sin. True, His omnipotence impels also the
ungodly; but the resulting acts are evil because of man's evil nature.
He writes: "Since, therefore, God moves and works all in all, He
necessarily moves and acts also in Satan and in the wicked. But He acts
in them precisely according to what they are and what He finds them to
be (_agit in illis taliter, quales illi sunt, et quales invenit_). That
is to say, since they are turned away [from Him] and wicked, and [as
such] are impelled to action by divine omnipotence, they do only such
things as are averse [to God] and wicked, just as a horseman driving a
horse which has only three or two [sound] feet (_equum tripedem vel
bipedem_) will drive him in a manner corresponding to the condition of
the horse (_agit quidem taliter, qualis equus est_), _i.e._, the horse
goes at a sorry gait. But what can the horseman do? He drives such a
horse together with sound horses, so that it sadly limps along, while
the others take a good gait. He cannot do otherwise unless the horse is
cured. Here you see that when God works in the wicked and through the
wicked, the result indeed is evil (_mala quidem fieri_), but that
nevertheless God cannot act wickedly, although He works that which is
evil through the wicked; for He being good, cannot Himself act wickedly,
although He uses evil instruments, which cannot escape the impulse and
motion of His power. The fault, therefore, is in the instruments, which
God does not suffer to remain idle, so that evil occurs, God Himself
impelling them, but in no other manner than a carpenter who, using an ax
that is notched and toothed, would do poor work with it. Hence it is
that a wicked man cannot but err and sin continually, because, being
impelled by divine power, he is not allowed to remain idle, but wills,
desires, and acts according to what he is (_velit, cupiat, faciat
taliter, qualis ipse est_)." (E. 255; St. L. 1834.) "For although God
does not make sin, still He ceases not to form and to multiply a nature
which, the Spirit having been withdrawn is corrupted by sin, just as
when a carpenter makes statues of rotten wood. Thus men become what
their nature is, God creating and forming them of such nature." (E. 254;
St. L. 1833.)
Though God works all things in all things the wickedness of an action
flows from the sinful nature of the creature. Luther: "Whoever would
have any understanding of such matters, let him consider that God works
evil in us, _i.e._, through us, not by any fault of His, but through our
own fault. For since we are by nature evil, while God is good, and since
He impels us to action according to the nature of His omnipotence, He,
who Himself is good, cannot do otherwise than do evil with an evil
instrument, although, according to His wisdom, He causes this evil to
turn out unto His own glory and to our salvation." (E. 257; St. L.
1837.) "For this is what we assert and contend, that, when God works
without the grace of His Spirit [in His majesty, outside of Word and
Sacrament], He works all in all, even in the wicked; for He alone moves
all things, which He alone has created, and drives and impels all things
by virtue of His omnipotence, which they [the created things] cannot
escape or change, but necessarily follow and obey, according to the
power which God has given to each of them--such is the manner in which
all, even wicked, things cooperate with Him. Furthermore, when He acts
by the Spirit of Grace in those whom He has made righteous, _i.e._, in
His own kingdom, He in like manner impels and moves them; and, being new
creatures, they follow and cooperate with Him; or rather, as Paul says,
they are led by Him." (E. 317; St. L. 1908.) "For we say that, without
the grace of God, man still remains under the general omnipotence of
God, who does, moves, impels all things, so that they take their course
necessarily and without fail, but that what man, so impelled, does, is
nothing, _i.e._, avails nothing before God, and is accounted nothing but
sin." (E. 315; St. L. 1906.)
Though everything occurs as God has foreseen, this, according to Luther,
does not at all involve that man is coerced in his actions. Luther: "But
pray, are we disputing now concerning coercion and force? Have we not in
so many books testified that we speak of the necessity of immutability?
We know ... that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ. But we
affirm that, if God foreknew it, this volition would certainly and
without fail occur in this very Judas.... We are not discussing the
point whether Judas became a traitor unwillingly or willingly, but
whether at the time foreappointed by God it infallibly had to happen
that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ." (E. 270; St. L. 1853.)
Again: "What is it to me that free will is not coerced, but does what it
does willingly? It is enough for me to have you concede that it must
necessarily happen, that he [Judas] does what he does of his own
volition, and that he cannot conduct himself otherwise if God has so
foreknown it. If God foreknows that Judas will betray, or that he will
change his mind about it,--whichever of the two He shall have foreknown
will necessarily come to pass, else God would be mistaken in foreknowing
and foretelling,--which is impossible. Necessity of consequence effects
this: if God foreknows an event, it necessarily happens. In other words,
free will is nothing" [it is not a power independent of God or able to
nullify God's prescience]. (E. 272; St. L. 1855.)
To wish that God would abstain from impelling the wicked is, according
to Luther, tantamount to wishing that He cease to be God. Luther: "There
is still this question which some one may ask, 'Why does God not cease
to impel by His omnipotence, in consequence of which the will of the
wicked is moved to continue being wicked and even growing worse?' The
answer is: This is equivalent to desiring that God cease to be God for
the sake of the wicked, since one wishes His power and action to cease,
_i.e._, that He cease to be good, lest they become worse!" (E. 259; St.
L. 1839.)