Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of
Melanchthon: In the _Loci_ of 1535 the so-called human cause of
conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as
endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do
not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the
endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary,
since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the
Word of God, but strive to obey it.... We see that these causes are
united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not
idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical
writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and
God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us
beware lest we resist.... Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who
is willing." (_C. R._ 21, 376.)
In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share,
but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is
also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third
elaboration of his _Loci,_ 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good
action concur (_hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis_): the Word
of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not
resisting the Word of God (_humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans
Verbo Dei_). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of
his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does
not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit
assisting, endeavors to assent,--in such a struggle the will is not
inactive (_in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa_). The ancients have
said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows.
So also Basil says: '_Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta_, Only will,
and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for
us, let us see to it that we do not resist. _Deus antevertit nos, vocat,
movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,_' (21, 658.) And Phil.
1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the
day of Jesus Christ,' _i.e._, we are assisted by God (_adiuvamur a
Deo_), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God."
(916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not
resist. _Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare
oportet._" (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when
assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. _Fit autem voluntas
adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera._" (663.) Frank comments
pertinently that the _magis_ presupposes a certain degree of liberty of
the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)
The boldest synergistic statements are found in the _Loci_ of 1548. It
was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was
embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a
block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (_C.
R._ 7, 51. 260.) As to the _Loci_ of this year, Bindseil remarks in the
_Corpus Reformatorum:_ "This edition is famous on account of certain
paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these
additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the
faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon
was charged with synergism by the Flacians.... For this reason the
edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (_omnium pessima_).'"
At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify
himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (_facultas
applicandi se ad gratiam_) as found in one of these sections. When
Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not
defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition
[1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend
it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked:
"The _Loci Communes_ of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the
_locus de libero arbitrio_ must confess, even if he judges most mildly,
that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four
paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read:
'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is
rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)
From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in
David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free
will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the
promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does
something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken
away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word,
he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (_C. R._ 21, 659.) Again: "I
therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that
free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and
immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you
hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is
that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented
to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can
(_immo aliquo modo potes_), and when you sustain yourself with the voice
of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the
Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this
manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle
with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious
affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that
free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (_liberum
arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam_); _i.e._,
he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against
conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore
between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These
matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered.
For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory
wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference
why Saul is rejected and David is received; _i.e._, there must of
necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. _Cum promissio sit
universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in
nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David
recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his
duobus._ Properly understood, this is true, and the use [_usus_] in the
exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in
the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of
causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (_C. R._ 21,
659f.)
At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is
reported to have said that the passage in his _Loci_ of 1548 defining
free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the
regenerated will (_voluntas renata_), as, he said, appeared from the
context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact,
however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the
passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in
conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly
confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying
that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving
against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from
that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply
itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar
actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability
accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such
was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but
which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new
edition of his _Loci._ For all, including the last one to appear during
his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by
the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all
subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (_C. R._ 21, 570.)
The sections which were added to the _Loci_ after 1548 also breathe the
same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which
says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or
resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in
the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to
govern his motions, _i.e._, he can enjoin upon his external members such
actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he
cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart
without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when
the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. _Cum autem
trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare._" (21, 1078; 13,
162.)
Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his _Loci_ of
1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (_bonae
actionis_), Melanchthon, in his _Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni_ of 1550,
substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these
causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will
of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with
trepidation, assents. _Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus
Sanctus ... vox Evangelii ... et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat
voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur_." Again: "And
concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the
assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but
he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and
there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in
a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of
the will (_tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio_)." "God therefore
begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is
willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from
the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God
always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (_auxilium Dei semper
initio et deinceps concurrere_)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely
concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the
third. In his _Examen Ordinandorum_ of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced
the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these
causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son
send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the
Word of God (_et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo
Dei_). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both
preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the
promise of grace.... Let us therefore not resist but assent to the
promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come
to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his _Opinion on the
Weimar Book of Confutation,_ March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again,
if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred
that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the
consolation. _Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist
dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen
Geist, so er den Trost annimmt._" (9, 768.)
W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view,
natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is
preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains
with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the
Word.... This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good
will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses."
(_Flacius Illyricus_ 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the
cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its
object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of
Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the
Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the
great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the
generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it
difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid
ground, once more recovered in the _Formula of Concord._" (_Conf.
Principle,_ 601.)
R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A
synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last
analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining
salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become
reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in
conversion equally a cause with the others. _Sie [die Mitwirkung des
Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte
Ursache in der Bekehrung._" God makes conversion possible, but only the
decision of man's free will makes it actual,--such, according to
Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, _Dogg.,_ 4, 444.
446.)
Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are
converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by
Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved.
But let us look where we have landed. We are standing--in the Roman
camp!" After quoting a passage from the _Tridentinum,_ which speaks of
conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank
continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation
doctrine of salvation by grace alone; _viz._, that nothing in us, not
even our will moved and assisted by God, is the _causa meritoria_ of
salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to
the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as
the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the
Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded
regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme
struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same,
with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian
theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.)
The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they
are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon,--the father of all
the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.