In order to put an end to the controversy, Major offered a concession in
his "_Confession concerning the Article of Justification,_ that is,
concerning the doctrine that by faith alone, without any merit, for the
sake of Christ, a man has forgiveness of sins, and is just before God
and an heir of eternal salvation," 1558. Here he states that he had not
used the controverted formula for several years and, in order not to
give further cause for public contention, he promised "not to employ the
words, 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' any more, on account of
the false interpretations placed upon it." (Preger 1, 396.) In making
this concession, however, Major did not at all intend to retract his
teaching or to condemn his proposition as false. He promised to abstain
from its use, not because he was now convinced of his error and viewed
his propositions as false and incorrect as such, but merely because it
was ambiguous and liable to abuse, and because he wished to end the
conflict. (Frank 2, 166f. 223.)
Nor did Major later on ever admit that he had erred in the matter. In an
oration delivered 1567 he boasted of his intimate relation and doctrinal
agreement with Luther and Melanchthon, adding: "Neither did I ever
deviate, nor, God assisting me, shall I ever deviate, from the truth
once acknowledged. _Nec discessi umquam nec Deo iuvante discedam ab
agnita semel veritate._" He had never thought or taught, said he, that
good works are a cause of justification. And concerning the proposition,
"Good works are necessary to salvation," he had expressly declared that
he intended to abstain from its use "because it had offended some on
account of its ambiguity, _cum propter ambiguitatem offenderit
aliquos._" He continued: "The facts show that we [the professors of
Wittenberg University] are and have remained guardians of that doctrine
which Luther and Melanchthon ... delivered to us, in whose writings from
the time of the [Augsburg] Confession there is neither a dissonance nor
a discrepancy, either among themselves or from the foundation, nor
anything obscure or perplexing." (Frank 2, 224. 167.)
Also in his Testament (_Testamentum Doctoris Georgii Majoris_),
published 1570, Major emphatically denied that he had ever harbored or
taught any false views concerning justification, salvation, and good
works. Of his own accord he had also abandoned the phrases: "Good works
are necessary to salvation; it is impossible to be saved without good
works; no one has ever been saved without good works--_Bona opera sunt
necessaria ad salutem; impossibile est, sine bonis operibus salvum
fieri; nemo umquam sine bonis operibus salvatus est._" He had done this
in order to obviate the misapprehension as though he taught that good
works are a cause of salvation which contribute to merit and effect
salvation. According to this _Testament,_ he desired his doctrines and
writings to be judged. In future he would not dispute with anybody about
these phrases. (168.) Thus in his _Testament,_ too, Major withdrew his
statements not because they were simply false, but only because they
had been interpreted to mean that good works are the efficient cause of
justification and salvation. And while Major in later writings did
eliminate the appendix "_ad salutem,_ to salvation," or "_ad vitam
aeternam,_ to eternal life," he retained, and continued to teach,
essentially the same error in another garb, namely, that good works are
necessary in order to retain faith. Enumerating, in his _Explanation of
the Letter to the Galatians,_ of 1560, the purposes on account of which
good works ought to be rendered, he mentions as the "first, in order to
retain faith, the Holy Spirit, the grace bestowed, and a good
conscience." (218.)
Thus Major was willing to abandon as dangerous and ambiguous, and to
abstain from the use of the formula, "Good works are necessary to
salvation," but refused to reject it as false and to make a public
admission and confession of his error. This, however, was precisely what
his opponents demanded; for they were convinced that they could be
satisfied with nothing less. As a result the controversy continued till
Major's death, in 1574. The Jena professors, notably Flacius, have been
charged with prolonging the controversy from motives of personal
revenge. (Schaff, 276.) No doubt, the Wittenbergers had gone to the very
limit of rousing the animosity and resentment of Flacius (who himself,
indeed, was not blameless in the language used against his opponents).
Major had depicted Flacius as a most base and wicked man, as a cunning
and sly adventurer; as a tyrant, who, after having suppressed the
Wittenbergers, would, as a pope, lord it over all Germany; as an
Antinomian and a despiser of all good works, etc. (Preger 1, 397.) In
the address of October 18, 1567 already referred to, Major said: "There
was in this school [Wittenberg] a vagabond of uncertain origin,
fatherland, religion, and faith who called himself Flacius Illyricus....
He was the first one to spew out against this school, against its
principal Doctors, against the churches of these regions, against the
princes themselves, the poison which he had brewed and imbibed some time
ago, and, having gnawed and consumed with the bite of a serpent the womb
of his mother, to destroy the harmony of these churches, at first by
spreading his dreams, fables, and gossip but now also by calumnies and
manifest lies." (Frank 2, 217.) Melanchthon, too, had repeatedly written
in a similar vein. In an _Opinion_ of his, dated March 4, 1558, we read:
"Even if they [Flacius and his adherents] condemn and banish me, I am
well satisfied; for I do not desire to associate with them, because I
well know that the said Illyricus with his adherents does not seek the
honor of God, but publicly opposes the truth, and as yet has never
declared himself concerning the entire sum of Christian doctrine." (_C.
R._ 9, 463. 476. 311.) In an _Opinion_ of March 9, 1559, Melanchthon
even insinuated that Flacius denied the Trinity. (763.) Before this,
August, 1549, he had written to Fabricius: "The Slavic runagate (Slavus
drapetes) received many benefits from our Academy and from me. But we
have nursed a serpent in our bosom. He deserves to be branded on his
forehead as the Macedonian king did with a soldier: 'Ungrateful
stranger, xevnos acharistos.' Nor do I believe that the source of his
hatred is any other than that the place of Cruciger was not given to
him. But I omit these disagreeable narrations." (7, 449. 478 ff.) This
personal abuse, however, was not the reason why Flacius persisted in his
opposition despite the concessions made by Major and Menius,--
concessions with which even such moderate men as Martin Chemnitz were
not satisfied.
Flacius continued his opposition because he could not do otherwise
without sacrificing his own principles, compromising the truth, and
jeopardizing the doctrine of justification. He did not yield because he
was satisfied with nothing less than a complete victory of the divine
truth and an unqualified retraction of error. The truly objective manner
in which he dealt with this matter appears from his _Strictures on the
Testament of Dr. Major (Censura de Testamento D. Majoris)_. Here we
read, in substance: In his _Testament_ Major covers his error with the
same sophism which he employed in his former writings. For he says that
he ascribes the entire efficient cause, merit, and price of our
justification and salvation to Christ alone, and therefore excludes and
removes all our works and virtues. This he has set forth more fully and
more clearly in his previous writings, saying that the proposition,
"Good works are necessary to salvation," can be understood in a double
sense; _viz._, that they are necessary to salvation as a certain merit,
price, or efficient cause of justification or salvation (as the Papists
understand and teach it), or that they are necessary to salvation as a
certain debt or an indispensable cause (_causa sine qua non_), or a
cause without which it is impossible for the effect of salvation to
follow or for any one to obtain it. He now confesses this same opinion.
He does not expressly eliminate "the indispensable cause, or the
obligation without the fulfilment of which it is impossible for any one
to be preserved, as he asserted repeatedly before this, from which it
appears that he adheres to his old error. _Et non diserte tollit causam
sine qua non seu debitum, sine cuius persolutione sit impossibile
quemquam servari, quod toties antea asseruit; facile patet, eum
pristinum illum suum errorem retinere._" (Schlb. 7, 266; Preger 1, 398.)
Flacius demanded an unqualified rejection of the statement, "Good works
are necessary to salvation"--a demand with which Major as well as
Melanchthon refused to comply. (_C. R._ 9, 474 f.)
The _Formula of Concord_, however, sanctioned the attitude of Flacius.
It flatly rejected the false and dubious formulas of Melanchthon, Major,
and Menius concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, and
fully restored Luther's doctrine. Luther's words concerning "good works"
are quoted as follows: "We concede indeed that instruction should be
given also concerning love and good works, yet in such a way that this
be done when and where it is necessary, namely, when otherwise and
outside of this matter of justification we have to do with works. But
here the chief matter dealt with is the question not whether we should
also do good works and exercise love, but by what means we can be
justified before God and saved. And here we answer with St. Paul: that
we are justified by faith in Christ alone, and not by the deeds of the
Law or by love. Not that we hereby entirely reject works and love, as
the adversaries falsely slander and accuse us, but that we do not allow
ourselves to be led away, as Satan desires, from the chief matter, with
which we have to do here, to another and foreign affair, which does not
at all belong to this matter. Therefore, whereas and as long as we are
occupied with this article of justification, we reject and condemn
works, since this article is so constituted that it can admit of no
disputation or treatment whatever regard ing works. Therefore in this
matter we cut short all Law and works of the Law." (925, 29.)
The _Formula of Concord_ rejects the Majoristic formula, not because it
is ambiguous, but because it is false. Concerning ambiguous phrases it
declares: "To avoid strife about words, _aequivocationes vocabulorum,
i.e._, words and expressions which are applied and used in various
meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained." (874, 51.) An
ambiguous phrase or statement need not be condemned, because it may be
made immune from error and misapprehension by a careful explanation. The
statement, "Good works are necessary to salvation," however, does not
admit of such treatment. It is inherently false and cannot be cured by
any amount of explanation or interpretation. Because of this inherent
falsity it must be rejected as such. Logically and grammatically the
phrase, "Good works are necessary to salvation," reverses the correct
theological order, by placing works before faith and sanctification
before justification. It turns things topsy-turvy. It makes the effect
the cause; the consequent, the antecedent, and vice versa.
Not personal animosity, but this fundamental falsity of the Majoristic
formula was, in the last analysis, the reason why the explanations and
concessions made by Major and Menius did not and could not satisfy their
opponents. They maintained, as explained above, that the words
"necessary to" always imply "something that precedes, moves, effects,
works," and that, accordingly, the obnoxious propositions of Major
"place good works before the remission of sins and before salvation."
(Preger 1, 377.) Even Planck admits that only force could make the
proposition, "Good works are necessary to salvation," say, "Good works
must follow faith and justification." "According to the usage of every
language," says he, "a phrase saying that one thing is necessary to
another designates a causal connection. Whoever dreamt of asserting that
heat is necessary to make it day, because it is a necessary effect of
the rays of the sun, by the spreading of which it becomes day." (4, 542.
485.) Without compromising the truth and jeopardizing the doctrine of
justification, therefore, the Lutherans were able to regard as
satisfactory only a clear and unequivocal rejection of Majorism as it is
found in the _Formula of Concord._