THE CONSTITUTION--THE CROWN AND THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT
A Constitution, if we are to accept the dogmatic assertions of those
who have written with a show of learning on the subject, ought to be
evolved rather than established by any parliamentary or despotic act.
The history of the world certainly tends to prove that paper
Constitutions have not been over-successful in the past. There
assuredly has been no lack of them in the last century or so, and
although some, if not all, of them have been practically tried, a very
few have attained any considerable measure of success. The English
Constitution has long been held up to the rest of the world by writers
on Constitutional history as a model of what a Constitution ought to
be, for the somewhat paradoxical reason that it is nowhere clearly, if
indeed at all, defined. It is largely the outcome of custom and usage,
and it is claimed for it that on the whole it has worked better than
any cut-and-dried paper Constitution would have done.
Nevertheless there does not appear to be any good and valid reason why
a Constitution should not be as clearly defined as an Act of
Parliament. Undefined Constitutions have worked well at certain
periods when there was a tacit general consent as to their meaning,
but they have not always been able to withstand the strain of fierce
controversy and the coming into existence of factors which were
undreamt of when these Constitutions were originally evolved, and
definitions or additions or amendments thereto have, accordingly,
become necessary.
The promulgation of a Constitution for Japan in February, 1889, was an
event of great interest to the civilised world. There were, of course,
at the time a large number of persons who prophesied that this
Constitution would go the way of many others that had preceded
it--that it would, in fact, be found unworkable and, being so found,
Constitutional Government in Japan would eventuate, as it had
elsewhere, in the resumption of autocratic rule as the only
alternative to anarchy. It is pleasing to be able to record that these
prophecies have, after nearly eighteen years' experience, not been
fulfilled, and that the Japanese Constitution, well thought out and
devised as it was, seems not only likely to endure but is admirably
adapted to all the circumstances and needs of the country.
In order to fully comprehend the events that gradually led up to the
establishment of Constitutional government in Japan, and the precise
place of the Crown and aristocracy in that government, it is, I think,
essential to make a rapid review of past events in that country.
In ancient times the Mikado was both the civil ruler and the military
leader of his people. Under him there were exercising authority
throughout the land about 150 feudal lords. Feudalism of one kind or
another prevailed in Japan until 1868. Towards the end of the
sixteenth century the feudal principle was apparently on the decline.
In the year 1600, however, Tokagawa Iyoyasu, with an army composed of
the clans of the east and north defeated the combined forces of those
of the west and south at the battle of Sakigahara and proclaimed
himself Shogun. The feudal lords of the various clans throughout the
country then became his vassals and paid homage to him. The Tokagawa
family practically governed the country till the Revolution of 1868,
when the present Emperor took the reins of government into his own
hands and finally abolished feudalism and with it the authority of the
Daimios. Many persons even now believe that the Shogun, or Tycoon as
he was usually called in Europe, was a usurper. As a matter of fact he
received investiture from the Mikado, and his authority was, nominally
at any rate, a derived one. At the same time there is no doubt that
the real power of the State was in his hands while the _de jure_ ruler
lived in the capital in complete seclusion surrounded by all the
appanages and ceremonial of royalty.
Up to the year 1868 Japan was divided into numerous provinces governed
by Daimios, or territorial lords, each of whom maintained large
standing armies. They were all subject to the Shogun, while retaining
the right to rule their particular provinces in ordinary matters. In
1868 the Shogun fell, and there can be little doubt his fall was to
some extent brought about by the concessions which had been made to
foreign Powers in regard to the opening of the country to foreign
trade. In 1868 the Shogun repaired to Kyoto, the first time for 250
years, and paid homage to the Mikado. Feudalism was then, as I have
said, abolished, the Emperor took the reins of authority into his own
hands, formed a central Government at Tokio and reigned supreme as an
absolute monarch.
"The sacred throne was established at the time when the heavens and
earth became separated." This has long been an axiom of Japanese
belief, but it has been somewhat modified of late years, even the
assertion of it by the Sovereign himself. A leading Japanese statesman
who has written an article on the subject of the Emperor and his place
in the Constitution has asserted that he is "Heaven descended, sacred
and divine." I do not think that the modern Japanese entertains this
transcendental opinion nor, indeed, do I find that the Emperor himself
has of late years put forward any such pretensions. For example, in
the Imperial proclamation on the Constitution of the Empire on
February 11, 1889, the Emperor declared that he had "by virtue of the
glories of our ancestors ascended the Throne of a lineal succession
unbroken for _ages eternal_." Whereas in the Imperial Rescript
declaring war against China on August 1, 1894, he contented himself
with asserting that he was "seated on a Throne occupied by the same
dynasty from _time immemorial_." The italics are mine, and the
difference in the pretensions which I desire to emphasise is certainly
remarkable.
When granting a Constitution the Emperor, as has been and probably
will be the custom of all monarchs so acting, declared that the
legislative power belonged to him but that he intended to exercise it
with the consent of the Imperial Diet. The convocation of the Diet
belongs exclusively to the Emperor. It has no power to meet without
his authority, and if it did so meet its acts and its actions would be
null and void. In this respect the Diet is on precisely the same basis
as the English Parliament. According to the Constitution the Emperor,
when the Diet is not sitting, can issue Imperial ordinances which
shall have the effect of law so long as they do not contravene any
existing law. The article authorising these ordinances defines that
they shall only be promulgated in consequence of an urgent necessity
to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, and all such
ordinances must be laid before the Diet at its next sitting, and in
the event of the same not being approved they become null and void.
To my mind, one of the most interesting portions of the Constitution
is that which lays down succinctly and tersely the rights and duties
of Japanese subjects. In this section there are contained within about
fifty lines the declaration of innumerable rights for which mankind in
various parts of the world during many hundreds of years fought and
bled and endured much suffering. Just let me mention a few of them. No
Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished unless
according to law. Except as provided by law the house of no Japanese
subject shall be entered or searched without his consent. Except in
the cases provided by law, the secrecy of the letters of every
Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. The right of property of
every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. Japanese subjects shall
enjoy freedom of religious belief. Japanese subjects shall enjoy
liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and
associations. Japanese subjects may present petitions. We have in
these few brief provisoes the sum total of everything that, in effect,
constitutes the liberty of the subject.
The Diet of Japan, like the Parliament of Great Britain, consists of
two Houses--a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The House
of Peers is composed of (1) the members of the Imperial family, (2)
Princes and Marquises, (3) Counts, Viscounts and Barons who are
elected thereto by the members of their respective orders, (4) persons
who have been specially nominated by the Emperor on account of
meritorious service or by reason of their erudition, (5) persons who
have been elected, one member for each city and prefecture of the
Empire, by and from among the taxpayers of the highest amount of
direct national taxes on land, industry, or trade, and who had
subsequently received the approval of the Emperor. It will be seen
that the members of the Imperial family, the Princes and Marquises,
have an inalienable right to sit in the House of Peers, the latter
rank on attaining the age of 25 years. In regard to Counts, Viscounts,
and Barons there is no such right. Those ranks, like the Peers of
Scotland and Ireland, meet together and select one-fifth of their
number to represent them in the House of Peers for a term of seven
years. Any subject over thirty years of age nominated by the Emperor
for meritorious service or erudition remains a life member. Those
returned by the cities and prefectures remain members for a period of
seven years. It is provided by the Constitution that the number of
members of the House of Peers who are not nobles shall not exceed the
number of the members bearing a title of nobility.
The question of the necessity for the existence of a second chamber
and the composition thereof has been keenly debated in this and other
countries of recent years. It seems to me that in this matter Japan
has hit upon the happy mean. She has combined in her House of Peers
the aristocratic or hereditary element in a modified degree with the
principle of life membership by which she secures the services and
counsel of the great intellects of the land, and such as have done the
State good service in any capacity. At the same time she has not
excluded the representative element from her second chamber--a fact
which must largely obviate any possibility of the House of Peers
becoming a purely class body. A second chamber so constituted must
obviously serve an extremely useful purpose in preserving an
equilibrium between political parties, in preventing the rushing
through and passing into law of hastily considered measures. For the
composition of her second chamber, Japan has taken all human means
possible to obtain whatever is representative of the stability, the
intellect, the enterprise and the patriotism of the country.
The composition of the House of Representatives, which answers to our
House of Commons, is as interesting as that of the Upper Chamber. When
the Constitution was first promulgated the principle of small
electoral districts obtained, one member being elected for each
district. This system was found or believed to be faulty, and hence,
after some years' experience, large electoral districts combined with
a single vote have been instituted. It may be interesting to relate
that both systems, the large and the small districts, were drafted by
an Englishman, Mr. Thomas Hair. Cities whose population exceeds 30,000
are formed into separate electoral districts while a city with less
than 30,000 inhabitants is, with its suburbs, constituted a district.
The number of members allowed to each district depends on the
population. For a population of 130,000 or under one member is
allowed, and for every additional 65,000 persons above the former
number an additional member is allotted. The number of members in the
House of Representatives is 381, or little over half that of which our
House of Commons consists. The population of the two countries is
almost identical, and experience serves to show that the number of
Members of Parliament in Japan is sufficiently numerous for all
practical purposes and that any material addition thereto would be
more likely to impede than to accelerate the wheels of legislative
progress. Neither the Japanese Constitution nor the Electoral Law
makes any provision for the representation of minorities, that aim of
so many well-meaning persons in different countries. In Japan the
majority rules as everywhere, and minorities must submit.
Manhood suffrage is not yet a _fait accompli_ in Japan. Under the
present law to qualify a Japanese subject to exercise the franchise he
must pay 15 yen (about 30s.) or more, indirect taxation. Only a
Japanese subject can vote at elections. No foreigner has any electoral
rights, but if he becomes a naturalised Japanese subject he obtains
all the privileges appertaining to that position.
Each House of Parliament in Japan possesses a president and
vice-president, who are elected by the members. The president of each
House receives an annual allowance of 4,000 yen (about L400) and the
vice-president 2,000 yen (about L200). The payment of Members of
Parliament is in vogue in Japan. The elected and nominated, but not
the hereditary, members of the House of Peers, and each member of the
House of Representatives, receives an annual allowance of 800 yen
(about L80). They are also paid travelling expenses in accordance with
the regulations on the subject. It may be interesting to state that
there is a clause in the Constitution which enacts that the president,
vice-president, and members of the two Houses who are entitled to
annual allowances shall not be permitted to decline the same! It says
much for the estimate of patriotism entertained in Japan when the
Constitution was promulgated that such a clause as this should have
been considered necessary.
Debate in both the Japanese Houses of Parliament is free and the
proceedings public. There will be no occasion for the uprising of a
Wilkes in Japan to obtain permission to publish Parliamentary Debates.
The Constitution, however, contains a proviso for the sitting of
either House with closed doors upon the wish of the president or of
not less than ten members, the same being agreed to by the House, or
upon the demand of the Government with or without the consent of the
House. When in the former event a motion for a secret sitting is made,
strangers have to withdraw from the House and the motion is voted on
without debate. The proceedings of a secret meeting of either Chamber
are not allowed to be published.
The Japanese Constitution, which is certainly a document containing
not only provisions of an epoch-making nature but most elaborate
details in regard to even minor matters, includes in seven or eight
lines one or two excellent rules in regard to what is termed "The
Passing of the Budget." Under these rules, when the Budget is
introduced into the House of Representatives the Committee thereon
must finish the examination of it within fifteen days and report
thereon to the House, while no motion for any amendment in the Budget
can be made the subject of debate unless it is supported by at least
thirty members.
The Constitution of Japan, as I have remarked, contains a vast amount
of detail. The framers of that Constitution seem to have been endowed
with an abnormal amount of prevision. In fact they foresaw the
possibility of occurrences and made provision for those occurrences
that nations which are, or which consider themselves to be, more
highly civilised have not yet taken any adequate steps to deal with.
For example, Article 92 of the Constitution enacts that in neither
House of Parliament shall the use of coarse language or personalities
be allowed, while Article 93 declares that when any member has been
vilified or insulted either in the House or in a meeting of a
Committee he shall appeal to the House and demand that proper measures
shall be taken. There shall, it is decreed, be no retaliation among
members. The Constitution also contains several salutary regulations
in reference to the disciplinary punishment of members.
The establishment of a Parliament in Japan has produced parties and a
party system. I suppose that was inevitable. In every country there
is, and as human nature is constituted there always will be, two
parties representative of two phases of the human mind: the party in a
hurry to effect progress because it deems progress desirable, and the
party that desires to cling as long as possible to the ancient ways
because it knows them and has had experience of them and looks askance
at experiments--experiments for which that somewhat hackneyed phrase a
"leap in the dark" has long done service. I have no intention, as I
said in the Preface, of dealing at all with Japanese politics. There
is no doubt a good deal of heat, and the resultant friction, evoked in
connection with politics in Japan as elsewhere. Perhaps this young
nation--that is, young from a parliamentary point of view--takes
politics too seriously. Time will remedy that defect, if it be a
defect. At the same time, I may express the opinion that, however
severe party strife may be in Japan, and though the knocks given and
received in the course thereof are hard and some of the language not
only vigorous but violent, the members of all parties have at heart
and as their objective point the advancement of Japan and the good of
the country generally.
The Japanese Constitution, though not a very lengthy, is such an
all-embracing document that in a hurried survey of it, it is possible
to overlook many important features. It provides for the establishment
of a Privy Council to deliberate upon important matters of State, but
only when consulted by the Emperor. It enforces the responsibility of
the Ministers of State for all advice given to the Emperor and decrees
that all laws, Imperial ordinances and Imperial rescripts of any kind
relating to affairs of State, must be countersigned by a Minister of
State. The Constitution also defines the position, authority, and
independence of the judges. That Constitution contains a proviso
all-important in reference to the upright administration of the law, a
proviso which it took years of agitation to obtain in this country,
that no judge shall be deprived of his position unless by way of
criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment. All trials and judgments
of the court of law are to be conducted publicly. Provision is made,
when there exists any fear of a trial in open court being prejudicial
to peace and order or to the maintenance of public morality, for the
same to be held in camera. I may add, before I take leave of the
Constitution, with a view of showing how all-embracing as I have said
are the various matters dealt with therein, that it defines and
declares that the style of address for the Emperor and Empress shall
be His, Her, or Your Majesty, while that for the Imperial Princes and
Princesses shall be His, Her, Their, or Your Highness or Highnesses.
In regard to no matter connected with Japan have I found so large an
amount of misconception prevalent as in reference to the position of
the Emperor of that country. The divine descent which is still
sometimes claimed for the sovereigns of Japan and which has never, so
far as I know, been officially repudiated, has caused some persons to
regard the Emperor from a somewhat ludicrous standpoint. In this very
prosaic and materialistic age, when very few persons have profound
beliefs on any subject, the spectacle of one of the sovereigns of the
earth still claiming a divine origin is one that appeals to the
ludicrous susceptibilities of that vague entity "the man in the
street." It is not well, however, that people should criticise
statements in royal proclamations or in royal assertions too
seriously. Even in this country there are documents issued from time
to time bearing the royal sign manual which every one regards as
interesting but meaningless formalities--interesting because they are
a survival of mediaeval documents which meant something some hundreds
of years ago and still remain though their meanings have long since
lapsed. And yet there are persons in this country who peruse such
documents and know that they are simply words signifying practically
nothing, who severely criticise the assertion of a long-used title by
the Japanese Emperor upon issuing a royal proclamation. I am not aware
whether his Imperial Majesty or his Ministers of State implicitly
accept his divine descent, but this I do know--that those persons who
regard the present Emperor of Japan as a State puppet, arrogating more
or less divine attributes, are labouring under a profound delusion.
There is no abler man in Japan at the present moment. There is no
abler man among the sovereigns of the world. In fact, I should be
inclined to place the Emperor of Japan at the head of the world's
great statesmen. He is no monarch content to reign but not to govern,
concerned simply about ceremonial and the fripperies and gew-gaws of
royalty. He is a constitutional sovereign certainly. He has always
shown the deepest respect for the Constitution ever since its
promulgation, and never in the slightest degree attempted to infringe
or override any portion of it. At the same time he is an effective
force in the Government of Japan. There is nothing too great or too
little in the Empire or in the relations of the Empire with foreign
Powers for his ken. He, in a word, has the whole reins of government
in his hands, and he exercises over every department and detail of it
a minute and rigid supervision which is, in my opinion, largely
responsible for the efficiency of the internal administration of the
country as also for the place that Japan holds among the Great Powers
of the world.
I cannot leave a consideration of this subject without referring to
the assistance rendered to the Emperor by, as also to the debt Japan
owes to, some six or seven great men in that country whose names I
shall not inscribe here because to do so would be to some extent
invidious, several of whom do not, as a matter of fact, hold any
formal position in the Government of the country. The wisdom of these
men has been a great boon for such a country as Japan, and if she is
not now as sensible of it as she ought to be future ages will, I feel
sure, recognise the debt that Japan owes to them. Some persons with an
intimate knowledge of Japan have told me that it is not, after all, a
constitutional State but in effect, though not in name, an oligarchy.
This word has in the past often had unpleasant associations, and one
does not like to apply it in reference to the Government of a
progressive and enlightened country. Still the word strictly means
government by a small body of men, and if in those men is included
the larger part of the wisdom of the country, and they exercise their
power solely and exclusively for the benefit of the country, I am not
certain that such a form of government is not the best that could be
devised. Of course, humanity being as it is, an oligarchy, has its
dangers and its temptations. I will say, however, of the wise men of
Japan, the men to whom I have been referring and who whether in office
or out of office have exercised, and must continue to exercise, a
marked and predominant influence on the government of the country,
that their patriotism has never been called in question, and no one
has at any time suggested that they were influenced by self-seeking or
other unworthy motives, or had any aspirations save the material and
moral advancement of Japan and her elevation to a prominent position
among the Great Powers of the world.